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(i)
SUMMARY
The thesis starts with a discussion of the methodological issues 
involved in researching perceptions of power, a description of the 
pilot project and its findings, sind a discussion of the rationale 
for the qualitative methodology based on a decision-making process, 
which was chosen for the main field study. A review of the existing 
literature of power is then provided, in which the main themes and 
conflicts of view across a broad range of theoretical perspectives 
are identified. A descriptive analysis of the field research 
follows, from which inferences are drawn and links made to existing 
theory. The pervasive ambiguity of organisational phenomena as 
revealed by this analysis is then further analysed. A classification 
of different types of organisational ambiguity, the ways in which 
it can arise in the organisation and the responses people can meike 
to it are suggested, its political significance being a major 
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Chapter 1 of this thesis discusses the methodology used in carrying 
out this research, the reasons for the choice of method and a 
number of issues raised by its use. Chapter 2 provides a review 
of the literature of power, carried out in preparation for the 
field research, and identifies a number of themes and conflicts 
of view. The descriptive analysis of the field research is 
provided in Chapter 3» and links are made in this chapter to the 
theory in Chapter 2. A major theme to emerge from the anlaysis 
is also identified in Chapter 3 and forms the basis for the 
development of theory about political behaviour which is discussed 
in Chapter 4. The conclusion to the thesis identifies a number of 
ideas of particular interest which emerged from the research and 





The idea for doing this research developed from my observations of 
the power structure and political behaviour in an industrial 
organisation, which raised questions about how participants perceive 
organisational power, if indeed they perceive it at all. The 
objectives of this research project were therefore to investigate 
and throw some light on the political perceptions of organisation 
members and the consequences of these perceptions for people's 
behaviour in the organisation.
2. Preparation for the field study
(a) Clarifying the concept of power. Researching people's perceptions 
of power raises the question of operationalising the concept "power" - 
what was I going to take to be a political perception? What a social 
scientist might call, "organisational politics" might not necessarily 
be recognised as such by organisation members. On the other hand, I 
did not want to narrow the study down to a linguistic question of what 
people mean by the word "power", since this might produce philosophical 
reflections on the concept which bore little relationship to people's 
perceptions and actions in organisational situations. I therefore 
decided to collect data both about people's perceptions of phenomena 
which could be classified as "political", even if they themselves would 
not use the word, and also about the sorts of phenomena to which people 
in the organisation would apply the word "political".
In order to clarify the concept of power in my own mind, before 
starting the fieldwork I carried out a review of the literature on
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organisational politics (see Chapter 2).
Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) in discussing whether or not one should 
use existing concepts when approaching field work, or, as some have 
argued, avoid reading the literature in order to avoid researching 
with pre-conceived ideas about what one will find, point out that 
there is a middle ground (as advocated by Glaser and Strauss (19&7)) 
in which existing concepts can have a sensitising function but are 
not regarded as sacrosanct - they can be abandoned if the research 
suggests they should be. My use of theories of power as a prep­
aration for field work has been in this sensitising vein. I agree 
with McClintock et al (1979) that it is impossible to start fieldwork 
without any theory at all, and it follows from this that a decision 
must be made as to whether the theories you do have at the start 
(perhaps not even explicitly) are to suffice. I decided that the 
more ideas I had about what might constitute "political" behaviour 
and the problems and nuances involved in the concept of power, the 
better able I would be to recognise political processes in the field, 
and therefore make the most of a research opportunity which was limited 
by time and other constraints. An alternative strategy of just taking 
one theory of politics - strategic contingency theory for example - 
would not have been appropriate, since I was more interested in finding 
out about organisation members' political perceptions and actions than 
in whether an existing theory in the literature could be supported.
Other social science concepts, such as "norms", "values" and 
"structures" have been used where they have seemed helpful, both in 
identifying the main strands in existing theory and in analysing the 
field work data. Some phenomena have therefore been "taken for granted" 
in these respects.
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As further preparation for the study I attended some seminars and 
an ATM Workshop* on research methodology and read some of the 
literature relevant to qualitative research methods, such as Bogdan 
and Taylor (1975), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Blumer (1969),
Berger and Luckman (1966), Jehenson (1973), Kelly (1963), Wann (1964), 
Husserl (1965), Jung (1968). Some of these authors were dealing 
directly with research methods, while others were writing more generally 
about the problem of knowledge and about differing perceptions of the 
human being- Although a great deal of such reading, both in research 
methods and about organisational politics, was completed before the 
main field study began, it did not stop altogether at that point, but 
continued to the end of the project.
In discussion with my research supervisor it was agreed that the next 
step would be to start the field work by carrying out a pilot project, 
using as a focus a particular decision-making process and this will be 
discussed in the next section.
(b) The pilot project. The pilot project was undertaken with two 
objectives
1. To clarify the methodological issues involved in
researching perceptions of power and
2. to provide a sharper focus on the research area.
*Association of Teachers of Management. A Workshop lead by 
John Burgoyne of Lancaster University.
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In order to avoid using a narrow definition of the concept of 
power and thereby pre-empting informants' perceptions (by asking 
them questions about "authority" for example) it was necessary 
to find some focus of attention for data collection which did 
not consist of power concepts themselves, but would nevertheless 
elicit perceptions of a political nature. Decision-making 
processes were chosen for this purpose.
The pilot study was carried out in an academic setting and took 
as it's focal point a decision made by the institution about how 
to allocate space in a newly-acquired building between academic 
departments, several of which had serious accommodation problems. 
It soon became clear, however, that there were two main foci - 
the decision by the local authority to purchase the building in 
the first place being bound up with the decision about how to 
use it once acquired.
In this project I was trying to find out something about people's 
perceptions of power in situations in which they were themselves 
involved. By focussing on these particular decisions about 
accommodation I expected to be able to leam something of their 
perceptions of power through their explanations of the decision­
making process - for example, who influenced the decision, who 
made the decision, whether they themselves had influenced it and 
what means of influence had been used. I expected that people 
would differ in their perceptions of the decision-making process 
as being "political" and in their own ability to influence the 
decisions.
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Since organisation members might find it threatening to discuss 
these political issues, I thought it best to collect data in a way 
which would cause least alarm. An interviewing method seemed most 
useful for the purpose, since it would allow me, apart from obtaining 
data about the decision-making processes, to guage interviewee's 
reactions to the project and respond to einy misgivings they might 
reveal. After the pilot study, research methods were given further 
consideration eind therefore will be discussed again later in this 
chapter. Suffice it to say here that in the pilot project data were 
collected mainly by relatively unstructured interviews, nine people 
being interviewed for about one hour each. The sample included the 
head of the institution, senior administrative staff, heads of the 
academic departments concerned and some lecturers who were also 
directly involved. In these interviews, people were simply asked to 
say what had happened in the decision-making process as they saw it, 
this process having taken place over the previous two years. 
Occasionally power-related questions were asked, such as "how did 
you go about persuading X to do that?" Notes were not taken during 
the interviews (as an experiment) but were written up immediately 
afterwards. In addition to the interviews, minutes of relevant 
committees were consulted.
The main findings of the pilot project will be recounted here. They 
represent my interpretation at the time of the data which I had col­
lected about my informants' perceptions of political processes 
(whether or not they would themselves have labelled such processes 
as "political"). The main findings were:-
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1. There was no consensus about who was making the decisions. 
Informants either identified different individuals as being the 
decision-maker or said that they did not know who it was -
the process was vague. It was also clear from the minutes of 
relevant committees that the decisions were not being made in 
formal meetings within the institution.
2. These decisions represented one of those organisational 
"dramas" to which Pettigrew (1979) refers - major events which 
stand out from the background of routine. This particular 
drama had the effect of disrupting routine relationships and 
norms of behaviour, and made some people feel that their power 
was being undermined. This was largely because administrators 
routinely had more to do with the local authority officials than 
did the academics, the latter being disinclined to be involved in 
administrative matters if they could avoid it. However, when 
the academics felt compelled to take part in the drama (because 
they were afraid of what would happen to their departments if 
they did not) the routine relationships between administrators 
and local authority officials were upset by the unorthodox 
methods of influence used by some academics - for example 
threatening to organise demonstrations and direct approaches to 
local authority officials. Doubt was being cast on the admin­
istration’s ability to deal with the local authority effectively, 
which threatened a loss of influence for the administrators 
within the institution. Because of the intervention of the 
academics, even when the outcome of the drama was favourable to 
the institution, the administration could not claim credit for
it.
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3- Some people appeared to cast themselves in politically 
oriented roles in response to being involved in the drama, 
and some people were cast in roles by others. Two people, 
both heads of departments, appeared to cast themselves in 
roles which I identified as the Knight and the Pawn respectively. 
Their political perceptions and reported behaviour in relation 
to the decision-making processes were in sharp contrast. The 
Knight explained how he had continuously taken initiatives in 
trying to obtain a favourable outcome for his department: 
raising the matter at every possible opportunity in committees, 
looking for alternative space elsewhere in the city, calling 
meetings of his staff and manipulating these meetings to get the 
decisions he wanted, threatening to hold demonstrations to bring 
the matter to public attention, distributing leaflets and holding 
discussions with possible allies and with people he needed to 
influence. The Pawn on the other hand presented a picture of 
himself as at the mercy of the administrators and a picture of 
the institution as at the mercy of the local authority. As he 
had not been consulted, he had not taken any initiatives himself 
and he was critical of people in his own department who were more 
politically active. He was also critical of the administration 
for not standing up to the local authority. Using Emerson's (I962) 
classification one could say that the Pawn's response to the 
political activities of others was to withdraw from the process, 
while that of the Knight was to reduce his dependency by extending 
his power network, forming coalitions and consolidating his 
department into a group with himself as it's spokesman, thereby 
enhancing his own status.
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4. Some people appeared to be cast in roles which I identified 
as "the Ogre". Ogres were people seen as especially powerful
and dangerous, around whom one must tread warily. They were
dangerous, not only because they were powerful but also 
because they were either antagonistic to one's raison d'etre - 
for example, they might be perceived as hostile to the 
inclusion of a particular department within the institution - 
or because they were seen as capable of acting irrationally, 
or being devious. Thus a local authority official was seen as 
an "Ogre" by one of the administrators, who in his turn was seen 
as an "Ogre" by the Pawn.
5- The decision-making process was not seen as a political 
process by some people involved, but rather as a rational 
bureaucratic process. Therefore, their strategy was to go 
through the formal channels or rely on rational argument to 
achieve the right solution. If things did not go your way ^
it was because there were issues involved of which you could not
be aware or because people misunderstood.
6. The data illustrated the importance of information in the 
political process. There was, in particular, a fear that 
information would get into the wrong hands - for example, it 
was feared that academic staff might pass information about the 
institution's discussions to their connections in local government 
since some members of staff were active as local councillors. 
Information was therefore withheld in order to protect a 
negotiating position or a relationship with an important third 
party. However, in some cases this had an adverse effect, since
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people began to feel that the administration were not being 
sufficiently firm in their dealings with the local authority.
7. Behind the manipulation of information referred to above 
could be seen the impact of the structure of the social system 
comprising the institution and the local authority. It is 
relevant to consider the two together as one system, as the 
boundary between them was not clear-cut, not only because of 
the formal constitution of the institution but also because, 
although each was divided into sub-groups based on the division 
of labour, there were overlapping memberships based largely on 
allegiances and values. For example, the local authority was 
divided along the lines of party politics and (not co-terminously) 
educational ideology, but some of the Institution’s staff were 
active in local government and local party politics, had 
differing educational ideologies and, moreover, as local residents 
were constituents of elected representatives in the local 
authority. One effect of these complex groupings within and 
between the institution and the local authority was to provide
or deny access to information.
8. One finding had more to do with the politics of researching 
politics than with the decision-making processes themselves.
I was not able to gain much data about these processes from 
one interviewee (one of the rationalists referred to above) 
because of his reaction to my research methods. He expressed 
concern that I was not using a prepared set of questions - a 
questionnaire for example - and at one point in the interview 
said, "Look here, you're talking to someone who's ....  done
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a lot of research and I’m rather concerned about your research 
methods". In spite of agreeing with me that different people 
can have different perceptions of the same phenomena, he 
appeared to find great difficulty in accepting the idea that he 
had "perceptions" of the decision-making process rather than 
"facts" about it. His statement, "If you ask a rational person 
a question they will give you the facts they know" illustrates 
this difficulty. My impression was that this informant wanted 
to control the interview within the bounds of some view he held 
about what a research interview should be like, rather than 
being in reaction to a perceived threat in being interviewed, 
since he could very easily have refused the interview. This 
incident illustrates the constraints which can be placed on 
research by informants’ views of what is an acceptable data 
collection method. If the informant is powerful in the organis­
ation and objects to the method, this could (although it did 
not in this case) jeopardise the collection of further data.
The results of this pilot project showed that using a decision as a 
focal point was a valuable way of collecting data about political 
perceptions, since in telling their story about what they had done, 
or not done, and why, interviewees were also drawing the political 
picture as they saw it. They differed in the degree of complexity 
of the view they presented of the process of influencing decision­
making and in their views of the power structure and these differences 
seemed consistent with the kinds of actions they took, or with their 
non-action. Since to some extent they were telling stories about 
each other, it was possible to find some corroborative evidence for 
statements they made about their actions.
— 10. —
As far as the method of data collection was concerned, I came to 
the conclusion that one or two people would have told me less, or 
even refused to be interviewed, if a tape-recorder had been used 
but that taking notes during the interview would have been acceptable 
and would have helped me to keep track of the order in which people 
gave their information as well as of what they said, although I 
felt that even so it would be important to write up the interview 
immediately while it was still fresh in the mind.
This had been a small project, involving a few informants and dealing 
with a major decision which had already been made and was therefore 
history. In analysis of the data I was considerably guided by ideas 
in the literature of organisational politics. The main field research 
differed from the pilot project in these and other respects and the 
next section deals with my approach to the main study, including
methodological considerations, the methods I used, and the problems
encountered in carrying them out.
3. Decisions about methodology
(a) Review of research methods. Having completed the pilot project,
I considered whether it would be possible to collect more precise 
information about people’s political perceptions by using alternative 
methods. So far I had relied almost entirely on relatively un­
structured interviews, plus some documentary information, in 
collecting data. Some documentary information was collected 
"unobtrusively" in that the papers were available from the library 
and participants in the decision-making process were not aware that 
I was collecting data from this source. However, this was background 
information and the most important data came from the interviews.
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Some alternative methods of collecting data about people's 
perceptions of power would be the use of a questionnaire survey or 
structured interview, or a projective test such as the TAT Eind to 
obtain information about people's behaviour as well as their 
perceptions, one might devise a laboratory experiment such as that 
used by Mulder (1977), or carry out some form of participant 
observation. These will be briefly reviewed, showing why in the 
event I did not use them:-
Structured questionnais and interview methods. The advantage of such 
methods is that all informants are asked the same questions in the 
same sequence and if "closed" rather them open-ended questions are 
used, requiring yes or no answers or ticks in boxes, the answers can 
be easily processed numerically. Moreover, since questionnaires can 
be sent through the post, it enables you to collect data without 
having the difficulties of travelling to see your informants and 
dealing with potentially stressful interviews. The trouble with these 
structured methods, as Swartz and Jacobs (1979) have pointed out, is 
that you have to know in advance what questions to ask, and there is 
an assumption that nothing relevant has been left out of the list of 
questions. There is also the problem of the acceptability of such 
methods, particularly when respondents are sophisticated in their 
use of words and when, as with the Kelly Grid technique, the 
procedure is time-consuming and potentially tedious.
Studies by Peabody (1962), Kenen and Kenen (1978) and Maddison, Allen, 
Porter, Renwick and Mayes (I980) illustrate the adverse effects of 
studying people's perceptions through highly structured methods. In 
such studies, concepts such as "authority", "formal power" and
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"influence" have to be assumed to mean the same things to different 
people, even though, as can be seen from the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 and as Maddison et al themselves admit with an irony of 
which they seem unaware, they do not all mean the same things to 
different social scientists. It also has to be assumed in these 
studies that power is a particular type of phenomenon, for example 
it can occur "more often" or "less often" and that interviewees make 
similar distinctions between aspects of the social systems within 
which they hold concepts of power, for example, distinctions between 
"staff" and "line" roles, or between "educational policy" and 
"financial policy".
As is shown in Chapter 2, theories about power in the existing 
literature are very wide ranging and contain considerable areas of 
disagreement between theorists. One of the problems of adopting a 
highly structured approach to the study of people's perceptions of 
power is that, not only does it lead to the squashing of interviewees' 
feet into social scientists' shoes, but also to a highly selective 
use of the existing theory to avoid the diversity and complexity, 
which would undermine the structuring of the research.
One of the criticisms made of the A-B model of power reviewed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2, is that it ignores the context within which 
people try to influence each other and there is considerable emphasis 
in the literature on the importance of that context for the concept 
of power. For example, structures and cultures are shown to be 
politically derived and to have implications for political behaviour. 
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that people's perceptions 
of their context will have a bearing on their perceptions of power.
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but again, it cannot be assumed that terms such as "structure" 
or "culture" mean the same things to different members of an 
organisation, or indeed, mean anything at all to them. A further 
consideration was that participants in an organisation might have 
perceptions and adopt behaviour which others, including social 
scientists, would call "political", but which particular informants 
would not. Not perceiving power in the organisation on the part of 
some participants might be important in the political processes and 
the literature about power discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that lack 
of awareness or ignorance can be of political significance.
For these various reasons it seemed clear to me that in order to take 
the perceptions of my informants seriously I could not predetermine 
what kinds of ideas about power they would have, or what their 
perceptions would be of the context within which these ideas arose.
The use of highly structured methods was therefore rejected as being 
inappropriate to this study.
Projective Tests - the TAT. One of my informants in the pilot project 
suggested that I should use this method of collecting data about 
people’s perceptions of power and I duly gave it some thought.
However, I could not see any way of devising such a test which would 
link people’s perceptions to an organisational event or situation 
such as a particular decision-making process. Without such a link 
I could not be sure that informants’ responses had any bearing on 
their perceptions of organisational politics. For example, if they 
gave an a-political response, would I be entitled to assume that 
they were unaware of any political processes in their organisation? 
Again, there was the question of the possible reactions of people.
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as yet unknown to me, to being asked to complete such a test, 
and because the method seemed to offer few gains sind considerable 
disadvantages, it was rejected.
Laboratory experiments. Like the TAT method, this means of 
collecting data about people’s perceptions of organisational 
politics has the disadvantage of being remote from the organisational 
setting, in which people have past experience, ongoing concerns and 
future prospects. Although, as with the TAT, some things can be 
learned from the use of laboratory methods, they were not close 
enough to the things I was interested in. It must also be said that 
the chances of gathering a sufficient number of busy people to take 
part in such an experiment for no particular benefit to themselves 
must be remote. Perhaps people with special interests in social 
science experiments would have been interested but that would have 
limited the research sample to an unwarranted extent.
Participant observation. As Swchartz and Jacobs (1979) point out, 
there are a number of ways in which one can be a participant 
observer, depending on what role the researcher intends to play and 
what other people in the research setting think the researcher’s 
role is. Members of the research setting may or may not be aware 
that there is a researcher in their midst. The difference between 
participant observation and interviewing is that in the former case 
the researcher has the opportunity and can legitimately be present 
at organisational events and can observe interaction between organis­
ation members. This could provide invaluable data for the study of 
organisational politics, both in providing an opportunity to observe 
political behaviour and also to hear statements revealing political
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perceptions, not necessarily addressed to the interviewer. One 
could envisage that a researcher into the politics of decision­
making could, in a known researcher role, be present at all meetings 
at which the particular process under observation was to be dis­
cussed, and by being around in the social system might also be 
present at informal exchanges between individuals concerning the 
decision. Two problems are involved in this: one is gaining access
to decision-making meetings, particularly those from which little 
information is normally made available to organisation members; 
the other is in being in the right place at the right time to catch 
the informal exchanges - which might in fact be crucial to the 
political process. For example, in the present study one would need 
to be in the professor’s office at the precise time when one of his 
colleagues telephoned him about a forthcoming meeting of the VCAC, 
as a lobbying tactic (and even then you would only hear one half of 
the conversation!) How much you could find out by just being around 
in people’s offices would depend to some extent on how closely people 
worked together and how much their work kept them inside the 
organisation rather than outside it. The ’’known researcher’’ role 
in participant observation would, however, have the advantage that 
it would legitimise not only being present in the organisation 
(provided access was agreed) but also interviewing organisation 
members about their perceptions.
Taking up a role in the decision-making process itself could have 
the additional advantage that organisation members might be compelled 
to interact with you as part of the decision-making process, perhaps 
in trying to influence you over some issue, which would be additional 
direct data about their political behaviour. One would also then
-  16 -
have one's own reactions to the decision-making process as data.
Taking up a substantive role in this way would present the difficulty 
of becoming too involved in the process - of maintaining detachment 
rather than "going native" as Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) have put 
it. This latter problem applies also to the "unknown researcher" 
role, particularly if one adopted this role in one's own organisation. 
Taking up an "unknown researcher" role in someone else's organisation 
might possibly be done through a secondment - perhaps on some staff 
development pretext - but if one wanted to study a particular decision­
making process, the role would have to be carefully selected to 
give sufficient access to decision-making arenas, whether formal or 
informal, and it might be risky to attempt this without some collusion 
with existing organisation members, in that you might spend your 
secondment in the "wrong" place. There,would also, of course, be 
the problem of successfully combining the overt and covert roles, 
which as Schwartz and Jacobs note, could be stressful. Moreover, 
if organisation members sensed that the researcher was particularly 
interested in political issues, this could change their attitudes 
and behaviour towards the researcher in subtle ways. The researcher 
might, for example, be regarded as "devious" - which would be true, 
but not for the reason that they imagined. Participant observation 
as a means of collecting data about people's perceptions of power 
and their political behaviour has a great deal to recommend it.
However, as a part-time research student it does necessitate 
negotiating a block of time away from one's own organisation in order 
to have the freedom to participate in the research setting and at 
the same time negotiating access to an organisation in which 
participant observation of organisational politics would be most
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suitable. Negotiating both these requirements so that they coincide 
can be a risky business. Among the horror stories which circulate 
between researchers is the one about the man whose organisation 
had agreed to his release for six months and had arranged to take 
on someone to cover his work. He had also obtained access to an 
organisation, only to find that they backed out at the last minute. 
Half his research time was then wasted in trying to find an 
alternative location.
At the beginning of the field study, I was not optimistic of the 
chances of getting access to study the political processes in an 
organisation, if only because people might see such an investigation 
as a threat to their political position. Participant observation is 
more demanding of organisation members (in that they have less control 
over the data you obtain) than is interviewing and consequently one 
can expect access to be more difficult for it. I found in the 
present study that there was some opposition to my being allowed 
even to interview people about a relatively uncontentious decision­
making process. This opposition was at a high level in two of the 
major segments of the organisation's formal structure, which meant 
that they would also have opposed my obtaining access to do 
observations of the more important decision-making committees in 
which they would have been involved.
Since I was offered an opportunity to do the main study based on two 
decision-making processes about the allocation of resources, such 
decisions being likely to stimulate political behaviour, I decided to 
start with a low-key interviewing approach and then see what other
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opportunities the setting might offer for observation. In the event,
I was able to do a small amount of participant observation in that 
I was able to sit in as an observer on an Area Meeting at which 
the Research Fund allocation for the Area was being decided. Also 
I found that from a political point of view I became a participant 
in the organisation by virtue of my researcher role and the 
reactions of organisation members to this could be used as data.
(b) The field study methodology. The location of the main study 
was again an academic setting, and it was both an advantage and a 
disadvantage that my research supervisor was a member of the 
organisation. The advantage was that he was able to provide the 
access to the organisation to do the research, which could have 
been difficult to obtain elsewhere. The disadvantage was that some 
people there might see me as an agent rather than a researcher and 
that some information had to be kept confidential from him.
It was agreed that I should use two relatively minor decision-making 
processes as the foci of the study - the allocation of money from 
the university's Research Fund and from the Equipment Fund. Although, 
as in the pilot study, these were decisions about resource allocation 
and might therefore be expected to encourage political activity, 
they differed from the pilot study decision in that they were 
annually recurring events, not one-off decisions, so that losers 
could try again next year. This had not been the case in the pilot 
project decision, which for that reason had been a more heated 
political process. Another difference was that, in the main study 
I would be researching the decision-making processes as they were 
taking place, rather than in retrospect. They would therefore be live
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issues, but not, it was hoped, so contentious as to make people 
unwilling to talk to me about them.
Since I would be researching these decision-making processes while 
they were taking place, I needed to plan the research to fit into 
their time schedules. I therefore began with the Research Fund, 
as this process started first and most of the interviews were 
conducted on this topic. The Equipment Fund process provided a 
second opportunity to collect additional data and to make a compar­
ison of the politics of two decision-making processes which were 
conducted in different ways.
(i) The sajnple. Fifty-two people were interviewed during the 
course of the project and this represents approximately 10% of the 
total staff of the organisation, both administrative and academic.
Since the organisation is formally structured into three Areas - 
Arts, Science and Technology - for the purposes of these decisions, 
an attempt was made to spread the interviews across these areas in 
a relatively even distribution. I considered that by this means I 
might be able to see whether this structure was reflected in differences 
in people’s perceptions.
The break-down of interviews by Area was as follows:-
Arts = 2 0  (1 administrative staff)
Science = 17 (3 " " )
Technology = 13 (2 " " )
Two administrators were not attached to any Area. On the basis of 
full-time academic staff members (excluding research officers, 
demonstrators and research assistants), Science is the largest
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Area (l46), Arts is the second largest (119) and Technology the 
smallest (90). (Figures relate to the year 1979-80).
It can be seen from this that the interviews were slightly over­
weighted on the Arts side. This was due to there being some 
resistance in the Science Area to the project, particularly in the 
early stages and given the constraint of the time schedule of the 
decisions, as the project progressed I realised that it was neces­
sary to collect data from those who would supply it and not to worry 
too much about an even spread of interviews. Most of the data 
relating to the Equipment Fund came from the Science and Technology 
Areas, since the Arts Area is far less involved in this decision than 
those Areas.
In the early stages, individuals were selected for interviewing from 
among names supplied by my research supervisor as being people who 
would be likely to be prepared to talk to me, and who were likely to 
have applied to the Research Fund. These included some people in 
the Science Area. In the Arts Area, Heads of Schools supplied me with 
names of people who had applied to the Fund and in some cases also 
indicated who would be willing to be interviewed.
In the Technology Area some individuals were approached via the Area 
Chairman and other names were supplied by a Head of School. In the 
Science Area, I was told that at an Area meeting it was agreed that 
I should not be supplied with the names of those who had applied 
to the Fund, as this was regarded as confidential information, but 
that I could approach members of staff at random. This meant that I 
might approach people who had not applied for Research Funds in that
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year, or ever, but in the event, tracking down applicants was not as 
difficult as it might have been.
Where I had the option of selecting people to interview from a 
number of names, I tried to choose people in different subjects or 
a mixture of those who had been in the organisation for some time 
and those who were relatively new to it, in order to have a sample 
in which the individuals were likely to have different viewpoints.
My initial approaches to interviewees were mostly made by telephone, 
although in one or two cases I wrote letters or simply knocked on 
doors. Ultimately, eleven of the fourteen Heads of Schools agreed to 
be interviewed and allow access to staff in their schools. Of those 
who refused, one was too busy but did not object to my talking to 
other people in his school; one simply refused to speak to me about 
the project, and his secretary told me that he "doesn't like being 
interviewed". The third spent some time explaining why he did not 
wish to be interviewed or to agree to my interviewing his staff. His 
objections were on three counts: one was my being on the staff of
another academic institution; the second was a concern about the 
kinds of questions I might ask. I was told that an "eminent person" 
had on a previous occasion wanted to ask questions in his school to 
which he had objected - "I don't see why I should put myself in the 
position of having to answer such questions"; The third reason was 
that he could not see any use for the research. It would not do him 
or his department any good, and it might do some harm so why should 
they give any time to it?
Taken at their face value these reactions suggest some issues in the 
relationship between researcher and informant. One is the informant's
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view of what research should be like cind what constitutes a legitimate 
method and topic of esearch, an instance of which was also found in 
the pilot project. The informant’s perceptions may differ 
considerably from the researchers on this point. Phillips (1973) 
points out that interviewees, like interviewers, have their theories 
about the world in which they live, and one could add that this may 
well include, particularly in an academic setting, theories about 
research itself. There is also the issue of the personal cost to 
the interviewee of taking part in the project, and no matter what 
efforts the researcher may make to avoid causing stress to informants, 
there is no guarantee that they will not find being interviewed an 
unpleasant experience. Van Maanen (1979) notes that there is often 
a good deal of "symbolic violence" in fieldwork in that people are 
pressurised in various ways to give information to a researcher 
which they would rather not reveal. It can be added that resistance 
to being interviewed may be the result of having suffered such 
violence on a previous occasion, which has coloured the organisation 
member's view of all research methods which appear to be similar.
In the organisation studied, research was itself an issue, as was 
the status of different types of academic enquiry - some people, 
for example, considering that physical science subjects were of 
sounder academic standing than technological or social science 
subjects. These were strands among the political pressures in the 
organisation as revealed in the data, and people's reactions to 
requests for interviews therefore became additional datacbout 
perceptions and actions of a political nature.
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(ii) Data collection. Most of the data in the study were collected 
by interviews, each of which lasted about an hour and in most cases 
these were written up immediately afterwards from notes taken during 
the interview. The interviews were more structured in the main study 
than they had been in the pilot project, for a number of reasons:-
(a) I had a better idea of the sorts of issues related to the 
decision-making process which might be considered "political" and 
about which it would be useful to have data.
(b) Since I could not expect people to spare me a lot of their time, 
I needed to structure the interviews a little by focussing attention 
on the decision-making processes, in order to provide the opportunity 
for discussing political issues fairly quickly.
(c) I had to bear in mind informants' probable expectations of what 
an interview should be like - they would probably expect me to have 
specific questions to ask them about, particularly if they were 
unfamiliar with the less structured social science research.
(d) I needed an aide-memoire, especially as data collection pro­
gressed, to help me to keep track of the various issues that might 
be relevant to raise with informants.
In order to provide the necessary structure but to avoid the pitfalls 
of using questionnaires, I used a check-list of topics which might 
be covered during an interview. Direct questions were asked about 
these topics if they had not emerged during the earlier part of the 
disucssion. Topics which appeared on the check-list during the study 
are given at the end of this chapter. Although the list remained more
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or less the same throughout the data collection, with some additions 
and subtractions, my use of it differed somewhat from interview to 
interview. More emphasis was given at times to some topics than 
others, depending on factors such as the amount of time available 
for the interview, my perception of what information I could obtain 
from a particular interviewee (bearing in mind the resistance already 
mentioned) and the stage the data collection had reached, in that the 
data already collected suggested to me that some lines of enquiry were 
more worth following up than others. This meant that not all questions 
were answered by all interviewees and therefore their responses were 
not comparable on every issue, but it also meant that I could adapt 
the interviews as seemed necessary and on occasions get answers 
to questions I had not previously thought of asking. In this way 
my questions developed from the basic outline as I gained more 
information about the decision-making processes. In one or two cases 
I abandoned the list altogether because it seemed to me that I would 
gain more data by simply allowing the interviewee to talk. In other 
instances the interview was far more structured than usual, with the 
interviewee answering questions with little elaboration, in which 
case the check-list became a questionnaire. Where questions were 
put to interviewees, they were not necessarily put in the form or 
in the order in which they appear on the check-list.
Apart from interviews, a number of documents were also provided by 
various members of the organisation. These included published 
booklets, minutes of meetings, memos, lists and notices. Some 
relevant written information regarded as confidential was not made 
available to me.
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As previously mentioned, I also collected data at an Area meeting 
which I attended as an observer and at which applications to the 
Research Fund were discussed. I arrived at the meeting before 
everyone else and stayed until everyone had left, and made notes of 
what I saw and heard during that time. Further notes were written 
up immediately after the meeting.
Notes were also made of organisation members’ responses to requests 
for interviews or for access to members of staff or to documents. 
Copies of all letters written to or received from organisation 
members were also kept.
Looking back on the data collected, it is possible to identify a 
number of themes which indicate the kinds of information I paid 
attention to in collecting data. As will be seen in the categories 
by which the data was analysed (see next section on Data analysis),
I took note of statements about the political perceptions and actions 
of interviewees and particularly of examples of what participants had 
done, or intended to do, or considered could be done to further their 
own interests, either in relation to the decision-making processes 
which were the foci of the study, or any other issue which was part 
of the interviewee’s context. Their perceptions of the political 
position of other individuals or groups was also noticed. Within 
these broad areas of attention, however, there were other types of 
observation and these will be briefly reviewed here:-
(a) Direct statements about power. These were instances where the 
interviewee used the word "power" or related concepts, such as 
authority, control and influence. They included indications of
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attitudes towards the idea of power or of using political behaviour 
and indicated the conceptual models being used by interviewees,
(b) The terms in which questions were answered. These were seen as 
reflecting the interviewees interpretation of phenomena and their 
conceptual models, and included their interpretation of what my 
questions meant. For example, a question about handling disagreements 
might be interpreted as "being rude to people", as shown by these 
words being used in reply to the question. Connections between ideas 
were also noticed, for example when the ideas of "strong personality" 
and "being tough" were connected. Shifts in perspective between 
question and answer were sometimes found, as when a question about 
relationships between Areas was answered by information about relation­
ships between schools, or when a question about why a grant rather 
than a studentship had been applied for was answered by information 
about the problems the School had had over the Research Fund alloca­
tions last year. It could be suggested that such shifts indicate what 
interviewees want to talk about and therefore what is important to 
them.
The kinds of images or metaphors used by interviewees were also noted, 
as possible indicators of how interviewees perceived their world.
For example, "They turned him over up the road" as a way of saying 
that an application had been turned down by the Research Fund Committee 
Sometimes too, the use of certain kinds of words helped to create a 
particular image of the interviewee. For example, the repeated use 
of phrases like, "Well, when it comes down to it..." to reinforce an 
image of the practical man.
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In some instances my questions were suiswered by further questions 
and these indicated the interpretation of phenomena by the 
interviewee. For example, in answer to a question about the criteria 
used in assessing research fund applications, the reply was, "At 
which level?" suggesting a perceived structure in the organisation.
(c) A further category of observation were things which people told 
me twice, or went out of their way to tell me. On some occasions I 
felt I had come across a hobby-horse, something the interviewee felt 
strongly about and had said before on other occasions Eind was now 
repeating to me, sometimes more than once. Instances of people going 
out of their way to give me information included their taking the 
initiative to raise topics I had not asked questions about and even 
on one occasion prolonging the interview long beyond the time an 
informant had said he could spare, in order to talk about such a 
topic. I took this to mean that these issues were of importance
to the interviewee and were perhaps current preoccupations of theirs.
(d) There was also a category of things not said. This included 
questions to which I could not get an answer, or instances where, given 
the opportunity to express an opinion which had been raised elsewhere 
and seemed to be a recurring theme, the interviewee did not take it. 
Whether these instances meant that the questions were meaningless to 
the interviewees, or that they did not share the general opinion, or 
were simply refusing to be drawn, I did not always have enough evidence 
to guess.
One example included in the category of things not said, was the almost 
universal absence of reference to students who were the recipients of 
the Research Fund awards. Where they were mentioned, this was usually
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as political counters in the attempt to gain awards. For example, 
if they were likely to be "overseas" students, this might count 
against the School in the allocation. Generally, the Research Fund 
awards were spoken of as awards to the staff, not to the students 
who eventually received them. This seemed consistent with the 
research orientation in the culture, which tended to emphasise the 
interests of staff and their career concerns rather than the 
interests of students.
(e) Indications of interviewees’ feelings, either about the inter­
view itself, or about the topic they were discussing, were also noted. 
These indications were found in the words used, but also in tone of 
voice, sometimes in actions, such as rapping the table with an
index finger to emphasise indignation. My impression of the general 
state of mind of the interviewee was noted, especially when this 
might have an adverse influence on the interview - such as being 
nervous, or wary, or as I noted on one occasion "seems to have had 
a bad day".
One interviewee referred directly to such feelings during the interview 
"Talking about (the topic) is bad for my blood pressure". There were 
also indications sometimes that I was straying onto dangerous topics 
during interviews and these were noted.
(f) There were several occasions on which people seemed to be 
developing, or changing their opinion during the interview. This 
showed itself in their expressing disatisfaction with an explanation 
which they had given me, or changing their opinion, or where my 
question suggested an interpretation they had not previously thought
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about, as in the statement "Yes, I suppose it is competitive now 
that you mention it". One interesting example of a shift in (stated) 
opinion occurred when an interviewee explained that he had been 
advised that it would be "unwise to be honest" over a particular 
incident in which he was trying to influence events, but immediately 
corrected that statement by saying that he had been advised that the 
rules did not require him to give certain information in the case in 
question. This could have been an attempt to be more accurate in the 
second version, or perhaps recounting the incident had reminded him 
that it might be unwise to be honest in giving information to a 
researcher.
(g) The final category of things noticed during data collection 
includes my own feelings about the interviews and about the informa­
tion given. I noted occasions on which I felt that the interview had 
gone well or badly, ray general impression of the interviewee and 
occasions on which I felt that I had been given false information.
It is not clear to me what effect such factors have on data collection, 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that the interviewer's as well 
as the interviewee's perceptions of and reactions to the interview 
are of consequence to the collection of data.
It can be suggested from these observations that data collection is 
not a neutral activity of recording statements which can then be 
classified on a cognitive basis, although that is important, but 
also involves gathering indications of people's feelings and 
perceptions. These may be reflected in the interpretations inter­
viewees place on what is said to them by the interviewer, the imagery 
and style of language they use, what they choose to tell you and what
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they do not say (given the choice), and their non-verbal 
behaviour. There is also the question of whether on a different day 
or with a different interviewer, the data would have been the same. 
Would different information have been given or paid attention to?
In this study, which focussed on the perceptions of organisation 
members, I had a particular interest in collecting whatever data I 
could which would indicate how organisation members saw their world 
but it could be suggested that all interview-based data collection 
methods provide clues to the perceptions and feelings of both 
interviewer and interviewee, and that it is as well to take note of 
these clues, even if interpreting their meaning and impact on the 
research is difficult. It could matter who is interviewing who 
about what and when.
(iii) Data analysis. The methodology used in the analysis of the 
data has been qualitative rather than quantitative. One reason for 
this is that my interest has been more in differences than in 
similarities - for example, I am less interested in how many people 
think the Senate powerful than in the different ways in which it can 
be seen as powerful. Moreover, as the study by Maddison et al (1980) 
illustrates there are some adverse consequences to using a quantitative 
analysis of data about perceptions. Although the authors used open- 
ended questions along with their rating scales in collecting data, 
the reduction of the data to countable categories has meant that we 
are given very little information about what the respondents themselves 
actually said. The quantification of data has required such pre­
structuring of the research that it is not possible from their analysis 
to disentangle the perceptions of respondents from the perceptions of 
the researchers, or of their data coder, or of the authors they have
- 31 -
used. In order to retain the focus of attention as far as possible 
on the perceptions of respondents, and to capture the nuances of 
their differing views, the analysis of the data in this present 
research has therefore been descriptive in words rather than 
numbers. This also seems a more appropriate way of analysing data 
which for reasons which are explained in a previous section of this 
chapter, has been collected in a relatively unstructured way.
My approach to the analysis of the data was influenced by Glaser
and Strauss (1967) although it does not follow them in every respect.
Some themes - such as decision criteria - emerged fairly early in the
data collection and were followed up, but detailed coding and 
analysis of the data was not done until about two-thirds of the 
interviews (i.e. those for the first decision-making process, the 
allocation of the Research Fund) had been completed. This was because 
I wanted to keep an open mind about what the data were going to tell 
me, and since the check-list was already providing some pre­
structuring of the data collection, I did not want to further pre-empt 
the findings by too early coding and analysis.
The second decision-making process (the allocation of the Equipment 
Fund) provided an opportunity to follow up particular themes which 
the data analysis of the Research Fund process showed as needing 
further data. This meant that Glaser and Strauss's suggestion that 
the collection, coding and analysis of data should proceed 
simultaneously, or the recommendation of the "intertwining" of data 
collection and analysis reported by Miles (1979) were only followed 
to a minor extent, for the reasons given. Other ideas borrowed 
from Glaser and Strauss were the use of comparison groups, and the 
derivation of categories and sub-categories from the data as a step
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towards generating theory.
The data showed that the interviewees could be divided into two 
main groups: those who were asking for resources to use in their
own work (who I have called the Applicants) and those who decided 
how the funds were to be allocated (the Deciders). This division 
is slightly arbitrary in that two people who were classified as 
Applicants could be said in some ways to be playing Decider roles,. 
but otherwise it seemed broadly to reflect the overall political 
structure of the organisation.
Data from both groups were separated out into three broad categories:
(1) Statements which referred to an interviewee's political 
perceptions,
(2) Statements which referred to an interviewee's political actions 
and,
(3) Statements about, or of relevance to, the interview itself.
Category 1 (perceptions) was then further divided into several sub­
categories :- 
Perceptions about:
(a) what the decision-making process is,
(b) decision-making cirteria,
(c} role of committees,
(d) political acts, attitudes, constraints and opportunities of others,
(e) own (political) situation,
(f) organisation culture: research norms and general ambience,
(g) secrecy,
(h) feelings of other staff,
(j) the University in relation to it's environment.
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For the Decider group, Category 2 (actions) was further divided 
into several sub-categories
Actions (including refraining from action) to do with:
(a) decision criteria,
(b) using or changing procedures and structures,
(c) general strategies or specific tactics,
(d) attempts to influence junior staff over this particular decision,
(e) general use of rewards and penalties,
(f) own activities in meetings.
For the Applicant group. Category 2 was divided into two sub­
categories: -
(a) influence attempts,
(b) avoidance of taking action to influence.
It will be seen that the items in the interview check-list and the 
list of categories and sub-categories are not identical. This is 
because questions and answers are not necessarily mirror-images of 
each other. For example, the question "who makes the decision?" 
might get the answer "X makes the decision" which would be a mirror- 
image of the question, or might be answered by comments about the 
secrecy surrounding the process and in the organisation at large, 
thus providing more information than the question ostensibly called 
for.
These various categories and sub-categories were chosen because 
they represented recurring themes in the data, and they provided the 
basic framework for the data analysis. The sub-categories were 
further divided in some instances and also some categories and sub­
categories which seemed related to each other in some ways were drawn
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together as the analysis was built up.
The data having been first sorted into categories and sub-categories 
on a substantive basis, that is, keeping close to the organisational 
events which provided the focus of attention for data collection, 
they could now be further classified under general theoretical 
headings. These general classifications - structure, powerful people 
and culture - were chosen because they reflect general concepts in 
the social sciences and broad themes in the literature about politics. 
They provide links between the original categories and sub-categories 
and also help one to begin to step away from the substantive issues 
and towards formal theory. These general classifications could then 
be used as the basis for further sub-classification of the data which 
would reflect the main themes emerging from the data within each 
classification. So, for example, under the general heading of 
"Structures", formal and informal structures in the organisation 
could be identified. Under the heading of "Powerful People", a 
title which suggests the differential distribution of power between 
individuals and reflects on the A-B model of power discussed in 
Chapter 2, particular roles in the organisation are considered. Under 
the heading of "Culture", issues in the data which reflected on the 
values in the organisation, both of individuals and groups, were 
dealt with.
As a further step towards formal theory, at the end of each section of 
the descriptive analysis (each sub-classification) are listed the 
inferences which I considered could be drawn from that section.
These inferences perform a similar function to the "memos" recommended 
by Glaser (19?8) in that they move away from the descriptive material.
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and substantive issues of the field research, towards a more abstract 
or generalised statement about what the field data imply. These 
inferences are hypotheses about the political implications of the 
data and it is not suggested that they are the only ones which might 
be drawn from the material. A reader not having been directly 
involved in the field research, might well see different inferences 
from the ones I have seen. In deriving these inferences from the 
data analysis, a narrow definition of the concept of power has been 
avoided, but I have tried to see how the data reflect on the pursuit 
of self-interest, or as Weber put it "any chance (no matter whereon 
this chance is based) to carry through one's own will..."
(Walliman, Rosenbaum, Tatsis and Zito (1980)). However, I have not 
excluded the possibility that this self-interest may be perceived 
as being pursued by a group rather than an individual. I have there­
fore looked for the political significance of the data. For example, 
given that rules have political implications - they affect one's 
chance to carry through one's will - it seems to me significant if 
people do not know what the rules are or whether they apply in a 
particular situation. I have also tried to preserve the assumption 
that all informants' views are valid, and not to arbitrate between 
differing views of the same phenomena. It will be seen, therefore, 
that up to this point, no attempt was made to systematically apply 
theories about power in the existing literature to the research data, 
although my own perceptions of power have inevitably, as I intended they 
should be, been informed by ray reading of the literature. As has been 
pointed out earlier in this chapter, the literature about power is 
wide-ranging and diffuse, with little of it based on empirical studies 
and even less on the perceptions of organisational participants. I
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considered that it was important therefore to try to see what the 
data would tell me about organisational politics, rather than 
imposing existing theories on them.
At the end of each of the three main parts of the descriptive analysis 
of the data, is a section drawing together the theoretical impli­
cations from the inferences in that part. At the end of Chapter 3 
these theoretical implications are drawn together around the theme 
of the opportunities which the perceived context presents for the 
pursuit of self-interest. These theoretical sections refer back to 
the theories of power discussed in the review of the literature in 
Chapter 2. Their purpose is to locate the findings of the research 
within existing theory and to comment on it where appropriate, but 
not to pre-empt the theory which might be developed from the findings.
The conclusion to Chapter 3 also identifies a key theme which has emerged 
from the field study and its analysis, and on which the development 
of theory in Chapter 4 is based. This is a theme constantly repeated 
in the data and one about which there is little direct reference in 
the literature on power. Chapter 4 therefore develops this theme 
from the field research, but (as advocated by Mintzberg (1979) it 
also goes beyond the research findings to some extent, and suggests 
a way of looking at organisational politics which would repay further 
study.
4. Problems of the study
In this section the main problems of carrying out this research will 
be reviewed (some have already been touched on) and the attempts made 
to overcome these problems will also be discussed. They can conven­
iently be considered under four main headings: Theoretical,
Logistical, Access and Communication Problems.
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(a) Theoretical problems. The conceptual problem of identifying 
"political behaviour" or "power" in the organisation (already 
discussed) was dealt with by adopting as broad a range of ideas about 
the concept as possible. Avoidance of narrow definition of the 
concept allowed for a wide variety of differing perceptions of the 
concept by organisation members to be included. This also enabled 
me to distinguish between behaviour or perceptions which might be 
labelled "political" by a social scientist, and participants’ own 
perceptions of what might be labelled "political behaviour".
The other main theoretical problem was in linking people’s words - 
the information they gave about their perceptions - with their actions, 
what they actually did. Unfortunately I was not able to gain access to 
most of the political arenas to observe interactions between partic­
ipants in the decision-making process, so that I was not able to 
check their statements about their activities in the process against 
my own perceptions of their behaviour. Being able to make more use 
of direct observation of interactions would have added an additional 
dimension to the research, although it would not, in my view, have 
been likely to have provided proof that my informants’ statements were 
either true, false, misleading or crazy. There were some instances, 
however, in which I was able to observe behaviour, which I considered 
to be political, at first hand, either because it was directed at me 
when I tried to gain access to information (a point which will be 
returned to later), or because, as happened on one occasion, I was 
able to be present when a committee was playing it’s part in the 
decision-making process. This limitation created a conceptual problem 
from a theory building point of view, in that it caused difficulty in
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making the link between perceptions and actions- My strategy for 
dealing with this difficulty was to maJte as much use as I could of 
whatever direct evidence was available to me, and to use also some 
relatively unobtrusive sources of data, such as minutes of meetings 
and other documents, so that I did not have to rely entirely on 
informants' statements. I was also of course able to look for 
corroborative or disconfirming evidence among informants' statements, 
which would at least tell me what was the consensus or conflict of 
view about people's behaviour.
(b) Logistical problems. The decision-making process for allocating 
money from the Research Fund started early in November and the decision 
about who was to receive funds was made by the Vice Chancellor's 
Advisory Committee early in the following March, and subsequently 
ratified by the Senate- Since I wanted to collect data while the 
process was taking place, I needed to interview people directly 
involved - Area Chairmen, Heads of Schools, Administrators and 
Lecturers who had applied for funds - before the March decision. Since 
the Equipment Fund was allocated, from the top down, on a formular basis 
it seemed likely that it was less politically contentious, and I there­
fore decided to collect data predominantly relating to the Research 
Fund decision. This meant collecting most of the interview data 
between the beginning of the Research Fund process in November and the 
following March, with the Christmas holidays intervening. Being a part- 
time research student meant fitting these interviews in with other 
work commitments and making the most of my visits to the site. I 
therefore adopted the practice of making appointments by telephone, as 
this avoids the delay in waiting for replies to letters, and doing 
several interviews during each visit, as far as possible leaving time 
between interviews for writing up notes. Since I find interviews quite
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tiring, it was counter-productive to attempt too many in one day.
On the other hand, since I could not expect busy people to spare me 
a lot of their time and since I wanted to obtain as much information 
as possible about people's perceptions of organisational politics,
I needed to interview as many people as possible in the time 
available to me. The interviews also had to be fitted in at times 
when the interviewees could see me. All these factors have a bearing 
on what information can be collected from whom and when and can also 
affect the quality of interviews at times.
The logistical constraints imposed by being a part-time researcher, 
by the time-schedule of the processes being researched and by the 
limits on the time which interviewees were able or willing to spare, 
were dealt with by a process of optimisation: trading off the
accessibility of data for an ideal spread of interviewees across all 
groups; trading off answers relating to what seemed to be major themes 
for answers to a complete set of questions; using one decision-making 
process as the main focus of research, and the second one to top-up 
data on particular topics, which by that time had emerged as major 
themes, and to look for indications of contrasts with the first 
decision-making process, rather than attempting an equal 
investigation of both processes.
(c) Access problems. The political aspects of lesearching the topic 
caused a few access problems and some of these have been touched on.
It seemed to be difficult for some people to grasp the idea that 
although I was using the decision-making processes as foci for the 
study, the research was not primarily about them, but about perceptions 
of power in an organisation.
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The confidentiality of the interviews was an issue which was 
discussed with interviewees. I explained that the research would 
be written up as a PhD thesis but that I would try to write it in 
such a way that individual respondents could not be identified. I 
also pointed out that the thesis could be made confidential. On one 
or two occasions I had to explain to X that I could not tell him what 
Y had said about a particular issue. Few people interviewed seemed 
concerned about confidentiality and some said that I could quote 
them by name.
Contrary to the belief of one or two people, I would not be producing 
a report which would show what was wrong with the decision-making 
processes in question, and I had to make that clear. Of course, 
there was always the possibility that the research might reveal 
problems with the processes, even though that was not its purpose, 
and concern that the accusing finger might be pointed at individuals 
or groups seemed to be behind some of the resistance to the project.
Some people, too, showed a certain nervousness in their relationship 
to the organisation, as though they did not want to put a foot wrong 
and were therefore being very cautious. For example, when trying to 
obtain an interview with one professor, I mentioned that I had cleared 
the project with the Vice Chancellor. The secretary commented,
"That’s the first thing he’d ask you - he’s always very careful". 
Someone else wanted to check what his colleagues were doing about 
letting me talk to their staff, before agreeing to my seeing people 
in his school. Another person, who was willing to be interviewed, 
nevertheless was anxious that the project should have clearance in
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writing and wanted "quite explicit approval" before he felt able to 
make some documents available to me. Other people appeared to have 
no such qualms and this suggests that reactions to the project could 
be reflecting people's feelings of vulnerability in the organisation. 
What appeared to some people as a threat was of no consequence to 
others, who perhaps felt themselves to be in a relatively unassail­
able position. Moreover it can be suggested that people in the 
Science and Technology Areas, where most (but not all) of the 
resistance was found, would be less familiar with the methods of 
organisational research, and uncertainty about what to expect would 
add to their other hesitations about being involved in the project.
While some people made explicit their resistance to the project, others 
resisted in more covert ways. One Head of School who had agreed to 
approach members of his staff about being interviewed, made numerous 
excuses for not doing so. This circumstance illustrates the political 
nature.of field research. In one way, there was no reason why I 
should not approach the relevant members of staff direct, since I knew 
who they were and the Head of School had in effect agreed that I 
could interview them. However, there was a risk here that, if the 
Head of School were deliberately prevaricating, he might be extremely 
displeased if I pre-empted this by approaching his staff direct. I 
had no way of knowing whether this would be the result, or whether 
such action might jeopardise ray access to other schools, so there was 
nothing for it but to continue to chivvy the reluctant "gate-keeper" 
until he finally carried out his promise. I came to the conclusion 
that he had been waiting until a point had been reached in the decision­
making process when the effect of my raising issues about it with his
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staff would be less likely to cause him trouble. One could argue 
that approaching the staff direct would have provided a good test 
of the politics of the organisation (one of the "field stimulations" 
that Salancik (1979) advocates) since it might have triggered off 
some clearly identifiable political activity, and one can see that 
it might be possible to test organisational politics by such methods - 
perhaps waiting until enough data has been collected by other means 
before taking a contentious step. This "smash and grab" approach 
to research, however, can have repercussions for other people who need 
access to the organisation for research purposes, not to mention for 
the reputation of the researcher. One additional facet of this 
constraint was, I suspect, peculiar to this particular organisation 
and was pointed out to me, indirectly, by one interviewee. Some 
informants perceived a considerable antagonism in the organisation 
towards the social sciences, and it was suggested that if I were 
seen as behaving inappropriately in carrying out this research, 
this would be used as ammunition for further attacks on all social- 
science-related activities.
A further example of oblique resistance was provided by the Head 
of School who wrote agreeing to see me "if you feel anything useful 
can be gained" by a meeting, and stating that he "would not be 
prepared to discuss matters which are properly the business of the 
reserved areas" of a particular committee. This latter restriction 
included the names of people in the school who had applied to the 
Research Fund, but I was told "there’s nothing to stop you 
approaching staff direct and accepting the rebuffs". All this seemed 
clearly intended to be discouraging but in the event I found the staff 
members I approached quite willing to be interviewed.
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These examples suggest that in researching organisational politics 
it is possible to gain some insights into people’s political 
behaviour and perceptions through the research process itself, but 
that some tests which might be made involve too great a risk to 
present or future projects to be undertaken.
Colin Bell (19?8) has commented on the way in which the "locally 
powerful" can avoid scrutiny by researchers and in this project it was 
generally more difficult to get interviews with professors than with 
lecturers, in that the former seemed more concerned with the politics 
of being interviewed, i.e. of giving information about the decision­
making process. The most difficult people to see in both the pilot 
project and the main study were the people at the top of the power 
structure - the Director and the Vice Chancellor. In the pilot study 
the interview with the Director had to be preceded by a meeting with 
him about whether he would be interviewed, and in the main study I 
was asked to put ray request in writing and explain what I wanted to 
see the Vice Chancellor about. A counterweight to this wariness 
however was that in both cases, but especially in the University, 
a strong interest in encouraging research had been expressed by the 
heads of these organisations, so that there was some moral pressure 
on them to be helpful to a researcher.
Salancik (1979) has pointed out that collecting data by an interviewing 
method which requires getting permission to study the organisation, has 
the disadvantage that organisation members can thereby constrain the 
researcher and limit the information which he or she acquires. While 
not denying that this has been a problem in this research, such a view 
does tend to assume that organisation members know what the researcher is
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looking for, and therefore what to conceal. Moreover, studying a 
minor drairaa rather than a major one seems less likely to stimulate 
organisation members into efforts at concealment.
In dealing with access problems it was undoubtedly helpful at the 
start to have an informed collaborator inside the organisation (my 
research supervisor) who could approach crucial people on my behalf 
in the early stages and steer me in the direction of people who might 
be helpful. In order to get started with the research at all I needed 
the Vice Chancellor's permission, and I doubt if this would have been 
given without some persuasion from the inside. It was also 
important not to stir up opposition early on, in order to be able to 
demonstrate to the doubters that taking part in the project would 
not cause problems for them. It was therefore useful to know who 
to approach first - the more difficult people being left until 
possible antagonism on their part was less likely to jeopardise the 
project. After the initial access to the organisation had been 
agreed and a start made on the data collection, I was then able to 
make contacts with interviewees independently and so avoid undue 
influence by my supervisor in selecting the research sample.
(d) Communication problems. In most cases I found that interviewees 
were willing to discuss the decision-making processes with me, but 
even so there were communication difficulties in the interviews 
themselves.
In order to understand informants' perceptions of the political 
aspects of these decision-making processes, I needed to grasp the 
details of the procedures and the substantive issues - for example,
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the timetable for applications and the financial implications if 
the research student receiving an award from the Research Fund was 
an "overseas" student. Even though a certain amount could be read 
about the administrative details in advance, it was necessary in 
the early stages of the research to spend some time in interviews 
finding out about these details. I could not take it for granted 
that just one version of this kind of information would suffice, 
since it was quite possible that different people would have different 
views of what the "facts" were, and this could affect their political 
perceptions. On the other hand, given limited interviewing time, I 
wanted also to explore other avenues. In order to solve this problem 
I cross-checked some procedural and substantive details with just a 
few people, but sought perceptions of other items from a much larger 
number, where there seemed to be less consensus and greater political 
significance - the criteria used in assessing Research Fund 
applications being one such item. The problem here is, given that 
one is researching people's perceptions of political processes, 
knowing what to follow up and what to "take for granted" as shared 
background information between the researcher and the informant.
Another problem in understanding what interviewees intended to tell 
me, whether substantively, in giving me the "facts" as they saw them, 
or symbolically, in presenting a particular image or role which they 
wished to play, was that since the interviewees were unknown to me,
I did not have a store of previous information about them to help 
in the interpretation of their statements. Interviewing strangers 
means that you avoid preconceived ideas of what they are likely to 
say (based on your previous experience of them) but it also means 
that you have to tune in quickly to their particular language styles. 
In this ̂ udy I found that people differed considerably in the
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precision and fluency with which they used words, their directness 
of expression and their need to be either prompted to talk or 
controlled from wandering too far from the topic. Starting with 
some fairly basic questions was useful in the "tuning-in" process 
and helped in making an assessment of how to approach more difficult 
issues. Another communication issue, noted by several writers on 
research methodology, is the credence which should be given to 
what informants say. Phillips (1973) » for example, suggests that 
one of the ways in which social science data collected through 
interviews becomes distorted is through interviewees adapting their 
behaviour to what they think is expected of them in the situation. 
Looking back on the findings of this research, it could be argued 
that, in this particular setting, this adaptation might well produce
the opposite of distortion. In other words, people who place a high
!value on research per se, and feel themselves expected to behave 
like scientists, might feel under an obligation to describe their 
perceptions as accurately as possible. However, this question of 
distortion is problematic on other counts. Van Maanen (1979) suggests 
that there are three ways in which researchers can be misled by 
informants
(a) interviewees may tell lies;
(b) they may themselves be misinformed and therefore give incorrect 
information, and
(c) they may be unaware of aspects of their own worlds "like fish 
who are presumably unaware of tiie water in which they swim".
Looked at with the hindsight of having carried out this research and 
come to some conclusions about it, the second of these perils is 
particularly interesting. If it is true that much of what goes on in
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an organisation is ambiguous (as this research has suggested to me) 
then what does it mean to be "misinformed"? It could be suggested 
that it is not only truth in social science which is culturally 
determined (Phillips (1973)) but that most organisational "facts" 
are similarly not objectively verifiable. To say that someone is 
"misinformed" may be to take sides between differing views of 
organisational phenomena. If this point is accepted, it becomes 
questionable to follow such advice as that given by McClintock 
et al (1979) that "It is important to select informants who are 
knowledgeable and to know if what informants say is accurate".
A similar doubt can be cast on the idea that the informant is 
"unaware", in it's assumption that the researcher's awareness is 
somehow more real than the informant's.
It would perhaps be more accurate to say, not that the researcher 
is being "misled", but that the informant is providing data from 
a particular point of view. As themselves "p>articipant observers", 
organisation members can be said to observe through particular sets 
of spectacles and report accordingly. Moreover, if one accepts the 
view that, like social scientists, informants too have their 
theories about social systems and human nature, those spectacles 
are tinted by preconceived ideas about what might be there.
The question of lies is somewhat different. To the extent that 
informants are participants in the organisation, they can be expected 
to have interests and obligations which could affect their responses 
for good or ill. It can be suggested that when they conceal 
information or make statements which they consider to be untrue, 
they are acting politically - furthering or protecting some interest 
they perceive.
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What, in any case, are we to take to be a "lie"? It is difficult 
to determine where the line can be drawn between giving information 
or opinions which you know to be false, and playing a particular 
role in an interview so as to guide the interviewer's interpretation 
of events, and your own behaviour, in a way which you consider to 
be most appropriate in the circumstances. Looking at informants 
in a political light, as participants in the organisation with 
self-interests to enhance or protect, the recommendation to "believe 
what you are told" (Schwartz and Jacobs (1979)) seems doubtful, 
since lies (however one defines them) are interesting data, 
especially to anyone studying organisational politics. Perhaps 
a better approach would be to accept what you are told as a 
justifiable statement from the informant's point of view, rather 
than either true, false or crazy. Interviewees'' statements can then 
be considered in the light of what other data you have about their 
context and some assessment made of what meaning they were intending 
to convey, and what they might be attempting to conceal. Phillips (1979) 
suggests that rather than attempting to develop methods through which 
to prove or demonstrate "facts" we should rely more on showing how 
particular circumstances (presumably discovered through collecting 
data) would entitle you to draw particular conclusions. If it is 
accepted that much of what goes on in an organisation is ambiguous 
(see Chapter 4), this seems sound advice.
5. Conclusion
In this research an attempt has been made to adopt as few pre­
conceptions as possible about what informants would tell me, and 
to assume that they had good reason for seeing things the way they
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did, given their vantage point. Perceptions of power have been 
researched within a particular context in order to tie them to real 
organisational events, and on the assumption that concepts of power 
cannot adequately be seen in isolation from their context, since 
this is politically relevant* This study has therefore attempted 
to discover participants' political perceptions in relation to 
live organisational issues which constituted a process over time, 
and to include their perceptions of the politically relevant 
context within which their perceptions of power arise. In keeping 
with this orientation a narrow definition of "power" has been 
avoided in data collection and analysis.
Although the research setting was a university and the foci used for 
data collection were two decison-making processes, this study is 
not primarily about universities or about decision-making, but 
about power, and therefore differs from studies of such people as 
Baldridge (1971) or March and Olsen (1976). It fits into the 
categories of power research, identified in Chapter 2, which are 
concerned with organisational settings and with power at the level 
of the individual. By focussing attention on actors’ perceptions 
(unlike the study by Pettigrew (1973)) it is interactionist in 
orientation, but with due regard for structural issues. Given the 
diversity of the literature about power and it's considerable 
dependence on theory which is neither based on field research nor on 
the perceptions of the actors in political processes, it is not 
to be expected that a tidy match can be found between existing theory 
and the findings of this study, however the links which seem most 
relevant will be identified in the course of this thesis.
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It will be seen from the discussion in this chapter that the 
research falls into a number of stages which can be summarised 
as follows
1. Clarifying/Sensitising to the concept 




5- Coding for main substantive themes.
6. Classification and sub-classification by general theory , 
concepts and political relevance.
7- Writing of descriptive analysis.
8. Derivation of inferences.
9. Location of findings within existing theory of power.
10. Identification of key theme.
11. Theoretical development from key theme.
The researching and writing up of this topic has not, of course, 
been as tidy as this list might imply, since it has inevitably 
been an iterative process. The format of this thesis generally 
follows the stages listed, with the exception that this chapter was 
written last and therefore is to some extent a retrospective look 
at the project. In the next chapter I shall turn to the first stage 
on the list, by presenting a review of the main issues in the 
existing literature on power.
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APPENDIX 1.
INTERVIEW CHECK-LIST
The following topics appeared on check-lists used during interviews.
Not all these questions were asked on all occasions, nor was this 
wording necessarily used. Additional questions were asked as 
appropriate.
Information about the interviewee (e.g. time in the University, 
subject group. Research Fund applicant?)
What is the decision-making process?
Who makes the decision?
What feedback do you get about the outcome?
With whom do you discuss the issue?
Who else is involved in the decision-making process? (e.g. who else 
has applied to the Research Fund?)
How much public knowledge is there?
Is the process competitive?
What criteria are used in making the decision/at what level?
Who are the most important people/what are the main hurdles in 
the process?
What pressures are there on you/or others? (e.g. to make an application/ 
decide a particular way).
What alternative sources of funds are there?
How important is the decision to you?
How fair is the allocation?
How do you influence the system/would you change it/do you try to 
influence it/change it?
How much power do particular individuals/roles have?
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APPENDIX 1,
What is the organisation structure/how does your School/Group 
fit?
How much power do you have?
Is the system democratic?
What connection do you have with other groups?




Power is one of those topics of universal interest about which analysis, 
description, interpretation and evaluative comment can be found in a 
variety of literature, novels, plays and poems, as well as in the 
social sciences. In this chapter on the theories of power I shall 
confine myself to the literature of the social sciences, where most 
of the issues have been raised.
This chapter attempts to draw together the main ideas about power 
which can be derived from the literature and its main function in 
the research project was to provide a range of ideas about organis­
ational politics which would be of value in carrying out the field 
study. Except where otherwise stated in this thesis, the word 
"power" is used to include all power-related words, such as control, 
influence, coercion and authority.
The approach of the various authors on power can be divided very 
roughly into three camps:-
(a) Those who deal with the subject primarily in the context of 
society and the state - writers such as Weber (1948), Miliband (1969), 
Agger (1964), and Freire (1973) are examples.
(b) Those who are mainly interested in power in the organisational 
setting - for example, Crozier (1964), Pettigrew (1973), Strauss (1962), 
Bacharach and Lawler (198O).
(c) Those who are mainly interested in power at the level of the 
individual, either in considering power as an aspect of personality 
or the individual's responses to power, including the strategies
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and skills employed - Adler (1958), Winter (1973), Emerson (1962), 
Zaleznik (1970) and Mangham (1979) come into this category. I say 
these are very rough divisions because they overlap to some extent.
For example, Freire has some comment to make about the individual's 
response to power, although his main interest is at the level of 
society as a whole. Zaleznik, although primarily concerned with 
the individual, focuses on the business manager and therefore to 
some extent overlaps with writers in the organisational group, who, 
while they refer to individuals and to society, are mainly interested 
in the way organisations work. Most writers in all categories have 
some discussion about what the concept of "power" consists of.
For some, the substantive issue is the concept of power itself, with 
society, or the individual, or the organisation, being used as 
examples to illustrate their view of the concept. (For example,
Lukes (1974), Peters (1959), Bachrach and Baratz (1962), Wrong (1979), 
French and Raven (1959))- The focus of attention of authors there­
fore ranges between the poles of macro and micro social science 
and empirical study and philosophical discourse. It would appear 
that power is not a concept easy to grasp in all it's aspects and 
levels at the same time, and when it comes to the question "what 
do you mean by power?" the boundaries of the concept are not too 
clear either.
Bacharach and Lawler (198O) suggest that the vagueness of the 
concept of power is due to its being a "primitive term", sensitising 
in function, rather than fully clarifying the phenomenon to which 
it draws attention. On this basis, "influence", "authority", "control" 
and so on, are types of power, being concepts which clarify the 
primitive term "power".
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2. The A-B model of power
The concept of power is often expressed in the literature by the 
words "the ability to...", as in Salancik .and Pfeffer (1977)
"the ability to bring about outcomes you desire". (See also 
Crozier (1964), Goldner (1970), Strauss(1962), Kaplan (1964),
Deutsch (1963), Hall and Bates (1970), Winter (1973), Tushman (1977) 
However for most writers this is not an ability innate in the person, 
but is seen as an aspect of a relationship between individuals, 
groups, institutions or classes, in which A gets B to do something, 
"do" being broadly interpreted to include thoughts and feelings as
well as actions. Particularly in the more philosophical literature,
this dyadic paradigm is used directly in order to consider the 
questions it raises in attempting to map out the concept of power. 
Most of these questions are noted by Lukes (197^) the most important 
ones being as follows
(a) Does the action of A have to be deliberate? Does A have
knowingly to attempt to get B to do something before one can talk 
of the power of A? Bates (1970) is sure that the action of A must 
be conscious, Winter (1973), French and Raven (1959) that it need 
not be.
(b) Should one distinguish between power, control, influence and 
authority? Lukes (1974), Peters (1959), Winch (1959), Hall (1972), 
Lasswell (I93O/60), French and Raven (1959) all wish to make the 
distinction between power and other forms of A getting B to do some­
thing, such as influence or authority. Influence can be seen as 
distinguished from power in that it is said to involve no coercion, 
and authority can be distinguished from power in that it is
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legitimised and implies acceptance of the right of A to get B to 
do whatever it is. Lasswell (l930/60) comments that coercion is 
the distinctive characteristic of what we call power "When coercion 
enters into the exchange (of resources) there is power". Blau (1964) 
by contrast, distinguishes between power, which implies the possibility 
that B might choose punishment rather than compliance, and coercion 
which allows B no choice.
Handy (1976) on the other hand calls the activity of A getting B to
do something "influence" and the reason why B will do what A wants, 
the "power" of A - some characteristic or situation of A which enables 
A to influence B. In this model, authority is seen as a type of 
power. One difficulty with this view is that it requires that some 
forms of "influence" must be said to be coercive, and it makes less 
clear the distinction between coercion and those instances of A 
getting B to do something where B is willing to comply - as in the
example supplied by Winch (1959) of A teaching B how to play chess.
In Bacharach and Lawler's (I98O) scheme, "authority" and "influence" 
as types of power, play a different part from "coercion" which is 
seen as one of four bases of power. Their scheme, too, shows 
"coercion" as a basis for "influence".
(c) If A tries to get B to do something, and B, as a result, acts 
in a way which is not precisely as A wishes, how are we to include 
this in the concept of power? One answer is to include the notion 
of control as a type of political interaction. Control is a topic 
with a literature of its own reaching out to the control of technical 
systems, and borrowing from these systems the notions of target- 
setting, monitoring and feedback, and corrective action. Social
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control and deviation at the level of the state, the group and 
the individual have also been widely discussed. (See Lemert (1964) 
in Worsley, P. ed. 1970).
Seen from a political perspective, control cannot exist in a 
social system without the implication that A is getting B to do 
something. Where A specifies a particular act to be performed 
by B - sets an objective or target - and B meets that objective as 
a result of A ’s requirement, then one can say that A controls B. 
Olsen (1970) uses the idea of predictability to distinguish between 
control and influence. Where the outcome is predictable there is 
control, but where it is unpredictable, there is influence. French 
and Raven (1959) distinguish between positive and negative control, 
positive being where B does what A wemts, and negative where B 
does the opposite, an idea which does not quite cover the situation 
where what B does is different rather than opposite. It should be 
said, however, that where "control" is discussed in the literature, 
especially by authors writing in the mode of classical or systems 
theory, the notion of "power" as a social system variable is not 
necessarily referred to (see Ouchi (1977) for example). In other 
instances, for example Etzioni (1964), "power" and "control" are 
used as synonymous terms and Etzioni then distinguishes between 
"coercive" and other forms of control (normative and utilitarian)-
Notions of coercion and negative control suggest that resistance 
is related to the concept of power. Writers are divided on this 
point however, French and Raven (1959) assuming that the resistance 
of B is necessarily involved, Weber (in Wallimann et al's translation 
(1980)) suggesting that it may or not be involved.
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(d) Should all instances of B taking account of A's wishes, even 
where these are not expressed by A, be regarded as the power of A? 
Social interaction is only possible at all because we make predic­
tions about each other’s behaviour and act accordingly. So if we 
answer "yes" to this question we are saying that "all behaviour at 
all levels and in all circumstances may be regarded as political" 
(Manghcim (1979))- Some writers, however, want to make a distinction 
between political behaviour and other kinds. Lukes (1974) suggests 
that political behaviour should be distinguished from other kinds 
of interaction by saying that the term political should only be 
applied to "significant events". An insignificant event may show 
that A "affects" B but this should not be called power. The problem 
with this idea is, of course, deciding what is "significant".
French and Raven (1959) consider that the concept of power is 
"useless if every momentary social stimulus is viewed as actualising 
social power". Blau (1964) also distinguishes political behaviour 
from other kinds. For him, political behaviour - "social exchange" - 
is goal directed, and should be distinguished from "expressive" 
behaviour, which is not. Although neither of these arguments is 
water-tight, they do reflect everyday usage of the concept of 
power in which people tend to confine it to particular forms of 
behaviour and to be able to identify certain activities as "political 
behaviour".
It is possible to summarise the ideas so far reviewed in the following 
way:-
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Figure 1
coercive act of Ar— #,»specified act of B — ►•coercive control 
goal directed unspecified act of B—►control
(significant 
event)
non-coercive act of^-^.specified act of B ►> authoritative control
AA, goal directed unspecified act of B— ►•influence
(insignificant
  — --    (affecting)
event)
The brackets are in acknowledgement of the points made in (d) above.
But one can quickly become embroiled in arguments over such a 
scheme. For example, does it make sense to talk of a coercive act 
of A where the act of B is not specified? It might, if one admits 
the possibility that an act is coercive, not because A intends it as 
such, but because B sees it as coercive and is therefore coerced. 
Similarly B may see a specific act required, or see an event as 
significant, where A does not.
Few writers on power include B's view of the situation as one of 
the factors which enables A to have power, but French and Raven (1959) 
show that B's perception of A's power is an important factor in the 
ability of A to influence B, and Mangham's (1979) Crocodile case 
study provides an example of how "coercion" over the use of Head 
Office systems existed very largely in the minds of the subsidiary 
company's managers, rather than in the direct intentions of Head 
Office. B's perception may be based on experience of this
— 6 o  —
particular A's past actions, or on B's experience of interactions 
with others perceived as similar to A, and will also include B's 
perception of the likelihood of A's power being used.
Bacharach and Lawler (I980), in discussion of sanctions, which they 
see as A's attempts to manipulate B by the use of rewards or 
punishments, point out that there are two probabilities which 
have to be weighed up by those involved: that the sanction will be
applied and that it will have the required effect. They draw 
attention to the subjective nature of the process by which these 
probabilities are assessed and to the importance of the deterrance 
value of this assessment in any conflict.
These various ideas about A's capacity for power in relation to B 
and of B's perception of the situation can be added to the diagram:
Figure 2
A's capacity
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Further characteristics of power are discussed in the literature.
It is said to be distributed differentially, so that some people 
have more of it than others, and that theoretically its quantity 
can be measured. It is also said to have magnitude, weight, scope 
and domain (see Dahl (1957), Perrow (1970), Gamson (I968),
Tushman (1977), Hickson et al (1971), Tannenbaum (1973) and 
Zald (1970)). This nomenclature has the effect of reifying power, 
and leads also to arguments about whether power has absolute or 
relative magnitude. (See Tannenbaum (1973) and Dalton et al 
(1968)), Other writers talk more of political acts - the exercise 
of power as action. For example Hall and Bates (1970) suggest that 
power involves directing activities of others, making rules for 
others, enforcing rules for others, setting goals and objectives 
for others, hiring and firing and making decisions. Decision­
making, whether it be deciding to act or to do nothing, has been a 
central theme in the literature about power seen in its active sense, 
(see for example Bachrach and Baratz (I962), Pettigrew (1973),
Lukes (1974)). The symbolic interactionist view, on the other 
hand focuses attention on the interaction between people, their 
definitions of situation and negotiations over these definitions 
as well as over substantive issues. (See for example Gamson (1968), 
Hall (1972), and Mangham (1979))- The political processes resulting 
from the exercise of power are variously characterised in the 
literature as "exchange", "cons and deals", "games" and "demand and 
control" processes. (See for examples Blau (1964), Bailey (1977), 
Allison (1971), Gamson (I968)). Behind many of these views is 
the idea of power as the outcome of dependence. Indeed, to 
Blau (1964) unless there is asymmetrical
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dependence between A and B there is no power relationship. Such 
views conclude that the more dependent B is on A, the more power 
A has over B. The strength of dependence is determined by the 
alternatives open to B and the relative value these alternatives 
have for B (Bacharach and Lawler (I98O), Blau (1964)). Bacharach 
and Lawler also point out that although there may be objective 
conditions of dependence, the use of power is also based on the 
subjective judgements A and B make about these conditions (p.22).
In general terms, the literature can be seen as expressing the 
need to see power in broadly two ways - as something one can 
identify as belonging to individuals or groups, so that it makes 
sense to say that A "has" power, and as an activity between people, 
so that it makes sense to say that A "exercises" power. Even if 
one rejects his labelling of the exercise of power as "influence", 
Handy's (19?6) model reflects the need to distinguish the two 
aspects of power: A "has" power and therefore can take action to
get B to do something. Dalton et al (1968) cannot agree between 
them on this issue, Zalzenik wanting to see power as dependent on 
characterists of A, and Dalton and Barnes as a relation between 
A and B. These differing views can be reconciled by making the 
distinction between power potential and power use (Bacharach and 
Lawler (I980)). There have been several classifications of 
potential power, or the bases of power. For example, it is suggested 
that power may derive from authority, or from control of resources, 
or from expertise, or from charisma. French and Raven (1959) and 
Wrong (1979) provide examples of such classifications, and their 
schemes are in some ways similar, except that Wrong uses the word 
"authority" where French and Raven would use the word "power".
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One further point must be made about the A-B model of power. Most 
of the literature in this vein tends to focus very largely on A, but 
there are some analyses of the responses of B. Emerson (1962) in 
particular looks at this side of the equation, pointing out that 
where there is a power imbalance, i.e. B is more dependent on A 
than A is on B, this represents a cost to B. B will try to reduce 
this cost, either by an alteration in values so that the issues 
involved become reduced in significance in the eyes of B, or by 
strategies for increasing the power of B. By such "balancing" 
operations, the psychological cost of complying with A can be 
removed or reduced. Dalton et al (I968), in reviewing Emerson's 
work, suggest the following list of adjustments which can be made 
where dependency is unbalanced:
(1) Acceptance of dependency by those placed in the more dependent 
position.
(2) Reduced dependency or withdrawal by the more dependent party.
(3) Diffusion of dependency onto other objects by the more 
dependent party.
(4) Dependency increases initiated by the more powerful party.
(5) Blockage of alternate dependencies which the more powerful 
party might seek.
Some of these adjustments seem to require ego-defences, and several 
other writers have suggested defences by which B adapts to the power 
of A. B is said to increase communication with A, to distort the
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perceived differences between B and A, to over-identify with the 
views of A, to increase liking for A, and in general to decrease 
the psychological distance between B and A, provided that this 
distance is not too great to start with. These activities are seen 
variously in the literature as reducing the cost of A’s power, or 
as ways of striving to gain more power in relation to A, or as 
substitutes for such power. (See Mulder (i960), Hurwitz et al 
(1968), Horwitz (1964). A line of argument found in the literature 
about the reactions of B to the power of A relates to item (l) on 
Dalton's list in suggesting that B "accepts" the situation or regards 
it as "legitimate" (French and Raven (1959) •
Winch (1959), Blau (1964) and Mechsmic (I962) for example suggest 
that when a person joins an organisation he or she is thereby 
indicating an acceptance of the authority of other persons. This 
raises the question of what "acceptaince" means in the context of 
working life. Dalton (1959) has pointed out that -the executive may 
need to dissemble acceptance of the norms of the organisation, while 
privately rejecting them. He vas considering this question primarily 
from the point of view of A's - executives attempting to gain and 
maintain their power in relation to others - but B's on the receiving 
end of such attempts may dissemble just as much as A's. The 
practicalities of employment may include the absence of any alter­
native jobs and for this reason alone B may consider it advisable 
to pretend acceptance of the authority of A. Moreover, although B 
may accept the authority of A on first joining the organisation, 
experience of working in it may bring a change of heart, and 
subsequent rejection of this authority. And what if B ’s orientation
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to work is entirely instrumental? (Goldthorp (I966)). In this 
case the issues which in other circumstances might have involved 
a power-struggle between A and B might be regarded as trivial or 
of no personal interest to B. The "struggle for power" view of 
organisation tends to make the assumption that all the actors are 
personally involved and interested in the various issues arising 
from the organisation’s mission and activities, but motivation 
theory indicates that this is not to be counted on. There is a 
difference between B’s complying with A’s wishes through necessity, 
identification or fear, and B ’s complying because the issue is of 
no importance to B, however important to A. Zald (1970) mentions 
as a fundamental problem of social systems, along with internal 
and external power relations, the motivational basis of individual 
commitment to the enterprise. One can look at the A-B paradigm and 
ask why A is keen to exercise power in relation to B in an 
organisational setting, but also what it is about B ’s motivation 
which affects the outcome of A ’s attempt. The fundamental problems 
cited by Zald are closely related to each other in that commitment 
can be said to affect political behaviour. Zalzenic ((1968) in 
Dalton et al) supports this view in suggesting that, in order to 
exercise power, a person must first internalise the authority 
structure of the organisation, and that this internalisation is a 
function of the individual’s decision to participate in the work 
of the enterprise.
The "acceptance" by B of the power of A can be considered at 
different levels. B's overt behaviour may consist of doing what 
A wishes, but it should not be assumed that B accepts A's power at
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a psychological level. B may deem it advisable to comply with the 
demands of A, but not interalise the norms which give A power. 
Etzioni's (I961) distinction between alienative, calculative smd 
moral involvement in the compliance relationship between A and B 
provides a framework for refining the notion of B ’s "acceptance".
In his criticism of Luke^ (19?4) analysis of power, Bradshaw (19?6) 
has pointed out that the "A getting B to do something" model of 
power, though useful in the analysis of the concept, presents a 
picture of an interaction between two people devoid of any context, 
and is therefore misleading. It also assumes a clarity in the 
activities of A and B which is often absent in real life. The 
nuances of the history of A and B and their relationship, their 
motivation, the presence in the situation of other actors, and 
the surrounding circumstances, are not represented in this model. 
Useful though the philosophical writings of people such as Lukes 
(1974) are, for the greater subtleties and complexities of power one 
must turn to the empirical studies of writers such as Crozier (1964), 
Goldner (1970) and Pettigrew (1973)-
3 . Structure
One theme which emerges from the empirical studies and from authors 
mostly concerned with power at the level of the state (for example 
Miliband (1969)) is the relatively permanent distribution of 
power, its structural apsect. Bacharach and Lawler (I98O) see 
authority as a structurally derived type of power providing stability, 
and influence as derived from personality, expertise and opportunity 
and providing change. In their analysis, power derives from the 
group, rather than from the individual. Hawley (I963) (quoted in
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Garason (I968)) seems to be taking an extreme structuralist view 
when he says that although individuals appear to have power, this 
is an illusion, since their power only derives from their position 
in the system and it is therefore the system which has power, not 
the individual. Dalton et al (1968) consider that a distinction 
should be made between structures based on authority and the inter­
action between A and B which they call influence. Kanter (1972) 
criticises the interactionist view of power for paying too little 
attention to structures and assuming too great a freedom for 
negotiation between individuals in decision-making processes, 
largely as a result of a pre-disposition for micro-analysis. 
Macro-analysis, on the other hand, tends to over-eraphasise the 
structural limits on behaviour, but she suggests that organisations 
do have collective as well as individual goals and takes the view 
that systems as well as individuals have power. Some of these views 
seem to be treating the abstraction "structure" as though it were 
a person, and also to be confining the concept of structure to 
formal authority relationships, and hence limiting its usefulness 
in the analysis of organisational power. An alternative would be to 
see structure as the relatively stable differentiation of roles and 
groups and the relationships between these. When French and Raven 
(1959) say that "Power is a useful concept for describing social 
structure only if it has a certain stability over time" they are 
implying a rather broader view of structure than simply authority 
relationships.
The interaction between the political activities of A and B and 
the power structure which forms part of their context is demonstrated
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in the organisation literature. Crozier (1964) for example, 
shows how the power struggle between individuals can be confined 
by the power structure represented by the hierarchy. Pettigrew's 
(1973) study shows how an individual was able to adopt certain 
political tactics in interaction with other people, because of 
the place he held in a power structure which provided him with 
access to decision-making committees and denied it to others.
The political structure of an organisation can be seen as arising 
out of the division of labour (see for example Goldner (197G)).
This differentiates the organisation,setting up boundaries of 
demarcation between groups, which have an inclusive and exclusive 
effect. The creation of groups provides the individual with 
experiences of belonging and of being an outsider, and facilitates 
the divergence of norms of behaviour and objectives between groups. 
The greater the divergence between one group and another, the greater 
the chance of communication failure and the development of conflict. 
The differentiation of the organisation makes co-ordination methods 
necessary - the hierarchy, bureaucratic procedures, committees, 
liaison departments and roles - but just as differentiation provides 
the conditions under which groups begin to compete with one another, 
so the co-ordinating mechanisms become pressed into the service of 
organisational politics. The rational attempt to create organisa-- 
tional predictability provides the conditions and the weapons for 
undermining it. Bailey (1977) for example, shows how committees 
can be used by organisation members for political purposes,
Roy (1955) how a bureaucratic control system was made to serve the 
purposes of those subjected to it.
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A structure of distributed power is seen in thé literature as 
resulting from the interdependence between individuals and groups 
which in turn arises from the division of labour. To, quote 
Tushman (1977) for example, "If there is no need for joint 
decision-making (i.e. no interdependence) and there is no resource 
scarcity, then the sub-units can make independent decisions. But 
if the groups are interdependent and must share scarce resourses, 
they must engage in joint decision-making. Under these ubiquitous 
conditions the political perspective has the most relevance".
But the pluralism implied by such views can be questioned. Zald
(1970) for example has suggested that interdependence may become
so routinised that it ceases to be perceived as interdependence, and 
Gamson (I968) and Dahl (1968) have drawn attention to the existence 
of unused political potential in social systems, all of which 
suggests that the political potential of interdependence can in 
some cases be inoperative. Wallimann et al (1980) discussing 
their translation of Weber’s definition of power; "Within a social 
relationship, power means any chance, (no matter whereon this 
chance is based) to carry through one's own will (even against 
resistance)" point out that the word "chance" in this definition 
not only allows for the inclusion of the structural dimension of 
power, but also for the possibility that the opportunity for power 
may not be used.
The strategic contingency view of power (for example Hickson et al
(1971)) develops the structural theme by showing that those groups 
in an organisation which deal with its major dependencies are in
a better position to exercise power than other groups. Goldner's 
(1970) study shows that the industrial relations specialists needed
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skills in dealing with the unions and with their colleagues, but 
these personal abilities alone did not give them power. Power came 
from the combination of these abilities with the fact that the unions 
were regarded in the organisation as a major threat. The importance 
to the social system of the issue to which the group's activities 
(and therefore the individual group member’s) are applied is a 
major consideration in the development of the power of individuals 
and groups into a relatively permanent power distribution.
Mangham (in conversation) has suggested that the contingency view 
of political structure needs refining to account for the shifts 
in salience of particular issues, which mean that the "chance" to 
carry through one’s will is a matter of timing as well as structural 
opportunity. Pettigrew (1975) makes a similar point when he 
suggests that the organisational consultant should "time his 
influence attempts to coincide with periods when his assessed 
stature is high". Such views tend to emphasise the relatively 
unstable nature of power structures, those individuals and groups 
in the ascendancy at one time being less powerful at another. But 
these ideas have,to be set against the views dealt with in the 
next section about the way in which political structures can be 
rendered permanent through the learning of values.
4. Values
The ideas about legitimacy (p.66) and about social control (p.^J) 
referred to earlier raise the question of the relationship between 
values and power. This relationship can be seen from a number of 
different angles.
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In the discussion on structure the way in which task differentiation 
results in divergence of norms (consensus of values) between groups 
was briefly referred to, and several writers demonstrate the links 
between structure, values and power. Pettigrew (1973) in con­
sidering the factors which are likely to be sources of conflict and 
give rise to political activity draws attention to the way in which 
people leam to adopt certain values through being in differentiated 
groups, so that political conflict is to some extent a legacy of 
the organisation’s history and the learned values of individuals' 
within its structure. Miliband (19^9) and Freire (1973) contend 
that the existing political structure is perpetuated through 
socialisation, which is the means by which individuals come to 
adopt values favourable to the ruling elite and by which the 
ascendancy of the nature of the powerful is maintained. Bucher (1970) 
shows how, in a medical school (which she characterises as a.non- . 
hierarchical organisation) there are structures in the form of 
committees and role-sets which provide the means by which people 
gain and exercise power. Crucial to their gaining power - getting 
on to the committee - is their ’’assessed stature" - a judgement 
made by their peers about their value to the school. Looked at 
through Miliband spectacles, this value judgement could itself 
be seen as a political and historical matter. What is considered 
"valuable" in the school being what those with power (who had 
assessed stature in the past) say it is. This is not to say that 
committee members are entirely conformist, since Bucher observes 
that you do not have to be a tame supporter of status quo to be 
on the committee. Nevertheless those characteristics which render 
a person acceptable or not as a committee member are those defined
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by the reigning value system. This value system determines who 
gains access to the political structure, and this structure in. 
turn determines whose ideas will be heard. These ideas presumably 
include recognition of which issues are to be considered 
important, and which should be ignored. Thus one can suggest 
that the structure and prevailing values of an organisation have 
additional political significance in the inclusion or exclusion of 
issues from the agenda in decision-making, to which Bachrach and 
Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974) refer.
The idea that if you have power your values will prevail is 
reflected in the definitions of power of several writers, for 
example "to carry through one's own will" (Weber in Walliman et al 
Û.98O)), the-ability to impose your point of view on others 
(Strauss (1962) ) ,  "ability of an individual or group to act out 
successfully its character or impose extrapolations or projections 
of its inner structure upon its environment" (Deutsch (I963) in 
Harvey and Mills (1970)). Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) offer a 
different viewpoint on this issue when they suggest that the way 
to gain power is to get your perception of the priorities of the 
organisation, that is your values, accepted. It is not enough to 
be able to deal with the critical contingencies of the organisation, 
you must first be able to define what these are and have your 
definition prevail.
The connection between values and power is central to the notion 
of authority. Winch (1959) considers that the notion of "the 
right and wrong way of doing things" is inherent in the concept of
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authority, which he sees as fundamental to the possibility of 
human decision-making. Day (1963) who considers that authority 
cannot be a coercive power, points out that the authority of 
governments includes the authority to coerce within certain limits, 
and that the assessment of whether a government has overstepped 
those limits and used excessive coercion depends on the values of 
the observers of such governments. The crux of authority is seen 
as the voluntary acceptance of it by those over whom it is exercised, 
and thus it is similar to the ideas of the ^acceptance" of the
power of A referred to in the secion of the A-B model. Bacharach
and Lawler (198O) seem to be confusing the notion of authority when 
they say that the "unique aspect of authority is that subordinates 
acquiesce without question and are willing to (l) suspend siny 
intellectual or moral judgements about the appropriateness of the 
superior's directives, or (2 ) act as if they subscribed to the
judgement of the superior..." and agree with Bierstedt (1950)
that authority implies involuntary submission (p.28-29). This 
suggests not only the right to decide, but also the right to be 
right, and that authority is at its root coercive rather than 
based on a consensus of values.
Gouldner (1970) however points out the danger of seeing power and 
authority as mutually exclusive terms, since those with authority 
have other forms of power as well. "Power exists quietly, as it 
were... It makes its presence felt continuously, underneath and 
alongside of "legitimacy" and all moral motives for obedience... 
authority is not merely some unanchored "legitimacy", but the 
legitimacy of power". (p.294).
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Day (1963) by contrast suggest that if people obey a government 
through fear of punishment they are responding to the power of 
that government, not to its authority. "When a person acknowledges 
another's authority, it cannot be because he is forced to. This 
is not what authority means."
Talcott Parsons has been criticised for basing his analysis of 
social structure on a theory of consensus of values, ignoring 
the conflicts of interest between groups and therefore political 
processes, and in his later writings for trying to show that all 
power is legitimised, i.e. based on authority and is therefore 
part of the value consensus. (See Lockwood (1936) and Giddens 
(1968) in Worsley (1970), Gouldner (1970)). Weber has distinguished 
different types of values on which authority may be based - 
traditional, legal-rational and charismatic - but Winch (1959) 
argues that these are not distinct concepts but all based on 
tradition, since all conceptualising is based on the traditional 
authority inherent in having a language, where rules about 
meanings attached to words are legitimised by usage. This suggests 
that the values on which authority is based are rooted in time 
and stability and also in a more fundamental consensus of meanings, 
rather than just a consensus about rights to decide particular 
issues.
It seems clear that these somewhat diverse notions about authority 
are based on the concept of '.'legitimacy", but there is also a 
divergence of view as to what "legitimacy" is. Schaar (1970) draws 
attention to the difference between older definitions of legitimacy 
in which any claim to power had to be justified by reference to some
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authority beyond and above the claimant (such as the law) and the 
later definitions of legitimacy. These later definitions "dissolve 
legitimacy into belief or opinion. If a people holds the belief 
that existing institutions are 'appropriate' or 'morally proper', 
then those institutions are legitimate. That's all there is to it". 
Helm and Morelli (1979) suggest that such definitions make it 
impossible for a group or individual in a society to say that they 
refuse obedience to a regime or institution on the grounds that it 
is illegitimate, but this seems to ignore the possibility that such 
a regime may be in power because of its ability to coerce the people, 
rather than because the people think it "morally proper". These 
arguments in drawing attention to the distinction between legitimacy 
based on the consensus of values and that based on an external power 
source, suggest that, since the consensus of values may exist in 
the form of unwritten rules, legitimacy may have an informal, as 
well as or instead of a formal basis, and raise the question of 
the circumstances under which the act of someone with authority may 
be said to be "illegitimate"- could it be said to be illegitimate 
simply on the grounds of a consensus that it was not'horally 
proper"? If legitimacy is based on formal rules, it can be 
assumed that such rules exist before the act of a person to whom 
such rules apply; but if it is based on an informal consensus, 
there is the possibility that the act may become illegitimate in 
retrospect, at least from the actor's point of view, if the act 
prompts the emergence of a consensus which did not previously exist, 
or which was not perceived by the actor. There is also the possibility 
that the consensus within a group may be at odds with the consensus 
outside the group - honour among thieves being denigrated as
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conspiracy by the wider society. Can a minority inside the group 
therefore claim that acts of group members are illegitimate, even 
though they accord with the group consensus, on the grounds that
they are not supported by the consensus outside the group?
This brings us to the question of the relationship between values 
and resistance to power, which is .also discussed in the literature. 
The resistance of B to the power of A (using the word power in its 
general sense) has been discussed in the literature, and it can 
be suggested that where the values of A and B are not congruent, 
resistance to the political activities of A, and to the political 
structure, will arise. Where these activities and structure reflect 
the values of both A and B, inequity in the distribution and 
exercise of power may remain outside the conscious observation of 
either party. However, it appears to be common for members of a
social system to notice attempts by others to control them, social--
isation not being complete. Crozier (1964) considers conflict to 
be an inevitable outcome of organisational hierarchy (structural 
inequality of power), since in his view the imposing of power from 
the top down automatically produces resistance. Other writers too, 
for example, French and Raven (1959) consider resistance to be 
inherent in the exercise of power. Weber's definition (in Walliman 
et al (1980)) allows for the possibility of resistance but does not 
make it inevitable.
Another facet of the connection between values and power is the 
attitude adopted towards the very fact of unequal power distribution. 
Is this a positive benefit or does power corrupt? Presumably those
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who set out to gain power for themselves are in favour of its 
unequal distribution and do not expect that it will corrupt them. 
Even people who do not want power for themselves because they lack 
the power motive (Winter (1973)) can be shown to place a high value 
on differential power. From the perspective of voluntarism some 
forms of power, such as "authority" or "influence" can be defended 
on the grounds that authority is legitimate by definition, and 
influence in most models of power suggests some choice by B or 
a congruence of values between A and B. "Expert" power where A’s 
advice turns out to be in the interests of B, or "referent" 
power, where the power of A is based on B ’s liking for A, are other 
examples of more easily defensible types of power, all of which 
contain the assumption that B plays a voluntary part in bringing 
about the situation in which A has power. But this is not to say 
that such types of power are seen as free of all blame. Day (I963) 
comments of authority "The authority of government, even if 
Hobbesian, is infinitely preferable to the Hobbesian state of nature 
where force is the only arbiter. Yet it is also true, as Paine says, 
that ’government, even in the best state, (is) a necessary evil’’’. 
There is also the problem of how A and B’s values came to be 
congruent in the first place, since it is possible for socialisation 
to produce values which benefit A rather than B, but to which both 
subscribe.
Some writers clearly see grounds for disapproving of power, at 
least in some of its forms, particularly because of its consequences 
for the development of the human personality. Freire (1973) for 
example sees those with power (the oppressors) and those without
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it (the oppressed) as being equally damaged by the power imbalance. 
The adverse effects of power on creativity have also been discussed. 
Writing from a psycho-analytic viewpoint, Marion Milner (1950) 
comments: "... the restraint of one’s will imposed by authority 
could at times feel like a threat to one’s whole existence, an 
attempt to separate one from the very source of one’s creative 
relation to the world". Winnicott(1974) in discussing the 
development of creativity asserts, ’’It is creative apperception 
more than anything else that makes the individual feel that life 
is worth living. Contrasted with this is a relationship with 
external reality which is one of compliance... many individuals 
have experienced just enough creative living to recognise that for 
most of their time they are living uncreatively, as if caught up 
in the creativity of someone else, or of a machine". His view 
does not ignore the need for the individual to adapt to the 
environment, of which other people form a part, but does suggest 
that a degree of personal autonomy for B is necessary for creativity 
and psychological health. Argyris (1972) considers that autonomy 
is necessary for the full development of psychological maturity, 
and further suggests that the modern organisation will tend to 
prevent this process by subjecting the individual to control by 
others, thus keeping him or her in an infantile,i.e. psychologically, 
unhealthy, state.
Organisational Development theorists and practitioners frequently 
adopt power-sharing approaches to organisational chainge through 
participative decision-making, thereby implying that the uneven 
distribution of power, especially that associated with centralised
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forms of management, is to be deplored. Smith and Drake (1972) 
point out that OD practitioners introduce their own values into 
the organisations they work with, and that these values are often 
of a humanistic-democratic kind. OD is seen as a way of adapting 
the organisation to the needs of individuals, and a healthy 
organisation is one which sees these needs as legitimate (Clark, 
in Bennis et al, (1970)). Organisations should develop along the 
lines of giving more responsibility and therefore more power to 
more people if they are to have the capacity to adapt to the ever 
increasing rate of environmental change. This power must be based 
on "collaboration and reason", rather than coercion and fear. It 
has been recognised that these values, based on Human Relations 
theories, can lead to behaviour which amounts to no more than 
manipulation (Miles (I965)) and that there is considerable 
practical difficulty in maintaining the authentic relationships 
based on trust which are advocated by OD theorists. Kelman (1965) 
shows the tension between the consultant's power and the consultant's 
values when he says "... valuing free individual choice is a vital 
protection against tyranny.... I recognise that freedom of choice 
is ... a rock-bottom value for me ... But we must remain aware 
that the nature of the relationship between influencing agent and 
influencée is such that inevitably ... a certain degree of control 
will be exercised".
Though writing from a different standpoint, Friere (1973) has a 
similar difficulty in reconciling the needs of individuals for 
personal autonomy and the needs for concerted action. How can you 
ensure that those who voluntarily join your levolution do not equally
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voluntarily go over to the other side and betray you? The answer 
is called "discipline" but really amounts to being powerful 
enough to stop them - that is, oppression.
Emerging from this discussion is a distinction between needs for 
personal autonomy for oneself and the need to control other people. 
Although this distinction can be demonstrable in an experimental 
setting (Mulder (196O)), in more complex situations it is difficult 
to see how personal autonomy can be achieved without in some way 
controlling other people. There is also a distinction to be made 
between valuing autonomy for yourself and valuing it for other 
people - seeing it as intrinsically desirable. Somewhere along 
the border between ego's autonomy and alter's behaviour based on 
values of individual choice and freedom can slide into tyranny, 
as OD practitioners have noted. However there have been arguments 
in favour of the uneven distribution of power. Salàricik and 
Pfeffer (1977) see it as a necessary mechanism for aligning the 
organisation with reality. Crozier (1964) considers that some 
individuals must be given freedom of action to make decisions, and 
therefore have more power than others. Mechanic (1962) asserts 
that organisations must control their "lower participants" meaning 
of course that the higher participants must control the lower ones,
i.e. there must be an uneven distribution of power. Hall and 
Warasley (1970) argue that an even distribution of power in an 
organisation is a disadvantage, causing the organisation to stagnate 
Blau (1970) sees the sharing of power as risky for an organisation, 
and tries unconvincingly to show that you can reduce the risk of 
decentralisation by a simultaneously high degree of formalisation.
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Bacharach and Aiken (1976) dealing with a similar dilemma - how the 
higher echelons of an organisation can gain reliable information for 
decision-making and at the same time avoid losing control of 
subordinates who supply it, suggest that the answer lies in 
the distinction between the use of authority and of influence. 
Authority, they argue, which is the right to make final decisions, 
must be retained by the higher echelons while influence should be 
widely distributed within the organisation. This suggests that 
some forms of power should be more equally distributed than others.
There seems to be a problem about reconciling the perceived need for 
some people to have more power than others, and the idea that there 
is something wrong with having power. The reasons why A is exercis­
ing power or wants to have power throw some light on this issue. 
Winter (1973) suggests that people csin strive for power for either 
neurotic or healthy reasons. Healthy reasons are that they feel 
they have "superior strength", which in organisational terms might 
be translated as meaning that they feel they have some special skills 
and knowledge to contribute to the decision-making process. A 
neurotic reason would be striving for power through fear of being 
dominated by others (see also R. Nevitt Sanford (1964)). Adler also 
distinguishes between people's striving to improve things for the 
future through a capacity for altruism or "social interest", and 
their unhealthy striving for power as a compensation for feelings of 
inferiority.
"With great avidity, directly or by detours, consciously or un­
consciously, through appropriate thinking and action or through 
the arrangement of symptoms, the neurotic strives for increased
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possession, power and influence and for the disparagement and 
cheating of other persons" (Ansbacher (1958)). Looked at from 
the point of view of the psychology of the individualthe 
difference between acceptable and unacceptable political behaviour 
seems to rest on whether it is derived from an inward-looking 
need or gratification, or from the capacity for outward looking 
"social interest", for although Adler does not say so, striving to 
improve things within the individual's social context suggests 
political behaviour of some kind. Mangham (1979) by contrast takes 
the view that all behaviour is political and arises out of self 
interest, so that concepts of "selfishness" and "altruism" have no 
intrinsic validity (although.they may, of course, be used as social 
control devices). Perhaps one reason for the distaste expressed for 
at least some aspects of power is to be found in the tactics people 
use for gaining it. Martin and Sims (1956) having interviewed a 
large number of top executives and studied the biographies of 
powerful people produced a list of the tactics reportedly used by 
these people. They include the following: false compromise, that is,
pretending to agree to a compromise solution while knowing that you 
have no intention of acting on it; delaying action - when a decision 
has gone against your wishes, tailing so long to carry it out that 
it becomes impossible or irrelevant to implement; manoeuvreability - 
not committing yourself to any project, person or group, so that 
you can always back down from a project, change your job, and act 
against the interests of an individual "friend". Dalton (1959) 
recommends similar "adjustments" which a departmental head should 
malce when dealing with the competing claims of subordinates and
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their attempts to counteract his power. Kotter (1978) speaks 
with approval of a young man who initiated a social activity for 
political purposes. Bailey (1977) considers that the only way 
in which a departmental head can keep a balance between academics 
and bureaucrats in a university is by lying, and observes that it 
is necessary for principles to be upheld in public but compromised 
in private. Most of these activities recommended or condoned by 
such writers could be categorised by Adler as neurotic "cheating 
of other persons". No doubt this would be countered by saying, 
as Bailey (1977) does, that it is only by such cheating that 
reality can be dealt with, so paradoxically the argument can be 
facilitated that the rules of conduct of the highest order must 
regrettably be infringed in the name of the interest of the enter­
prise, thus meeting Adler's criterion of "social interest" as an 
indication of healthy political behaviour. This argument is 
undermined by the problem of assuming the objectiveness of "reality". 
It is interesting to note that whereas Bailey is opposed to the 
idea of a "real" person behind the role being played,he is willing 
to believe that there is an objective "realitÿ' beyond the 
subterfuges and beyond the definitions of reality proposed by 
the role-players.
5. Rules
There are indications in the literature that among the norms of 
behaviour in an organisation there are always some rules which draw 
the line between acceptable (if disagreeable) political activity 
and what is unacceptable. Bucher (1970) for example, suggests that 
in the medical school "not being a bastard" in political behaviour
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meant not keeping all the benefits of the exercise of power for 
yourself. Bailey (1977) notes that the roles that people choose 
to play, the masks they choose to wear, must not differ too greatly 
between one situation and another. Too much unpredictability or 
inconsistency of behaviour is unacceptable. The interaction between 
power and rules has been commented on by several writers and is 
particularly relevant in organisational life. Bailey (19^9) 
distinguishes between normative rules and pragmatic rules, the 
latter being tactical guides about how to win in political struggles, 
coming into play when normative rules are not available or are 
insufficient to guide behaviour. But within normative rules there 
is also the need to distinguish between explicit organisational 
rules, such as "no smoking", and the unwritten norms which draw 
the ambiguous line between what is and is not acceptable in political 
behaviour. The use of all three types of rules, and participants 
attitudes towards them, are shown to be important aspects of 
political behaviour.
It has been suggested that within an appropriate technology, 
behaviour can be so prescribed by the explicit rules of the 
organisation, that it would become "power-free" since the depend­
encies between persons in the structure would be removed by these 
rules. (See Crozier (1964) and Ouchi (1977). As long as there is 
some possibility of freedom of action, some gaps where the rules do 
not exist or cannot be enforced, political activity is facilitated. 
Where A can give or refuse permission for B to bend or break the 
rules, A has the possibility of exercising power in relation to B.
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Moreover, Dalton (1959) points out that rules can become outdated, 
and that a weak manager is one who does not recognise this and who 
cannot "improvise" in a changing situation where there are no rules 
to guide behaviour. The strong, on the other hand, "quickly turn 
ambiguous situations to their needs" - in other words, they use 
the rules or their absence, in the exercise of power. Astute 
politicians are, presumably, those who note that there is no rule 
prescribing their behaviour, or that it cannot be enforced, or that 
it has become outdated, and accurately predict what they can get 
away with as a result. They may face charges of deviousness, 
especially from those who are adversely affected by their activities, 
but they could equally claim with Dalton (1959) that such is the 
complexity of political life, no matter what their action someone would 
regard it as an infringement of an implicit rule of conduct. Perhaps 
tolerance of a degree of obliquy is also necessary to the astute 
politician, but since the participants in the enterprise must 
maintain a certain level of co-operation if it is to function at all, 
the politician must also retain sufficient support among colleagues. 
Walton (1963) has drawn attention to this dileirma, in which A, while 
on the one hand making political gains at the expense of B, needs 
at the same time to secure the positive attitudes of B. However, 
some writers have demonstrated that it is possible to do both.
Lukes (1974) and Hall (1972) for example show that power can be 
exercised by A without the knowledge or understanding by B that 
there is a conflict of interests between them. De Crespigny (I968) 
also observes that A can have "impedimental power" - the ability 
of A to affect outcomes for B without B being aware of this.
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What Bailey (1977) has called the myths of the organisation, 
embodied in such slogans as "managers must be allowed to manage" 
and "business is business" may be used to rationalise the activities 
of A and substantiate a claim that no normative rule has been broken. 
Such myths may also help to accomplish the situation noted by 
Crozier (1964) whereby A can be said to have power in relation to 
B because B’s behaviour is narrowly prescribed by rules but A ’s 
is not. Success in the power struggle can therefore be seen to 
depend on a number of factors; the ability to perceive and man­
ipulate rules, whether explicit or implicit, to accurately judge 
where the line is drawn between acceptable (if regrettable) action 
and unacceptable action, to justify one’s use of rules especially 
by reference to some superordinate rule (an appeal to legitimacy); 
and the ignorance of B.
6. The consciousness of A and B
Some writers (for example Winter (1973) and Adler (1938)) consider
that the exercise of power can be unconscious, but in most of the 
literature the assumption is made that the people involved in the 
political process are aware of the political nature of their inter­
actions. They are assumed also to be aware of the issues and to 
adopt deliberate strategies for getting their own way. (See for 
example Bacharach and Lawler (I98O)). Among contingency theorists, 
with the exception of Salancik and Pfeffer, the identification of 
the major dependencies of an enterprise is not considered to be
in dispute. Moreover the problem of cause and effect, though noted
by Dahl (1968) as a problem of power theory, is not given much
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consideration. This problem raises the question of how you know 
that B ’s action was a response to A's action, rather than some 
other cause. It is only by being able to make that causal link 
that one can say that A is exercising power, but in complex 
political situations this may be in doubt. This difficulty relates 
to the methodological problems of studying power, which are dealt 
with in another chapter, but one can note here that one aspect of 
power which receives little attention in the literature is the 
consciousness of A and B. What do A and B think they are doing?
To what extent do they see themselves as having power and exercising 
power, and how does it relate to their value systems and their 
behaviour? To what extent is there consensus among participants 
as to political cause and effect? Do the concepts of power, if 
any, held by participants match the views of theorists, and under 
what circumstances?
There are a few references in the literature to the ways in which 
people can perceive political activity. Allison (1971) for example, 
suggests that there are three different models (at least) by means 
of which people analyse the activities of governments: the
"rational actor" model, in which the government is seen as a 
monolith, or as though it were an individual, making a rational 
decision among alternatives in order to meet its objectives; the 
"organisational" model, which focuses attention on the various 
departments involved, theirroutines and their objectives; and 
the "governmental politics" model, which considers the competing 
interests, skills and political resources of individuals.
Kaplowitz (1978) has put forward a number of propositions, based
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on a combination of power literature and attribution literature, 
about how power is attributed to other people and the consequences 
of such attributions. Kanter (1972) draws attention to differences 
in percpetion when she points out that people inside a political 
arena may see it as having infinite gradings of complexity, and 
rate the question of who wins a particular battle as being of great 
importance, but outsiders may see only a simple division of haves 
and have-nots, and the issue of who wins as trivial. Dearlove (1973) 
quotes Sprout and Sprout (1963) "••• from the perspective of decisions 
and decision-making, what matters is how the individual or group 
imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is" (p.73) This 
comes near to “the starting point for this research, although the 
implication that there is an "actual" milieu, or at any rate that it 
could ever be known, will be questioned.
7. Conclusion
It will be seen from this review of the literature that writers on 
power cover a wide range of views on the subject, and that it is a 
topic which crosses several discipline boundaries. There is no all- 
inclusive theoretical perspective, perhaps because writers tend to 
stay within their particular disciplines when considering this topic, 
and sonie power-related concepts, such as "authority", are seen in 
radically different ways by different authors- While there is no 
shortage of literature about power, there is relatively little based 
on field research in organisations, and hardly any which gives 
consideration to the perceptions which participants in a social 
system have of the political processes or structures in that system.
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It can be suggested that some general concepts from the social 
sciences such as "structures", "groups", "values" and "normW'seem 
of importance to the understanding of power in its various forms.
The interactionist viewpoint seems also particularly relevant to 
theories based on the A-B model, and all it implies, and to notions 
of political tactics, bargaining behaviour, the "struggle for power" 
and the pursuit of self-interest within organisational settings. 
Central to theories about power is, of course, the idea that it 
can be differentially distributed - some individuals or groups 
having more of it than others, and this in turn raises questions 
about whether this ought to be the case, and about the legitimacy 
of political action.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the descriptive analysis which 
follows is based on a field study in which the perceptions of 
organisational participants were the focus of attention. The theories 
of power which have been considered in this present chapter will be 
referred to again in Chapter 3i both through the theoretical sections 
which come at the end of each main section of the chapter, and 
through the main classifications on which the chapter is based, 





In this analysis of the field research data, two main "comparison 
groups" (Glaser and Strauss (1969)) have been used. "Deciders" 
are a group consisting of the Vice Chancellor, Principal 
Administrative Officer, Area Administrators and Professors. 
"Applicants" (with a capital A) are a group consisting of everyone 
else. I have followed this nomenclature because it is convenient 
for distinguishing between those who want resources for their work 
and those who decide who shall have them, given that the field work 
focuses on two decision-making processes concerned with the 
allocation of resources. Given this perspective, the divisions into 
"Deciders" and "Applicants" seems to me to roughly represent the 
way the university is, and also the way it appears to many people 
in it.
The amount of information provided in the following sections 
reflects the information which emerged from the interviews, and 
also the information which was sought, given the time available for 
each interview, and therefore sections are not equal length. The 
section on the structure of the university as a whole, for example, 
is therefore relatively short because not much information was 
volunteered by interviewees on this topic, and also because it 
was not regarded as a priority to obtain more information on this 
at the interviews.
in analysing the data I have tried to reflect how the members of 
the organisation saw their political situation in relation to
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particular issues. However, it should be noted that they would 
not necessarily themselves consider that all the organisational 
phenomena discussed here are of political significance, since 
they tend to limit their ideas of what is political to a narrow 
range of behaviour, as compared with the views of writers on 
organisational politics whose ideas were discussed in Chapter 2.
At the end of each sub-section I have listed the inferences about 
organisational politics which can be drawn from the analysis of the 
data. As discussed in Chapter 1, these inferences perform a 
similar function to the ’’memos” used by Glaser (1978) in that they 
represent a step away from the substantive issues of the field 
data and towards the development of theory. These inferences are 
cross-referenced to the text of the data analysis, in that the 
numbers in brackets in the descriptive analysis refer to them, 
so that the reader can see what it was in the description which 
suggested the inference. Each index number may appear more than 
once in the text and occurs at the end of a relevant passage. As 
was pointed out in Chapter 1 , it is not suggested that these inferences 
are the only ones which might be drawn from the data description, 
but were selected for their political relevance. Avoiding a narrow 
definition of the concept of power, they represent answers to the 
question ’’what does the descriptive analysis say about organisa­
tional politics?”. It is recommended that, to avoid a fragmented 
reading of the data description, the text of each section should 
be read first, followed by the inferences, which can then be cross- 
referenced back to the text as necessary.
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At the end of each of the three main sections of the descriptive 
analysis is a section on Theoretical Implications, which draws 
together the main ideas from the inferences in that section and 
relates them to the theories of power reviewed in Chapter 2. Since 
the theories of power in the literature are wide-ranging and contain 
conflicting ideas, and are not in the main derived from field 
research, nor concerned with participants’ perceptions, a neat 
fit between the findings of this research and existing theory is 
not to be expected. At the end of Chapter 3 these sections on 
theoretical implications are drawn together around the theme of 
the opportunities provided by the field setting for political 
behaviour, and this section, like the other theoretical sections, 
relates the field study to the existing literature. The final 
section of Chapter 3 also identifies a major theme to emerge from 
the descriptive analysis, which is little discussed in the 
literature, and which forms the basis of the development of theory 
in Chapter 4.
The abbreviations used in the text are as follows:
VC = Vice Chancellor
PVC = Pro Vice Chancellor
VCAC - Vice Chancellor’s Advisory Committee
RFC = Research Fund Committee
URF. = University Research Fund
FGPC = Finance and General Purposes Committee
UGC = University Grants Committee
SCR Senior Common Room
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2 . Structures
(a) University structure. The data show a mixture of perceptions 
about the form the university structure takes. Although people 
in the Decider group were aware of a structure divided into three 
main Areas, this was not always so among the Applicant group. In 
fact one Applicant had difficulty in answering a question about 
structure at all, and I came to the conclusion that the idea of 
the university’s having a structure was somewhat foreign to his 
way of thinking about it. Another Applicant saw the structure as 
being mainly a Technology group, with humanities and social science 
as a small separate group and then ’’odd departments such as Botany, 
Pharmacology and Languages. I’m not sure how they fit in”.
One informant, who felt particularly powerless in the organisation, 
described the structure in the following way: ”We are at the lowest
level of a pyramid structure, with people getting to the top and 
becoming more and more remote”. The professor who was Head of 
Group was referred to as ’’the boss” by this informant. Another 
view suggested an oligarchy. ’’There is a little group of people 
who run the university and have the power. They are the ones who
(3)are close to the VC, for example PVG's past and present.”
An informant who had been at Bath for several years compared the 
structure with that at a previous university, ”I am not very clear 
about the structure of the university. In comparison with other 
universities, the structure at Bath is not fully developed. Apart 
from the Profs and Mawditt and the VC, the other people are just 
appendages for pursuing curiosities rather than being formed into 
the sort of system you might expect to see.”^̂ ^
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It was suggested by another interviewee that the present structure
could be traced back to the previous Vice Chancellor. "Rotherham
instituted a system rather like an industrial company. He didn't
like the existing set-up so put another one alongside it. A pyramid
of administration resulted which gives power to the Chief Administrative
Officer. This caused a controversy about whether the administration
ran the university and employed the lecturers to teach, or whether
(2)the academics ran it and employed the administration to assist.”
It is clear from this and other comments that some people see a 
structure which separates out the "academics” from the "administration”, 
and "the professoriat” from the rest. At least two people seemed 
to recognise some structural body call "the university” as a distinct 
entity, as in the statement "I wanted to do this, but the university 
would not agree to it”, where "the university” did not appear to be 
any distinct committee such as the VCAC or the Senate.
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1. It is a mistake to assume that everyone perceives an organisation 
as having a structure, or that, where structure is perceived, it will 
be seen as having the same form by everyone. It seemed to me that 
those people who had been in the organisation a long time, and 
those who were in the Decider group and therefore sat on committees, 
were more likely to have common perceptions about the form of the 
structure.
2. Decisions of a powerful individual can live on in the organisation 
even after he or she has been gone for some years, and in spite of 
changes of direction. This suggests that, once established, the 
structure becomes valuable to some people, making change difficult.
3. Perceptions of structure are related to perceptions of power, 
as most obviously demonstrated by ideas of the structure as an 
"oligarchy” or a "pyramid”. However, the perceived political 
implications of structure depend on the perceived structure, and you 
cannot take into account the political implications of other 
structures of which you are unaware. If powerful people are 
behaving as if these other structures exist, your capacity for 
political action will be limited by your being unaware of this.
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(b) Committee structures
Introduction. All the members of the Decider group were, or had 
been, members of one or more of the main committees relevant to 
the University Research Fund and the Equipment Fund. Some members 
of the Applicant group were unaware of the existence of some of 
these committees, for example the Research Fund Committee (RFC) or 
even of the VCAC (which has the same membership as the RFC). About 
75% of the Applicants group showed uncertainty about the membership of 
such committees, or of who the decision-makers were where these were 
seen to be individuals rather than committees. So, although they 
had perceptions of the criteria being applied to decisions about 
the URF, they were not clear about how they were applied or who was 
applying them. Where people were aware of committees, they did 
not necessarily consider them to be powerful, decision-making bodies, 
as will be shown. It can be said therefore that there is not a 
commonly held perception of the political structure between the two 
groups, the Deciders group having more information about the who, 
what and how of the decision-making process, and the Applicants 
group being generally vague (with some exceptions) on these questions.
The data show that the role of a committee can be taken as an 
indication of its power in a number of ways. It can be seen as 
either making decisions while in session, or as simply ratifying 
decisions already taken by another group. Being a ratifying body 
does not necessarily indicate a lack of power. This will depend 
on whether it can, and does, refuse to ratify decisions it does not 
like. Being a decision-making rather than a ratifying committee 
does not necessarily indicate high power, since one can ask to what
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extent the decisions are constrained by factors outside the control 
of the committee, or taken in advance informally by some sub-group, 
with only a facade of decision-making left to the committee when 
in session.
It will also be seen that representation on committees can become 
an important issue, either because this is seen as affecting the■I
balance of advantage between different groups, or because of the 
ambiguity which cein arise over whether committee members are, or 
ought to be, representing particular groups.
The data collected in this study throw light on interviewee's 
perceptions of the following committees: the Senate, Vice Chancellor's
Advisory Committee (VCAC), particularly, but not exclusively as it 
functions as the Research Fund Committee (RFC) Area Committees, 
and Boards of Studies. Data from committee records and other 
written documents has also been used.
(i) The Senate. Most comments about the Senate were along the 
lines that it was a ''rubber stamp'' for decisions made elsewhere, 
sometimes said with a certain amount of derision, but also in some 
instances with something like approval. Evidence was provided that 
it was not seen as entirely powerless. For example, it was suggested 
that ''it would have something to say” if the URF decisions were not 
roughly fair, thus providing a check on the freedom of decision­
makers. It was also reported that the Senate had prevented a 
move to transfer some of its power over a particular issue to the 
VCAC. One suggestion for the apparent lack of power of the Senate 
was that it delegated decision-making to other committees and "let 
them get on with it”. According to the University Statutes, the
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Senate can, among other things, "review, amend, refer back or 
disallow any act of any Board, Committee or appointed body, of 
any School, Department, Institute, Delegacy or other such 
academic sections of the University". The word "academic" is 
interesting here and raises the question of whether the VCAC might 
be considered as an "academic" committee and whether the allocation 
of money from the Research Fund and the Equipment Fund are con­
sidered to be "academic" matters. There seems to be some 
ambiguity on this issue, resulting from the way the university as 
a whole is structured. The Senate Chairman's statement, "The 
Senate normally accepts the allocations (of the Research Fund 
Committee) but could refer them back I suppose... I don't know 
if there is a rule book about this - things get done more by 
custom and practice (laughing) than by the rule book", suggests 
that if the Senate does have formal powers over this issue they 
have not been much asserted and therefore the position is unclear. 
It also suggests a certain nervousness on the Chairman's part about 
discussing this absence of clarity. The view has been expressed 
that this ambiguity about the Senate's actual powers is in itself 
a "political manoeuvre" and there have been demands from some 
members of Senate for clarification of these powers, but so far 
these demands seem not to have been met.
One informant indicated the extent and nature of the Senate's power 
when he referred to it as "an interfering body" and said he adopted 
the strategy of not giving it the opportunity to interfere in his 
school, "I don't expose the school to the Senate unless I have to". 
Senate meetings were said to be a "bore", but on the other hand, 
"you have to monitor the monitors" and so reports from the VC and
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the Long Range Planning Committee are listened to, to make sure they 
"don't do anything to curtail the activities of the School" and also 
to keep the School informed. This suggests that the interference 
might come, not just from the Senate itself, but from other 
individuals and committees whose decisions might be ratified by 
the Senate to the detriment of the school.
Other comments about the Senate suggested a view of it as part of 
a grievance procedure. For example, it was said that in the past 
the Senate had been used by members who wanted to raise issues that 
were being blocked by their Head of School. By getting themselves 
elected to the Senate, lecturers were able to make grievances public 
in spite of the Head of Scholl's opposition. Another informant 
spoke with disapproval of the way people use the Senate to make 
complaints. However, it was also suggested that sis a forum for 
grievances perhaps the Senate was not very effective, partly because 
of disinclination on the part of the aggrieved to make use of it: 
"when it comes to it, no-one wants to put themselves forward for 
election". Another reason given was that the really powerful 
committees were the Area Committees and the VCAC, to which people 
who were not Head of School had no direct access, either through 
minutes or through personal representation. It hsis been pointed 
out that Area Committee minutes go to the Board of Studies, but the 
point being made here is that the reverse does not apply - Board 
of Studies minutes do not go to the Area Committee, and the Board 
of Studies has to rely entirely on the Head of School's willingness 
to put its views to the Area Committee. On this view, a Head of 
School can effectively block the appeal of aggrieved parties to 
the committees which really matter. However, it seems clear that
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some people at any rate see the Senate as worth taking trouble over,
in that it was reported that a "cabal" of non-professorial members
(l)get together before Senate meetings take place-
The view of the Senate as a possible resolver of grievances was 
clearly not approved by the informant (a member of Senate) who 
summed up its role in the following way: "The Senate is not intended
for resolving conflicts, but it checks what's going on and takes 
action if the tide is flowing in the wrong direction. It doesn't 
usually initiate action, but will refer back decisions that it 
doesn't like".
In general I think it can be said that people who are members of 
Senate see it as rather more powerful thsui people who are not 
members and who are more inclined to see it as a powerless "rubber 
stamp".^  ̂ It may also be true, as suggested by one informant, that 
some people use the Senate meetings as a way of gaining "air time" 
for pursuing their own private interests. One further comment 
worth noting is "The Council rubber stamps the VC and the Senate is 
a rubber stamp too" with its hint that it is not other committees 
whose decisions are being complied with by the Senate and Council, 
but particular individuals, in this instance the Vice Chancellor, 
whose role will be discussed in a later section. It is a reminder 
that it may be individuals who are seen as powerful rather than 
committees. This view was also endorsed by the comparison one 
informant made between the Senate and the Council, which reflected 
on the relationship between the two committees, but also indicated 
the power of individuals to influence their decision-making: "There is
a fiction that the Council governs, but the Senate has to control
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the Council. The Senate itself is manipulated by the VCAC and 
the VC, but the Senate can in the end maike decisions, whereas the 
Council can only operate on the information given to it by the 
Senate, and the Senate only gives it the information it wants".
One distinctive difference between the Senate smd the Council is 
that the latter includes people from outside the university in its 
membership. According to my informant, these "laymen" have to be 
"cajoled and bullied", the implication being that it is the 
university members, some of whom are also members of Senate, 
who really have the power in the Council and are presumably in a 
position to manipulate both committees. The Senate was said to 
have "a long running fantasy about what the university should be 
like, and you have to manipulate this fantasy. You gain power in 
the Senate through power of advocacy". This informant was aware 
of other forms of power which he had in other arenas, and seemed 
to take the view that people could "switch off" their knowledge 
of these other forms and only concern themselves with his powers 
of advocacy when in the Senate mee^ing^^
Another informant took the opposite view of the relative power­
fulness of the Council and the Senate, pointing out that a major 
difference between the two was that the Council dealt with resources, 
while the Senate was concerned with academic matters, suggesting 
that this gave the Council the greater power. The "lay" members 
of the Council in his view, were not people easy to hu^ly^^
Evidence of the power relationship between Council and Senate is 
reflected in the formal Statues of the University (October 1974),
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which show that of the functions of the Senate laid down by the 
Statutes, 4o% contain statements requiring the Senate to refer 
matters to the Council. This is somewhat off-set, however, by 
the requirements in 30% of the statements daout the functions of 
the Council that it should take the wishes o^ the Senate into 
account- This seems to put the balance of advantage with the 
Council as far as formal intentions are concerned, however, the 
effect of overlapping membership of various committees in the 
organisation cannot be ignored, and in the following pages I 
shall present some information from official records which 
illustrates this feature of the committee structure, and also 
throws light on the question of representation of different 
interests on these committees.
In the academic year 1979-80 eighteen people could be identified 
as being members of a number of different committees, generally 
regarded as important in the organisation. The following table 
shows the pattern of their committee membership and indicates 
whether they are in the Arts (A), Science (S) or Technology (T) 
areas, or are members from outside the university (O). Some 
academic members are also members of Boards of Studies, and this 
information is given where it is available. Student members, and 
administrative officers have been excluded from the following 
analysis.
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TABLE 1 Pattern of committee memberships






1 (VC) X X X X* X -
2 0 X X -
3 A X X X X X X
4 0 X X -
5 0 X X -
...6 0 X X -
7 A X X X X X X
8 T X X X
9 A X X X
10 0 X X ■ -
11 S ; X X X X X
12 T X X X X X
13 . A X X X X
14 S X X X X
13 S X X
16 S X X X X
17 T X X
18 T X X
X indicates membership.
* ex officio, not normally exercised.
/ Finance and General Purposes Committee (a committee of the Council)
There are forty-six members of Senate and thirty-two members of 
Council, so it can be seen that there is a sizeable minority with
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a foot in both camps. Also, if one takes as an example the Finance 
and General Purposes Committee, which is generally regarded as 
influential by those who are aware of its existence, half the 
members are outsiders and of the rest, the Arts area is strongly 
represented, and Science not all, unless one counts the VC (who 
is a scientist) as representing Science. This is not to say, of 
course, that this committee is intended to be representative of 
particular area interests; it is simply noted here that the 
representation works out tha^^wa^^^^^
However, representation is not just a function of who is entitled 
to attend, but also of who actually does attend. Again taking the 
FGPC as an example, one can compare the number of "outsiders" and 
"insiders" who were entitled to attend (figures in brackets) with 
the numbers who actually did attend during the year 1979-80:
TABLE 2 Outsiders and insiders committee attendance
Meeting No. No. of Outsiders No. of Insiders




If one adds to these figures the four "insiders" who attend each 
meeting in a non-voting administrative capacity, and who include 
the Accountant, Bursar and Principal Administrative Officer, and
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also the three student members who attended at least three of the
four meetings, it would appear that the representation is over-
( 5)whelmingly in favour of the "insiders".
Further complexities of the issue of representation on formal decision­
making bodies can be illustrated by considering membership and attend­
ance of the Senate for 1979-80. Tables 3 and 4 show the effect of 
attendance and non-attendance on representation of different schools
and Areas, taking into account the numbers of staff represented by
(5)each Senate member.
It will be seen that representation on the Senate is not evenly spread 
among the Schools, and since some membership is ex-officio but some 
by election, it can be suggested that representation reflects also 
the interest of members of the School in putting up for election, 
as well as the perceived suitability of members of the School to be 
members of Senate. Difference in representation is not necessarily 
related to the size of the School, as the table shows. The School of 
Management, for example, has thirty-four staff members and four rep­
resentatives, whereas the School of Biological Sciences has thirty- 
seven staff members and two representatives. Chemical Engineering 
with eight staff members also has two representatives. It can be 
assumed that the fewer the staff being represented the better chance 
they have of influencing their representative, however, this could 
be offset in committee by the perception of other members that the 
representative "only" represents a small School and also by non- 
attendance by the representative. The optimum situation for 
constituents would therefore seem to be membership of a large school
but with a large number of representatives in the Senate, aid moreover,
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TABLE 4 Summary of Table 3 by Areas













Tech. 90 13 95 6.9 0.95 1
Sci. 146 13 75 11.2 1.95 3
Arts 119 15 101 7.93 1.18 2
Two further factors have to be taken into account, however, one 
being whether a representative who does not always attend, does 
attend when issues important to the School are beind discussed, and 
the other is the skill with which the representative deals with the
committee.(2)
It is interesting to note that although Science is seen by many 
people as powerful in the university, it is not well represented 
on the Senate in terms of the evidence given in Table 4. Moreover, 
Modern Languages, which appears to some people to be in a relatively 
weak position in the university because it is the only pure arts 
School, is better represented than most. It may be that Schools 
and Areas which feel themselves to be at a disadvantage take more 
trouble to be represented on decision-making committees such as the 
Senate, and regard attendance as more important to them. The School 
of Biological Sciences' representation is particularly low by com­
parison with the numbers of staff in the School, and it is also a 
School in which there has been considerable disquiet expressed over
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its representation at the Area Committee. It may be that people 
in this School feel that Area representation is more important to 
them than Senate representation, and that, as one informant 
suggested, committees compete with each other, in this instance 
for the involvement and interest of the staff. People will perhaps 
tend to spend their time and energy on those committees which they 
consider to provide the best return on their investment^
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INFERENCES
1. The nature of a committee, its formal and informal power and 
its purpose, can be ambiguous, thus enabling different individuals 
to take differing views of its value. Deciding to participate and 
be active in a committee is presumably a function of (a) wanting to 
achieve or avoid something and (b) seeing that committee as a means
of achieving and/or avoiding it. Participation in a committee appears 
to change one’s view of its power and purpose, but where people have 
a choice of whether to join or not, one can assume that they already
think it worth while before they become members.
2. The question is raised as to whether it makes sense to talk about
committees having power, or whether it is more realistic to say. that
certain individuals who are committee members have power and exercise 
it through influencing other committee members. The perception of
a committee as being powerful or not depends, of course, on the 
perception that it exists.
3» Membership of two or more committees in a decision-making chain
may provide individuals or sub-groups of such committees with power 
to manipulate them. However, there is a danger in looking for uni­
directional causation when considering which committee is more 
powerful. It may be nearer reality»to say that such committees 
influence each other, and this enables some people to say that the
one committee is the more powerful, and others to say that the other
committee is, both with justification.
4. , Participants reflecting on*committees may present a tidy, 
rationalistic view of the cause and effect of influence, but this
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presumably represents their personal ground rules for political 
action, since these "rational" views of different people may not 
agree. The question arises as to whether people’s behaviour within 
a committee is governed by their perceptions of the, committee, or 
whether their perceptions are governed by the way in which they 
wish to act.
5- Whether or not representation on formal decision-making committees 
is a political advantage to a group can be seen as depending on a 
number of factors: the numbers of representatives in relation to
the numbers of constituents in the group, the actual attendances 
at committees of those representatives and the coincidence of their 
attendance with issues important to the group, the relative.importance 
of a particular committee on which the group is represented in com­
parison with other committees, the quality of communication between
'
the representatives and their constituents, and the skill with which 
the representatives deaü. with the committee. Being represented by 
those who are perceived by other committee members to be powerful 
may also be more important than the number of representatives.
6. "Rubber stamp" committees can be dangerous, since they may 
accept recommendations of group A which are disadvantageous to 
group B, without the committee being fully aware of the implications 
of its acquiescense.
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(ii) The Vice Chancellor’s Advisory Committee. The VCAC consists 
of the Vice Chancellor, two Pro-Vice Chancellors, three Area 
Chairmen, and the Principal Administrative Officer. Membership 
therefore changes as different individuals take up these roles.
When considering the applications to the University Research Fund, 
the committee becomes the Research Fund Committee (RFC). Unlike the 
Senate and Council, this committee is not set up by statute.
Perceptions of the Deciders group about the power of the RFC to decide
about the allocation of the research fund are indicated by statements
that ’’the absolute priority over all areas is determined by the RFC’’
and ’’The VCAC makes the ultimate decision on who gets grants. It
sets the policy and decides accordingly’’. But some constraints on
that power were indicated: ’’the RFC sticks to the priorities of
the Area Committees’’, ’’On the question of prioritising in principle
we evaluate the projects scientifically, but in practice there has
(1)to be equitable sharing - a kind of rough justice’’.
It would appear that at the RFC meeting the main argument is over 
the split of funds between the Areas, as to how many awards each is 
going to get, on the basis of what is to be considered ’’fair’’.
Comments were made reflecting views of the role of committee members 
in this process. "You know the composition of the meeting. The Area 
Chairmen are there to represent their areas, and the PVC’c - they 
have the lists in front of them and come to an agreement on what 
seems fair". When questioned about the Area Chairman "representing" 
the Areas the interviewee did not want to say that they were rep­
resentatives. (One can see that, other considerations apart, this 
would raise the question of who the PVC’s "represent"). Instead it
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was suggested that "Six rational people try to make the best 
decision".
Other informants were less squeamish on the question of representation: 
"The RFC look - unconsciously, although they say they don’t - 
everyone wants something for their own area (laughing) - they’re 
prejudiced towards a fair distribution. This is not consciously 
expressed. It is not done on the basis of numbers of students in 
each area or anything like that". "At the VCAC everyone tries to 
get the best for their own school (sic), but also for the university 
as a whole".
It can be said that people in the Deciders group would have liked to
have been able to say that the RFC was looking for the best
applications, but had to admit that it was in fact a question of
sharing out the money fairly, and what someone referred to as
(2)"the horse trading that goes on".
Some doubts were expressed about the fairness of representation at 
the RFC, thereby reinforcing the view of it as "representing" the 
interests of particular groups. "The RFC is the VCAC in a different 
guise. Perhaps that isn't right - it used to be an independent 
research committee with people on it not necessarily VCAC members.
I doubt if it is entirely free from bias. Each Area Chairman is 
present but also the PVCs who come from two of the Areas, so there 
is a built-in imbalance. There is a science bias because science 
has more departments. The VC is a physicist and doesn’t have much 
feel for engineering." Of course, to some people this imbalance 
is an advantage. "It is a small committee and with Iain and Ray 
on it there is almost bound to be something for the School of
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Management", a comment which suggests that it is School bias, not
(4)just an Area bias which operates at the meeting.
Because people try to say that the RPC decides between applications 
on the basis of an evaluation of their merits, i.e. that the "best" 
applications are awarded, people who accept this "merit" theory 
of KFC decision-making may also doubt the fairness of the out­
come because they do not think that such a committee can make 
such decisions in the circumstances. Apart from the comments that 
they would be unable to assess the merit of applications in fields 
in which they were not expert, it was suggested that they are not 
provided with sufficient information in order to make a proper
judgement. It seems easier to substsintiate the "rough.justice" of
(3)the decision if it is not seen as based on merit.
On the question of it being a "rational" decision, a member of 
the Applicants group suggested that a "carve up" of funds between 
areas was a more "rational" solution than giving money to the best 
applications, which might then be concentrated in one Area, and 
another commented, "I feel that it starts with relatively rational 
criteria, and becomes rather less rational as it progresses through 
the system". The RFC is the last point in the decision-making 
process of any significance, and the least "rational" on this view, 
but it should also be noted here that the RFC is also the least 
accessible committee to any applicant. One member of the applicants 
group however wanted to hold staunchly to the view that the RFC made 
its decisions on the basis of merit, i.e. back to the idea of 
evaluating the projects "scientifically". "The merit of the present
-  114 -
system is that the best applications from the whole university
would get awards from the fund". Although challenged with evidence
that even at school level the system was being turned into an
allocation system rather than a merit system, he was reluctant
(2)to give way, "That's going a bit too far".
On the question of whether the RFC "really" makes decisions, or 
simply goes through a facade of decision-making and arrives at 
foregone conclusions, it was clear that interviewees in the 
Deciders group could not easily predict the outcome. Some 
attempts at prediction were made: "We will get at least five •
awards and not more than twenty'(a wide margin of error thisl)
"We are likely to get two grants and two studentships", "You 
can make an intelligent guess how many grants Technology might 
get, say four or six". This last prediction was the only accurate 
one if "grants" here means "awards", as it probably did, in that 
each Area received four studentships in the event.
Because the outcome of the RFC deliberations is not easily pred­
ictable, the allocations are sometimes not as expected by those who 
try to see what basis is being used for the decision. Hence this 
comment, "The rules have been chainged, not at Area level but at 
RFC level. We infer the change of rules from the answers we get". 
That is, if the RFC only awards studentships, this is taken as a 
decision rule that grants are out. Uncertainty about the decision 
rules was also reflected in this comment by a member of the Decider 
group, "The problem is that the rules change... Last year there 
seemed to be a priority that no-one over lecturer grade would get an 
award, but they won’t say so definitely"^^^^^^
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One committee member who was aware there was an element of allocation 
of funds between Areas at the meeting, and that this was subject to
change, nevertheless expected such changes to be small. "All
funding is done this way. You start with the historic or existing 
pattern and then adjust it slightly. Like doing equations, you are
less likely to make a mistake if you go by small adjustments"^^
In the event, the "historic" 6-4-2 split between Science, Technology 
and Arts areas respectively, was radically changed to a 4-4-4 split, 
and one member of the Deciders group commented that people in his 
area were very upset at this result, especially at the Arts Area 
"getting so much".
Because of the unpredictability of the outcome, it wais suggested by
one committee member that it was necessary to find out "which way
the wind is blowing", in advance, and with a wide variety of decision-
criteria to choose from (see p.248) it is necessary to have a good
(6)idea which ones are going to turn into deciding issues. For example, 
if you put forward a large number of applications for grants, and 
then the committee decides to award only studentships, your Area 
may lose out.
With a variety of criteria to choose from it is also possible to 
use them selectively in support of one's own case. For example, if 
one Area Chairman wants to say that another should get fewer student­
ships, he can raise the question of whether the applications of the 
other Areas are really comparable in academic merit with his own.
Or if one Area has put forward named students for its studentship 
applications, but the Area Chairman sees that another Area has not 
done so, he cein raise this as an issue. A further example concerns
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the criterion sometimes cited that studentships should be for new, 
young or junior staff, although not everyone approves of this 
criterion. As one Area Chairman put it, "my applicants are not 
inexperienced people, and this might become an issue at the meeting
(6 )(7 )if someone chooses to raise it".
As far as the procedures adopted in this committee and the quality
of its interactions are concerned, information was not too easy to
obtain, because as someone commented, "it is a very private meeting"-
Most committee members becsime uneasy when asked direct questions
.about it. It was interesting to note that this very privacy could
be used as a political weapon at the meeting. One member said that
on one occasion he had threatened to take an issue outside the meeting
and that this had induced other members to make a concession. Such
(8)a threat is "always a good point in negotiating’*.
The procedure used at the meeting is not clear. One informant told 
me that on a previous occasion the Chairman had himself proposed 
that they should start the RFC with the basis that eight of the 
available studentships should go to science, that is, there was an 
opening bid from the Chair. However, when I asked the Chairman 
whether he started off the meeting by suggesting an allocation 
between Areas he replied, "There is no set procedure. It changes 
every time and how it’s done depends on who is present". This 
flexibility of approach is consistent with other information, and 
the comment also suggests that the Chairman does not entirely control 
the procedure at the meeting and that there is the chance for oppor­
tunistic initiative, all of which would be consistant with other data.
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However, another informant stated that the procedure of taking agenda 
items in turn which was followed at the meeting, could affect the 
fortunes of a particular Area, and it would appear that being first 
on the Agenda, and thereby being the first to speak for your Area, 
could be an advantage. This would suggest that there is some
procedure which is routinely followed, and that this could affect
 ̂  ̂ (6) (9) (10) decision outcomes. '
Perceptions of the quality of interaction at the meeting varied from,
"There is a friendly atmosphere - although I don't know what will
happen to that if the economic climate declines" to comments about
"the fighting" and "the lion's den". 'T cruelly knocked him down"
was how one member described the way he had dealt with the argument
of another. Although there did not seem to be a pre^meeting cabal,
and indeed the short time-scale between the circulation of the agenda
and papers and the meeting itself would make that difficult, it was
clear that people from the same Area did discuss issues beforehand
and that there were alliances formed between committee members.
In some ways it appears to be a kind of bridge game in which people
calculate the value of their own cards, those of their allies, and
those of their opponents, and play accordingly. It is apparently
the practice to hold the RFC meeting immediately following a regular
meeting of the VCAC, and there is evidence that what happens in the
preceding meeting spills over into the interaction at the RFC. One
member who had been attacked at the VCAC, reported that he "was not
(ll)disposed to give way" on an issue at the RFC as a result.
There was not much data about the VCAC from the Applicants group, for 
the reasons already suggested, that they have no direct access to this
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meeting and little information emerges from it because of its 
private■nature. Many of its papers are on a restricted circulation, 
and as already mentioned, mainy people in the Applicants group had 
little awareness of this committee. Those who were aware of it, 
mostly thought it powerful, but one applicant commented that although 
he had heard the VCAC was powerful in its way, he did not believe 
that the real power in the university resided in official committees.
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INFERENCES
1. Although a committee may be seen as powerful in that it can 
really make decisions rather than ratifying or in other ways "rubber 
stamping" decisions made by others, it may nevertheless need to be 
able to justify the decision to other members of the organisation.
2. The basis of the justification may clash with people's values 
on the one hand, or with the rationale for the entire procedure on 
the other. So, saying that the basis of the decision is academic 
merit is compatible with values held by people in the organisation 
that academic merit should win out, but it reveals that a justifiable 
decision is impossible to make on that basis by this committee. On 
the other hand, saying that the basis of the decision is an allocation 
of resources between Areas enables the decision to be seen as justi­
fiable, in the sense that it is possible for such a committee to
make such a decision (even if they get it wrong sometimes), but 
will offend those people who think the allocation should be on merit.
3 . The membership of a committee and the roles of participants are 
also part of the justification of its decisions. If the basis of 
decision is allocation of resources and the roles of participants 
"representatives" of groups, is the representation evenly balanced?
Is it an equal contest? If the basis of the decision is specialist 
knowledge, are participants sufficiently well informed, both through 
their own knowledge and the information provided, to make this 
decision?
4. Representative status cannot be shaken off at will. The 
expectation of interested observers that you will represent their
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interests (which you are seen to share) results in pressure to be 
partisan, even if you are yourself prepared to give up an opportunity 
of advantage to your own group for the sake of some more global 
consideration.
5- Where open information about a committee and its deliberations 
is not available, people will make inferences about the bases of 
its decision-making from what they know of its members and also from 
its previous decisions on the same issue. So its decision rules 
will be inferred from previous decisions and people will act 
accordingly in trying to influence the committee in their favour. 
Disatisfaction will result when the rules do not appear to be 
consistent between one decision and the next over the same issue.
6. Participants in the committee may find that uncertainty or lack 
of consensus about the criteria to be applied in making a decision 
provides them with both political resources and also the danger of 
attack by others. Being able to justify the use of the criteria most 
helpful to your own cause therefore becomes important. Chance can 
also play a part in swinging a decision in your favour, as when you 
just happen to be first on the agenda and this turns out to be crucial 
in obtaining what you want.
7. While ambiguity of procedures, roles and rules may be of use 
to committee members they can cause confusion and disatisfaction to 
onlookers who have an interest in decision outcomes.
8. Where a committee is regarded as private, this can be used as a 
political resource by disgruntled participants who can threaten to 
make its deliberations public. This is particularly the case where
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members attend as of right and presumably therefore cannot be 
"voted off" the committee.
9. In group decision-making some method for proceeding to a 
conclusion has to be followed, and this method structures the 
decision-making process. It is possible that being able to pre­
structure a decision for a group confers power on whoever does it 
to control the outcome. A committee chairman is in a good position 
to try to establish a procedure whereby he or she can pre-structure 
the decision, but is likely to be vigorously opposed in this by 
group members who perceive the chairman to be biased against their 
interests, and would not want to see this bias permanently built 
into the decision-making procedure,whether formally or by "custom 
and practice". If the chairman fails to establish this right for 
the chair, it is open for committee members to attempt to seize
it for themselves when they have the opportunity. This is one of 
the ways in which the procedure of decision-making can itself become 
a political issue.
10. People's perceptions of group decision-making processes can be 
influenced by their ways of thinking in other fields. They can also 
be misled by apparent similarities between committees and fail to 
notice important differences, such as the effect of a committee 
membership which changes fairly frequently vis a vis a stable 
membership. It makes a difference who is on the committee, particularly 
when it is constrained by few formal rules. "The RFC" is not neces­
sarily the same committee every time it meets.
11. People's behaviour in a committee may be affected by events in 
other committees with the same membership.
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(iii) Area Committees. According to informants' statements, the 
University Research Fund procedure requires the Area Committees to 
put forward their list of priorities for URF awards to the VCAC, 
which then determines who gets what. By contrast, the Equipment 
Fund is allocated, on the basis of a standard formula, to each Area, 
which then has to decide how to divide it between the Schools. The 
demands for Research Funds "bubble up" through a series of filters 
from the lecturers to the top, whereas the Equipment Fund flows 
down from the UGC via the VCAC and is divided at every stage until 
the allocations reach groups and individuals within Schools.
Each Area Committee adopts its own procedure for prioritising the 
applications to the Research Fund, and political processes differ in 
the three Areas. In all three Areas, applications are received by 
Heads of Schools, who are as of right members of the Area Committee. 
In Technology I was told that a referee from within the Area and 
one from outside it (but in a related discipline) are asked to 
prioritise the applications, and their decision is not questioned by 
the Area Committee. In the Arts Area, grading is also done across 
the Area by a referee from within the Area, but this csm, in theory 
at any rate, be adjusted by the committee. The Area Committee 
decides on the overall priority - i.e. just which grade A applica­
tions should be at the top of the list. In Science, a draft ranking 
across the Area is done by the Area Chairman, the applications 
having been refereed by Professors in relevant fields, and this
ranking is discussed and a final version agreed by the Area 
(6)Committee. It seems clear from these procedures that the Technology 
Area Committee has the least power of decision over the Research
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Fund applications^ According to informants, in none of the Area 
Committees is the academic content of the applications discussed, 
but where applications are discussed at all, it is over questions of 
whether applicants are younger members of staff, or which School's 
turn is it to be first on the list, or what the VCAC's criteria 
are likely to be.
In two of the three Areas, it was claimed that no attempt was made
to allocate the priorities for applications fairly across the Schools.
"You need high quality applications to put forward to the VCAC" (in
spite of the fact that the VCAC appears not to consider the content
of applications). On the other hand, in one of these Areas where it
was said that no attempt was made at fair distribution, it was also
said that, "At the meeting Heads of Schools are present. All know
the situation in the Schools. It becomes a personal thing. The
chances of imbalance between Schools are small. Taking one year
(7)with another each has a fair crack of the whip". This suggests 
that although no overt, official attempt at fair distribution is 
made, there is perceived an informal process by which this distribu­
tion is arrived at. However, it should be said that the perception 
of a fair outcome is not universally shared by members of the 
Applicants group, nor by some members of the Deciders group who 
are not on the Committee.
In the third Area it was clear that a deliberate attempt was made 
to give each School an opportunity to gain Research Fund Awards by 
rotating the School priorities so that each year a different School's 
"A" graded applications would appear at the top of the Area priority
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list. But in this Area, too, members of the Applicants group 
could be found who did not regard the system as fair.
The importance of the Area structure as such is seen differently by
different people. One person did not see the Area as impinging
much on his own concerns: "I am not really aware of the Area level.
It is way above my head". Another informant doubted its importance
to most people. "There is probably more control within the Schools
than most people realise. Many people stay within their School and
are not interested in cutting across Schools, so for most people in
(2)their everyday work, the Areas are not very powerful". However, 
he went on to say that at a certain level the Areas are powerful in
that any money coming into the Area is split by the Area Committee,
and that they also decide priorities on appointments.
Another informant was in no doubt about the importance of the Area 
because of its function in allocating resources, particularly because 
he did not believe the allocation was fair. "The Area is very 
important to us. We don’t get as much from it as we should in 
relation to our size and the amount of work done". Another informant 
from the same Area but in a different School had the impression that 
his School was doing better now than in the past but could not be 
certain. "I have never broken down the figures to find out who 
gets what." This suggests that he felt the information was avail­
able to him should he want to know, but also that inequality for his 
School was no longer a major issue to him at leis?^
Unfairness was put down by some informants to the imbalance in the 
representation of the various Schools in the Area Committee, where
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each School has one voice, regardless of size. One informant who had
a "vague feeling" that the imbalance in representation was detrimental
said he couldn’t be sure what effect it has because he did not know
(1)who was on the Committee or who made the decisions. This suggests 
a perception that who is on the Committee, and whether the Committee 
really makes decisions are important factors in deciding on the 
implications of a particular structure. However, this question of 
representation was said in one Area to be a "politically contentious 
point", and was a theme which recurred in data from that Area.
Two examples show how, in different ways, representation of particular 
disciplines on an Area Committee can become an issue. In the first 
case, the subject Group which felt aggrieved was large, and larger 
than one of the Schools in the same Area, but was not directly 
represented because it was not a School. It was felt therefore that 
the full importance of the Group and its needs was not made sufficiently 
apparent in Area meetings. By contrast, another, small. School felt 
itself to be in a weak position because its discipline differed very 
considerably from the rest oi the Area. Although it was directly 
represented, its needs were not understood by other members of the 
Committee. It was suggested that without the backing of a large 
School behind you, you do not carry sufficient weight in the meeting.
"At the Area Committee we are not backed by strog support of people 
who know what subjects like ours are all about, whereas other
(3)professors go into the meeting with this support."
The comment that the Area Committee is "that mysterious body with 
no legal status" and another that "the prime concern of our Area
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Committee is for each member to fight for the interests of his own 
School, not to benefit the Area as a whole. I am cynical about the 
Area Committee for that reason", cast doubt on the perceived 
legitimacy of the Area Committees. The Committees were also seen as 
being set up for administrative convenience "probably good for the 
VC and Mawditt, since it simplifies the administration - they only 
have three people to deal with" and also as a tactical ploy on 
the VC's part "... it is simply a way of enabling the VC to avoid 
talking to us directly^î
Being Area Chairman gives you a place on the VCAC, but there was a 
suggestion that this was not necessarily welcomed. "You hear people 
saying they must decide who's going to be Chairman next, and they 
hope it's not them^.
The question also arose as to whether the Areas each received their 
fair share of resources. One informant, who was on a Board of 
Studies and therefore received Area Committee papers, said that he 
had no information on which to assess the balance between the Areas, 
since although he had information about his own Area, he knew nothing 
of the other two. Another informant on the other hand was quite 
clear about the situation. "There is too much Social Science. It 
is not useful", suggesting that the Arts and Social Science Area 
should have less of the cake. A similar view was shared by another 
informant who thought that Technology and Science should be treated 
as equal partners, with Arts as less than equal, and was not happy 
that the Arts Area should have been given an equal number of Research 
Fund Studentships - Cinderella should not be allowed to go to the ball,
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It should perhaps be noted here that people were able to form an 
impression of how resources were divided, without having any firm 
evidence, as suggested by the statement, "I think engineering and
science get the bulk of the studentships. That's my impression
(8)(10)(11) though I have no figures."
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INFERENCES
1. In setting up a structure, some people become excluded from 
decision-making processes in which they feel they ought to take part. 
Such people may become disatisfied with this situation, even if there 
is no firm evidence that they lose out as a result.
2. The perceived importance of a committee depends upon the issues
it discusses, as these are important to the perceiver at a particular 
time. So, for most day-to-day purposes a committee may have no 
importance and impinge very little on the lives of individuals. It 
may therefore only be perceived as powerful as it comes to deal with 
a matter of importance to the perceiver at that time (which may be 
never).
3. The power of a participant in a committee depends on the external 
structures which provide the committee's context, and which affect 
the perceptions of committee members, i.e. what they understand and 
attach value to. The power of a group external to a committee, on the 
other hand, depends on what their representative at the committee 
understcinds and attaches value to.
4. The setting up of a structure can be seen as a political act, 
designed to advantage a particular individual or group setting it 
up.
5. A variety of procedures may be adopted by different groups to 
deal with the same type of decision, some of these procedures giving 
more power to individuals and other more power to groups in decision­
making.
-  129 -
6. The question is raised as to what extent being able to pre­
structure a decision i.e. to put forward a priority order of 
applications, which other people are then invited to agree to in
a group, confers power on the person who pre-structures the decision.
7. Where values conflict, i.e. "fairness" as against "high quality" 
the one may be overtly acknowledged (probably whichever is congruent with
the prevailing value with which decision-makers wish to be identified)
and built into the decision-making process, whereas the other may
be allowed to "happen" informally.
8. People may take a view of an appropriate "pecking order" between 
different decision-making groups which are ostensibly or formally of 
equal status, and this pecking order may be based on values held by 
the perceiver, rather than on information about the groups in 
question or their actual political activities or influence.
9. The legitimacy of a decision-making body may be called in 
question if some committees in the organisation have legal status 
and this one does not and if, at the same time, the committee is 
seen as infringing values held by the perceiver.
10. People may make little effort to find out if they are being
fairly treated if they have no reason to suppose that they are being 
unfairly treated. In these circumstances they may assume that the 
necessary information would be made available to them should they 
wish to check on this.
11. The setting up of structures brings with it the need to make 
decisions about how resources are to be allocated between distinct
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groups where the grounds for an unequal distribution may be 
difficult to justify on any demonstrably fair basis. Moreover, 
the more people become locked into their group in the structure the 
more difficult it becomes to assess the claims of other groups.
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(iv) Boards of Studies. Data about Boards of Studies come primarily 
from the Applicants group. They showed a variety of perceptions 
about these School level committees.
There were no statements indicating that Boards of Studies were seen 
as very powerful in the university, perhaps the strongest being that 
the Board of Studies was "the governing body of the School". Its 
power, in so far as it was seen as having any, was largely indirect.
For example, it could "filibuster and delay things", or could influence 
the RFC through the Senate, which receives minutes of Board of Studies 
meetings, by making "public" statements about the RFC decisions. It 
was also seen by one informant as being able to limit the power of 
the Head of School. "Heads of Schools can't push things through 
unless they get the Board of Studies to agree. It's like President 
Carter and the Senate." However, another informant said that the 
Board of Studies meetings were largely "a monologue from the Chair 
(Head of School). Giving information down and passing information 
up", which does not suggest much control on that Head of School. 
However, an informant from another School saw the "monologue" from 
the Chair in his School as a deliberate manipulation of the Chairman 
by the participants at the meeting, who usually wanted to avoid 
raising issues at the Board of Studies. Other informants did not 
see Boards of Studies as being of much value. They were seen as 
"not doing anything much" by one informant, and another reported 
that his last Board of Studies had been cancelled through lack of
... ^ j.(l)(2)anything to discuss.
It was pointed out that the Board of Studies was in competition with
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other committees and with "the professoriat" for influence, and
it was generally seen as being concerned with internal School academic
matters, rather than with wider university issues or matters of fin-
(2)ancial resources. Again the question of representation arose. The 
constitution of a Board of Studies is such that there is an imbalance 
across subject groups in representation. It was pointed out that 
it was possible for some subject groups to go unrepresented, while 
others had more than one member. However, this did not seem to be 
such an important issue as representation at Area level, perhaps 
because the Boards of Studies are not concerned with the allocation 
of resources. However, that they do have some importance to some 
people in some situations was suggested by the following comment:
"The power of the Board of Studies really lies in the block. A 
proportion of members are elected so there is not a balance between 
groups. So a group of people can have the issue all cut and dried
before the meeting, and at the meeting they all vote together."
This suggests that although some Board of Studies meetings may be seen 
as monologues or non-events, others have sufficient significance for
people to tcike the trouble to "pack" them and develop a voting
. (1) (2) strategy.
One informant thought that being on a Board of Studies would be use­
ful in providing insight into "how the place works". Another drew a
distinction between political activity and being a committee member.
"I don't wcint to get involved in politics. I am on the Board of 
Studies but this is useful committee experience. Every member of the 
staff should do their sentence on the Board of Studies." This person 
clearly did not see being a committee member as being in itself a
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political act, an attempt to influence the decision-making 
process, although he thought that the committee itself had influencé!
The discussion of perceptions of the various committees as revealed 
by the data will be rounded off by noting that opinions about 
whether power was to be found in official committees or elsewhere 
were varied. Two examples will illustrate these perceptions:
"I suspect that real power is not in official committees but in the
ad hoc gatherings of individuals in smoke-filled rooms", and, by




1. Committees of the same status, purpose and composition can 
yet be seen as differing in power, perhaps on account of, and 
resulting in the inter-active style which develops in the committee. 
The Chairman of one may dominate the committee, but of another may 
have to negotiate with it. So, the structural opportunities for 
power are differently used.
2. People do not necessarily see committees as being powerful or 
important, even when they are themselves involved in them. This 
appears to be related to perceptions of the importance of the issues 
dealt with. For example, committees dealing with resources tend to 
be seen as more important than ones dealing with academic matters. 
One can surmise that this judgement would be stronger in times of 
economic scarcity, but when resources are fairly easy to come by, 
perhaps "academic" issues would be seen as more important than 
"resource" issues, and the status of the relevant committees there­
fore change. In this way characteristics of the organisation’s 
environment could affect peroeptions of the status of formal 
committees in the organisation.
3 . It is possible to see committee membership as a neutral admin­
istrative task for oneself, even when other people in the same 
committee are perceived as acting politically. This seems to 
subscribe to the view that in order to beha-ve politically you have 
to intend to do so, regardless of whether other people make any use 
of one's a-political behaviour for political purposes of their own.
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4. Saying that a committee is only powerful to the extent that 
it deals with issues perceived by any particular observer as 
important, raises the question of whether a committee can be said 
to be "objectively" powerful. Can one say that, regardless of 
what suiyone in the system thinks, a committee "really" does make 
decisions which have an "important" impact on the organisation's 
members? It is difficult to see how this question could ever be 
answered, since one would apparently end up at best with a unanimous, 
consensus, or majority view of whether it was powerful or not.
On the other hand, saying that any committee which is seen as 
powerful, will be powerful, also presents difficulties, in that 
people can be misinformed about a committee, for example in thinking 
that it discusses issues which it does not in fact discuss.
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(c) The formation of Groups. Apart from the formal committees, 
the organisation csui be structured through the formation of Groups. 
Some of these, such as the "professoriat" and the "administration" 
have already been mentioned. Within the School organisation there 
are officially designated subject Groups, and grouping of people 
around subjects of study and teaching would be an expected source 
of structuring the organisation. People seemed to vary, however, 
in their perception of the existence of such grouping. For example, 
someone in the Deciders group commented "maybe it's a team effort 
with three or four people working on the same topic area. This 
is especially so in Science... though in the Arts area you can 
also find a number of people moving in the same direction - separate 
but connected topics". Another comment, "The student (Research 
student) becomes part of a team - for example, about eight people - 
all working on the same project". A member of the Applicants 
Group, also in Science saw things differently. "We are all in 
separate disciplines and tend to be one-offs, not related to each 
other's work. There are very few, if any, teams." Or, "I work 
on my own", was a comment from the Arts area. In the Technology 
area too, there were different perceptions about being in groups. 
From one School, "We work in teams, on major projects. Only one 
person is one-off". From another, "We all have different research 
interests, so you might say there are as many groups as people in 
the School". Another clearly saw himself as working in a group 
with several other collelgues^^^^
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One person commented that a professor was deliberately trying to
build a group around a subject interest: "He doesn't positively
prohibit people from pursuing their own independent lines of
research, but thinks that in order to do research well the focus
(4)of attention should be in one direction". However, another comment
was that there was very little collaboration in the university
between professors and more junior staff: "Few staff collaborate
with senior people." A contrast was drawn with the German
system, where a junior member of staff was said to work with a
professor until a certain standard of research is reached. However,
it was also said that there was collaboration over the running of
courses. "The orientation is towards teaching in collaboration
(1)(2)rather than research in collaboration."
One reason for the absence of groups based on subject interests seems 
to be that several people are the only specialist in their field 
of study in the university, or, where there are others in their 
field, they are not in the same School or the same Area, and there­
fore do not form a Gro&^^ When it comes to matters such as 
applications for the Research Fund, competition between staff can 
prevent interaction on this subject. "There is not much discussion 
between colleagues about applications. I came from a university 
where it was the norm, but I don't do it here because other people 
tend not to do it to me. There is an element of competition between 
staff," It was also suggested that people do not see siny particular 
need to discuss subjects or anything else with their colleagues:
"The Schools tend to be rather insulated in the Area - people don't
-  138 -
talk to others - they don't have to and they can keep themselves 
to themselves". Another comment, "There is a threshold where you 
can operate by yourself virtually. Within this you can get the
(3)things you want...".
Some people felt that there were opportunities for social inter­
action on an informal basis: "In the SCR the bridge players meet
every day, smd the snooker group. Then there are the alcoholics 
who are always found in the bar". "The SCR is a good place for
meeting and chatting, playing snooker, hearing what other people
(4)think of the Board of Studies they've been in."
But more comments were made pointing out the limitations on this 
interaction: "You will also find that in the SCR people sit in
groups with people of their own School" was a fairly general comment. 
One person felt that it was not possible to cross the boundary of 
another group, "If you were to go to the wrong group they would 
drop dead with shock. They would make it so uncomfortable for you 
that you wouldn't try it again. They wouldn't talk to you". Another 
thought the barriers were less formidable, "Hens flock together, 
white hens and red hens, but I don't think a white hen would be 
pecked to death if it strayed into a red hens' comer^^
One member of the Deciders group said that the fact that the School 
met at the same time and in the same place for coffee each day 
was very useful, and was used instead of formal group meetings,
"I know where to find people smd they me". However, another Decider 
commented: "I tend not to go to the SCR - I tend not to know people
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and therefore I don’t talk to them. I have written off that side 
of things. They are more like amorphous colleagues than people I
There were also people who saw no point in discussion with others, 
and preferred not to get involved. "In Science you learn to cut 
through, do your own work and not bother about the rest of it. 
Contributions of other staff apd of Head of Group would not be 
useful." A technologist commented, "I don’t mind as long as they 
leave me alone. I don’t get involved in the rest of the university". 
Someone from the Arts area said "I am very narrow minded. I don’t 
think about other parts of the university^^
By contrast, one scientist regretted that there was not more discussion 
across specialisms: "It’s a pity we don’t meet more people from
other Schools, because you can pick up tips by talking to people 
across disciplines, for example, if you are looking for a method of 
doing something, someone in another science might have an idea".
These differences in view about the value of interaction with other 
people do not seem to be related to the type of subject, but to 
the person’s preferred way of being in the organisation and/or 
their experience of interaction with o^tierŝ
This may be related to the perceiver’s role in the orgsinisation.
The VC for example seemed to be seeing the academic staff as a 
relatively cohesive group when he said, (in answer to a question 
about the disincentive effects of people applying for research 
awards and not getting them) "They ought not to be depressed.
Research has increased enormously in the last five years so they
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should be very pleased at the amount that is being done." This 
suggests a view of academic staff with a high level of identifica­
tion with the university as a whoie] An alternative view was 
suggested by an administrator who said, "Academics are individualists, 
starting to specialise from the age of fifteen or so, and getting 
narrower and narrower interests" who "don’t want to spend time" on
(3)the university as a whole. It may be that the administrator’s 
role, which brings him into closer contact with academics on a 
day-to-day basis, enables him to be more aware of the individual 
interests of academics, and the VC, being rather more remote, over­
estimates the extent to which one academic can offset his or her 
own feelings of disappointment by contemplating the success of 
others. The reputation of the university as a whole is clearly of 
some consequence to academics, as witness the arguments over whether 
it should be called a "University of Technology" or not, and it is 
presumably of major importance to the VC, but the data on group form­
ation suggest that for many people identification with the organisa-
(3)(4)tion as a whole is not of major importance.
One reason suggested for the absence of social interaction was the 
physical properties of the campus. The distance of the South Building 
from the rest of the university, including the SCR, was one example. 
Also the internal arrangements of the buildings themselves were 
cited as barriers, "You don’t meet people even in your own School.
The place is built with separate rooms and solid doors and no-one 
knows you’re in". Also, "There is a lack of a social area for talking 
to each other in the Schools". However, the question was also raised 
as to’Whether this is a personal or institutional failure" - is the
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absence of social interaction to do with an inadequacy in the 
individuals themselves, or in the arrangements provided by the 
institution? (There is here an implication that people ought to 
interact). Some people included in this study, the administrative 
assistants, are debarred from using the SCR, so are not able to use 
it for whatever interaction there is, but make their own arrange­
ments for meetings between them over coffee. Since they are each 
in a different School this would appear to be the only informal 
inter-School meeting that takes place. According to informants this 
particular Group have a common grievance over their salary structure
and their coffee meetings have recently been revived after being
( 3 ) Wallowed to lapse for some time.
There were some indications in the data that informants saw the 
forming of Groups and informal social interactions as having political 
implications. One example was where a School was said to have adopted 
a deliberate policy of forming alliances with another group: "Admin
has always found us co-operative, pleasant and not ’anti'. This is 
part of our internal policy". Some alliances might be extremely 
temporary, as when people combine at a Committee meeting over a 
particular issue: "X and I gang up against the other group, but
sometimes X gets a pay-off from advantages they get, so he is not . 
always on my side". Others may be longer lasting, as when a group 
of people combined to try to get changes made : "In the past the
staff in the School have banded together to try to get some 
improvement", although this strategy was seen as having failed!
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The importance of getting information informally was pointed out 
by one member of the Deciders Group, "You have to assess how the 
central body is thinking - which way the VC is thinking. You do 
this by getting him talking. I’m not trying to extract information 
unfairly. You can read the signs over the last few years, and ask 
what did they anticipate?" It is interesting to note that this 
informant was sinxious to be seen as not being manipulative in 
thus deliberately setting out to find information informally.
Another person with no such qualms said, "The SCR is a good place for 
information. You can arrange to sit next to someone "accidentally’? 
making it look natural, then discuss with them what you want. If 
you can convince them in fifteen to twenty minutes nver lunch or
coffee, you have a good chance. Then you put it through the formal
(«(6)system".
The forming of alliances through patronage was also seen as politic­
ally valuable, for example, as a means of access to more powerful 
people: "I always go to my Head of Group if I want anything, who
in turn goes to the Head of School if necessary", the Head of Group 
in this case being the patron of the interviewee. Patrons may also 
provide information and other resources directly, and the patron- 
protege group could also be seen as somewhat set apart from the 
formal university system. This is because patrons may not only 
have a role in the university but also in an academic field of 
research and teaching which crosses organisational boundaries. This 
extra-mural role may be seen as more important to the protege than 
the university role, particularly when it provides a short cut to 
resources which the university would provide only through a
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laborious process. As one protege put it: "It is too much effort 
to try to influence the system. I find the easy way roun&^ii^!
It should also be emphasised that while some people experienced the 
level of social interaction as deficient, others seemed quite happy 
with the present situation. On the question of working in teams 
generally, or being able to discuss their subject interests with 
others, people also varied as to whether the absence of these 
opportunities was felt as something lacking. In one School, where 
the subject groups did not function except on paper, none of the 
people I spoke to seemed to find any disadvantage in their absence, 
as a means of grouping people together. Another informant found 
the official grouping of subjects actually divided up his subject 
into fragments, and his ideas about how the subject should progress 
were being thwarted by this!
Examples also occurred in the data of the failure of people to form 
alliances or act as a group. In one instance the Chairman of a* 
Committee was prevented from making a strong protest over future 
resources to be provided for the group. Because the group had failed 
to develop and keep to a policy about these resources, a decision­
maker was able to successfully adopt the strategy of "divide and 
rule", dealing with group members individually and getting some of 
them at least to agree with his view.
Another example cited was over the question of the joint purchase of 
equipment between Schools. It was suggested that Schools could not 
adopt the practice of clubbing together to buy equipment between
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them because "some people wouldn’t cough up when it came to it".
One professor was said to have refused to pay for the maintenance 
of an item which it had been agreed would be jointly purchased 
between his School and another one, now that it had been purchased.
In another instance, money had been allocated to a School for the 
purchase of some equipment which was to be housed in that School 
but used by other Schools. Once the purchase had been made, other 
Schools found themselves prevented from using the equipment!
So far I have considered the official grouping into subject groups 
and the possibilities of informal social interaction across formal 
boundaries. However, it is clear from the data that people make 
a large number of other distinctions between people and perceive 
them as groups accordingly.
The distinction between administrators and academics has already been 
mentioned. Within the administrative group, there is also the 
distinction between those who can use the Senior Common Room and 
those who cannot, and between those who relate directly to the 
Principal Administrative Officer and those who relate directly to 
their Head of School. This is roughly a distinction between Area- 
based and School-based administrators, but the groups are not 
coterminous with the SCR - non-SCR distinction.
Among the academics there are multifarious fragmentations.
Outsiders/lnsiders: Some people appear to others, or regard them­
selves as more oriented to working outside the university than inside 
it. It was suggested that by the nature of their subjects "scientists 
tend to be more academically confined, but technologists of necessity
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link with industry". Among the Outsiders are those who spend a lot 
of their time on research in outside locations, or are very heavily 
funded by outside bodies, or who are very much involved in consult­
ancy for external clients. Divisions between those who do consultancy 
and those who do not can be aggravated by jealousy, according to one 
informant. "There is a certain amount of jealousy about this.
They feel that people are not contributing to the university but 
just feathering their own nest. This is resented." It was suggested 
that Schools such as Architecture and Management were particularly 
prone to this criticism. Among the Outsiders too there is a split 
between "nationals" and "locals", according to one informant.
Eesearchers/Non-Researchers: This dichotomy was a recurring theme 
in the data*, and among the Non-Researchers there were those who were 
seen as particularly student-oriented, emphasising the importance of 
teaching, and also those who carried out administration within their 
School. Among the Researchers there were distinctions made between 
pure and applied, theoretical and experimental, scholarship-based 
and measurement-based, "real" science end "trade". Being "trade" 
oriented was a matter for scorn in some people's view but of 
positive value in others. "Scholarship-based" according to one view 
meant "the study of past answers". A distinction based on the scale 
of the work carried out was also made, for example in the Technology
*Perhaps because the data were collected around the Research Fund 
decision-making process. This makes it difficult to see how strongly 
people are conscious of this division.
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Area, Electronics was seen as being very near to Physics in 
dealing with very small items, whereas Civil Engineering was seen 
as dealing with a whole large-scale process.
Apart from these distinctions, other boundaries were drawn between
people, which seemed to be largely based on their commitment to
the organisation itself, both in time and intensity. One fairly
obvious distinction in a social system is between the older and the
younger members, and that distinction is made by university members,
as will be seen from the criteria listed on page 248. However,
distinctions are also made between those people who were members
of the organisation before it obtained its Charter as a university,
and those who joined later, some of whom would be classified as
"older". A distinction was also made between those who are ?’hard-
working and committed", and those who are "mostly not". People
who joined the university relatively recently are often seen as
representing a change of direction in the organisation, particularly
a move towards a greater research orientation, and there is. a
distinction made between those with new ideas (mostly but not
(1)(2)(4)
entirely iiewcomers) and those with "old" ideas.
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INFERENCES
1. Large numbers of distinctions can be made between different 
groups in the organisation, but these may be perceived groups of 
people who would not recognise themselves as groups. The 
distinctions made are sometimes value-loaded.
2. The existance of groups, and the basis on which they are 
formed, is a matter of perception of individuals, presumably based 
on their experience of being in a group, or excluded from one, and
on their vantage point, from which they see or do not see other
people in groups. Hence, although the organisation may seem to a 
researcher to be multifaceted structure (in the light of all the 
perceptions of individuals taken together) it does not necessarily 
seem that way to individuals in the organisation, whose "perceptual 
model" of the organisation may contain just a few groups.
3 . A number of factors may prevent the formation of groups:
(a) individuals see no need to interact with others, either to
accomplish their tasks, or for emotional reasons - what McClelland 
would call a need for affiliation.
(b) Norms of behaviour can prevent social interaction, keeping 
people out of existing groups or preventing groups from forming which 
might do so otherwise, and also, presumably, confining people to 
certain groups. These norms are learned by newcomers. Some of 
these norms may be embodied in formal rules.
(c) The physical context of the organisation may hinder social 
interaction, as may the way in which people use the physical setting.
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(d) It may be perceived that agreements, which might form the basis 
of an alliance, would not be kept.
4. Groups form around some activity or idea which becomes the 
raison d'etre of the group. The activity may exist formally as part 
of the organisation's task, or arise from ideas about how the task 
should be accomplished. It may also arise informally, as with a 
recreational activity, from the opportunities and resources provided 
by the organisation. Groups may also form on the basis of some value, 
such as a perceived importance of social interaction for its own 
sake, or because people might learn from each other, or because 
social interaction improves relationships between groups and 
facilitates the influencing of one group by another, or it may be 
valued by an individual as a means of influence. Where the group
is formed on the basis of an idea, or value, this may not be clearly 
defined and it may be difficult to see what needs of participants 
are being met by the formation of the group.
5. Of all the reasons why groups may be formed by people, some 
appear to be more highly valued than others in the organisation, which 
would suggest an organisational norm about the legitimate basis of 
group formation. The organisation may therefore provide more encourage­
ment to the formation of groups on the basis of organisational tasks 
than on the basis of ideas which are less easily definable. The 
organisational norm may also discriminate between values on which groups 
may be based, by, for example, facilitating interaction between people 
who have common specialisms but not facilitating it between people 
whose specialisms differ. Exchange of information on technical
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matters may be seen as a more legitimate basis for group formation 
than the creation of opportunities for influence. The formation 
of groups against the tide of the organisational norm takes a good 
deal of effort.
6. The opportunities for social interaction provided by the 
organisation, the existance of groups and their bases, and the 
permeability of group boundaries can be seen as having political 
significance in that they provide or limit access to information 
and to decision-makers, but this significance may not be perceived 
by organisation members.
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(d) Theoretical implications. In Chapter 2, Section 3i the 
structural aspects of power were identified as an important theme 
in the literature, and the inferences in this present section 
reflect on the nature of the relationships of power to structure.
It seems clear that, on the basis of the participant's comments., 
there is no unequivocal answer to the question of whether it is the 
structure itself or individuals in the structure who have power 
(see Chapter 2, Section 3) since some people were able to see 
Committees as powerful, while others thought that individuals in 
Committees were. As Dearlove (1973) has noted, it is the actor's 
perception of the milieu that counts.
The picture is complicated by the differences of people's percep­
tions of what the structure actually is. Some people may be unaware 
of parts of the structure perceived by others, and which can be said 
to affect their fate for good or ill. For example, not knowing that 
a decision-making committee such as the RFC exists affects what they 
perceive can be done to influence decisions. It has been noted 
in the literature that the ignorance of B is a factor in the power 
of A (see Chapter 2, Section 5) and it is suggested by this research 
that .this ignorance may be of structural boundaries within the organ­
isation which are perceived and reacted to by others. However, it 
is also suggested that some aspects of structure, especially the 
informal groupings of individuals, may be difficult to substantiate 
as "facts". Their existence, or the nature of their boundaries may 
be in implicit or explicit dispute. The view that structures either 
have power, or confer power, as suggested in the literature therefore,
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(las to be qualified to take account of the uncertainty as to 
whether particular structures really exist or where and how their 
boundaries are drawn. A further aspect of the relationship between 
structures and power suggested by this research is that the basis 
of group formation may depend on organisational values about what 
groups should be encouragedcr discouraged, and this indicates a 
relationship between structures, values and power, as suggested 
in Chapter 2. For example, the value may be found in an orgeinisation 
that forming groups 'for technical purposes is more acceptable than 
forming them for the exchange of general information about the 
organisation, or for social interaction as such. Perceptions of 
structure are also related to perceptions of power in that a person's 
view of a structure may be in itself a political one, for example, 
that the structure is a pyramid shaped hierarchy, or it may be seen 
as a division of labour, without necessarily implying a differentiation 
of power. It is also possible for different individuals to perceive 
the direction of political cause and effect between differed! parts 
of a structure as going in opposite directions. This supports 
Dahl's (1968) contention that the identification of cause and effect 
in political behaviour is problematic. The reason why this matter 
has received little attention in the literature (see Chapter 2,*
Section 6) is perhaps because of the scarcity of empirical studies 
of power in organisational settings. In the field it is possible 
to say with equal justification that A causes B's behaviour, and 
on the contrary that B causes A's. This ambiguity is also reflected 
in the fact that it is possible for one person to see a part of the 
structure as powerful, and another to deny this.
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It is suggested in Chapter 2, Section 3i that the setting up of 
structures through the division of labour, suid the integrating 
devices which are a necessary counterpart of this division, provide 
individuals with opportunities or constraints for political 
behaviour. It is possible to view the various committees in this 
study as integrating devices, but it is also clear that there are 
considerable political subtleties involved in such devices as far 
as integration is concerned. Politically, one can see integration 
as being reflected in the representation of different groups with­
in different other groups. So, for example in this study, 
representation of Schools in the Senate would be a manifestation 
of political integration. Baldridge' (1971) has identified that 
representation on committees was an important factor in enabling 
a group in the organisation he studied to secure resources. However, 
it becomes clear from the present study that there is doubt about 
what "representation" amounts to. The balance of representation 
(and therefore the political balance of integration of the structure) 
is not just a matter of numbers of representatives and constituents, 
although these are important, but also of their behaviour inside and 
outside the integrative structure. As has been suggested, people may 
have their own ground rules for how to behave effectively in committee 
(what Bailey (1969) would call normative and tactical rules - see 
Chapter 2, Section 5) which suggests that they see a cause-and- 
effect pattern which guides their behaviour, whether or not they can 
be said to be right about it, but also that the uncertainty about 
cause and effect can be used to justify the pragmatic rules they wish 
to adopt. For example, do you "cajole and bully" committee members
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because you enjoy cajoling and bullying? Whatever people's 
behaviour and the reasons for it, it is both permitted by and 
affects the nature of the integrative structure of the organisation.
As Bailey (1969) and Dalton (1959) have suggested, the opportunity 
for innovative political behaviour is greatest when normative rules 
are few or where their effectiveness is uncertain. In this study, 
the uncertainty about rules was both an opportunity and a threat 
to committee members. For example, you might assert a rule if it 
favoured you, but hope that no-one else would if it did not. It 
was also suggested that an attempt to establish rules which favoured 
your cause was a possible response to the absence of existing rules - 
for example, rules about how a committee should proceed. However, 
such an attempt becomes in itself a politically contentious act 
if it works to someone else's detriment.
It can be suggested from this research that whether or not a committee 
member was seen as powerful within the committee, might depend on 
perceptions of what committee members see as important, and thus 
representation and hence political integration of the structure is 
affected by these perceptions. How much influence the group 
external to the committee has within the committee may also depend 
on what their representative perceives to be important. For 
example, is it more important to preserve the confidentiality of 
proceedings than to oppose another member's demands? The answer 
to such a question can affect the power of the committee member and 
the fate of the group being represented. This example also puts 
an additional facet on the relationship between values, structures ■ 
and power, as discussed in Chapter 2, Sections 3 and 4, in that it
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shows how a structural boundary (created by "confidentiality" in 
this instance) can be used as a political resource by the mainipulation, 
of values.
Added to these aspects of the relationship between structures and 
perceived power, is the suggestion in the data that in some 
circumstances it may be unclear whether a group member is, or is 
perceived to be, or ought to be, or can avoid, "representing" another 
group- This question relates to the idea of political behaviour 
as involving "conning" or "cheating" people, or playing "games", 
as raised in Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 4, but also to the suggestion 
that you can be perceived as acting this way, whether or not you 
are. It is also to be noted that being a member of a committee 
does not necessarily mean that one sees membership as a political 
act in itself, regardless of the possibility that one's member­
ship may be used politically by others. This may indicate a clash 
of values between a distaste for acting politically, and doing 
something one likes doing - being a committee member.
The research suggests that in addition to factors which encourage 
group formation, both formal and informal, there are those which 
prevent it. Reforming of relationships between individuals and 
groups may be discouraged, by perceived facades, or risks of 
agreements not being kept, or by competition, or by the physical 
properties of the organisation, such as the distribution of 
buildings. It can be said that the culture of the organisation, 
including the values of individuals and norms of behaviour within 
and between groups, which affect people's experience and
- 155-
interpretation of interactions with others, encourages the form­
ation of some groups and discourages others, thereby helping or 
hindering social interaction, the forming of alliances and the 
exchange of information. These processes of group formation or 
prevention can therefore be suggested to have political signifi­
cance, both in their impact on "the ignorance of B" (see Chapter 2, 
Section 5) and the opportunities available for political tactics 
(see Chapter 2, Section 4).
The data also suggested that perceptions of structure can affect 
perceptions of the legitimacy of decisions made within structural 
groups, such as committees. From the perceiver's point of view the 
committee may consist of the "wrong" representatives to make an 
adequate decision on a particular issue. Moreover, if the basis 
for one committee's existence is legal - for example, it is set 
up by statute with statutory powers - people may be more inclined 
to regard it as legitimate as a decision-making body than a group 
which is "merely" set up by the administration or by informal 
processes. People may differ- as to which basis of legitimacy they 
will accept, as suggested in Chapter 2, Section 4. However, it was 
shown in this research that people could see the non-statutory 
groups as more powerful than the statutory ones, (Senate, Board of 
Studies) which suggests that legitimacy based on external authority 
does not necessarily confer political advantage within the organisa­
tion, if the scope of that legitimacy does not include issues 
considered important by the perceiver.
The next section will return to the descriptive analysis.
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3. Powerful people
The data reveal information about the perceptions informants have 
of the political actions, attitudes and situations of other people, 
whether they be individuals or groups.
(a) The Vice Chancellor. If there is one powerful individual in 
the university, one might suppose that the Vice Chancellor would 
be that person, so it is interesting to see what perceptions 
informants had about him from a political point of view.
The data show that people relate their perceptions of the VC (and, 
indeed other aspects of the organisation) to the history of the 
organisation as they experienced it, and to their experience of 
other organisations elsewhere. It was mentioned to me several 
times that the VC took over from a predecessor who seems to have 
been considered abrasive and threatening - "Rotherham the Ruthless" - 
who ran the university as though it were an industrial company. 
People who have been in the university for some time therefore 
tend to compare the two VC’s, but some newcomers compare him with 
other VC’s they have known at other universities. Some people have 
roles which bring them into working contact with the VC - especially 
some people in the Deciders group - but others, especially in the 
Applicants group may have no contact with him at ai^!
Perceptions in the Deciders group about the VC's power are mixed.
He is seen as "having great influence on the decision" (over the 
URF awards) but also as not being able to get his own way always.
On the other hand, he in turn is not easy to influence, "He is easy 
to talk to but you can't influence him"! He is seen as "very
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powerful" especially since he can "wait and do things in the vacation
if it is that urgent for him to get his way, under vacation powers
in the summer". A "powerful persuader and a strong leader", but
’hot putting pressure on people". He is also seen as a "fixer",
trying to lobby support for his view before meetings, and "packing"
committees, for example for the appointment of the new Chancellor.
He is also seen as identifying where Schools are divided in their
views on an issue and using that fact for his own purposes, which
(5)suggests a certain political astuteness.
He is said to be 'kfraid of the Senate - not that he shivers in 
his shoes, but he is concerned that the business is carried through. 
He wants to see that everyone gets a fair crack of the whip, because 
there is a considerable danger of the outcome if they don’t". He 
was also said to "manipulate the Senate" which suggests a somewhat 
different orientation, in that the emphasis of causality shifts from 
the VC responding to a political situation which governs his be­
haviour, to a view that the VC governs the behaviour of the Senate, 
(it would, of course, be possible to suggest that both were true). 
Another comment which seems also to cast the VC in the role of 
manipulator was "people who decide academic priorities have power. 
Especially the VC, but he has to carry the staff with him. So, 
you single out the opposition and isolate it". One informant,
however, expressed uncertainty about whether the VC was powerful,
(2) (6)
"I think so, I assume so".
It was pointed out to me that some people had more contact with the 
VC than others because of their particular roles in the organisation, 
and also that being geographically nearer to the VC's office was an
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advantage in having an opportunity to influence him. People who 
held the relevant offices close to the VC when he was a newcomer 
to the organisation were also, it was suggested, in a particularly 
good position to influence him, because he would be dependent on
(4)their knowledge of the system.
Among both groups, the VC is not seen as neutral, in that "he has 
an agenda of his own". This fact may be seen as an advantage or 
a disadvantage to other people. In the deciders group it was 
pointed out that the present administrative structure was set up 
by the VC's predecessor who saw the administrators as his henchmen, 
and this in turn led to arguments about who was running the university, 
the administrators or the academics. This theme recurrs in the data 
and one person suggested that "perhaps the VC is too closely assoc­
iated with the administrators". Another possibility for partisanship 
is to side with one academic subject or area rather than another, 
and there were several comments to this effect. Among the Deciders 
it was said that "the VC has a hard mind but tries to understand 
other people's disciplines. Other VC’s are very bigotted at the 
core in favour of their own disciplines" (the assumption being that 
this one is no^f! But also by another interviewee that "there is 
a lot of lobbying between the Science area people and the VC" and 
he is suspected of colluding with the Science area. Another Decider 
commented that "the VC has great influence on the URF decisions" 
and that "he is biassed in favour of Science^.
One variation on this view should be mentioned. This was the 
comment that Technology was unfairly treated and Science favoured,
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but this was laid at the door of the VCAC, not the VC himself, 
suggesting that it is the committee which has the power to follow 
its biasses.
In the Applicants group, those who had any view of the VC's power
and their own ability to influence him, gave mixed reports: "the
VC is very accessible, but that doesn't mean he would necessarily
listen". "The VC is around suid you can talk to him. He might 
discuss things in a general way, tut would probably route things
back through the Head of School." One person perceived a change
in the VC's approachability: "The VC has now decided that on any
important matter he won’t discuss it informally with a person, say
in the Senior Common Room, because he has found himself being
misrepresented by people. So with an important matter he asks
people to put it through the more formal channels". Another comment
raised doubt about the VC's power, "I am not sure that the VC has
got a grip on the university yet" - the expectation being that he
would eventually get a grip on it, and perhaps ought to, a perception
not shared by one member of the Decider group, who thought it would
be a pity if the VC did exercise a high degree of control over 
people in the organisatiü]!^^^^^^
Among the Applicants there were several comments to the effect that 
the VC is antagonistic to the Social Sciences, or to Sociology 
in particular. "The VC has been to the department and told the 
sociologists that he cbuldn't see any point in what they were doing". 
It was also suggested that Ije avoids talking to the Social Science 
group in the Senior Common Room, "The Social Science people tend to
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sit together in the SCR over coffee, and the VC never visits our 
comer" (although he is perceived as visiting other groups).
Another informant suggested that this distance was mutually kept - 
the Social Science group making no attempt to talk to the VC.
The idea that the VC is pro-science was not supported by one scientist, 
mainly because he was "so remote". "He's a pure scientist and doesn't 
understand the applied approach". It was felt that it would be a 
mistake to try to turn Bath into "the Imperial College of the West 
Country" (seen as part of the VC's agenda) because "a lot of people 
joined it (Bath) in the beginning because of its new ideas, and it 
would be a pity if that were all destroyed and it became like every­
where else - it could be dangerous too." In other words, the VC 
is not seen by this informant as being in favour of the right kind 
of science or scientific institution, and therefore not necessarily 
benefiting this interviewee. By contrast, a technologist felt that 
the VC's being a scientist was a positive benefit "the VC is a 
scientist so he takes a balanced view of the worl^^!
One of the priorities of the university at present was said by several
people in the Deciders group to be to increase the amount of research
done, and the VC is seen as making a special effort in that direction.
This is an advantage to people who wajit to do research, ( and most
of the people in this study said they were interested in research)
but it was also seen as a disadvantage by those who felt that they
lost out as a result. One comment was that the VC didn't have much
effect on their group, except that they had lost rooms in the last
(2)two years because of the emphasis he has placed on research.
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The staffing of the university was said to be very much the VC's 
personal decision, and his preferences are seen as an advantage 
by some people and a disadvantage by others. A new member of staff 
in the decision making Group commented that having been selected by 
the VC "is in my favour" (rather than being already in post when 
the VC was appointed). On the other hand, one example of the VC's 
anti Social Science bias was cited as his having'frozen posts in 
Social Science when posts are not frozen in other areas^! I was 
also informed that he is technically not in a position to discrim­
inate in this way over frozen posts, which does not, of course, 
alter the fact that he is seen as being able to do so.
From the data one can say that the VC is not seen as all-powerful, 
not an "Ogre", to be "human" and approachable on a personal level, 
but also able to project his own biasses onto the system, and 
adopting manipulative strategies to get support for his wishes. It 
should also be said that his wishes, for example to favour science 
and to encourage research, are not necessarily out of keeping with 
other people's in the organisation. His perceived attitudes and 
priorities, therefore, are seen as a positive advantage to some 
people and a threat to others, but these advantages and threats 
are modified by the perception that the VC does not fully control 
events in the organisation, although he may strongly influence them. 
It has also to be remembered that the VC is seen as having little 
impact either way on the daily lives of some organisation members!
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INFERENCES
1. Having access to the Head of an organisation through informal 
social interaction provides the opportunity for influence, but the 
influence may not be fcrthcoming. A person may be perceived as not 
susceptible to influence because the reverse is true. He or she 
may, of course,have already made a decision and be able to refuse 
to change it, but it may also be that the person is not able to 
make a decision without the agreement of others, but be perceived 
by would-be persuaders to have this power. The person therefore 
avoids making any commitment, but this may be seen by others as 
not being susceptible to influence.
2. When a leader of an organisation has plans for changing the
direction an organisation should take, but cannot rely solely on 
authority to carry them out, the creating of opposition, particularly 
among powerful organisation members must be avoided. Those who stand 
to gain by the new direction will of course support it, and if
these are the stronger groups, the opposition can be ignored, 
particularly in arenas which are not public. Public arenas are 
probably the most politically dangerous places for such leaders, 
especially when they are newly appointed. The kinds of behaviour 
which the leader in such circumstances adopts may be seen variously
as taking steps to sound out support, i.e. indicative of the limit­
ations of the leader's power, or as deliberate manipulations, indica­
ting the political canniness and strength of the leader.
3- Where the Head of an organisation is seen to have, by definition, 
a greater understanding of one part of the organisation's work than
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another, this in itself alters perceptions of the power balance 
between groups. Subsequent actions of the leader will be scanned 
for confirmation of this perception. "Out-group" individuals are 
likely to take a more jaundiced view of the leader's actions than 
"in-group" people would of the same actions. However, this 
tendency should not obscure the possibility that some "out-group" 
people will not see themselves as disadvantaged, either through 
a cognitive failure to perceive the implications of the leader's 
appointment, or through the use of denial as an ego-defence, or 
because they lack the necessary paranoia. Similarly, some in-group 
members may, because they are able to perceive the leader with a 
more sharply critical eye, not see the advantage to their own 
interests as being so great as would at first glance appear.
4. When a leader of an organisation is newly appointed, the early 
stages of the appointment provide an opportunity for people in 
closely related roles to increase their power, through the new 
appointee's dependence on them. There is a danger of the leader's 
being unwittingly "captured" by one or other group in the 
organisation, through this process.
5. , People's perceptions and evaluations of a leader will depend 
on their experience of others who have held the same role, either 
in the same or in similar organisations. They will also depend on 
the extent to which people come into contact with the leader or are 
directly affected by his or her actions, and on the evaluator's own 
values, that is, the criteria they adopt in assessing the leader's 
actions. This in turn reflects their values about whether some 
people ought to have more power than others. For example, a belief
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in "strong" leadership, i.e. that the leader ought to "get to grip" 
on the organisation, suggests the view that the leader ought to 
have a high degree of power.
6. The "cause and effect" view of human action is time-bound 
in that it suggests a sequence of events, but this seems to be 
inadequate for explaining human behaviour. The fact that different 
people can justify interpretations of the relationship between VC 
and Senate which are largely contradictory suggests that both 
interpretations may be true. The participants in an interactive 
process can be said to affect and react to each other simultaneously, 
not sequentially, since each is in the other's field of perception 
in making the decision to act.
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(b) The Principal Administrative Officer. Another person who 
was singled out as being powerful was the Principal Administrative 
Officer, usually referred to by his surname, "Mawditt". The basis 
of Mawditt’s power was variously perceived by different people, 
and some were not clear why he was powerful, but felt that he was.
The most often given reason was that he was very competent at 
dealing with the finances of the university. "I have a feeling 
that Mawditt is strong and powerful. He is a very capable financial 
manager, and finance is so important". Another interviewee in the 
Decider group who thought Mawditt had power, felt it had to do 
with his being able to control the finances of the university. 
However, he did not feel it was quite true to say that his power 
rested solely on his reputation for being a good financial manager, 
but was more to do with his role in relation to the Finance and 
General Purposes Committee (FGPC). He also said that if they go 
to Mawditt to ask for funds he can say yes or no in the light of 
his view of the overall budget, and perhaps his power lay in the 
fact that he was the only one with this overview (the VC being 
seen as not getting involved in this detail). The feeling seemed 
to be that Mawditt in some way controls the finances, even though 
it is the committee which decides who gets^^l^^?^ It was suggested 
that Mawditt can make decisions to use money without anyone's 
blessing "except the VCAC". It was agreed that he must have a good 
argument supporting his case if challenged, "but the main thing is 
not to be challenged". Another interviewee in the Decider group 
suggested that Mawditt's role in putting forward financial priorities 
to be dealt with by the FGPC gave him power, but another informant 
(a committee member) pointed out that this committee was "not a
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rubber stamp" and that they ask for justification of the figures.
However, there was also overlapping membership of the K jPC and the
VCAC, as my informant and the VC and Mawditt and the Registrar were
all on both committees. It is not clear, however, to what extent
this works in Mawditt’s favour, although having the VC on his side
(2) (5)in both committees would possibly be an advantage.
Another perception was that Mawditt "can influence the finances on 
marginal sums. He can find £1,000 for a job if you ask him to - 
he has to report this to the Finance Committee and they could object 
if they don’t like it. He can also influence the spending of 
larger sums by putting a good case".
It appears to be difficult for some people to check out what Mawditt
puts forward in making his case, in any detail. For example, one
informant said that Mawditt had given a figure for the available
Research Fund money 'TDut I think there is more". This indicates
a perception that Mawditt has some leeway in the figures he presents,
but this seemed to be regarded as a fact of life rather than a (2)(8) 
major issue.
Two instances were quoted of Mawditt being able to make decisions on
his own initiative. "I mentioned a budget problem to Mawditt and
■r
he just changed it. He apparently has the power to do that without 
consulting anyone. However, someone in Science heard of it and was 
angry that it had happened." "I needed some money for the department 
and went to see Mawditt and at a stroke he produced more moneyT^
Among the Applicants group, who seem to have little or no contact
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with Mawditt, he was also perceived as being powerful. "Mawditt I
have never spoken to. I suspect he has a lot of power. He has a
priviledged car-parking space. He has weathered the departure of
a pro-Mawditt VC and emerged with power unimpared." Also he was
seen as closely related to the VC. "The university is run around
departments reporting to senior administration - the VC and Mawditt..
Mawditt is the commercial manager and has a say in the financial
(1) (5)control... I think Mawditt is very powerful."
It was also suggested that Mawditt has too much power: "The admin­
istrators have too much power. They make decisions to which they are 
not entitled. When we were recruiting new staff and had decided who 
we wanted we had to go and ask Mawditt about it. As though asking 
his permission rather than just telling him and asking him to 
arrange it". But the added comment "perhaps it is just the way 
people appear to be behaving", suggests that some uncertainty was 
perceived as to whether Mawditt was "really" being asked for permis­
sion, or in fact being told, the words and behaviour signifying 
something different to the participants them to an observer.
However, the interviewee was quite sure that Mawditt had "a lot 
of power over the finances and is very involved in investment, and 
he could make money available if he wanted by selling something".
Also that Mawditt makes rules about the spending of the UGC equipment 
fund, "We were given a rule about spending money on equipment and 
consumables - you can’t transfer the funds from one to the other.
The UGC told us that they hadn’t made this ruling. I am not sure 
if the profs were involved in it, but I’m sure the rule was made
(?)(4) by Mawditt".
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On the question of the power of administrators in general, a Decider 
denied that they had any power, but then appeared to change his 
mind by saying that they had "the power of initiative and suggestion", 
adding that "there’s a difference between power and authority and 
power is more important", which I took to mean that although 
administrators did not have decision-making authority they did have 
power. This was referred to by my informant as a "civil servant" 
view of the administrator’s role, and perhaps gives an indication 
of the type of power which Mawditt is seen as haviij?^
Other comments indicated that although Mawditt was seen as powerful, 
limits on his power were also perceived. In the Deciders group some­
one commented, "Mawditt actually makes the decisions on equipment 
himself, although they are supposed to be made by a committee. He 
doesn’t have the same power in relation to research", and from the 
Applicants group, "Although he’s worth lobbying in some respects, 
he is not worth lobbying on any detailed or academic matter. I 
think the VC would resist it if Mawditt tried to get involved in 
academic matters". These comments suggest that Mawditt’s power 
is limited by the issue concerned.
It was also suggested by a Decider that Mawditt’s power is limited 
by the power of other people, and indeed by their political awareness: 
"He has to be circumspect in the use of his power: (a) if his power
begins to rival that of the VC, the VC will destroy him and (b) if 
his power is seen as a threat to the profs, they will destroy him". 
This presents a picture of Mawditt, the VC and the profs (all of 
them?) nicely calculating how far Mawditt can go and being able 
to "destroÿ’him if he oversteps some presumably definable^mar^^
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One Decider commented that Mawditt "has a reputation, which I don’t 
think is really deserved, because he doesn’t tell people what he 
is doing enough. He is accused of overstepping his remit".
Another interviewee put Mawditt’s power down to personality, "You
would expect that the Registrar would be the powerful person in
the university, but it is actually Mawditt. He is young and
thrusting and is the powerful one. It’s a matter of personality.
He is very approachable". Another informsint however, while
agreeing that Mawditt was powerful, did not share the reason,
"Mawditt is powerful, though you wouldn’t think so to talk to him.
I can remember him when he was just an accountant, so perhaps this
(8)
has coloured my view".
- I7O' -
INFERENCES
1. A person can be identified as powerful without the perceiver 
being clear why the powerful person is so perceived. This is more 
likely to happen when perceivers have no direct dealings with the 
powerful person. Where visible signs of status are identified, 
these will encourage the perception that a person is powerful
but the identification of these signs is not a necessary condition for 
being perceived as powerful. Even those who have direct dealings 
with a person may be unclear about the exact basis of their per­
ception of that person as powerful. They will be able to offer 
some good reasons, but not necessarily the complete rationale.
2. A person who has expertise in dealing with what is seen as a 
major resource of the organisation will be seen as powerful, even 
though that person's decisions may have to be ratified by others 
who have the authority and willingness to scrutinise them.
Ambiguity about the status of the relevant facts can increase this 
perception of power, since it creates difficulty in challenging the 
"expert". The ambiguity may reside in the technical difficulty of 
establishing what the facts are, including the difficulty of deciding 
what is important and what is not, and it may therefore be seen
that the expert has the opportunity to slant the facts whichever 
way he or she thinks fit, either through the presentation of informa­
tion or through the manipulation of the agenda. This may create 
suspicion in the minds of those who see themselves as disadvantaged 
by the expert's decisions that they are being unjustly treated, but 
they cannot challenge the decisions on sufficient grounds to overturn 
them. Hence the feeling that the expert is powerful, since events 
are perceived as turning out the way the expert wants.
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3. People have ideas about how much power individuals ought to 
have in relation to other individuals, in accordance with notions
of the appropriate pecking order of different groups in the organisation.
4. Power may be more or less apparent than real. What sounds like
a request, i.e. is in that form of words, may be intended as an
»
instruction. What is intended as a suggestion may be read as an 
instruction. Questions arise as to what the receiver hears or reads, 
how this accords with his or her values about who ought to have 
power, and whether the political meanings of the interaction are 
shared by both parties. It is difficult for third parties to know 
what political meanings the words have for those taking part in 
the interaction, and the extent to which they are shared. Comments 
such as "X oversteps his remit" may indicate that the meanings are 
not shared, or that X is making a bid for power perceived as 
illegitimate.
5. Structural centrality of a role, that is, having an organisation- 
wide remit and being unconfined to any particular operational sub­
group, is insufficient in itself to confer power. However, when 
allied to perceived control of a major resource, the political 
potential of centrality can be realised.
6. The power of the individual may be limited by the issue under 
consideration, but control of a major resource may make it difficult 
to corral an expert within boundaries of an area of decision-making 
seen as appropriate to that expertise. It is difficult to maintain 
a clear distinction between academic matters and the resourcing 
decisions to which they are related, the substantive decisions and
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the means by which they will be effected being interlinked. It 
may be seen as necessary to keep watch and be ready to apply 
sanctions should the expert roam too far afield.
7. A person may be seen as powerful because of the effects of 
change of scale between the context of the powerful person on the 
one hand and of the perceiver on the other. Being able to decide to 
give out £1,000 for a project to a group may seem like a lot of 
money to that group in relation to their scale of finances, but
may be a marginal sum, and therefore not a major decision or a 
powerful act, to the giver and other perceivers who are accustomed 
to dealing in much larger sums.
8. The skills of avoiding challenge can be seen as part of an 
expert's political repertoire, important for maintaining credibility. 
This issue is rooted in the relationship between the roles of "decision­
makers" and "adviser". Through the control of information which is 
relatively inaccessible to the non-expert, the so-called adviser
may so heavily influence the decisions of so-called decision­
makers that the boundaries between the two roles begin to be unclear. 
The demarcations may be further eroded by the practicalities of 
day-to-day running of the organisation so that it becomes legitimate 
for advisers to make some decisions on their own. Knowing how far 
you can step across this boundary without facing serious challenge 
is a matter of judgement. Identifying where the opposition is and 
judging whether it can be ignored, or how to deal with it, are 
important matters, particularly in organisations where there is a 
rotation of roles so that a person in a relatively weak position
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this year may occupy a powerful role next, and where there is a 
possibility that decision-makers may decide to act in concert against 
advisers. Having a reputation for a high level of technical expertise 
helps to maintain support among decision-makers, as does skill 
in communicating whatever justifications are necessary to establish 
the legitimacy of actions. The situation is complicated by the 
variability in people's interpretations of what constitutes having 
over-stepped the mark, and by the fact that people who have little 
contact with the expert and may even be mistaken about his or her 
actions, may nonetheless evaluate the role being played, thus adding 
to the expert's reputation, for good or ill.
9. People's assessments of political relationships are related 
to their modes of thinking about social systems in general. For 
example, perception that people in particular roles act as a group 
and have a common set of values and a readiness to take concerted 
action, influences also the perception of the possible political 
action that can be taken. If you think a coalition exists, this 
will colour your views of the possible political tactics between 
the parties.
10. It is possible to see a distinction between "authority" and 
"power", in which "power" seems to be non-coercive.
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(c) Heads of Schools and Heads of Groups. These roles have been 
singled out as possibly conferring power on their holders and as 
having implications for other people in their Schools and Groups.
Except for one or two Heads of Groups, all these roles are held 
by professors, and professors as such are seen as a powerful group 
by some people "There is a club of professors controlling the 
departments", so the question arises of how these particular 
roles of Head of School or Group affect their power.
Heads of Schools sit on Area Committees and are also members of 
Senate. Some disapproval of this system was voiced, and some people 
compared it unfavourably with the Faculty system found in other 
universities. For example, a professor who was not Head of School 
felt that it prevented him from taking part in decision-making.
"I am used to the idea of the professor being in charge of the 
department - he iâ the one who carries the can." There was a sugges­
tion that the system diminishes the standing of the professorial role - 
you are not a "real" professor if you are not part of the decision­
making process at university level. As one informant commented,
"A friend told me I shouldn’t take a job where I didn’t have a say
(3)in what was done".
On the other hand, being Head of School and being on an Area Committee, 
especially where the Head of School is always the same person* is 
seen as an advantage. "Professors A and B were both vociferous when
*In some Schools the role is "rotated among professors, but not in 
others, where there only one professor.
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they first came and found they were only professors and there was
no Faculty Board - they wanted things to be much more democratic.
However, now they are both Heads of Schools and go to Area meetings
they don't want thihgs changed, because they see it puts them in
(11)a strong position." There are other professors, however, who see 
being Head of School as an administrative demand which prevents 
them concentrating on other work, and there have been cases of 
people resigning from the role for this reason. Another reason 
mentioned for not bèing unduly worried about not being Head of 
School as a professor, was having enough power already and having 
access to important committees from other sources, and so not
(1) (4)feeling disadvantaged.
Comments about professors in their roles as Heads of Groups or 
Schools, and especially the latter, suggested perceptions that these 
powerful figures ought to be benefiting their Schools or Groups, 
getting them what they want, but that there are conflicts of 
interest for professors which can prevent this, either because of 
others roles or subject commitments, or because of their preferred 
personal style.
Being Head of School is seen as a powerful role by the Applicant 
groupj but this may not be just power being exercised in relation 
to members of the School, but also in other arenas of the university 
and outside the university. The power of the Head of School, how­
ever, is not always seen as being an advantage to the School. It 
can be a mixed blessing. For exsimple, one informant who said, "We 
are fortunate that our Head of School is very fair" (in his 
treatment of the various groups in the School) also said, "He is
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always up at the other building because of his contacts with the VC,
and he’s always abroad, so we don’t get as much attention as one
might expect from a Head of School". Another informant seemed to
be complaining that the Head of School was too fair - insufficiently
biassed in favour of his own School in other roles: "He tends to
take a university-wide view when you really weint him to be partisan 
(4)
for the School".
In another School, doubts were expressed about the political strategy 
of the Head of School: "He is not a fighter. He adopts the gently,
gently, approach. It is probably better that way. I have a divided 
mind on this. A few years ago I would have thought that approach 
correct, but others have been nasty and got what their Schools wanted, 
It is partly a personal matter... he plays things close to his chest. 
It is a political strategy as well as part of his personality - when 
they are in a bad mood, people call him the dour Yorkshireman".
Here it is seen that the strategy suits the personal style of the 
Head of School, but the question is raised as to whether it is 
really effective from the School's point of view. It is interesting 
to note here that the low-key approach was seen as effective "a few 
years ago" when the university had an abrasive VC. With a change of
style at the head of the organisation there is the suggestion that
(8) (9) (14) (17)
the strategy should change in the opposite direction.
When a Head of School.has good contacts with the outside world and 
an external reputation, this is seen as advantageous to the School.
For example, "He has,a £2^0,000 grant from (an outside source) and 
this means three or four staff to help with teaching and to mind the
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store, and adds to the strength of the department (sic)". On the
other hand, these external commitments can work to the School's
disadvantage. Of one Head of School who was reputed to be on
twenty committees it was said that he "doesn't attend Area
Committees enough and so we lose out. You have to be there making
your case for your School... Some people would say he doesn't
spend enough time here, but on the other hand he keeps the School 
(2)(14) 
up to date".
One Head of School was seen as very coercive. "The Head of School
won't discuss the matter with us. He's a real fascist. He told
us we were not important enough to discuss it with, so there is ̂
(2)(7)(14)nothing we can do. We are powerless."
Heads of Schools usually rotate on a three year basis and each Head 
of Group who is a 'professor becomes Head of School in turn. This 
fact is seen as having certain political consequences. "The Head 
of School is important when it comes to sharing out money. A Head 
of Group who is Head of School must feather his own nest while in 
that role, because he knows it will be difficult to do so when not 
Head of School." Another comment in similar vein, "When a prof 
is Head of School he emphasises his own area of interest. This 
is therefore a self-perpetuating system, because each in turn 
emphasises their area of interest'.'.
One Decider commented, "There's a lot of personal greed in places 
like this", and contrasted it with the running of a business where 
"you’ve made the money yourself. Then, if a particular Area needs
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boosting you boost it, not just think of your own Area". (This 
plea for a university-wide approach came rather ironically from one 
who was reputed to spend most of his own effort in the outside world, 
or within his own School?]
One way in which professors, whether Heads of Groups or Schools, 
can adversely affect members of staff was seen by some people as 
being through the drawing up of timetables. For example, "There 
is double talk by the profs. They say they recognise that different 
people are better at somethings than others, but when the crunch 
comes and they are making up timetables you’re expected to do 
everything. They did start reducing our teaching hours, but they’ve 
crept back up again".
However, it was also pointed out that in the present economic climate 
"we have come to rock bottom of the trend to get more staff and less 
teaching. There is likely to be more teaching in future, so I could 
find myself teaching subjects or courses I don't want".
"Bad timetables or being given courses to teach you don't want has 
happened... This could be for malevolent reasons or because the work 
has to be done." Also, "He (our Head of Group) believes people 
should teach what they are competent in and enjoy doing, but in 
other Groups you can end up teaching something you know nothing 
about. Prof X thinks there are subjects to be taught so you have 
to teach them". There are suggestions here that the professors are 
being in some way devious in the drawing up of timetables, but also 
that there could be rational explanations for what they do - there 
is suspicion, but no proof, that the professors could act otherwise 
if they wi?^e§^
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Heads of Schools and Groups caui adversely affect members of staff 
simply by not doing things, either deliberately or by default. Take 
for example the statement by one Area Chairman that, "We are some­
times very rude about applications. If a person puts in a bad 
application it counts against him for promotion", sind that "Some 
Heads of Schools just allow their staff to stick their necks out",
that is, they make no attempt to filter the applications or help
(14)staff to improve them.
Although promotions are made by an academic staff committee euid are 
a matter of competition across the Schools in an Area, "not on the 
nod from the professor", nevertheless, professors are seen to act 
as gatekeepers to promotion, since, "Your Head of Group's view is 
important for promotion - you don't get promoted if he or she 
disapproves". Other examples of this preventative power of 
professors were given "It's important that the professor gives 
his backing. If he doesn't like the student (for whom you want a 
studentship) you are not likely to get anywhere", and this gives 
the opportunity for the professors to make choices which express 
their own values. A more direct example of this was indicated by 
the remark, "The ranking (of Research Fund applications) is done 
by professors on an individual basis and I could bet which one an 
individual professor would choose as priority. For example, our
(7)(14)professor likes research based on statistical analysis".
Although a professor can act as a patron he can also act as a block, 
not only through making direct choices but through his own academic 
reputation. This is a kind of patronage in reverse, as explained 
by one informant: "It is an advantage if your Head of Group is an
expert in your own Area if you want to get money from outside bodies
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such as the SRC. My Head of Group is not in my field of work
and is therefore unknown in it. If he had a steady reputation in
the university it would help... but unfortunately he doesn't."
Here a Head of Group is perceived as "useless" because, not only
does he not have a reputation in the same field of study which
can be used by the staff member, but has no reputation as such which
could give him influence in the university and therefore help
members of the Group. Tha lack of power of the professor here is
(10)seen as a disadvantage.
Heads of Schools and Groups can also block the "normal" means of 
improving one's position by breaking the chain of effort and reward. 
Even though an important contingency of the organisation may be to 
obtain research funds from outside, and those who achieve this may 
expect some credit for it within the organisation, this pattern may
be upset by a particular Head of School or Group. "You are supposed
to obtain more clout by getting money from outside, but it doesn't 
seem to happen like that... we seem to get no help from the people 
at the top". Even though the outside funds are obtained, this 
informant felt that they did not receive any extra attention]
Another example shows the professors combining together in blocking 
tactics. "... the Head of this Group is not a professor, and 
recently they tried to clip the wings of this Group and incorpor­
ate its degree in all other degrees. The profs didn't succeed in 
this... however, there has been a selective ban on recruitment... 
so this puts the degree in jeopardy from another angle. The profs 
might just not push hard enough for replacement staff if they want 
to do away with the degree." This example also hints at the 
disadvantage, mentioned by other informants, if the Head of Group
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is not a professor. "Some Groups have more clout than others" 
for this reason, since non-professorial Heads of Groups are left 
out of some decision-making- In some cases, where in the past 
the Group Head.had not been a professor but a professor had now 
been appointed, this was seen as being an advantage to the Group, 
particularly for obtaining extra resources?^
An example of the way in which interaction between professors can 
affect the fate of members of the Applicant group was provided by 
an explanation of the official system for promotions. A report on 
a likely candidate is made by two people - the Head of School and 
the Head of Group. Since the Head of School may also be the Head 
of Group, the opinion of another Group Head may be sought where 
members of the Head of School's own Group are concerned. This can 
lead to some bargaining between professors over support for each 
other's candidates. In this instance, a particular constellation 
of procedures and structures can lead to political interactions 
which have consequences for the less powerMl?^
One or two people I interviewed clearly saw their Head of School as 
a patron, someone who would benefit them as individuals. Such people 
showed considerable dependence on their professor. For example, one 
informant, relatively new to Bath, commented that his professor had 
be’en successful in getting studentships in the past, and was relying 
on him to get a studentship this time also. My informant himself 
knew little of the decision criteria and procedures, but had not 
been at any pains to find out about them, being guided entirely by 
his professor's advice. Another interviewee commented of his Head 
of Group, "He gives me what I want. He's powerful and I cover half
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his research interests, so I get privileged treatment- There are 
two other people who came here also with the professor. One of 
these covers the other half of his research interests." The 
perception here is that the patronage is mutually beneficial. It 
was not clear in this case what the professor’s power was seen as 
resting on, since it was also said that, "Heads of Schools and 
professors are not really in control of finance - it has been 
removed to an administrative level", and "He can't employ another 
member of staff without getting permission centrally". This 
informant said he avoided getting involved with the rest of the 
university and was not able to say who the powerful people were in 
the system, but nevertheless perceived his Head of Group as powerful. 
He also said that decisions recently made about technical facilities 
in the university in which his Group had a particular interest were 
wrongly made as a result of "managerial incompetence", but did not
(12)(13)include his patron in this deprecation.
There were also some perceptions of professors as having power in
that they were able to get what they wanted for themselves - as
well as benefiting their Groups or Schools. For example, "All
the applications to the Group come through the professor and he
picks off the best students... He does OK for himself. ...he's
done a lot for us, more money, better apparatus, and he's improved
(3)the section a great deal since he was appointed". A professor 
may also be seen as benefiting himself and his Group by being 
able to deviate from the perceived values of the organisation. It 
was said that one professor's "values differ from other people's 
here... in the nature of the research going on and in attitudes to
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research". This was seen as a benefit to Group members, but it was 
also suggested by another informant that this professor needed to 
be protected for this reason, as though there were some threat 
involved in being déviant on these issues. It was not clear what 
the threat was, and perhaps no specific threat was envisaged, but 
a general loss of advantage or the possibility of becoming an 
object of a(?ac^]
However, another example showed that, although professors may have 
some freedom to deviate from the cultural norms, they may have to 
give an outward show of complying.
One professor was said to be of the "traditional type..." whose 
appointment specifically committed him to a particular policy.
"He therefore has to pay lip-service to it, but is not committed.
He is not a true convert to the faith, but goes to church on Sunlays?^'
One variant on the theme of the power of professors arising , from 
contact with the outside v/prld was suggested by the following 
observation of one of the Applicants: "If you have enough clout
as a research person you can follow your own groove. If you get a 
large grant to do research in a special field and get staff etc., 
they will make you a professor in the end to prevent you from leaving 
for another university". Interestingly, this process was seen as 
enabling the person concerned to "opt out of politics" as though 
being in a position to pursue your own interests and having gained 
a certain high status in the institution as a result of relations 
with the outside world enabled you to cease taking part in political 
activity. Perhaps the perception here is that you no longer need to
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expend much effort in getting the institution to give you what you 
want. However, the way in which you might influence the institution 
as a result of being in this position is not encompassed by this 
perception of power] In rather similar vein, a Decider commented: 
"You have to understand the realities of power in the university.
I bring in more money than my salary... I am therefore a source of
income. My power position is strong - I could move to another chair
at another university at any time. They therefore try to keep me 
happy here". Another Decider commented: "I don't need this job. 
Because of my national reputation they need me more than I need 
them". In these comments it was not clear who "they" were who 
were thus being influenced.
They also raise the question, mentioned by one informant, of the
possibility of a professor having enough leverage to get what he
wants from "the university" because of his outside contracts, or
money-making ability, but at the same time being "not up to the
(2)job" of being a Head of School or Group.
The role of professors in building Groups, or alternatively
encouraging individualism has been touched on in the previous section
on structure. The power that this role represents was strongly put 
by one informant who said, "I started the Group and took on people 
who wanted to pursue my vision. We have conflicts, when I think they 
are going off at a tangent and not keeping to my vision, and I try
to pursuade them". He agreed that what he called his "power of
patronage" made such persuasion easier. This aspect of professorial 
power was also indicated by the remark of someone in the Applicant
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group that "Profs have special interests... people who have the 
same interests as the profs get on". However, there were circum­
stances in which some people get on in spite of not sharing the 
same subject interests as their professor. For example, the member 
of the Applicants group who had been in the university for some 
time, and for longer than the professor, and had already built up 
his own reputation sufficiently to be successful in getting research
grants from outside sources did not feel at a disadvantage that
(7) (12) (15)the relatively new professor did not share his specialism.
One should perhaps also see professors as instruments of the 
university, particularly of the Vice Chancellor, in bringing about 
changes of direction, especially through new appointments. The 
appointment of a professor with a particular background or 
orientation can be a means of harnessing the power of the profes­
sorial role to the preferred policy. In two cases, the advent of 
a new professor was seen as causing an increase in research: "There
used to be very few research students, but with a change of leader­
ship they suddenly took off". The new orientation is not, of course, 
always welcomed by the existing members of staff of the Group or 
School. One new professor was said to have "forced a marriage" 
between two Groups, one of which was described as "like the whites 
in Rhodesia - they failed to move with the times. They started 
the School going but have now been overtaken by events". Consider­
able conflict was generated by this change, but it was also said that 
a Head of School must have sufficient support within the School in 
order to make such changes. "He cannot fly a kite against the
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school", and "can't push things through unless he gets the Board 
of Studies to agree". From this point of view in making a new 
appointment the VC would need to take account of the trend of 
opinion within the Group and School, in order to bring about change
through appointment, but I was not able to find out if he does take
(15)(16) account of it.
Being a new professor was perceived as having both advantages aind
disadvantages from a political point of view. If the new professor
is not a Head of School or a member of Senate (which he usually is
not), he is debarred from important decision-making activities, as
has already been mentioned. He can also be at a disadvantage in not
understanding the politics of the organisation when he does take up
one of these roles. For example, one informant commented: "X has
taken over as Head of School stnd is new to the gsune, but he'll act
(31)politically when he understands how". However, it was also clear 
that professors can gain concessions because they are new to the 
system. One professor commented that he had been given a student­
ship "as a sop to the new professor", and another informant saw this 
procedure as overriding the decision-rules: He had questioned the
fact that some professors were being given research awards from the 
Fund, which was intended for inexperienced staff. "The message 
from the higher powers was that this had been agreed at their
appointment, so they (the professors) had to be given them, and 
(16)
that was that."
Perhaps because of their power, professors can be seen as acting 
politically in the sense of deliberately manipulating events, even
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when there seems no evidence that they have done so. For example,
I was told that a professor through whom I had obtained access to
interviewees, had "channelled the people you can interview towards
particular people" although appearing to have provided me with an
open list. However, I was not able to find any evidence of his
having done so. Professors can also be suspicious of each other's
actions when there seems no evidence to justify it. One professor's
not being able to see me on a particular day was seen as "a trick"
by another, although again I could find no direct evidence of this.
It could be that this is simply an example of the difficulty of an
outsider in recognising "tricks", but an alternative, and I think
more plausible reading in these particular cases, is that some people
are perceived to be capable of devious behaviour or trickery, and
perhaps have demonstrated it in the past, and that this becomes
(8)part of the expectation others have of them.
Data about two professors in particular throw light on the ways in 
which people can be perceived as being "political" or not. Informa­
tion about these professors was not deliberately sought, but was 
volunteered by interviewees.
Professor A. "A very powerful person. He has the natural ability 
and also the opportunity. Others don't have the same instinct - 
they have the opportunity through their role but don't exploit it.
He gets what he wants. He doesn't usually fail to get his way."
"One of those professors who only take part in the university in 
so far as they have to, and is not really political. He is more 
interested in his own research and own School."
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"His subject gives him an advantage because it provides knowledge 
of how to handle committees" ... "He has so many commitments out­
side that he doesn't always realise the workings of the system 
inside around here."
(31)(three informants)
Professor B . "I assume he ought to be powerful, he has the ear of 
people who count, but I'm not sure about his ambitions or how 
effectively he weilds his power. I think he wants power. He doesn't 
follow a path with the same consistency and single-mindedness as 
Professor A. He tends to diffuse his power over a variety of things."
"I wouldn't like to be part of his Group - it's a political set-up."
"He speaks his mind and is a fluent and good persuader. He is said 
to be influential with the VC. He is also said to be a man of iron 
underneath the bon homie - if you cross his path you are for it."
"He told me that I had fulfilled the criteria I had set myself, but 
I am not sure that he would have voiced this opinion in the committee. 
Political forces may have been at work..." (implying a "U-turn" in 
opinion for political reasons).
(four informants]
The data about Professor A in these examples seems less consistent 
than that about Professor B, and one reason for this might be that 
the latter seemed more in the public eye (within the university). 
Because of the fragmented nature of the social system, being well 
known probably requires being a member of several committees and
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being oriented to the internal workings of the organisation rather 
than being an "outsider". This provides various audiences who can 
evaluate the political nature of the person's behaviour and so 
reputation can grow within the system. "Outsiders" may be regarded 
as "not political" simply because there has not been the opportunity 
to observe them acting politically]
It is interesting to note in these observations that people can be
seen to have certain political skills, such as being a fluent
persuader or being good at dealing with a committee. Also that a
person can at the Scime time be seen as good at dealing with a
committee and not understanding the system in which that committee
arises. Further, that a person can be perceived by another as
"wanting power" although apparently not wanting it for
some specific purpose, which suggests that a need for power is seen
(14) (17)as a characteristic of his personality.
In considering the perceived power of professors, particularly in 
their roles as Heads of Schools and Groups, it is relevant to look 
at the ways in which they see themselves, or are seen as influencing 
other people over a specific issue, in this case the research 
activities of the Applicant group. The perceived feelings of the 
Applicants are included because of the light they throw on whether 
Applicants are being influenced against their will.
Members of the Applicant group themselves made comments about the 
pressures on them to do research. The most frequently quoted 
pressure came from within - the person's own interest. External 
pressures were also mentioned, and ranged from formal sanctions, 






Formal Sanctions Manipulation Encouragement
I_________________________ I_____________I
Formal sanctions included the view that even a tenured person could 
"get the chop" for not fulfilling contractual obligations to do 
research, and the failure to pass probation or efficiency bars 
for the same reason. Perceptions of the possibility of such sanc­
tions being applied varied from "You get through (probation) if 
no-one blocks you" to "It's not a formality... people have left here 
because they didn't get through their probation". Manipulation 
refers to such perceptions as "it is expected that you will apply 
(for the Research Fund) - they can't force you to, but it is not 
in your interest to refuse". The way in which a Head of School 
or Group can impose sanctions through your teaching load or through 
giving or withholding permission to go to conferences also came into 
this category. "Generally its a question of patronage." The 
perception that the status of the School itself was affected by 
the research done also came into this category. The Encouragement 
category was the most commonly reported of external pressures. One 
informant said that his Head of School "goes on and on at you", 
but this was rare and most forms of encouragement ranged from giving 
positive advice about how to apply for Research awards and the criteria 
used to distinguish between applications, to simply informing people 
about the timetable for applications to the URF with no attempt at 
follow-up. "He doesn't push us to apply. A note comes round but 
no reminders. It is up to you if you take it up."
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One applicant made a distinction between talk and pressure. ’’They
talk about research, but there is not much real pressure to do it.
You’re expected to publish papers, but some do none.” Another
distinguished between "pressure” and "encouragement”. ”I was
not under any pressure to apply... but there is general encouragement
to put something in if you possibly can.” One comment suggested that
a distinction should be made between internal pressures based on
interest and those based on ambition, and that members of the
Applicoint group themselves pressurise people. "Some people have
grand schemes afoot... others are more political in the career sense -
they do what is necessary to get on and are much concerned with their
public image. They are the people likely to tread on their research
assistants - they have that reputationl” Perhaps one should note
here that pressure to do research arises also from competitive
behaviour between Applicants, as well as, and perhaps in response
(25)to, the pressures applied by Deciders.
Certain pressures were also reported which worked against doing 
research and in particular against applying for studentships through 
the ÜRF. The most often quoted was the lack of time to take on a 
student because of other commitments. In some cases these other commit­
ments were the staff’s own research interests already started, or 
their teaching interests. The comment was also made that, "I would 
rather do ray own research than get someone else to do it”, indicating 
that taking on a student to do research was seen more of a deprivation 
than a benefit. In some cases, even where people had applied for URF 
studentships, they reported that they would rather not be successful.
It was also pointed out that, since there were no promotion prospects
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in the university, career considerations did not operate as an
incentive to do research. The lack of space in the school was also
(19) (21)given as a reason why research was not done.
Applicants seemed to attach varying amounts of importance to the 
Research Fund, varying from "would rather not get an award" through 
"I don't care if I don't get it", to an award being "quite important". 
One person saw himself as being in a catch 22 situation which a 
studentship award would not help him out of "I am unable to attract 
studentships for postgraduate work, and therefore unable to 
demonstrate that I aim capable of doing research". He had a reputation 
outside the university, but was not sure that anyone inside knew of 
it so, "For promotion purposes I need to get a research student or 
two". Another reason given was psychological, "I have managed to 
rationalise my own position by finding suitable reasons why I don't 
do a lot of research... so I don't feel bad about it". The dis­
tinction that csin be drawn between the gesture of putting in a 
research application to the URF and the wish or interest in doing 
research is illustrated by the remark: "I don't expect to get it
(URF award) and would not be overjoyed if I did, because it would 
mean extra work. My application is a political gesture to demonstrate 
that the School is doing research, rather than an application as 
such". One reason which can be suggested for the somewhat low-key 
approach to the Fund by the staff is the small number of awards which 
can be made by comparison with the number of applicants. Some 
applicants speculated on their chances of being successful, and their 
speculations ranged from "no chancel" through "a 50-50 chance" to 
"optimistic". The optimistic ones were relatively new members of 
staff who seemed to work closely with their professors. In fact they
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were not as well informed as they seemed, since one of them saw 
himself as being "first on the list" (which was not true, although 
he did get a studentship) and the other one was .doomed to disap­
pointment because he had applied for a grant and no grants were
(i8) (19) (20) (21)
awarded. The less optimistic ones had been around for longer.
The perceptions of the Deciders group of the political position of 
the Applicants group gives indications, not only of Decider percep­
tions, but also of their actions, since it is usually they who are 
applying the pressures, if any. One informant among the Deciders 
was reluctant to say that pressure to do research ceune from any 
other source than the person’s own interest. "The promotion prospects 
of staff don't come into it. ... People do research because they are 
interested". However, later in the conversation he said, "If a 
person puts in a bad application (to the Research Fund) it counts 
against him for promotion", and I came away with the impression 
that although he would like to present an ideal image of autonomous 
staff disinterestedly researching, he was unable to maintain that 
image and tell a plausible story at the same time. Another informant 
was more forthright about the link between research and prospects. 
"Rewards for researchers, apart from inherent interest in the work, 
are promotion suid career prospects. There is also the chance of 
jobs outside the university ... they build up a reputation by 
research." It was pointed out that doing research was linked to 
getting funds from outside sources, and that people who had not done 
any research had difficulty in getting these funds, "because they 
haven't proved themselves". "Nothing succeeds like success. Once 
you have shown that you can get a grant and use it well you are more
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likely to get one from an outside body" - hence the importance of 
the University Fund. The requirement to do research was said to be 
part of the contract of employment of all staff, but this was denied 
by at least one Decider group member, who said that the only contrac­
tual requirement was to keep up with one’s subject. However, it was 
said by another informant that the research requirement was "built 
into the time-table of all staff" and that for new members of staff 
on probation, doing research was necessary for the confirmation of 
their appointments. One "hard-line" comment on this subject was,
"It counts against people if they don’t apply for research grants 
etc, but there is no kudos in applying unless you succeed", i.e.
You get no marks for tryingl
These comments suggest that formal sanctions are envisaged as a means
(18)(21)(22)(23)of getting staff to comply over particular issues.
Manipulation as a strategy was acknowledged by the comment, "The
only thing I can use as a lever with the staff is money, since they
ask me for it for projects". However, this was seen as double-edged,
"Those who comply are more likely to get funds, but it also works
(6)(24)
the other way - because they complied they can demand funds from me". 
Various forms of encouragement were also mentioned which largely 
tallied with the Applicant group’s account, but also included such 
activities as suggesting to particular individuals that they apply 
for the URF and even suggesting the particular topic of research. 
However, it is difficult to see how the line might be drawn between 
manipulation and encouragement in these latter cases, since direct 
approaches to individuals may seem to them like offers which can't be 
refused. In one instance at least it seemed to me that staff were
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(31)being directed, however obliquely, in this way.
About the Research Fund in general, there were comments about the 
interest of the staff in applying for awards. One informant said 
there was no reluctance to apply in his area unless people were 
already provided for or had given up - the "old stagers". However, 
various reasons were suggested by other informants for a reluctance 
on the part of staff to apply for the Fund. These included: 
being more interested in teaching; senior staff wanting to spend 
time on something else; being "feeble" in research; "Can't be 
bothered"; not being bold enough; lacking confidence. It was 
suggested that "there's nothing in it for the staff to take on 
students" and that with little time to spare staff would not be too 
pleased to get a studentship from the Fund, although they would 
accept the extra load. Also that, staff who were working on their
own PhD theses would feel inhibited about supervising someone else's
(21)research.
Rather more general comments about the system for the URF were, in 
one School that "There's a certain amount of paranoia around here 
about research funds", suggesting general dissatisfaction. Another 
professor suggested that people react adversely to failure to get an 
award (and most people do fail) "You'll get a very biassed and 
distorted view from people who have applied for funds and been 
unsuccessful". Another, however, thought that even if people did 
fail they would still feel they had got something out of applying, in 
the opportunity to clarify their ideas. One professor seemed unaware 
of the mystery surrounding the workings of the Research Fund for some
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people (see page 244) when he said that staff in his Area were 
practical people and therefore would not mind the fact that the 
applications were not judged on academic grounds. There were 
people in his Area unaware of that fact, but he seemed not to
(25K26)realise this.
One Decider voiced doubts about knowing how his Group members
felt about their situation: "It is difficult to say if people are
happy. I try to encourage them to tell me by talking to them.
They don't complain to me... they feel they should keep on the right 
(22)side of me".
This last comment indicates in itself an acknowledgement of the 
informant's own power in relation to members of the Applicant group 
and was made by a professor who saw himself as powerful in the 
organisation as a whole, as well as in relation to members of his 
own Group. This self-perception can be contrasted with that of a 
professor who felt himself to be excluded from the decision-making 
process at university level, and said of his Group members, "I 
doubt if I'm seen as powerful. They probably see me more as a 
clown". This informant seemed to have an ambivalent attitude to 
power, in that he criticised the decision-making system for not 
giving him enough control over his Group, "I'm not in charge", but 
at the same time, gave as his reason for wanting to be involved in the 
decision-making process at a higher level: "You would have a chance
to hear all shades of the discussion", and "you would get more 
feeling of belonging to a corporate whole. I'm not wanting it for 
political reasons, so that I'd know how to influence the system".
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His description of how he ran his Group meetings indicated democratic 
values, for example, "I like to have the maximum approval of the 
Group", and it may be that the ambivalence arises from a perceived 
clash between these values and the idea of power and acting 
politically.. He was clearly not above slanting an application for 
Equipment Funds in such a way as to increase his chances of being 
successful, "You have to embellish it a bit", but this was also
perceived in such a way as not to clash with other values, 'It's
(3) (7) (30) (31) a game people play, but it isn't false".
One role played by professors in the organisation is to make 
assessments of other people's work, and this role might be expected 
to provide them with eoi opportunity for power in the form of expres­
sing their own values, and having their definitions of what is "good" 
or "bad" work prevail. Acting as referee for the University Research 
Fund, either at School or Area level, is one such role. Many of the 
comments about this role were about the "objectivity" of the asses­
sments, and their fairness.. This reflects on the extent to which 
the personal preferences of the referee are given reign as against 
some perceived common standards of what constitutes academic excellence. 
However, there are certain variations of this idea which appeared 
in the data. For example, it was said of one referee by a member of 
the Decider group: "He has an eclectic approach and I am sure he
would discount the opinions of other people". This suggests that it 
is a positive benefit that the individual should exercise his own 
values and standards, since other people's are presumably biassed.
It could also indicate however that the referee should not only set 
aside other people's views but also his own preferences, and exercise 
some objectively rational judgement. However, the same informant
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also said,"I think he would have some sympathy for applications 
from this School", suggesting that the person concerned could be 
influenced and might exercise his personal preferences to some extent. 
The object of this comment considered himself to be biassed in making 
his assessments, but said that he took deliberate steps to offset 
this bias. "I am biassed in making my assessment by my own discipline 
This has both good and bad effects. It may make me more critical of 
my own Area... people in other disciplines tend to get off lightly 
because I don't feel I understand them...." One referee admitted 
to being "biassed by names", being more likely to give a high grade 
to someone known to him as "good"; "A good person is likely to get
a high grade, even if he has only written a few lines, because I
(7)(26)(29% know his work."
A referee whose own Group members had not applied for .awards also 
suggested that he might have been biassed in their favour had they 
done so, and another facing a similar problem had taken steps to be 
seen to be fair: "I wanted to give (an application by a member of
his staff) an A grading, but thought that a bit naughty when the 
others were not personally known to me". He solved the dileimna 
between being fair and being seen to be fair in the following ways: 
"This is where the subtlety comes in. I put in my note about the 
applications that I felt I must downgrade the candidate to B because 
he was one of my own staff. I suppose I had done it rather in the 
hope that it would be upgraded to A by the other referee". It 
seems unlikely that the other referee would have downgraded an A 
given by his professorial colleague, but it could have reflected 
adversely on the professor's reputation had his action in giving an
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A grade been interpreted as favouritism, and it seems to have been 
fear of ill-repute which motivated his political^ta^ic^
Other informants among the Decider group suggested that irrationality
came into the judgements made by professors judging the work of
others: "Dr X put in a good application... but got nowhere. It
was a red rag to some bulls on the Committee. He had fallen out with
some people, perhaps it was a personality problem". Another
suggested that the decision about who would get awards was made on
(27)the basis of "whim and prejudice".
Comments were made by Deciders about the political position of 
referees, which appeared to be unknown to Applicants. It was pointed 
out that it was not easy to get people to act as referees: "There is
a constraint on getting referees if there are too many applications. 
It is a difficult task", and another informant said, "The referees 
have better things to do with their time". This no doubt is a 
contributory reason why the Area "feels it should accept the referees 
decision, having asked them to give guidsoice", and why another 
informant considered that the priority given to applications by the 
Schools "could be reversed by the referees". Power of the referees 
in this case seems to arise from the fact that they are doing a job 
other people don’t want to do - they have a scarcity value and can 
therefore make demands in recompense. Or at least, other people may 
see them as people who should be given power as a compensation for
(28)doing jobs which others don't want.
One informant who maintained that "no priority is given to practical 
research" also commented that referees tend to say in their comments
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on applications, "We desperately need this research..." or in other 
words indicate that the research is useful and urgent. This may 
indicate that the informant did not realise that in saying this 
referees may have been acting politically, in that they were homing 
in on the "useful" criterion* for gaining awards, and emphasising 
that aspect of applications they particularly wanted to support 
(for whatever reason). Or it may be that he was not aware that the 
two statements were to some extent contradictory, and wanted to 
maintain both positions: that no priority was given to usefulness,
and also that usefulness was a criterion for gaining an^awarl^
The referees themselves also indicated perceptions of their own 
power. One explained that there were constraints: "It is
important in a small community to maintain good relations with 
people. ... it is not possible to downgrade the work of a senior 
colleague." Another said, "It would be difficult to give a low 
grading to a professor putting in an application. I am aware of 
status when giving a grading. It is a pressure".
However, another referee was unconcerned about such matters, saying
that he had deliberately given a low priority to an application in
a field he knew to be of great’interest to one of his professorial
colleagues. It was not clear whether he considered that this
(25)(27)(28)(30)would not cause ill feeling, or that he did not care if it did.
It should also be noted here thatlefereeing applications for the URF 
is not necessarily regarded as an important activity. One member of
*See page 248
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a refereeing group said, 'It takes a lot of time to prepare an 
application and we feel that every consideration should be given to 
the applicants". However, another called the URF procedure "all 
parish pump stuff", and if one assumes that the importance of an 
issue colours people's political behaviour, perceptions of import­
ance should be taken into account. However, "importance" can 
relate to the indirect significance of an event rather than to 
the event itself. Someone suggested that the VCAC decision which 
gave equal studentships to all the Areas, rather than giving more 
to Science and Technology than Arts, represented a change of heart 
towards the Arts Area. Thus indicating how an event which might 
not in itself be perceived as of great importance can be seen as a
straw in the wind heralding important shifts in political advantage 
(19)generally.
As might be expected, members of the Applicant group also had their 
perceptions of the "objectivity" or otherwise of those who were 
assessing their research applications, and it should be remembered that 
in many cases Applicants did not know who the referees were. Where 
Applicants had comments to make about referees, they invariably 
expressed concern about the validity of their judgements. For example, 
"It's a subjective matter. Different people would rate a project 
differently. It depends on the interest of the person rating".
"People specialise within a subject and you can't know everything".
It was suggested that professors were biassed by ignorance, "There 
is no-one really appropriate in the university to judge my work" 
was a fairly typical comment. The applicant who said, "If people 
in my School cannot really assess my project, even less can the
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Area Committee make an assessment on the basis of fact", had
perhaps perceived a reality of the refereeing procedure in going
on to 6ay, "It can help if you are known to them or if your face fits -
(26)(27)these factors are more important I feel than the scientific content".
Apart from the perception that the referees do not understand the 
content of applications, some applicants also referred to other 
political aspects of the referees' role. For example : "He's on
the Committee and also a potential recipient of the Fund himself, 
so..." It was also suggested that they had a vested interest in 
ensuring that the awards for funds should go to their own Schools, 
or that they may be thinking in terms of getting money from particular 
external sources for which an application might be seen as a pump- 
priming application. There was also the fear that professors would 
favour their particular proteges, as shown by the fact that one 
School set up a Committee to rank applications which excluded 
professors, "to save having people on the Committee pushing for 
people they'd guided or who were thinking on the same lines". As 
one applicant commented, "There was a lot of trouble last year because 
people didn't think it was fair. It was felt that there was favour­
itism on the basis of individual influence".
It is interesting to note how the need to have applications assessed
by people knowledgeable in the subject and the need to be seen to be
(27)fair can be in conflict.
On the whole the data suggest that whereas the Deciders might recognise 
situational factors making their decisions less objective than they
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would like to see, in general they see themselves and each other
as making rational judgements in view of the demands and priorities
they perceive. Applicants on the other haind are more likely to see
referees as in a position to act in their personal interest and to
question the legitimacy of their power. The referees are known to
the Deciders, mainly being members of that Group, but are little
known to Applicants, and there appears to be a norm of behaviour which
forbids anyone from discussing an application with those who are
refereeing it - seen, not as a formal rule but as something that
(27)is "not done".
To summarise the main threads of the data in this section:
Taking up an organisational role, such as Head of School or Head of 
Group or Referee, when you have professorial, statu^ is one means of 
gaining power in decision-making in the organisation. However, it is 
not the only means, and if you obtain power by other means, such 
as through external sources, these may conflict with the taking up 
of organisational roles. On the other hand, the structure may debar 
a professor from a role in decision-making in the organisation and 
this may be seen as incongruent with professorial status and hence 
demeaning to that s^Ë^A^^
There is not much evidence' that Heads of Schools are greatly influenced 
by members of the School if they do not wish to be, since although 
School members may make demands on a Head of School, it is still 
possible for a Head of School to resist those demands and be coercive 
in dealing with staff. Though this requires a thic^^s^in!
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The power of professors in relation to individual School members 
lies in part in the control they are perceived to have over the fate 
of individuals, in such matters as promotion, timetabling, and 
adjudicating bids for resources. Even so, the economic climate is 
seen as a limitation on the power of professors in these respects. 
Patronage (and anti-patronage) where they exist are perhaps the 
strongest political resources of professors, where staff are anxious 
to gain academic standing through research and publication. Where 
a professor already has high status in his field, and can commend 
resources from outside the university, this gives him considerable
power in relation to those inside it who seek status and resources
(2) (12) (13) (14) (18) (21)in the ssume field.
Where professors have decision-making roles in the organisation they
can be seen as particularly powerful where they appear to be acting
together in concert - as the professoriat versus the rest. In this
way they can be seen as furthering the interests of professors as
such. On the other hand, they are also perceived to have the capacity
for furthering their own personal interests, as distinct from anyone
(4)(10)else's, and this confers power on them.
Perceptions of the power of professors depends on their visibility 
within the organisation, and this seems to be related to their pre­
ferred means or style of gaining and exercising power. Whereas some 
professors may be quite clear about their own power, others seem to 
take a somewhat limited view, based perhaps on somewhat mechanistic 
views of social processes. For exaumple, money may be seen as a lever, 
but it is not so in a purely mechanical sense of affecting only that
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to which it is specifically applied. Control of money can confer 
a general aura of power on a person, so that they can be seen as
powerful without the perceiver having specific information of that
, . (2)(17)power being exercised.
The power of professors can be seen as limited by various factors: 
their contract with the organisation (whether formal or informal); 
organisational norms; the reputation which non-professors can build 
for themselves and which makes them independent of professorial 
patronage; the various factors which reduce the level of interest 
either of professors or non-professors in a particular issue 
including their perceptions of its importance; and the effectiveness 
of their personal political style in a given situaiion^
People have to reconcile their perceptions of their own power and 
their need for power with their values and their need to demonstrate 
these values in action. For example, for some people it is neces­
sary that academic values, which are seen as emphasising the 
importance of objectivity and rationality, are seen to prevail. 
However, maintaining academic values in decision-making can run 
counter to other values such as the avoidance of conflict, so that 
an "objective and rational" approach to the substantive issues about 
which a decision is being made, can be compromised by the political 
pressures which arise from the interest of other people in the out­
come and their possible reaction to it. This compromise can, of
(26)course, be designated as itself "rational", in the circumstances.
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INFERENCES
1. Aspects of the relationship between professional status (that 
is, status conferred on a person because of academic achievements) 
and organisational role are apparent in the data. Where there are 
important political arenas in the organisation (such as the Area 
Committees) which consist of people who play roles of organisational 
leadership in which they represent the interests of groups and where 
these leadership roles are conferred on people on account of their 
professional status, high professional status provides access to 
important political roles but there are also factors which prevent 
these being taken up. For example, where there are several potential 
leaders in a Group, because the Group's task requires that they have 
several members with high professional status, procedures such as 
the rotation of leadership mean that these powerful organisational 
roles are only played intermittently by the same individual. Where 
there are no alternative leaders in a Group, either because people of 
sufficiently high professional status are not needed for the Group's 
task, or because the alternatives are unwilling to take up the 
leadership role, some individuals will have a permanent place in 
these political arenas, in which others are temporary members. This 
confers potential advantages on such "permanent" individuals and may 
also cause the organisation to be perceived as being run by a 
"clique". ’
2. A person may acquire high professional status, and thereby a 
leadership role, through an ability to deal with a critical 
contingency of the organisation, i.e. for political reasons, rather
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than on the basis of an ability to perform the leadership role, 
either in respect of the Group’s task or in important political arenas 
in the organisation.
3 . If professional status is not accompanied by an organisational 
role perceived as having an appropriate amount of power, the status 
may be seen as diminished. This shift in perception of status may 
result from the perceived reaction of a reference group to the 
discrepancy between status and role.
4. Roles as Group Leader and as organisational member may clash 
with professional roles. It may be more in the Group Leader’s 
interest to give priority to the professional role, and in so far 
as this is to the detriment of the Group, the legitimacy of the 
leadership role will be questioned. However, ambivalence towards 
the leader will result when the advantages and disadvantages to 
Group members of the leader’s own priorities seem balanced.
3 . Values encouraging the preference of the needs of the 
organisation as a whole over the needs of an individual or Group 
can be over-ruled by norms of behaviour associated with temporary 
leadership roles in the Group. These norms may encourage opportunism 
on behalf of some members of the Group, and once set up are likely 
to become self-perpetuating. Who will be first to forego the sub- 
Group’s self-interest without any guarantee that the gesture will be 
reciprocated when another leader takes over?
6. Where a leader is powerful in relation to the organisation and 
also usually not dependent on the Group, but must on a particular
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than on the basis of an ability to perform the leadership.role, 
either in respect of the Group's task or in important political arenas 
in the organisation,
3- If professional status is not accompanied by an organisational 
role perceived as having an appropriate amount of power, the status 
may be seen as diminished. This shift in perception of status may 
result from the perceived reaction of a reference group to the 
discrepancy between status and role.
4. Roles as Group Leader and as organisational member may clash 
with professional roles. It may be more in the Group Leader’s 
interest to give priority to the professional role, and in so far 
as this is to the detriment of the Group, the legitimacy of the 
leadership role will be questioned. However, ambivalence towards 
the leader will result when the advantages and disadvantages to 
Group members of the leader’s own priorities seem balanced.
3 . Values encouraging the preference of the needs of the 
organisation as a whole over the needs of an individual or Group 
can be over-ruled by norms of behaviour associated with temporary 
leadership roles in the Group. These norms may encourage opportunism 
on behalf of some members of the Group, and once set up are likely 
to become self-perpetuating. Who will be first to forego the sub- 
Group’s self-interest without any guarantee that the gesture will be 
reciprocated when another leader takes over?
6. Where a leader is powerful in relation to the organisation and 
also usually not dependent on the Group, but must on a particular
- 208 -
issue gain the support of Group members, this gives Group members 
some power in relation to the leader over that issue, but not 
necessarily over any other.
7 . In the absence of task inter-dependence between the leader of 
a Group and the followers, and where there are few formal rules 
governing the leader’s behaviour, and where the means for applying 
formal and informal sanctions to the leader are weak, the main 
constraints on the leader’s behaviour must arise from his or her 
own values. The result is likely to be a considerable diversity in 
leadership behaviour between one leader and another, and the decisions 
made and decision-making procedures adopted can be taken as highly 
expressive of the personal values of such Headers.
8. Where there is uncertainty about the intentions and freedom of 
choice of powerful people, it is open to the perceiver to make an 
interpretation of that behaviour, based on whatever evidence the 
perceiver has and perhaps largely influenced by the perceiver’s 
own preferred way of seeing the world. However, the perceiver may 
avoid making a decision between explanations but keep various 
possibilities in mind when considering the behaviour of that person.
9. Behaviour contrary to the prevailing norms of interaction may 
be seen as dangerous but can be successfully used as a political 
tactic, which may include pretending to comply. The fact that 
there ia a norm presents an opportunity to use it as a political 
resource.
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10. The more powerful may act as a "block" on the activities of 
the less powerful by a number of means:
(a) Being incompetent.
(b) Not observing formal or informal rules by which effort and 
reward are related in the organisation.
(c) Combining against the less powerful.
Informal bargaining between the powerful within the context of 
particular structures and procedures may affect the fate of the less 
powerful (for good or ill) in ways of which they may be unaware.
11. It is easier to maintain democratic ideals when you are not 
yourself in a position of advantage in a power structure.
12. Patronage creates dependency, but people are more inclined to 
perceive that the proteges depend on the patron than that the 
patron depends on the proteges. This may leave proteges unaware
of their ovm power, and is particularly likely to occur in situations 
(as in this case) where the goals of proteges are seen as clear, 
i.e. to achieve the same status as the patron, but the goals of 
patrons are less so. Proteges may also be unaware of the extent of 
their dependence, nor how well or badly their interests are being 
served by their patron, if they relate to the rest of the organisa­
tion only through the patron and avoid other organisational contacts.
13. Having chosen to accept the patronage of another, a protege 
may also choose to see the patron as powerful and competent 
regardless of evidence to the contrary. This may be done by blaming
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deficiencies on other organisational members rather than on the 
patron.
14. A person may affect outcomes for another by withholding infor­
mation or action. X may be unaware that information or action has 
been withheld by Y, as when a professor could show how an application 
to the URF might be improved but chooses not to do so. Where the 
situation may be defined in two different ways (i.e. as a test or
as a learning/coaching activity) the withholding of information 
or action may be seen as legitimate by one party but not by the 
other. The definition of the more powerful party (i.e. the one 
who can withhold the information or action and hence affect the 
outcome for the other) will prevail. Withholding information or 
action may be a manifestation of personality, rather than a tactic 
related to pragmatic interests.
15. Some aspects of the role of a "new broom" as a means of change 
are suggested by the data. Where the Head of an organisation has
to make an appointment to a powerful role, this will also present an 
opportunity to give impetus to the policy direction which the 
organisation’s leader prefers. The more power the leader has in 
making the appointment (i.e. through not having to consult others 
or get their agreement) the greater the opportunity to express the 
leader’s own values in making this appointment. However, there are 
other factors which may work against the use of a new appointment 
as a means of change. One is the resistance of the Group to be lead 
by the new appointee to the policy of the organisational leader, and 
their ability to affect the implementation of this policy, including
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their independence from the leader. Moreover, the personal goals 
of the appointee may not be congruent with the policy in every 
respect, but this may be unknown to the organisational leader, 
either through misunderstanding or through deliberate concealment.
The extent to which the organisational Header can influence the 
appointee's action once appointed, or apply sanctions if the 
perceived "contract" is broken, will also be a factor in the effect­
iveness of this means of change. Making the appointment from outside 
the organisation has the advantage of bringing a fresh approach to 
bear on the organisation's activities, but also the disadvantage 
that the new leader is largely unaware of the political forces 
with which he or she has to deal.
16. A.person joining an organisation has, for some time, a 
"threshold" status in that he or she may be formally or informally 
debarred from taking full advantage of political opportunities - 
formally because as a newcomer it may be seen as unfair to burden 
the person with an organisational leadership role, and informally 
because of the difficulty of understanding the political processes 
of the social system. However, threshold status can also be an 
advantage, in that other powerful organisational members may feel 
obliged to make a favourable impression on the newcomer to confirm 
that he or she made the right decision in agreeing to join the 
organisation, so that demands made by the newcomer may be more readily 
agreed to. Not understanding the political processes of the organisa­
tion may also give the newcomer greater freedom of action. For 
example, not perceiving yourself as a member of an "out-group" may 
prevent you from seeing constraints which are more imagined than real.
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17- Some types of organisational activity, such as behaviour in 
Committee meetings, are more easily visible to other people and 
more easily designated as "political" by others. It is on such 
activities that a reputation for being a politician in the organisa­
tion will be more readily based since they are visible and under­
standable to more people. Others who adopt a low profile may have 
considerable power in the sense that they get their own way, "even 
against resistance", but may have little reputation for political 
behaviour in the organisation, since their activities are not widely 
known. A low profile strategy may have the disadvantage that the 
opinions and values of a person not perceived as powerful will carry 
little weight in the organisation, but have the advantage of not 
presenting a clear object for attack by others. The low profile 
approach may enable a person to follow his or her own interests 
without in any obvious way influencing the organisation as a whole.
It is also easier for people to attribute power-seeking personality 
characteristics to those who involve themselves in highly visible 
political activity. Whereas some people may advocate the use of 
one particular style of interaction as politically effective, a 
perceiver may be in doubt as to whether it is effective or not, 
which suggests a difficulty in interpreting the outcome of political 
behaviour.
18. There may be a disjuncture in the mechanism for relating 
internal incentives to organisational members to meet the external 
contingencies of the organisation. The rational view of the mechanism 
is that incentives are offered to organisational members to extend the
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use of their abilities and skills beyond existing levels in order 
to increase the organisation's leverage in obtaining more resources 
from its environment. The trouble comes when what you have to do to 
increase the leverage will not readily turn itself into an incentive 
to organisational members, since an incentive only exists if those 
to whom it is offered see it as such. In the examples reported here 
the means of leverage (increasing postgraduate student numbers) may 
be seen as a disincentive by some organisational members whose 
personal research interests cannot be met by such means, but whose 
workloads would be increased by it. Neither is the incentive of 
improving one's career prospects necessarily effective for some 
organisational members, since they may perceive that the absence of 
growth in the organisation's activities and the low staff turnover 
of relevant posts, will provide few opportunities for career 
advancement within the organisation or in similar organisations- 
Other members of the organisation, however, may find the incentives 
offered to be compatible with their own interests and their 
perceptions of advancement opportunities. The mechanisms for 
relating internal incentives to external contingencies may therefore 
favour some organisational groups and individuals more than others, 
and be a disincentive to some people.
19. The importance of an issue to an organisational member may not 
reside in it's substantive content, but in the symbolic significance 
which may be attached to the organisational member's participation 
in the decision-making process involved. So, making a bid for 
resources may be a political gesture to demonstrate conformity to 
prevailing norms rather than a demand for resources as such.
- 2l4 -
20. An organisation may narrowly define the achievements for which 
credit within the organisation will be given, and people whose 
achievements lies outside that narrow range may feel obliged to
take part in an activity which will symbolise their credit-worthiness 
to the organisation, rather than attempting to widen the range which 
the organisation will accept.
21. Attempts by powerful people in the organisation to gain 
compliance to norms considered important may be thwarted by con­
straints placed on particular individuals or groups by their special 
circumstances, and also by the ability of individuals to make 
psychological adjustments which facilitate their deviation from
the norm.
22. People in roles generally seen as powerful in the organisation 
vary in the certainty with which they describe the views and feel­
ings of others. They rarely mention the political difficulties of 
finding out what other people think. This may be because they are 
unaware of these difficulties, or because their role requires them 
to be in touch with the views and feelings of their subordinates 
and it is therefore difficult for them to express uncertainty on 
this issue.
23. Of the pressures on individuals to comply with demands of power­
ful members of the organisation one might expect the formal sanction 
to be an easily discernible indicator of political cause and effect.
For example, that Mr. X did not get what he wanted (e.g.pass the effic­
iency bar) because he did not produce the required level of output 
(e*g. published papers). However, considerable doubt can exist
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as to whether the sanction really applies, or about its efficiency 
in bringing about the behaviour. The behaviour may be compatible 
with avoiding the penalty, but it need not be caused by the 
existence of the penalty. So, a person may do research because 
they are interested, rather than through fear of not passing 
probation, but they avoid the sanction nevertheless.
24. Influence attempts based on inducements should not be seen as 
uni-directional causation, since offering a reward in exchange for 
behaviour legitimises demands for the reward, the behaviour having 
been complied with. B can therefore be said to cause the behaviour 
of A through having complied with A ’s demands. However, it would 
be a mistake to think that this equalises the relative power of A 
and B, since A may have considerable freedom in the choice of reward 
to be offered.
25» Where there is some doubt as to the effective influences on the 
behaviour of others, an individual may adopt a reason most compatible 
with the image of the organisation he or she prefers, in spite of 
conflicting evidence.
26. In situations which are seen as calling for complex judgements 
to be made, people are likely to have ambiguous notions about fairness. 
On the one hand they may feel the need to advocate "objectivity" but 
on the other recognise that as this "objectivity" must reside in the 
mind of someone, it cannot really exist. As a result, "being 
unbiassed" may mean not being seriously open to challenge with the 
likelihood of the judgement being over-ruled and/or not being
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biassed against me. Maintaining faith in one's own objectivity 
may involve seeing those who disagree with a decision as "biassed".
27. Procedures and norms of behaviour may make it more difficult to
challenge those who make complex judgements, so that they are
shielded against having to justify their actions. However, this 
will not automatically shield their judgements from suspicion.
People who have no information on which to assess the substantive 
arguments will base their assessment of the fairness of the judge­
ments on what they can see. If they see the substantive issues as 
being based on exclusive knowledge to which they do not consider 
that the judge is a party (i.e. it requires specialist knowledge
to fully understand), or if they see that the judge is so placed 
in the organisational structure as to be likely to be subject to 
political influences, the judgement will be suspected as unfair. 
Alternatively, the judge may be seen as exercising his or her own 
whims.
28. One factor which can affect the decisions made by a judge is
his or her interpretation of the behaviour of colleagues and predic­
tion of how they will react to a particular decision. So, it might 
be assumed that a decision with which they do not agree will spoil 
relationships over other issues. Clearly, the reactions of those 
who can adversely affect the judge will be more important than of 
those who cannot, either because they do not know who the judge is, or 
because they have no power in relation to the judge. These two factors, 
the predictions about the reactions of the powerful and the vis­
ibility of the judge to such persons, can bias judgements in favour
of powerful members of the organisation. Where the judge has no
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fear that harmful effects will ensue in relations with powerful 
people, constraint on decision-making is reduced.
29. Some judges reported taking steps to off-set their biasses, 
for example, in favouring their own subjects or members of their 
own staff. As well as not wanting to upset powerful colleagues, 
they also wanted to be seen to be fair. This suggests that they 
do not expect powerful colleagues to regard a decision in their 
(the colleagues) favour as unfair. Perhaps the boundaries between 
a fair decision and self-interest are not clearly perceived.
30. People may have ambivalent feelings about exercising power and 
reject the idea of deliberate attempts to influence decisions. 
However, a tolerance of the adverse reactions of others to one's 
decisions indicates a willingness to exercise one's own will, even 
against resistance.
31. A number of perceptions about the concept of power emerge from 
the data:
(a) You can be seen as opting out of politics if you have enough 
power, which suggests a notion of political behaviour as making an 
effort to compete with others.
(b) "Acting politically" can be seen as a special kind of activity, 
distinct from other behaviour, and perhaps implying a degree of skill 
in influencing events, and perhaps also an inate ability.
(c) It may be difficult to detect the difference between coercive 
and non-coercive forms of power, since the classification of A's
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behaviour in this respect depends on the feelings of B, information 
about which may be impossible to obtain.
(d) It is possible to distinguish between a political game and a
political falsehood.
(e) Being powerful means getting your own way.
(f) "Political" is a pejorative term.
(g) A person may be seen as having a need for power, i.e. it is an
aspect of their motivation, but having an intrinsic value for them, 
and not being directed towards some particular purpose.
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(d) Theoretical implications. The data analysis in this section 
has theoretical implications which mostly centre around the A-B 
model of power discussed in Chapter 2, and the idea that power 
is differentially distributed, but also bringing in some of the 
structural aspects discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter, and looking forward to some value issues dealt with more 
fully in the next section.
The research has brought to notice the difficulties which A and B 
have in interpreting each other’s behaviour, or assessing whether 
someone is powerful or not, or how much power they have, or what 
it is based on. People may take a view of what interests powerful 
people represent, and see themselves advantaged or disadvantaged 
in consequence, without having much direct evidence on which to 
base this view, perhaps because the powerful make their decisions 
in private meetings such as the VCAC. The interpretation of how 
power is differentially distributed and whether a particular 
individual is powerful or not, can also be seen to be dependent on 
the criteria adopted by the perceiver for determining this. For 
example, whether the criterion relates to observable behaviour, or 
to the outcome of the behaviour. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, 
section 2, the A-B model of power has limitations in that it does 
not include the context of the interaction between A and B, and it 
can be suggested that this interaction will be influenced by what 
A and B perceive to be this context, as well as by their own values, 
which guide their interpretation. There is again in this section 
evidence of the difficulty of determing the cause and effect of
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political behaviour noted by Dahl (1968). For example, even when 
B appears to be complying with A's wishes, it may not be correct 
to assume that this compliance was due to some action of A. A 
may threaten to use some negative sanction (such as failure to pass 
probation) to make B conform, but B may do what A wants for reasons 
other than the presence of this sanction.
A further example of this problem occurs where A is trying to get 
B to do something where B is structurally more powerful than A.
This may raise the question of how much autonomy B has, how free to 
comply with A's demands. What looks to A like freedom to decide on 
personal whim may in fact be the outcome of constraints which B 
perceives but A does not. This uncertainty about the power of B 
in the wider context underlines the importance of the context to 
the A-B model of power, and the difficulty it can create for 
organisation members trying to determine the cause and effect of 
behaviour, and hence the difficulty of knowing how to influence 
others.
As for the reason why a particular person may be seen as powerful, 
what is the perceived basis of an individual's power (see Chapter 2, 
section 2, page 6 3), perceivers may themselves be unclear on this 
question, but the data suggest some answers. For example, actors 
may be seen as powerful because of some valued expertise, or because 
they are seen to get their own way. "High-profile" behaviour in an 
organisation may enhance a perceived powerfulness and "low-profile" 
behaviour prevent such a perception. Membership of a particular group 
may also confer perceived power on an individual. However, 
a member of a group generally perceived as powerful may feel
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relatively powerless if not involved in political processes such 
as the formal decision-making process. Disatisfaction at this 
incongruence between group membership and perceived power indicates 
an underlying value that certain individuals ought to have more 
power than others. This question of values about the differential 
distribution of power is discussed in the literature, see Chapter 2, 
section 4, and it can be suggested that being expected to be power­
ful can confer a perceived power on an individual, even though this 
perception may not be in accord with that individual’s feeling of 
powerfulness.
It is suggested in this research that neither structural centrality 
of role (e.g. the PAO) nor legitimisation by external authority 
(e.g. the Senate) in themselves necessarily confer power, but may 
need in addition control of a valued resource, such as finance (PAO) 
or appointments (VC). A further route to power suggested in the 
data is being able to give attention to tasks which others cannot 
spend time on, so must allow those who can to make decisions, and 
thereby extend their domain of power.
It is further suggested that the potential for power (as distinct 
from the exercise of it) which is discussed in the literature (see 
Chapter 2, section 2) may rest, not just on such bases as expertise, but 
also on uncertainties in the actor’s context, such as uncertainty 
about the facts, or about the legitimate boundary or appropriate 
"domain" of a person's role. This raises again the question of what 
power a person ought to have, and who should have more power than 
whom, already referred to, and also questions about the extent to
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which such values are shared by organisation members, and about 
shared understandings of what constitutes legitimate behaviour.
These issues were discussed in Chapter 2, section 2 in consideration 
of the symbolic interactionist view of power, and in section 4 in 
reference to legitimacy. It can be said that such perceptions and 
values about who is powerful and who ought to have power, and the 
uncertainties involved in them, both provide and limit political 
opportunities - "the chance to carry through one’s own will"
(Walliman et al (1980)). However, the research in this section 
also shows that, not only may the opportunity to exercise power arise 
from the procedures adopted for integrating the structure, as 
discussed in the previous section, but may also arise from the way 
in which different parts of the structure may provide some individ­
uals with better opportunities than others, regardless of a similarity 
in status between these individuals. For example, just by being a 
professor of a small school rather than a large one, you could be 
a permanent member of an integrating committee, rather than a temporary 
one, an outcome which may be seen to illegitimately favour the "less 
powerful" (i.e. smaller Schools and their professors). One can see 
that in such cases structural opportunities for power may run counter 
to values about who ought to be powerful.
This research suggests that the question of the importance of the 
issue, which as was indicated in Chapter 2, section 3? has an impact 
on political opportunity and is part of the potential for power, may 
depend, not just on shifts in salience over time - i.e. what is an 
important issue today is not important tomorrow - but also on the
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perceiver’s perspective from within the structure, so that what 
looks important to one person is less so, or unimportant, to another. 
According to "strategic contingency" theorists (see Chapter 2, 
section 3 ) important issues which arise from cfemands made by power­
ful sectors of the organisation's environment provide the opportunity 
for power for those who can deal with such contingencies. In this 
study, for example, it could be said that the VC and the PAO both 
derived power from the importance of financial resources in times 
of economic stringency, and the dependence of the organisation on 
an external source of funds (the UGC). Expertise in dealing with 
this issue and a role which provided the opportunity to interpret 
the external demands and have one’s interpretation accepted (Salancik 
and Pfeffer (1977)), were means by which particular individuals 
in particular parts of the structure, at a particular time, could 
acquire power. In this instance it can be seen that the "strategic 
contingency" and "symbolic interactionist" perspectives combine to 
show how individuals can be in a position of political opportunity. 
However, it was recognised in this research that this opportunity 
is not sufficient without the skills to make use of it. It can be 
suggested from the data that these skills include the ability to 
deal with ambiguity of domain - for example, what is to be 
considered within the remit of a financial expert - and the uncertainty 
inherent for others in one's having expertise which they do not share. 
The avoidance of challenge may be a necessary skill in this respect. 
Perception about the social system - for example, whether groups 
exist or whether they act in concert as a coalition - will affect 
the actor’s subjective judgements about what steps can be taken.
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As has been implied in Chapter 2, sections 3 and 6, such perceptions 
affect A ’s judgement about the tactics which can be used to gain 
the compliance of B, for example in deciding whether a rule exists 
and/or whether it can be ignored, and what the chances are of 
securing the positive attitudes of B. It can be suggested that 
the actor's perception of the opportunities and constraints on 
behaviour in the organisational context may considerably influence 
what is attempted. The nature of such perceptions may be illuminated 
by the advent of newcomers into the organisation, who may be at an 
advantage or disadvantage because of their unsocialised status, 
and a tendency for existing organisation members to feel that they 
should acceed to newcomers' demands.
The research in this section offers a further comment on the 
"strategic contingency" concept, seen as a route to power, in the 
opportunity it offers for increasing the individual's domain of power 
beyond the contingency itself. For example, the strategic contingency 
route to power may provide the individual with status and authority 
to play a number of additional roles beyond his or her competence, 
or into areas in which a clash of values with others may become 
important. One person's advancement by the strategic contingency 
route may therefore be of considerable disadvantage to others in the 
organisation, through this creation of roles and spreading of the 
domain of power.
In this study it can be seen that the opportunity to play a number 
of different roles in the organisation could also be in itself a 
political opportunity since individuals could choose to emphasise
- 223 -
whichever one best suited their self-interest as they perceived 
it, even though this might not match the perceived needs of others 
who were affected by this choice. In the conflict of self-interests 
which may result from such a situation, it can be difficult for the 
structurally less powerful to successfully pursue their own perceived 
self-interest when there is, as in this case, little task 
interdependence or highly asymmetrical interdependence between the 
people concerned. A professor might be, for example, an "anti­
patron" to a lecturer, but this may not matter at all to the 
professor, but be of considerable consequence to the lecturer.
The structurally less powerful may also be at a disadvantage if they 
do not see how the more powerful are dependent on them. As was 
suggested by the literature in Chapter 2, sections 3 and 3, lack of 
awareness of factors in the A-B relationship which might provide 
opportunities for power, is an important aspect of that relationship.
In this interaction between individuals, there is the question of 
the difficulty of identifying the meaning of behaviour and the 
potential for power, of others. The intentions, interests and 
political position of a more powerful person are part of the organ­
isational context of the less powerful, but they are open to 
alternative interpretations. Where there is little task inter­
dependence between individuals or groups, and where there are few 
formal rules governing the behaviour of individuals, their behaviour 
may be guided by informal norms or by their own values, but if the 
latter, there may be a considerably diversity of behaviour between 
different organisation members of the same status. Their freedom to
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act as they think fit makes it more difficult to predict their 
behaviour. Even organisational norms may not constrain them, 
since flouting these may be used as a political tactic. Moreover, 
political behaviour may be the outcome of their own personality 
needs for power (see Chapter 2, section 4, pp 81 etseq) rather 
than pragmatism. But there is a difficulty also about determining 
whether the powerful really are acting on the basis of particular 
values - such as objectivity - or simply using these as one of 
those "myths" of organisation which Bailey (1977) talks about 
(see Chapter 2, p.87). It is suggested that the boundary between 
conforming to values and the pursuit of pragmatic interests is 
not necessarily clear even to the actor.
It is suggested in Chapter 2, section 2, that B's perception of 
A ’s power may be affected by B's perception of whether or not A 
can apply sanctions to B, and also that the outcome of A ’s attempt 
to influence B may be assisted or thwarted by B ’s ability to make 
psychological adjustments to justify compliance or non-compliance. 
These processes are identified in the data, for example in the 
perception of whether passing probation will be used as a negative 
sanction, and in the rationalisations which allow a person to avoid 
doing research. It can be added that the resistance of B (see 
Chapter 2, section 4) may be facilitated by the opportunity and 
skills to'bon "A, for example, in situations where A is committed 
to a bargain which B may be able to avoid fulfilling, but may also 
be able to conceal this fact. Moreover, B's resistance may be due 
to constraints on B of which A is unaware, or has failed to take into
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account, such as the opposition of other individuals or groups 
to what A requires of B, or a lack of resources which B needs in 
order to comply. It can be seen therefore that the resistance of 
B may arise, not from a resistance of will or clash of values, but 
from contextual constraints. However, it may be difficult for the 
perceiver to determine whether such constraints are real, or 
opportunities for B to justify non-compliance.
The capacity of B to resist the influence attempts of A has a 
bearing on the "strategic contingency" view of power. Whereas A 
may have identified the action necessary to meet the demands of 
external pressures on the organisation over an important issue (such 
as how to obtain money from the UGC) this action may require changes 
in the activities of B, but these may be unpalatable to B or perceived 
to be against B's self-interest. It may be possible for A to try 
to manipulate incentives such as promotion so that it becomes 
advisable for B to comply for the sake of self-interest, provided 
that such incentives are available to A. However, if what B con­
siders to be an incentive is intrinsic rather than extrinsic, it 
may be impossible for A to change B's perceived self-interest in 
the necessary direction. For example, it is difficult to see how 
A can cause B to be intrinsically interested in doing research 
rather than teaching, if teaching is a long-term interest of B.
This would seem to involve changing B's compliance from a 
cooperative (based on shared values) to a calculative one (based 
on assessment of pragmatic interest) (Etzioni (196I)). However, 
both types of contract were found in the data, and also examples of
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failure to get the compliance of B in an attempt to meet a strategic 
contingency. For example, there were people who did not want to 
do research, and refused to do any, and others who did not want 
to but pretended to want to, and still others who wanted to and did.
A coercive contract did not seem to be possible. These issues 
suggest a connection between motivation theory and theories of 
power.
This problem of gaining the compliance of B to meet a strategic 
contingency identified by A, might be used to justify the unequal 
distribution of power if A's perception is accepted as representing 
"reality". One could then say with Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) that 
A should have enough power to align the organisation with this 
reality (see Chapter 2, section 4). In the organisation studied 
there seemed to be a general consensus about the nature of that 
reality and what had to be done to meet it, but with a few dissenting 
voices as a reminder that, as the symbolic interactionists suggest, 
defining reality is in itself a political act. (See Chapter 2, 
section 2).
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4. The culture of the university
The culture of the university can be seen as the mixture of norms of 
behaviour existing in it, together with the values of individuals, which 
may be congruent or incongruent with these norms. Sometimes people 
made direct comments about their perception of the norms existing in 
the organisation, or about their own values. At other times people's 
comments indicated an underlying value although it was not directly 
expressed. The norms dealt with here are those concerned with research, 
competitiveness, the use of information, management style and the 
handling of conflicts.
The theme that the university is in transition recurred quite 
frequently in the data. References were made to its being relatively 
new, an ex CAT and to the change in Vice Chancellor. However, it 
was pointed out that it was becoming crystallised into one form, 
although still at present dynamic, and the possible outcome of that 
crystallising process was suggested by an informant who said, "Places 
like Leeds may have more goodies, but I observe they suffer from long­
term staff having entrenched rights to those goodies. In a way it's 
an advantage to be in a newer university". This raises the question 
of what is becoming entrenched at Bath.
Other data reflect the shifts in norms and divergences of values 
perceived to result from this transitional status. One topic around 
which these shifts and divergences gather is research itself.
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(a) Research values. Among the Deciders group, the importance of 
research in the university was hardly disputed, and the re­
orientation of the staff towards research commented on. A typical 
remark: "The university is an ex-CAT*. The staff were more
teaching oriented 10 years ago and there were a lot of non­
researchers here. It's our top priority to increase research", 
and, "It's a young university and research is a new field so 
we have to make a conscious effort to get it going". However, 
the comment, "There's a lot of stress on doing research these 
days at Bath - perhaps an obsession some would say", indicated 
a mildly dissenting viewl
Among the Applicants group, there was general agreement in views 
about the importance of research to the university and as shown 
in the previous section many people had a personal interest in 
doing it. However, there was more dissent and it was more sharply 
voiced than in the Deciders group: "There is hysteria about
research sind publication" and, "The university is neurotic about 
research" were examples. Some people felt it was wrong that no 
credit was given to being a teacher, and the suggestion was made 
that doing research was detrimental to teaching, "There is no doubt 
that when you start research in the department, the undergraduates 
suffer". For this reason the staff in some Sçhools felt antagonistic
*CAT = College of Advanced Technology
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to the new orientation. "There is hostility among the staff
towards the rest of the university because in the School they
want to do teaching etc. and not research." Commenting on the
drive to increase postgraduate student numbers another informant
said, "Postgraduate numbers lead to more money for the university.
It's one of those numbers they use. It's one of those indices
they use these days and I feel they are often irrelevant". The
suggestion here was that although the university's attempt to
increase postgraduate numbers was understandable, nevertheless
it could be leading the university astray from its "proper"
(1) (6)
function.
Apart from the importance placed on doing research, other questions 
arise about research itself, what it is, what sort of research is 
favoured. One Applicant commented: "Our approach to research is
misunderstood by the rest of the university", which suggests 
that there is a sharp difference of view about what research should 
be like. Another said that, "There are intellectual biasses about 
epistemology" and that these formed part of "the political real­
ities of the university" which suggests conflict between groups 
or individuals over these differences. By contrast, a member of 
the Decider group said that, "There is no problem about defining 
research". This professor was seen as having a very biassed view 
of research by an Applicant with whom he had crossed swords on a
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a research matter: "He couldn’t see the ways I was thinking
and couldn’t move from his own view to someone else’s" and,
"His questions showed that he had no idea of the field of study".
This contrasts with the professor's definition of what research
is: "Research is something of interest to the member of staff,
a problem or new idea or disproving something. It depends on
the collection of data and the interpretation of data. It
doesn't need to be statistical". This statement suggests an
open-minded view which would be capable of encompassing many
different approaches to research. The mismatch between these
perceptions is curious and perhaps it highlights the difficulty
specialists have in communicating across subject boundaries,
particularly if there is no perception that a problem exists.
The difference in power between the Applicant and the Decider is
relevant to this conflict, in that the burden of proving his case
rested with the Applicant - it is easier for the powerful to
(2)have their definition of "research" prevail.
Another informant in the Deciders group considered that there was 
a question to be raised about research: "The question arises 'what
is research?' It is a question of what you do and how it is 
published". The notion that publication shows that research has
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been done was a common theme in the data. Here it seems to be 
implied that the answer to the question, "what is research" can 
be found in a certain type of outcome by which it is made manifest 
to the outside world. Research is that which is published in 
journals and books, as well as being an activity in itself. If 
no-one publishes it, should it be assumed that it wasn’t "really" 
research? Does it matter how it is published? For example, if it 
is turned into a learning package for schools, does that count?
Doubt was expressed about the value of much publication. "When you 
look at publications it often appears that they almost duplicate 
each other, and few are really worthwhile". Another suggestion was 
that you can get a "stab in the back" rather than accolades if you 
publish too much duplicate material, indicating that some sanctions 
are seen as needed against the abuse of publication as an indication 
of researc^^
One informant in the Decider group made a distinction between 
"scholarly work" and "research" and also between proper research - 
"a long hard slog" and a low-level routine activity. "Research is 
not just a matter of taking readings off apparatus every morning". 
Another person suggested that the university needed to take a 
different view of research. "The trouble is that we still work 
on the scientific model - a research student in a lab. This doesn't 
suit all activities," a view supported by another comment, "Research 
in our subject is different from that in science. Science works 
more to the standard pattern of the young person with a degree 
working with a professor on his research, doing laboratory experiments 
and writing them up".
- 234 -
A technologist commenting on research in his field said, "Science 
and engineering must have someone at the bench full-time, research­
ing, computing etc. It takes two people, a student and a supervisor 
to do research properly". Itds interesting to note in these last 
two comments that this view of how research in science is done would
not be shared by some scientists at Bath, as shown by the data on
(2) (3) ,how groups are formed in the organisation, (see page 137).
Another question which recurred in the data was whether research
should be pure or applied. Should it deal with knowledge for its
own sake, or should it be useful? Someone, who was slightly hedging
his bets on this said, "The meaning of a university is research
and teaching together, and the dispersal of knowledge. This work
can contribute to the economy, be useful". This comment seems to
beg the question: It can contribute to the economy, but does it
have to? And is usefulness only to be defined in economic terms?
Another comment was: "The university was set up to deal with
practical matters, assistance to industry", and he suggested that
people did not necessarily understand this, and some were against
this view of the university. "They can therefore be surprised by
(2) (3) (6)the turns of university policy, and they don’t like them."
One theme that recurred in the data was the perception that the
social sciences were useless by definition, usually mentioned by 
people in the Arts area For example: "A lot of people in science
are very anti social science. They will say it is a useless area",
and of a Decider in Technology, "He is anti social science. He
doesn’t see any reason why social processes need investigation,
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because they are self-evident". This is perhaps related to the 
view of the university as being scientific and technological in 
orientation, and therefore the rationale for the Arts area being 
unclear. The Cinderella role of the Arts area has been referred to 
in the discussion of the university structure, but it should be 
mentioned here that not everyone sees it that way. One relatively 
new Decider commented, "I am not convinced about the Science/ 
Technology bias of Bath. I haven't found it myself, though others 
in the School have felt it". An Applicant who had been in the 
university some years alsoiejected the idea that people in non­
applied subjects such as history or theoretical sociology were at
any disadvantage, although he himself subscribed to the "usefulness"
(2) (3) (4)
value.
The idea that the university is "technological" recurrs in the data, 
and the university was at one time called "University of Technology", 
a title to which some people, I was told, strongly objected. "It 
was felt that the technology title made it a second class university 
somehow." One informant took a legalistic stance on the question.
"The university charter states that this is a technological university 
catering for the needs of society". Another suggestion was that it 
was more a matter of political realities, "Science and technology 
have the strength and power in the university", however, he went on 
to say, "My subject could gain some sympathy from scientists because 
it could be seen as dealing with hard numbers and measurement", a 
comment which seems to shift the argument away from "is it useful" 
to "is it seen to be useful", quantification being taken as the sign
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of scientific or technological research and hence of usefulness.
Thus, powerful people in the organisation can obtain a distorted 
perception of a subject in a way which is an advantage to that subject.
(6)(7)Consequently "it is not an alien environment" for that subject.
The scientific and technological bias does, however, create an alien 
environment for some subjects according to some informants: "There
is little understanding of our problems in the university... we are 
at the end of most queues", and "The School is a foreign body at 
Bath". However, another informant, while acknowledging the power 
of science, due to the VC's being a scientist, nevertheless did not 
feel alien: "We have to work twice as hard to get what we want... 
but I don't feel like an outsider in a technological university".
One informant referred to the distinction between being scientific 
and being useful, and rejected the suggestion that pure science might 
find difficulty in keeping its head above water, while admitting that 
the trend was towards applied science. "Our aim is to extend know­
ledge, whether by pure or applied research". However, his comment,
"It is easier for pure science to argue that it might be useful in 
future than for literature and language research to show that it might be 
useful" is an acknowledgement that usefulness might be required 
ultimately, and also indicates a perception of what 'usefulness is.
On this view the "needs of society" are perhaps to do with solving 
particular problems. As another informant put it, "The problem is 
not being able to say that researching colour images in Kafka is 
'useful', but improving the railway system in Pakistan useful".
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People seemed to have an idea in their minds about that "useful"
(2)(3)
means, and no-one raised the question of its definition.
An informant from the Arts area suggested that economic circumstances 
contributed to the pressure for applied approaches to research.
"In the present climate there is no way of developing the non­
applied side of things, and we have a no-growth situation anyway... 
The pressure is on the abstract people at every level, in ordinary 
conversation and in meetings and from the VC". However, there were 
some dangers seen in this applied orientation: "There is a limit­
ation on the university because there is so much emphasis on 
application. You ought to have the theoretical grounding as well, 
but this gets pushed out... the university is out of balance as a 
university". In the science area too, doubt was expressed about 
the "applied" bias. "You should be able to pursue pure science 
research and not have to show usefulness^^
The way in which research arises has a bearing on the question of 
usefulness. In technology, research was said to be funded largely 
by companies who wanted a problem solved, and is therefore by 
definition intended to be applied and useful. Research as a response 
to external demands for problem solving has its limitations, as one 
technologist indicated, "Getting money from the Equipment Fund gives 
me more freedom of action in choosing my research lines. I don't 
have to be tied to what I can get someone outside to be interested 
in". In science, although it was said that research grants come 
from a variety of outside sources, including industrial companies,
- 238-
it was denied that this meant problem-solving in quite the same 
way "we do basic research not product development" was the comment.
Perhaps behind these views about research is a commonly held view 
of the need for usefulness, but a range of ideas about what use­
fulness is. On the one hand it is solving a particular problem for 
a client, and perhaps this represents one end of a continuum, the 
other end being research undertaken because of the interest of a 
member of staff, but which in the long term the outside world might , 
find useful. At some point the initiative for innovation changes 
from being predominantly within the organisation to being 
predominantly outside it. It may be that the absence of consensus 
about research values arises because some people see as opposites to 
this process of "changing the world" as someone put it, being
(3)abstract or theoretical or the absence of quantification in methodology.
One slight twist to the question of research values was given by
the comment that, "making money seems to be a criterion in the
university" or rather more cynically, "money in, paper out" was
a description of the university system. This seems to suggest that
usefulness to the organisation itself is part of the picture of
research norms, while the data on pressures on staff to do research
also indicate that career considerations are also a factor in
relating the individual's research values to the research norms of
the organisation. These comments on the nature of research suggest
that there is no consensus of view about what it means to do research,
what criteria should be applied in assessing the value of a piece of
(2) (6)
research, or on methodology.
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INFERENCES
1. When an organisation changes its policy there is a shift also 
in the perceptions of what is to be valued, which in turn changes 
the balance of power away from some individuals and groups and 
towàrds others. This is reflected in what the organisation will 
spend its resources on, as well as how the contribution of indi­
vidual members of the organisation will be evaluated. Although 
many people in the organisation may welcome these changes, as being 
in line with their own values, some will feel that their situation 
has been changed for the worse, and their contribution no longer 
held in esteem.
2. Where a highly valued activity is not easily definable, 
individuals and groups will try to characterise it so that it 
most suits their preferences. Operationalising the concept, e.g. 
in this case saying what will be taken as a sign of research having 
been done, will become an important activity if there are resource 
implications of the definition. In these circumstances groups will 
try to have the activity defined in a way which will justify their 
claims on resources and may also seek to exclude other groups from 
a share of resources by the same means.
3- A consensus may develop from a narrow range of definitions of 
a criterion by which‘a major activity is to be evaluated, "usefulness" 
in this case. Groups may fail to take action to either broaden this 
definition or to bring their activities within its range, with the 
consequence that their raison d'etre in the organisation will be 
undermined, both in their own eyes and in others.
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4. Prejudice against a group may manifest itself as dogmatic 
statements that the group’s activities fail to meet the criterion
of evaluation as normally defined in the organisation. This enables 
some people to justify the exclusion of the group from sharing in 
the organisation’s resources when they have no other way of 
justifying this.
5 . Where an organisation has to deal with complex abstractions, 
there is a considerable danger that the meaning of its activities 
will shift in undesirable ways. So, research activity in this 
case could turn into the simple production of paper or the routine 
reading of apparatus. Organisational procedures for identifying 
such activities, evaluating them and apportioning resources to them 
are a major factor in bringing about such shifts of meaning.
6. Difficulties of obtaining a consensus about organisational 
priorities and how activities are to be evaluated may be related 
to a lack of consensus about the purpose of the organisation as a 
whole. This may be related to wider values about what organisations 
of that type should be like and their place in society. The policies 
pursued by the dominant group in an organisation may seem to some 
members to be contrary to, or falling short of, these wider values.
7 . It can be to your advantage if powerful individuals and groups 
misunderstand your activities by applying irrelevant criteria which 
enable them to define these activities in ways which make them 
acceptable to themselves, (e.g. It is all done with numbers, 
therefore it must be scientific, therefore it is OK).
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(b) The use of information
Among the Deciders group, the clearest indications about the norms 
of secrecy in the organisation came from their replies to my 
requests for information. One piece of information which one area 
regarded as secret was the names of people who had applied for 
Research Funds. One informant wanted to say that it was not a 
competitive situation and that people would not want it known that 
they had applied. Another that the decision criteria themselves 
were confidential to the Area committee, and were not known to the 
Applicants. A third member of the Deciders group suggested that 
the reasons why people were turned down should not be generally 
known "largely because it would cause appeals against the decisions" 
In all these cases, secrecy can be seen as a form of protection; 
of the Applicants against loss of status with their colleagues; 
of the Area committee's autonomy to choose their priorities among 
the applications; of the Deciders against appeals from Applicants; 
and perhaps also to prevent competition from becoming manifest. 
Another informant considered the whole decision-making process in 
the university as a "management tool" which should be kept confiden­
tial, presumably in order to give the university an edge in its
(1)(7)
competition with other institutions.
Among Deciders and Applicants, one or two were concerned about the 
confidentiality of the interviews. For example, "I am concerned 
that my views should not be broadcast round the university", or 
the Decider who was "anxious that ciny report you made would not 
make information attributable to particular departments"
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The usefulness of withholding information was indicated by one 
Decider who suggested that if one Area finds out what another Area 
is putting forward as its list of applications for the Research 
Fund before this information has been reciprocated, that could be 
to the first Area's disadvantage. Another informant indicated the 
importance of not disclosing or drawing attention to information 
about applications which could be seized on by another Area as a 
reason for not awarding funds to your applications.
A further perception about the usefulness of withholding information 
was that the less it flows the less trouble there is, as revealed 
by the comment, "It's all so difficult... the less said about it 
the better".
Such informaints were clearly aware of the political nature of inform­
ation in that they saw it as capable of affecting their own position 
in some way, even when the information concerned what was, in 
university terms, a relatively minor matter such as the Research 
Fund. Apart from these comments about the research project itself, 
evidence about the use of information in the organisation emerges 
also in other ways from the data. Comments were made about the 
availability of information and the impact of this availability; 
and about trends in information availability within the university 
and differences between Schools or Areas.
Two people suggested that information could be obtained informally: 
"There is plenty of information around - you can cultivate the right 
people, those who have been on the committee, the Head of School".
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and, "I know from the Prof who has applied, and I assume other people 
know from him that I have". More typically, however, people reported 
being "in the dark", particularly about the reasons why their 
application was not successful (which the majority are not). One 
person suggested that the URF was run in a similar way to the SRC 
system: "I wasn’t told why my application was turned down. It
is rather arbitrary; they suddenly tell you you haven't got it.
There is secrecy about it as with the SRC unless you know people 
on the committee who feed information back to you or in other ways 
give you something to go on. They tend to say its just unfortunate - 
I think there should be some dialogue".
One effect of the lack of information surrounding the Research Fund 
was that people acquire false information about it. For exsimple,
I was told that the Vice Chancellor arbitrated between the applications; 
that the Board of Studies of a School considered them; that the final 
decision was made at Area level; that it was not necessary to have 
a named student this year; and that the applications could not be 
referred by anyone inside the university, all of which views were 
false. One person thought that the content of his application (in 
a social science subject) "was assessed by a Professor of Germaji". 
Another was unaware that the person to whom he had gone for advice
(4)about his application was also applying to the Fund.
Opinions were divided as to whether the protection of confidentiality 
was necessary to Applicants. For example, one informant commented 
that "people mind about the list of ranking being published, 
especially if they are low on the list, because they don't like their
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project being put down in that way", A contrary view put forward 
was that because people apply for awards so much, both inside and 
outside the university, they are accustomed to being turned down:
"We are hardened to not getting awards", and because it is like 
trying your hand at the pools, that is, a game of chance rather than 
a true competition, there is no disgrace in losing. It is inter­
esting to note here that the ranking of applications can be taken 
to indicate academic merit, when in fact it could mean an ordering 
by youthfulness and inexperience, so that the better (academically) 
applications could come at the bottom of the list. Publishing the 
ranking of applications without publishing the decision criteria 
actually used could cause unnecessary anguish. This clearly relates 
to the importance placed on reputation and hence status in the 
university, as witness the difficulty some referees have in giving 
a lower grading to the applications of senior colleagues. In the 
light of that value orientation, publishing one piece of information
without the other, i.e. the ranking without the criteria, could
(1)(4)(5)cause distorted perceptions of the meaning of decisions.
There were also indications from some people that the system had 
become more secretive than it had been: "We used to get a list
through the Board of Studies of priorities given to applications, but 
they stopped doing it - I don't know why not". And from another 
informant : "The whole system is too secret. At one time you could
read minutes of Senate and they'd mean something. Now because of 
bureaucracy they refer to papers you don't have access to so you 
have no idea of what's going on unless you're one of the few".
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There were also indications that hhe level of secrecy varies between
Schools and between Areas. On the whole, science and technology were
represented as being more secretive than the Arts area, but within
the Arts area there were variations: "On their School agenda it
mentions applications for grants, and discretionary action by the
Chairman - there is fairly public discussion about it - this
(6) (7)doesn't happen in our School".
One question which arises about the flow of information in the 
organisation is the extent to which its lack of circulation is due 
to secrecy - deliberate withholding of it - rather than other causes. 
The data shows that people are sometimes ill-informed because they do 
not seek the information out, in some cases because they do not 
consider the issue of sufficient importance to warrant the effort, 
"There's no time to fuss about it... one would be wasting time".
It can be suggested too that people who are relatively new in the 
organisation and relatively junior do not have access to, or know 
of the existence of, the informal channels of communication which 
could provide them with information. Also, that communication takes 
time, and people who have information may not want to spend time 
passing it on if they have other priorities, especially perhaps
(1)if their orientation, is outside rather than inside the organisation.
The criteria by which a decision will be made are an important part 
of the political processes of decision-making because of their 
effect on the outcome of the decision. From the point of view of the 
flow of information it is interesting to see what criteria participants 
in the process think are being used, either by themselves if they are
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Deciders, or by others. The criteria used in the URF decision­
making process provide an example of how perceptions of criteria 
used in decision-making can vary between individuals and groups.
Taking the Decider and the Applicant groups together, the perceived 
criteria fall into six categories: criteria relating to the
substantive content of the application; to the Applicant himself/ 
herself; to the research student; to some administrative matter; 
to the referee, the School or the committee; and to the presentation 
of the application.
Since everyone with whom the URF was discussed was asked about the 
criteria, the results are tabulated below:








1. Substantive content 9 17 26
2. Applicant 13 16 31
3- Student 3 3 8
4. Administrative matter 14 16 30
5. Referee, School, Committee 1 7 8
6. Presentation of application 2 6 8
"Administrative matters" includes such considerations as whether a 
studentship or a grant is applied for, whether the application has been 
ranked first on a previous listing, whether it would lead to a grant
-  247 -
being awarded for further work from outside sources, whether the 
research has already started.
These figures suggest that most weight is perceived as given to the
content, the Applicant and administrative considerations, but it
is interesting to note the divergence of perception between Deciders
and Applicants over the importance of content, the Deciders giving
more weight to the Applicant and the administrative matters than to
(2)(3)the content than is perceived by the Applicants.
It is also interesting to look at the most reported criteria - 
regardless of the above categories. Criteria with more than five 
mentions were as follows:
TABLE 6 Most reported decision criteria.
Criteria • Deciders Applicants Total
1. Being young and junior (it was
usually assumed that these
conditions coincide) 7 .7 14
2. Technical, Scientific, Academic
merit of application.. 3 7 10
3. Being new member of staff 2 4 6
4. Pump-priming project .. 4 3 - 7
3. Reputation/track record of staff 3 3 6
6. Wording/presentation of project 2 6 8
7. Useful/practical/applicable project 3 4 7
8. Relevance/topicality of project 2 4 6
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These figures show a divergence of view between Deciders and 
Applicants which is quite marked in some instances - for example, 
items 2 and 6.
Some people among the Deciders (the referees and some professors) 
had particular responsibilities for ranking or grading applications, 
and could therefore be seen as being particularly powerful in the 
decision-making process. They appear to have not taken much account 
of items 2, 3 and 6, but have subscribed to all the others, and 
added also*the criterion of having named student for the projec^-
It would appear, therefore, that the Applicants are not so far out
in their estimate of what criteria are most important as the raw
distinction between Deciders and Applicants criteria might suggest.
Yet Applicants do not appear to be well informed,' as has been shown,
and perhaps one therefore has to assume that they share the same
values as those Deciders who are relatively more powerful t h ^
(2)(3)they over this issue.
Some people among the Applicants group said that certain considera­
tions were positively not used as criteria, even though in some cases 
they suggested that they ought to be. These were:
Being young and .junior (because it was clear that in the past senior 
and older members of staff were given awards from the Fund. Two 
people in the Deciders group, both referees, also said that being 
senior was a criterion for success).
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Academic merit (because they (Deciders) don’t know anything about my 
subject, or because that sort of judgement across disciplines is 
not practicable).
Studentships rather than grants applied for (because the university 
no longer makes this distinction).
Having a named student (because I have been told this is not necessary)
A project which is useful/practicable/applicable (because if it is a 
good project it will get through regardless. This was also asserted
by a member of the Deciders group, "No priority is given to practical
(2) (3) ,
research".)
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INFERENCES
1. People may lack information of importance to a particular activity 
for a number of reasons: the information is deliberately withheld as
a protective measure; they fail to seek out information; information 
is only available through informal channels to which they do not have 
access.
2. Having accurate information may be a matter of being able to 
accurately interpret the power structure relating to the decision, 
which will indicate whose "information" will be regarded as correct.
In this case, because there were such a large number of criteria which 
might possibly be applied, it matters whose criteria they are.
3 . Knowing the relevant criteria (i.e. those which will be applied 
by the most powerful participants in the decision-making process) 
enables people to attempt to influence decision-making in their 
favour, by demonstrating that their bids meet the criteria.
4. One result of a lack of information is that people can acquire 
information which is false. Saying this, of course, assumes that there 
are "facts" to be known, but questions such as whether or not a 
committee deals with a particular topic, or whether it has the final 
decision-making authority or passes it on to another committee,
come as near as any to being able to be answered factually.
3* Where there is uncertainty about the criteria being applied in 
a decision-making process, people will infer the criteria from the 
decision that is actually made. The inference may not coincide with
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the criteria actually applied by decision-makers, and this may 
provide false information to the participants as to the meaning 
of the decision for them as individuals.
6 . Where there is no task inter-dependence between groups it is 
possible for them to vary in their handling of information, so that 
there can be easier access to information in one group than in 
another.
7 . As the organisation develops, norms about the use of information 
crystallise into procedures which most suit those with the most 
power. This is likely to be in the direction of withholding informa­
tion or limiting access to it.
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(c) Competition. An aspect of the culture which is of relevance 
to perceptions of power is the perception of the culture as being, 
or not being, competitive. Some informants made a distinction 
between being in a competitive culture and competing over a particular 
issue. It can be suggested that seeing yourself to be in a 
competitive culture involves seeing other people as rivals or 
potential rivals for some valued long-term objective or for an 
advantageous position in the social structure. Structural aspects 
of power in the organisation, such as a bias towards one particular 
group's values and demands can in turn affect the opportunities 
for gaining advantage over others, and it has already been shown that 
there are winners and losers among Areas and Schools in the university. 
One Decider also pointed out that a procedure adopted to determine 
priorities among applications to the Research Fund emphasised the 
politics of the situation, (for example, the role of the VCAC in 
the process) whereas an alternative procedure (an independent 
committee) would put more emphasis on the academic merit of applications, 
suggesting that the procedure of decision-making itself which 
structures the process, could alter the basis of competition, and 
therefore the balance of advantage^
Comments were made about the value placed on competition itself, and 
also about its relationship to other values held by individuals. It 
was suggested that competition was "a good thing" by one member of 
the Applicants group, and an advantage of the present URF system, 
since it would increase the quality of applications for funds. One 
Applicant however commented that "competitive behaviour is contrary
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to the whole idea of a university", since it encouraged behaviour 
such as the withholding of information, and another rejected it, 
in that it lead people to do research "in order to get on" -
i.e. for the wrong reasons. This informant would probably not have 
approved of the strategies reported by some people for trying to 
get research grants: "It's the in thing to do work on engineers
at the moment, so I might slant my work that way. 'Why British 
Industry isn't doing better' is the kind of research that gets grants, 
even if they're academically rather poor". Another example was the 
tailoring of the cost of the project to the amount of money likely 
to be given "I was told that I would be more likely to get a medium 
range amount of money - under £1,000 - so I have tailored my project 
to fit that and asked for £900". Others reported asking for student­
ships rather than grants, even though the latter would be more useful 
to them, because "you are more likely to get a studehtship". These 
strategies, though adopted, may go against the grain. "It is not 
really right to distort one's application in this way, but..." 
Competition can be seen as infringing other values because of the
kinds of behaviour it encourages, but some people find competition
(2)(3)quite compatible with other values.
Some people in both the Deciders and the Applicants group considered 
that the URF was competitive to the point where people would not 
want it known that they had applied for these awards and failed - 
they would be disadvantaged in some way.
One informant who was not too concerned about winning an award was 
nevertheless clearly aware of the competitive nature of the situation
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"I wouldn't discuss the application widely with other staff 
because I wouldn't want to encourage them to apply and compete".
Although some people reported that the URF decision was a competitive 
situation, the culture in general is not seen as particularly 
competitive. Various factors in these perceptions were summed 
up by one informant who commented, "Some people are competitive as 
an individual characteristic, whereas others don't care. It 
depends on your aspiration level. If you feel there's a realistic 
chance of getting on you might make a bid to compete. It is a 
competitive situation whether or not we agree to compete, but it 
is not a competitive culture as such. There isn't a realistic chance 
of promotion these days." There are various factors here in the 
perception of people's competitiveness. One is that some people 
are more competitive by nature than others, it is a part of their 
personality. It is an aspect of their personal goals, rather like 
McClelland's n Ach - some people set high goals for themselves, 
others do not. There is also the question of competitive action - 
making your bid to compete - which is perhaps the same as mobilising 
your political resources. If the object of competition is not likely 
to materialise - why compete for promotion where there is none - 
people will tend not to mobilise their political resources. The 
suggestion is that this is the current situation at Bath. There 
is nothing to compete for, so people don't bother. The idea that 
you can have a competition situation "whether or not people agree 
to compete" is also interesting. This person had put in an 
application although he thought he had "no chance" of success sind
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had not made much effort over it. Competing on this view means 
making an effort, rather than just putting in an application. It 
indicates the difference between the potential for competitive action
(1) (4) (8)inherent in the situation, and actually making an effort to win.
Another interviewee who, with one or two other members of a group, 
worked closely with the professor as patron, was asked about the 
feelings of other people outside this coterie - did they feel 
competitive with this group? The reply was, "They may be competing 
but I'm not". This again suggests that competing means making some 
special effort, and in this instance no effort need be made perhaps 
by those in a good position already.
However, that people do feel competitive with each other over 
aspects of their work which most concern them is indicated by the 
comment of one person who was clearly trying to make his name through 
research and publication: "If someone else gets something published
you feel slightly piqued... but you rationalise it by saying it's 
nice for them..." Here one of the person’s colleagues is seen as 
a rival, and it is not pleasant to feel that the rival has got a 
step ahead, so the situation has to be deliberately reinterpreted 
in order not to feel piqued. The shift was also in the direction of 
maintaining good relations with a colleague^
That competition for status can exist between colleagues was indicated 
by the comment "my closest colleague tends to use the situation (of 
my consulting him) to his own advantage. He makes public use of it, 
tends to be condescending, so I don't feel much confidence in
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discussing things with him". It would appear that the person asking 
for advice is being made to feel inferior and being used to demon­
strate the superiority of the colleague who seizes the opportunity 
to gain an advantage. The informant perceives this to be a 
competitive situation created by the colleague, which has resulted 
in limiting communication between them. The importance of status in 
a group was also suggested by this comment by a Decider who offered 
it as a reason why some members of staff did not get involved in 
research projects, which might take them outside their well-known 
areas and possibly reveal weaknesses; "Everyone wears their cloak. 
There's a lot of face around ^ere^^
But, is the URF really a competitive situation? One person commented 
that the Research Fund was "like a football pool - I may be lucky" 
and another reported that there had been a suggestion in the Area 
that all the names of Applicants be put in a hat and a draw held, 
indicating a feeling that the competition was not in fact true 
competition - i.e. the winners were not necessarily "better" than 
the losers.
One Applicant suggested that applying for the Research Fund was 
"a useful exercise in formulating ideas and in making applications" 
and also to "show interest in research" rather than to actually obtain 
an award. One has to add to this the practice of one Area of limiting 
the competition by not opening the applications to whoever wishes to 
apply. Open competition does not necessarily provide a "fair" 
result according to this view. "... if we got a lot of applications 
through circularising everyone, someone has then got to decide the
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the one case versus another, and that might not be fair either".
A fair result depends of course on the criteria to be applied - 
the measurements to be relied on for judging what is "better".
The attempt to limit the competition just described was in acknowledge­
ment of the situation in an open compeition, where more senior people 
can chocse to apply and the "academic excellence" criterion can win 
out over the "young/junior staff" criterion. "The younger members
would not get a look in because more experienced people would put in
(5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 )  better applications".
The way in which competition can be limited by the decision-making 
procedures is also illustrated in one Area by the allocation of 
the Equipment Fund. In this procedure the funds are divided up 
at the various levels, starting from the top, according to a formula 
which had previously been agreed. Changing the formula is difficult, 
because as one informant put it, if one School asks for more "the 
person would immediately be asked who should have less - which would 
put them on the spot in front of their colleagues". Apart from one 
portion of the money which is set aside for purchasing larger items, 
most of the Fund is divided up in a way which does not allow people 
to make bids and compete with others for it. However, this procedure 
was described by participants to be "an informal iterative process" 
of bargaining, and an "ad hoc gentlemanly agreement" which suggests 
that the outcome of the process is subject to scrutiny by the 
participants. Perhaps what competition there is involved in this 
process is confined to keeping one’s place in the pecking order by 
keeping in line with the criteria on which the formula is based. As 
one Head of School put it, "I feel I must keep updating my information 
about how well the School is doing against all the criteria -
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for example, ESNs, Postgraduate student numbers, numbers of
(5) (8)staff..."
To say that competition is limited by the procedures adopted is not 
to suggest that conflict is avoided, and the ways in which the 




1, Competition can be seen as action taken to improve one’s 
position at the expense of others. The more powerful individuals 
and groups in the organisation can be seen as those who have won 
more, or more often, in the past. If the link between winning 
and increased power is broken, however, competition will diminish.
2. People may reject the idea of competition, in that it may
be seen as conflicting with other values, so for example "increasing 
knowledge" may require the sharing of information, but competition 
may be facilitated by withholding it. Helping others may be 
incompatible with competing with them, and attitudes to competition 
are likely to be related to perceptions of one’s role in the 
organisation.
3- In spite of values to the contrary, it may be impossible to 
avoid some competitive situations with colleagues. One way of 
avoiding the danger to relationships inherent in this situation is 
to isolate the competitive event from other relationships with 
colleagues. Another is for "losers" to make a psychological 
adjustment which enables good relationships to be maintained.
4. Some people appear to have a psychological need to compete 
with others. Even when they do not particularly want to win, they 
may take steps to gain an advantage over their colleagues seen as 
rivals. This may be related to a need for status in a group and 
perhaps it is this status which is really being competed for, rather 
than the practical value of any particular "prize". This may also
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account for the way in which competitive persons respond to 
requests for help from colleagues by seizing such requests as 
opportunities to demonstrate superiority over these colleagues.
5 . It may be necessary for procedures to be adopted which limit 
participants to a competitive event to prevent the more powerful 
from seizing prizes which were intended for the less powerful. This 
suggests a reluctance on the part of some powerful people to place 
such limitations on themselves, perhaps because the habit of 
opportunism dies hard.
6. An event may be ostensibly competitive, in that there are 
limited resources to be shared among more people than caui be 
supplied with them, but the meaning of it may be changed by 
participants. Competition implies that there is some evaluation 
between competitors, so that some are deemed more worthy than others 
to receive the resources. However, if it is perceived that the 
allocation is done by some other means than evaluation of worthiness, 
perhaps by throwing a dice or on the outcome of some other event over 
which participants have no control, then the meaning of the event may 
not be competition at all, but a game of chance. Participants may 
also have other reasons for "competing" in the event than the desire 
to win, and these reasons will change the meaning of the event for 
them.
7 . Where there is some ambivalence towards the value to be placed
on competitiveness, it may be that shifts in the meaning of ostensibly 
competitive events are a psychological means of accommodating 
competition with other values.
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8 . Perceptions of competitive culture can be complex in that 
the same person may distinguish between inter-group and intra­
group competitiveness as well as between competitiveness of the 
culture and competition over specific issues. Consequently it 
might be said by an individual (a) we are not competitive with each 
other in this group (b) we compete with each other on this part­
icular issue and (c) our group loses out in competition with other 
groups.
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(d) Dealing with conflict. There were indications that people had 
views about the style of behaviour which should be adopted in dealing 
with one’s colleagues. They divide roughly into two styles: the
forceful and the ’’low profile’’. It has already been mentioned that 
one informant saw both styles at work in the university - the 
"gently, gently" approach and the "nasty". In this connection it 
is necessary to take into account the history of the culture. One 
informant commented, "Under Rotherham, people with the loudest 
voices got what they wanted".
The existence of a reluctance to use "robust" styles of interaction 
was suggested by the words used to describe disagreements. On the 
question of the fair allocation of resources between Areas, one 
informant said, "People would be suprised if 90% of the awards went 
to one Area" - "surprised", not "angry" (which they would undoubtedly 
have been). Another informant said that when minutes are written 
up, even though at the meeting the VCAC may have been roundly attacked 
for a decision, the wording in the minutes would be that the meeting 
was "disappointed" at the decision.
Another comment on the same lines was "Somewhere in the Senate papers 
you’ll find the statement that the VC ’thinks it unlikely that...’ 
overseas students will get (URF) awards - which means they won’t.
But you don’t say that in a university directly^’’
Several people in the Deciders group made comments suggesting that 
the low profile was preferable. For example: "You have to continue
to work with your colleagues, and if there is a strain between you
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then everyone suffers. It is important in a small community to
maintain good relations with people". It was suggested that people
were not overtly critical of each other for the same reason - so as
not to strain relationships. The suggestion here is that in a small
community where people can get to know each other well, it is
necessary to avoid conflict. This view was supported by the informant
who said that the hierarchy of committees was there to avoid (rather 
(3) (4)
than resolve) conflict.
One informant claimed to be ready to "have fights and bust-ups with 
people, but not ones which lead to ill-feeling" but also made it
clear to me that his position in the university was strong, "My
power position is strong. I could move to another chair at another 
university at any time. They therefore try to keep me happy here".
It was also suggested that different Areas had different interactive 
styles, and that this affected the perception each had of the other, 
"among engineers one is expected to use very direct speech. It is 
a game. In the Arts area the tradition of understatement is quite
strong. In Technology we tend to be blunt. In the Senate my Arts
colleagues tend to think I'm being bloody minded", but he also 
considered that, "you change your style to suit the occasion - 
sometimes I pretend to be an Arts man" (i.e. adopting the under­
statement style). Another technologist, however, seemed to dispute
this view of engineers, suggesting that the reason why there was a
(2)(3)science bias in the university was "because we don't scream so much". 
Not everyone, either, would agree with this assessment of the Arts 
area as being characterised by understatement in interactions. One
- 264 -
informant spoke (with some disapproval) of the Arts area being
"more argumentative'and ill disciplined than other areas, so some
Boards of Studies in that Area are more conflictful". A further
suggestion was that a direct approach was counter-productive,
"If you put your head down and charge it won’t get you anywhere.
It is a political situation". It is interesting to note here, and
in other comments, that being coercive and being political can be 
(2) (4)
seen as alternatives.
By contrast, it was suggested that it was a disadvantage that people 
in one School "won't speak up for themselves at meetings", but 
grumble afterwards about the decisions made. When asked, "Why 
didn't you say so at the meeting?" they say, "It wouldn't do any 
good". It was also said by this informant that "academics are not 
good at giving ground and compromising in arguments". Where a 
matter had become a bone of contention, there had been "a lot of 
unpleasantness about it" and "I'm quite glad I don't have to get 
involved in the squabbles". On the basis of this information, it 
would appear that norms of behaviour for dealing with conflicts 
between individuals have not been developed further than avoidance. 
Even at an informal level, the way in which groups keep to their 
own corners of the SCR can be seen as a way of avoiding having to
(2) (3) (5)interact with people with whom contentious issues might arise.
Decision-making procedures can also be adjusted to avoid overt 
conflict: "For capital expenditure we used to put in bids, which
meant that whoever shouted the loudest got the most, but now they 
allocate it by ESN’d"(equivalent student numbers).
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Several people commented that the ability to operate effectively 
in meetings was important in getting your way, and one ex^ple shows 
how difficult it can be to get the meeting to focus on an issue which 
is of importance to you. In the following interaction the applications 
to the URF were being discussed by committee:
Professor X : (referring to an application from his School). "We had
thought that these studentships were for junior staff, and so rated 
him B+ on that account, but if professors can apply (as two present 
had done) then this applicant should also be an A". This was 
followed by some procedural discussion to the effect that the meeting 
had agreed to go through all the A ’s first (which put Professor X's 
point out of order).
The committee then went on to discuss the remaining A's and then 
the B's without any further reference to this disputed grading, and 
discussed one or two other matters relating to the awards. At last. 
Professor X tried again:
Prof. X: "I must raiseagain the case of Mr. Y. He wasn’t given
an A because of his rank - it had been thought that only junior staff 
should apply."
This was followed by statements justifying the applications by 
professors on grounds that they had people needing to finish off 
research, and that other Areas had put in applications from professors 
last time, neither of which statements met the point which Professor X 
was trying to make -'Mr. Y ’s application should be upgraded.
- 266 -
The discussion then slid from this to the priority to be given to 
named candidates and to the question of how many studentships 
Mr. Y ’s School had had in the past, to whether these had been 
studentships or grants, to how we were going to interleave the 
applications for grants and studentships this year... by which time 
Mr. Y had sunk without traced
Perhaps this kind of problem indicates why it is that some people 
advocate the "high profile" style of interaction. One informant 
suggested that in large meetings in particular "you have to talk in 
a robust way... you have to make yourself heard" and "theatrical 
gestures are very useful". It was also pointed out that to be 
effective in committee it was necessary to do some homework outside the 
committee meeting. "People don't take the trouble to see which way 
the wind is blowing, so they get clobbered in committee". It was 
suggested that newcomers to committees and the organisation were at 
a disadvantage in this respect, but also that "some people pick up
the idea very quickly" suggesting that differences in skills in this
(1)(2)W(5) respect were apparent.
The personalities of those involved in such committees was said to 
have a considerable effect on what was done and how things were done 
in committees. One committee member said, "The personalities at the 
moment won’t push. They like things to be calm. Before with Z and W 
(two Professors) we used to have vociferous debates and fall-outs, 
but I can’t imagine this happening now... The people on the committee 
don't want tension". This suggests that the low profile norm had 
not always existed in that Group, but changed as group members 
changed. There is evidence that the norm did not exist at the
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present time in other parts of the organisation. For example^
"In the School we know each other sufficiently well to disagree 
quite forcefully". Here the perception is that the smaller the 
unit, the better you know people and the more you can argue with 
them - in contrast to the mentioned earlier view that closer 
association requires less open argument. On the other hand, this 
person would be wary of conflicts with people outside the School 
and particularly if it involves powerful figures in the university.
"You can blacken your name if you remonstrate with them". It was 
said that there was no point in taking this chance if you were 
unlikely to be successful, or unless the issues were really important. 
This suggests one reason why some people do not speak up for themselves 
in meetings, as mentioned on page 265. If reputation is important 
and you will blacken your name to no avail,- better to keep quiet. 
Another reason was given as to why people were reluctant to take up 
contentious issues. If a School is unhappy about its treatment, say, 
over the allocation of rooms, members of the School would "have to 
make a fuss at Board of Studies, Area level and then the Senate. A 
lot of people would not be prepared to create that sort of split (in 
the School, Area etc). It would sour relations for the next few years"!
There is also the problem of getting a contentious matter dealt with 
in the right arena. Even if you are prepared to speak out strongly 
and argue the case against others to disagree, you may be debarred 
from having the opportunity to confront your significant opponents. 
Someone who could only raise an important (as he saw it) issue at 
the Board of Studies level commented, "They all nod and agree but I’m
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only talking to my School. They are one's colleagues so they 
probably feel they must support you although they think it a bore - 
and it is a bore really but one must do this". Someone else referred 
to this same meeting as "very dreary" and "We don’t seem to achieve 
anything". The first informant was debarred by the structure from 
raising the matter directly through the formal channels with those 
who might have been opposed to it, although these were the people who 
had to be convinced to bring about change. The only resort was to 
try to get the matter dealt with through the medium of a group of 
people who did not share the perception of its importance, and had 
not the energy to take it up with any commitment. The informant 
himself was beginning to hesitate about continuing the struggle "I 
shall give up and devote myself to other things... No, probably I 
will lick my wounds - not that they are wounds really - and I shall 
think of some other way of getting things changed." The hierarchy of 
committees has worked here as a means of avoiding direct confrontation 
between possible protagonists, but these statements also reflect the 
beginnings of informal political activity at work, suggesting that 
when thwarted by formal channels people do not necessarily give up
the struggle, but look for alternative opportunities for getting what
_  (3) (5)they want.
Although the data presented above indicate a considerable unwillingness 
by most people to bring conflicts into the open over contentious 
issues, it should not be forgotten that the VCAC meeting has been 
characterised as one in which conflicts of interest are overtly dealt 
with and resolved. One result of the existence of such a committee
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was seen by two people as allowing other committees to avoid 
dealing with conflict themselves by passing the buck to the VCAC. 
This was not done overtly, but by simply not resolving a contentious 
point. For example, one committee was faced with the problem of 
putting a case forward for the replacement of staff who left the 
Area. "Privately they know all the reasons for not agreeing to 
the replacements, but they don’t want clashes and friction at the 
meeting, so they make the recommendation to replace them all. At 
the VCAC the Area chairman can put forward the reasons why the 
posts should be frozen and the application can be turned down - but 
it will be the VCAC decision, so this avoids frictions in the Area." 
A similar point was made by another informant. Commenting on the 
number of "A" gradings that were given by a committee: "If you
put in a lot of.A’s, people at the next level up. have to decide 
between these A ’s. The question of who gets awards is therefore 
taken out of your hands, as happened this time. You could see this 
as handing on responsibility to someone else i.e. no-one cein blame 
us because we didn’t decide. Maybe that's what the Area wants". 
Alternative explanations for the actions of these committees are 
possible. For example, one interviewee commenting on the delibera­
tions of a committee about applications for funds said, "Then we 
guess how much money might be available for us from the Fund, and ask 
for more as one does in negotiating". It has been shown that the 
organisation can be seen as characterised by competition between the 
Areas for resources, and that it is necessary to negotiate the best 
deal you can for your Group. Demanding three staff and giving a
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large number of A gradings could be seen as a strategy for gaining
at least the minimum of your requirements, because it allows you
+ . (5) (6)room to give some concessions.
Norms of interaction between people can be considered in the 
particular case of how the organisation is managed. This is a 
question of how people with formal decision-making roles in the 
organisation interact with those in relation to whom they have 
authority, and to what extent there is a norm apparent concerning 
this interaction. This question of management style will be dealt 
with in the next section.
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INFERENCES
1. Preferred ways of dealing with conflicts of interest in an 
organisation may be reflected in the language people use when talking 
about conflicts, and tactics for dealing with them.
2. The prevailing interactive styles become a phenomenon with 
which the individual must deal through the available range of poss­
ibilities for compliance with or deviance from it. It may be seen 
as a political resource, in that you can further your own interests 
by such compliance or deviance.
3 . People may recognise a prevailing interactive style in the 
organisation as either in accordance with or contrary to their own 
values about how people ought to interact in the organisation. ’ There 
is also the problem of having the skills so to act.
4. Organisation members may prefer the avoidance rather than the 
open resolution of conflict for a number of reasons:
(a) They find open conflicts distasteful, and seek to avoid painful 
experiences. This may include a distaste for "high profile" behaviour 
or theatrical gestures, which may be necessary in large meetings.
(b) They perceive that if conflicts are openly dealt with they will 
have to facé the dilemma of having to make compromises while at the 
same time adhering to principles which they regard as important.
(c) Their view of appropriate behaviour towards close associates 
excludes open conflict in order to maintain friendly relationships.
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(d) Their view of appropriate behaviour towards relative strangers 
excludes open conflict because they perceive that such strangers may 
be powerful in the organisation and could do them harm.
5 . Various processes in the organisation can help organisation 
members to avoid open conflict:
(a) Interactive processes in arenas where conflicts might arise 
(e.g. committees) may thwart attempts to deal with such conflicts 
for example, by sliding off onto other topics or ruling contentious 
points out of order.
(b) Where conflicts do have to be faced, the interactive process 
chosen by organisation members for dealing with them, for example, 
"clobbering" people, may inhibit other attempts to raise conflicts 
openly.
(c) Lobbying committee members in advance of a meeting can be used 
as a means of conflict avoidance.
(d) Potential protagonists may be kept apart by the formal and 
informal structure of representation, which limits who talks to who 
about what and by decision-making procedures.
(e) Conflicts may be "delegated" from one group to another, which 
enables the first group to avoid the problems of dealing with them.
6 . What looks like conflict-avoidance may be alternatively perceived 
as a political strategy for furthering one’s interests. Both 
interpretations might apply simultaneously.
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(e) Management style. Perceptions about managerial norms revealed 
in the data tend to make use of the democratic-autocratic classification, 
although there were some variations on this.
Among the Decider group, one informant characterised the system as 
both a "workers cooperative" and an oligrarchy "and that’s as it 
should be". The suggestion seemed to be that the organisation was 
run by and for the people who produced its output or product, but 
that it was run by just a few people. These two views would seem 
to be incompatible, but given the individualistic nature of much 
of the work done, perhaps they are less so than at first appears.
This informant also thought that the system was "not oligarchic 
enough - power is too widely diffused" which suggests that the 
workers have too much control over their own work in this individual­
istic system. He considered that the university was run by a group
of professors, but that this was not a permanent elite and that
(1)(14)there might be one or two non-professors in it.
Another Decider agreed that; the system was "not democratic. Just a 
few people, about twenty, make all the decisions, and other people 
have little say". An alternative suggestion was that the organisation 
was run by a hierarchy of committees, these being the locus of decision­
making according to this view. A Decider who also saw the committee 
as the place for decision-making considered that representation on 
such committees .had become too broad, "As things become more 
democratic they become less so... Now they have staff and students 
on the Senate it is less democratic". The argument seemed to be 
that the committee has become too "public" by including so many
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different groups, so that you can no longer speak freely at its 
meetings and also that it becomes deflected from its true purpose. 
"People are using it to complain". Another difficulty, from this 
informant's point of view, seemed to be that he was not the sole 
representative of the School on committees at university level, 
and consequently felt a loss of control over School matters. In 
his view, this reduced the politics of the meeting "the politics 
goes", and although he agreed that this might mean that the politics 
simply shifts to outside the meeting, added, "It's more difficult 
to influence the politics then". This Decider seemed to be regret­
ting that the organisation was not more like a conventional hierarchy,
and would probably agree with the previously mentioned view that it
 ̂ (3)(4)(5)(14)(16)was not oligarchic enough.
There were suggestions that the preferred style of interaction of 
committee chairman was due to superordinate values which influenced 
their behaviour. For example, it was suggested that because he had 
a Quaker background, one Chairman "has this family concept. Every­
one works together. He doesn't allow voting at meetings but will 
try to persuade everyone to his point of view". Another Chairman 
also considered that he might be influenced by being a Quaker.
"They always insist on unanimous decisions and I don't like voting.
If someone is not happy with a decision I try to postpone it. In 
the end, maybe not everyone is enthusiastic about it but they can 
go along with it." When asked what happened if a person did not 
express any views, he replied, "My duty is to ensure that all 
opinions are expressed". It is not quite clear from these reports
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whether there is much room for adjusting the decision to meet the 
views of those who disagree with it. In the first case it would 
appear to be a matter of persuading those who disagree to change 
their minds, - overcoming their resistance, and it was reported 
that that was how some members of the committee saw it. "Some 
lecturers don't like this (the absence of voting) - they think he 
is trying to prevail over them. He is in a sense, but only because 
he wants the right decision". Although these decision-making processes 
may not be as democratic as they might appear at first glance, they
do seem to represent some attempts to resolve conflicts of
(1)(2)(14)
interest within the formal structure.
One informant considered that committee chairmanship included the 
capacity to deal with vociferous persons, and seemed to view an 
attempt by a chairman to seek everyone's views as a form of weakness in 
chairmanship. "He would not be tough enough to deal with people like 
X" (a 'fighter') and, "He is inclined to ask everyone's opinion at 
the meeting, and outside, letting them have their say", but if the 
informant himself were chairman he would, "make sure that the decisions 
were made before the meetings, so that at the meeting I would know 
that the decisions would be made as expected". The perception seemed 
to be that conflicts should be controlled by turning the meeting into 
a rubber stamp, and by covert decision-making. This alternative was 
apparently favoured above the committee's previous mode of "vociferous
debates" and the present one of sounding out views openly within the
(2) (8) (14)overall style of keeping things calm.
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The way the values of members of the Applicant group can affect their 
responses to the management behaviour of Deciders was indicated by 
this comment: "X is not a strong personality. Some lecturers need
pulling up and X doesn't do it, though he should, so they get away 
with things. He has the status for power, but not the personality 
to exercise it." The way in which these values were seen as 
conditioned by the past experience of the informant was shown by the 
added comment, "Of course, I have a service background, and I'm 
used to everyone jumping to". However, it was not just a question 
of values, in that it was made clear that some of the administrative 
duties of this informant would have been made a good deal easier if 
everyone did "jump to", so that stronger authoritative control over 
other staff in the School would be in his pragmatic interests, as 
well as in accord with his super-ordinate values!
Some Deciders offered a rationale for am oligarchic structure of
making decisions: Committees "take up too much of the staff's
time and they don't get on with their academic roles. Also some
of them get to like administration and they are not necessarily good 
.(7)at it." Another considered that organisation members were individual­
ists who were following their special interests and did not want to 
spend time sitting in committees. He thought that academics prefer 
it if other people make decisions for them, but did not agree that 
the university was run by a group of professors. It was also 
suggested that it would be an advantage to avoid taking matters to 
committees. It was reported with approval that on a particular 
issue it had been suggested that it would "cut the red tape" if
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instead of putting a matter to the VCAC it were discussed by
individuals directly with Mawditt. My suggestion that this might
be seen as undemocratic was met with some surprise, and I had the
(6)(13)(17)impression that this informant related democracy with informality.
One Decider clearly did not see it in his, or his staff's interest 
to be participative. Making a distinction between funding decisions 
and academic work he justified not involving his staff in funding 
decisions by saying, "I don’t see why they should have to cope with
(6)this as well as me... It doesn't do me any good if they get involved".
Among the Applicants group, one informant characterised the system 
as "very patriarchal" and said that communication was poor. By 
contrast, another said, "One must think of Bath as having a management 
system run on democratic lines, rather than as autocratic, as in 
industry. It runs on committees". Another said, that "things are 
very democratic in the Area" but suggested that they were less so in 
the university as a whole. An example was given of how a group had 
been consulted by the Head of School about its needs and had been
(1)(15)able to reverse a proposed change to which it objected.
There was also some support in the Applicants group data for the 
view that academics do not want to be involved in decision-making in 
the university. One asserted that he tried to keep out of the decision­
making process "and get on with the job - that's what I'm paid to do". 
Another, "I put all internal memos into the waste-paper basket on 
principle. ' It takes a long time to study how a bureaucracy works 
and I am not interested in studying how the university works". Several
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other comments were made on the theme of personal autonomy within 
the system. "One has a lot of freedom in the sense that one can say 
no if one doesn’t want to do things". However, another comment was,
"I don’t know what would happen if I refused to do something". It 
was also pointed out that "Not everying is in dispute. Not every­
thing you are asked to do is against your will", and this view was 
shared by another who was "a willing horse" so, "I don't feel
(6)(q)oppressed".
One informant's comments were interesting in that they related
personal autonomy, democracy and control over other people's actions.
Democratic practices of consultation sind recognition of the needs of
different groups within the Area and the School were spoken of with
approval. However, it was also suggested that administrators should
be told what to do by academics. Academics should not be directed
by administrators, but nor should administrators influence academic
decisions. This view seemed to have behind it an idea of the
purpose of the university, and that the right to decide should rest
with those who carry out that purpose (as perceived by the informant).
It also suggests a wish to have freedom from influence by others
(autonomy) and at the same time to influence the decisions of
(2)(7)(8)(i4)others, where one's own interests are involved.
A further aspect of the preferred management style which can be 
mentioned here is the use of rules in the organisation. To what 
extent are there overt rules which govern the activities of individuals? 
It has been shown in a previous section (page 248) that the decision 
criteria for the URF were not clear to all participants, not everyone
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involved had the same idea of what the decision rules were. It was 
said that the VC "doesn’t like rules and set criteria - he would 
tell you so himself", but this informant added, "In the School we 
like things to be clear cut". Other people complained that, "The 
rules change" and one comment showed how being concerned for rules 
can be seen as inappropriate behaviour. "He always performs oddly 
in Senate, sticking to rules and regulations, the letter of the law, 
when everyone else realises that that is not desirable or possible.
He gets jumped on by people because of this."
Against this ambiguity about rules, however, must be set practices
such as the allocation of the Equipment Fund by the use of a formula
(10) (11) (12)
which in itself constitutes a set of decision rules.
There were also comments illustrating management style at the level of 
personal interaction. One member of the Decider group commented,
"You can't tell anyone to do anything in a university, in fact it is a 
bad policy to do so. But you can indicate what you would prefer", 
suggesting that informal manipulation rather than overt direction is 
the norm. Another Decider suggested that the amount of direction of 
others varied with the level in the system. The image was one of 
hierarchy with higher and lower levels: "This is what I mean by
hard-nosed power at the higher level. Going up you get these muted 
directives". This view of the management style of the organisation 
was also indicated by the Decider who would not ask his staff if they 
would be interviewed for this research project because, "if I speak
(1) (9)to them they will feel obliged to agree".
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By contrast, however, there were comments by Applicants which
showed a different view: "At the moment we have a student who
was just thrust on us, without our choosing, by the prof" and,
(1)"someone up there decides".
The data suggest that there is considerable variation in the per­
ceived management styles of individuals, so that some people in 
decision-making roles are seen as coercive, others are seen as 
democratic in their approach. It is interesting to note in this 
context that whereas one informant referred to the Head of School 
as "the boss", one professor consistently referred to his Group 
members as "colleagues", and pointed out that the university was 
not characterised by boss-subordinate relationships. This seems to 
show that perceptions about the nature of relationships in the 
organisation, the way in which they are classified in the thinking 
of individuals, can vary considerably. Nevertheless, the weight of 
the evidence suggests that to most people the organisation presents 
a picture which is not democratic, but that to most people this 
situation is, at the moment at any rate, sufficiently acceptable to 
prevent their mobilising their political resources to change it. 
Whereas some people might want any change to be towards greater 
democracy, others would like to see more centralised control, and 
whereas some people might wish that individuals with decision-making
roles were less authoritarian, others seemed to wish some individuals
(1)(2)(6)(13) to be more so.
Norms of interaction in an organisation and the prevailing management 
style can be seen in relationship to the values of individuals. One
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informant provided a fairly comprehensive picture of his perceptions 
of these norms and of his own values. His comments will be presented 
here, together with some contrasting perceptions of other people 
who although seeing the same situations, adopted different attitudes 
towards them.
This informant (I shall call him Zed) was in an Area in which there
was considerable contention reported by others about the fairness
of representation oil the Area committee. Zed’s view of this situation
was that "It is felt that Heads of Schools can represent people in
disciplines not their own perfectly well". He was "full of praise
for the way this was done", in particular mentioning the Head of
(7)Physics for being able to understand the needs of psychology. To 
a suggestion that other people in the Schools might feel lees con­
fident about their subject being represented, the reply was in essence 
that "most people are prepared to go along with the system". Dissenters 
were dismissed with "some people will not be satisfied until they get 
exactly what they want" i.e. their claims are illegitimate, and 
other people were said not to care either way because most of their
funding came from outside the university. There was no room in this
(13)(14)picture for legitimate objections which needed to be taken seriously.
It c.'ould be that one reason for this view of what to others was a 
contentious matter was that some voices had been structurally blocked 
from the hearing of this informant.
The way in which voices can be structurally blocked out was explained 
to me in diagram form by another interviewee: The suggestion was that
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where a group is larger and more complex than other groups, but only 
has the same representation as they do on the committee, it is not 
receiving the advantage it should have in the committee given the 
numbers of people in the group. The following diagram was drawn 





The pressure of the larger more complex group is no greater at 
the committee table than the pressure of the smaller, simpler groups, 
and consequently the pressure of the larger group is thwarted. One 
result is that, seen at committee level it would appear that "most 
people go along with" the status quo, but seen at group level, 
particularly in the dissenting group, there is contention and
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frustration. It is interesting to note here that a somewhat
mechanistic view of political processes is being put forward, as
though the pressure at the committee table were something which
(1)(13)(15)might be measured in a Boyle's tube.
To return to informant Zed: He seemed to see the managerial role
as mainly consisting in the avoidance or even suppression of overt
conflict, and spoke with distaste of an Area where this role was
not being fully played. The Area in question was said to complain
that they did not get enough money from the Equipment Fund, and
some people were "paranoid" about it. This paranoia was "fed by
their administrative style". He considered that people with roles
conferring authority, such as Head of School, should be listened to
in preference to the Groups they might be thought to represent, such
as Boards of Studies or the School as a whole. "The Head of School's
view counts, rather than the Board of Studies... we don't want a
situation of taking the side of the Board of Studies against the
Head of School". He would also like to see the centralisation of
those administrative functions which at present report to Heads
of Schools (the administrative assistant roles), and also of the
(13) (14)technical support in the university.
An alternative view to the centralisation values and emphasis on 
authority was suggested by the Head of Group who commented, "The 
university should want to know what I think". The suggestion here 
was that his Group had a unique point of view which the organisation 
needed. Which voice is heard should depend on who has the information 
rather than who has the authority, or perhaps that authority to speak
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should be given to those who have the information. Either way 
this would indicate that the voices of some Groups can be blocked 
out both because the structure denies them access to the relevant 
audiences, and because the values prevailing in the organisation 
lead to the views of some people being disregarded.
Zed's view of power seemed to be mainly concerned with manipulation 
of decisions behind the scenes. This included "finding institu­
tional sanction for what you are doing" (presumably showing that 
the rules allow or require it) and when something outside the normal 
is done, such as the allocation of resources somewhat differently 
from usual, telling people in advance about it before they ask 
questions, because "this isolates the opposition and people then tend 
not to ask about it". Knowing how not to be challenged appears to 
be the political skill involved here aided by the perception that 
"simple minded professors" do not understand university finance.
The fact that certain decisions are made year after year was said 
to help in this, because if your action seems to favour one Group
this year, people will be inhibited from objecting in case they may
(7)(ll)(l6)want you to do the same for them next.
Although "some people try to trade on" the fact that he got on better 
with some colleagues than others. Zed said he was unaffected by these 
differences. He pointed out that he did not benefit from the 
decisions that were made, so when it came to allocating resources he 
was not using his power in his own interest. He seemed to see him­
self as being objective and non-partisan in his judgements. He also
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favoured a tough line on some issues. It has been mentioned that
one area of conflict in the university arises from the change
towards a research orientation. On this question my informant
commented, "The proper needs of the teaching function will be met,
but not the demands of people who reject the research orientation
policy. The sooner they leave the better. If they don’t like it,
hard cheese". When it was pointed out that this change in policy
represented a change in the psychological contract which some staff
had built up with their organisation, he said that, "no account
was taken of this", and it seemed clear that the feelings of the
(13)people involved were to be disregarded.
One can contrast this view with that of the research oriented professor 
who thought that "not enough weight is given to achievements of people 
who do other things (than research) ...the divided environment affects 
the researchers. They are seen as a privilidged group by the dis­
affected and this has an affect on them. The cost of applying a 
tough policy to the non-researchers is too great". This represents 
an interactive view of the organisation, in its suggestion that what
happens to one Group, however lacking in power, will affect
powerful other Groups, (although it is doubtful to what extent this
is true in the university).
Direct expressions of feelings over contentious issues were not 
favoured by Zed. A question from me about arguments over issues 
was translated by him into "being rude to people" - "We are all on 
Christian name terms, and you aren't rude to people you are on 
Christian name terms with - though you may be behind their backs".
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Clearly, hostilities lurk under the calm surface. In general, Zed 
seemed to identify with people in authority, to see himself as being 
objective, tough, rational and valuing order. Conflicts of view
were seen as disruptions of order and tolerance of their overt
(13)(l4)
expression a weakness.
It would appear that some people do not see any difficulty in under­
standing other people's needs, while others do not feel that their 
needs are understood. People who are not represented at a meeting 
are not able to make an assessment of the quality of the discussion 
relating to their specialism, and members of the meeting are free to 
consider their grasp of the topic as adequate. To put it more 
directly, how do you know that a psychologist is being adequately 
represented by a physicist if you are not a psychologist yourself?
It may be that people who value the status quo for the benefits they 
derive from it, justify the existing system, in part, by maintaining 
the belief that there is no communication problem. Norms of behaviour 
which inhibit making dissatisfactions known also contribute to the 
maintenance of the system, as do the criteria by which the effective­
ness of a system comes to be judged. As one Decider commented: "Some
(staff) lament certain aspects of the system but don't see it as 
starkly as I do. They say we got the money didn't we? ... The 
system is not an evil one - it works". The result of these processes 
is that there is a filtering out of values, opinions and information
which dictates whose values and ideas will prevail in the organisation
(2)(6)(15)
in the decision-making arenas.
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INFERENCES
1. A distinction needs to be made between the forms of democracy 
(i.e. the existence of representative committees) and democratic 
processes, which depend on the quality of interaction between 
individuals. Differences of place in the power structure and 
experiences of attempts to influence the system may account for 
differences in the perception of the system as "democratic". People 
who depend little on the management system because they have built 
up power-bases external to the organisation may see the organisation 
as "democratic" because the forms of democracy are present. People 
who are relatively ]ess powerful, and need to make demands on the 
system, may consider it democratic or otherwise because they find 
that they can or cannot have their say and influence decisions.
The latter experience would seem to be a better test of democracy 
thcin the former. Place in the power structure may also affect 
perceptions of how democratic the system ought to be. Generally 
speaking Deciders were more positively favourable towards oligarchy, 
than Applicants, even though the latter were not necessarily keen 
to become more involved in decision-making within the organisation.
It would appear that the powerful think they should be more powerful 
and the less powerful disagree. However, in spite of the broad 
agreement, considerable variation in the perceptions of the management 
style of the organisation was found.
2. The quality of interaction in democratic processes depends on 
the interactive skills of participants and their level of interest
in arriving at a democratic decision of whatever degree of democracy. 
This includes their level of willingness.to participate in manage­
rial decision-making and to behave in ways which they perceive to be 
"political".
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3. Democracy by representation can reduce democratic interaction 
because people feel unable to speak freely. This may be related to 
adherence to a personal value or an organisational norm of avoiding 
conflicts. The greater the number of different Groups represented 
and the greater the differences of interests between them, the more 
likely it is that there will be conflicts and the more inhibited 
some people may be about stirring things up.
4. Where a group is represented by more than one person, the 
representatives may feel that the legitimacy of their representative 
roles is undermined and their power with the Group and in a
representative committee is also undermined.
3 . When the political arena is not clearly defined, that is, not 
centred on a clearly identifyable process such as a committee 
meeting, some people may feel at a disadvantage in influencing the 
system, particularly if they lack an informal network of relation­
ships within the organisation.
6. Democratic ideals can be. undermined by competing demands on the 
time and energy of organisational members. Where the organisation 
adopts a form of democracy which requires an organisational member 
to adopt two or more roles which are not interdependent (i.e. you 
can carry out a definitive study of goldfish without being a member 
of the Board of Studies), given freedom of choice the organisation 
member will concentrate on whichever role appears more compatible 
with his or her intrinsic or extrinsic interests.
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7. The question of what is to be regarded as a specialist activity, 
that is, activity requiring special skills and knowledge which is 
largely not capable of being carried out by the untrained, can be 
turned to political advantage by individuals and Groups. If your 
own activities can be defined as highly specialised while others
are defined as non-specialist you can justify your retaining a high 
degree of autonomy over your own activities while at the same time, 
in the name of democracy, demanding a say in the activities of Groups 
designated as non-specialist. In these circumstances, non-specialist 
Groups have a vested interest in having their activities defined as 
specalist also, if they are not able to undermine the specialist 
status of other Groups. Hence, "simple minded professors" are said 
not to understand university financing.
8. A distinction needs to be made between personal autonomy and 
democracy. In some circumstances, autonomy may consist of freedom 
to pursue your own interests without impinging on the autonomy of 
others, but where there is a conflict of interests an interface 
between autonomy and democracy occurs. Demanding freedom of 
decision-making for oneself and denying it to another is not 
democratic, nor is demanding a say in other people’s decisions while 
denying them a say in yours. However, it is possible to justify the 
latter inequality by references to some superordinate values, such 
as a reference to the purpose of the organisation, which can be 
used to show that the balance of decision-making power ought to rest 
with yourself.
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9. People can feel that they have a considerable degree of 
personal autonomy, a feeling which may stem from a high level of 
congruence between their own interests and the demands made on 
them by the organisation, and/or from their not having tested the 
boundaries of their freedom of action. Perhaps also because the 
more powerful avoid confrontations which might lead to testing such 
boundaries.
10. An organisation may vary in its adoption of, bureaucratic norms, 
depending on the issue. Adherence to rules may be used in support
of an important organisational value such as the avoidance of conflict, 
and an avoidance of rules or a flexibility in their use may be used 
in support of other values such as that of "fair play".
11. Both the rigid adherence to, and flexible use of rules may be 
used as political resources but such tactics will be counter­
productive if used when the prevailing view is that they are in­
appropriate. Where powerful organisational members adopt anti- 
bureaucratic values, appeal to rules will tend to be a weak argument 
unless there are legal implications (i.e. an external source of 
power) in support of it. Rules may also be used as a post-hoc 
justification of a decision.
12. The adoption of anti-bureaucratic values by powerful orgsinis- 
ational members can facilitate their manipulation of decisions in 
line with their own interests by increasing the level of uncertainty 
surrounding issues in decision-making.
— 29̂  — .
15- The quality of interaction in decision-making depends on the 
personalities of those who occupy decision-making roles, and this 
in turn affects the extent to which the management process is 
democratic. Someone with a high need for personal dominance, with 
skills of advocacy and who interpret^ the situation as calling for 
forceful expression of views, is likely to adopt a conflictful 
style of interaction with others. Alternatively, a person with a 
high need for power based on identification with authority figures, 
whose skills are more in the maintenance of order than in personal 
expression, and who sees the situation as calling for behind-the- 
scenes manipulation of events, is likely to adopt the low-profile 
approach in dealing with others. These are just two examples, but 
it can be suggested that people's political behaviour depends on a 
mixture of their intrinsic needs, and their interpersonal and 
cognitive skills and perceptions, as well as on contextual factors 
such as their place in the power structure. Included in their 
cognitive skills can be suggested a preferred way of thinking 
about phenomena which may be influenced by their specialist training.
14. People's intrinsic needs and values affect their reactions to the 
behaviour of others, so that the overt expression of differences or 
feelings can be seen by one person as a necessary part of the demo­
cratic process, and by another as a sign of weakness in management.
15. The structuring of the organisation can have the effect of 
blocking some views and values out of decision-making arenas, and 
make it possible for some organisation members to avoid coming to 
terms with dissenting views, thereby enabling them to maintain their
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preferred view of reality. The unwillingness, for whatever reason, 
of dissenting members to become involved in the decision-making 
process also helps to maintain this view.
16. Where decisions are repeatedly made over time, rather than being 
"one-off" decisions, this fact can be used as a political resource.
17. Some perceptions of the concept of power which emerge are:
(a) Being democratic (that is, sharing power) is being informal.
(b) "Politics" needs a formal arena - or at any rate, is a lot 
more difficult without one. It is also undermined if representation 
has to be shared with someone else. This suggests a highly ego­
centric view of political activity.
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(f) Theoretical implications. The research findings in this 
section reflect on the ways in which values are related to power and 
political interaction and also on the transitional nature of the 
culture of the organisation studied.
The data support a symbolic interactionist view of political behaviour 
(see Chapter 2, section 2) in that they show how powerful people can 
define, and in this case re-define, what is to be considered of 
importance in the organisation (for example, doing research) but 
also how individuals and Groups can then seek to negotiate a definition 
of this value in ways which suit their own interests. For example, 
they can seek to define what "doing research" is to mean in such a way 
as to justify their own activities, and perhaps attack those of 
others. The difficulties of obtaining a consensus about what is to 
be valued may be related to an underlying conflict of pragmatic 
interests (such as competition for resources) and the possibility 
which the values present &r re-definition (for example, because 
"research" is not a clearly definable concept) and therefore a shift 
in the power balance. It is not necessarily the case, however, that 
the potential for making this adjustment is fully realised by 
disadvantaged individuals or Groups. There are also indications 
that where the definition of what is to be valued is tied to rewards - 
i.e. is given a political significance ^ there is the possibility 
that a facade of compliance will be used by organisation members, 
raising questions about what is "real" and what is "false" behaviour, 
as suggested in the literature mentioned in Chapter 2, sections 2 and 4. 
One could see this as a failure of A to control B, but one in which
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B appears to be complying, and therefore being controlled by A, The 
real meaning of B*s activities and of the interaction between A and B 
therefore bee omes uncertain. It is interesting to note that B may 
not need to take any positive action to deliberately mislead A, 
since A may misinterpret B's actions in a way which favours B, 
a misinterpretation which B need not take any steps to rectify.
Although the literature about power suggests that the values of 
those who have power will prevail (see Chapter 2, section 4), the 
present study suggests that there can be difficulty for organisation 
members in predicting whose values will prevail in relation to a 
given issue. This may arise from the difficulty they may have in 
knowing who is going to make the decision about the issue (who has 
the power), whether this is an individual or a number of individuals, 
and what criteria will be applied in making the decision - i.e. what 
do the powerful consider important, what values do they hold? 
Ambiguity in the information they do receive about the decision­
making process - for example, information about the outcome of a 
decision to which different meanings can be attached - may lead 
them to make false assumptions about the decision-making process and 
how to influence it. The absence or ambiguity of information makes 
it difficult for A to influence B, where B has power but it is not 
clear who B is or what will influence B. This provides an illus­
tration of the importance of information as a political resource, 
as found also by Pettigrew (1973).
The data suggest that the way information is disseminated within the 
organisation may be subject to norms about how much information people
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should have and whoshould be given what kinds of information. It 
is suggested that these norms are likely to work to the advantage 
of the more powerful, so that if information is seen as likely to cause 
conflict, and conflict is considered harmful to them, information will 
be limited. However, the way in which the structure of the organis­
ation, which is seen in the literature as having political implications 
(see Chapter 2, section 3)1 can provide or limit access to information 
is also suggested by this study. In particular, where group norms 
diverge, this may include norms about the sharing of information, so 
that from a political point of view it can matter which Group you 
belong to, even among Groups of similar status in the overall structure, 
in that politically useful information may be more widely shared in 
some Groups than in others.
The literature of power suggests an ambivalence among authors 
towards having and exercising power (see Chapter 2, section 4 
pp 77 et seq). In this study there were indications that political 
behaviour was not entirely approved of. For example, political 
behaviour in the form of competitiveness with others was confined to 
particular issues, or particular circumstances (for example, 
competition with other Groups rather than between Group members). It 
was also inhibited because it was seen as conflicting with other 
valued activities, such as the dissemination of knowledge, or the 
avoidance of conflict. Where such values were not shared, 
particularly among the more powerful organisation members, competitive 
behaviour was evident, though frowned on by others. Such cases, 
exemplify the grey area between the legitimate opportunism of the
— 296 —
astute politician and the unacceptable infringement of norms, 
discussed in Chapter 2 section 5«
Apart from the problems of de terming how to influence others and 
whether particular instances of political behaviour are legitimate 
or not, there is also the question raised by the data of what an 
apparently political activity means to the participants. The data 
show that people have the capacity to shift the meaning of events, 
(such as competitions for resources) either by prior intent or post 
hoc adjustment to the outcome, thus obscuring the reality of what 
they are doing.
The data suggest that norms in the organisation about how conflict 
should be dealt with, and values which encourage conflict avoidance, 
lead to strategies for handling conflict which can make it difficult 
for organisation members to deal with the political processes. It 
can be suggested that these strategies may not allow conflicts to 
be freely articulated and therefore obscure the issues in contention, 
or indeed help to prevent conflicts of interest from coming into the 
conscious focus of organisation members, as suggested in Chapter 2, 
section 3 p.69 ). A consensus of norms about conflict-avoidance 
can also facilitate the incidence of non-decision-making, in that 
contentious issues are kept out of decision-making agendas.
(Bacbrach and Baratz (1962); Lukes (1974)). There was also evidence 
that organisation structures, for example a hierarchy of committees, 
may have the effect of keeping potential protagonists apart, and 
therefore reducing the possibility of overt conflict, and also of 
making clear where the conflicts of interest are. This supports
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Crozier's (1964) view that organisation structure can limit the 
struggle for power (see Chapter 2, section 3)-
This question of norms about dealing with conflict also has a bearing 
on the way in which people can have political potential which they 
do not use, as discussed in the literature (see Chapter 2, section 2 
p. 63 and section 4). This study suggests that people may be unwilling 
to be involved in political processes either because these are seen 
as being incongruent with their interests in behaving in ways which 
accord with their values, or because involvement in such processes 
is seen as being against their pragmatic interests. Wanting a quiet 
life, or wanting to apply your time and energy to activities other 
than the political processes of the organisation (for example, research 
rather than committee membership) can make you unwilling to behave 
politically in some ways or make use of some political opportunities 
available to you. This issue of the willingness of people to be 
involved in a power struggle is also suggested by the literature, see 
Chapter 2, section 2, and suggests the relevance of motivation theory 
to political behaviour.
The data show that whether you see yourself as powerful, or see 
others as powerful, depends on the ideas you have about power. For 
example, whether you consider power to be a zero-sum phenomenon, so 
that if you share leadership or representation with others, you 
yourself become less powerful, less able to influence others, and 
what criteria you adopt for identifying power or powerlessness in 
others. Is lobbying or consultation a sign of political weakness or 
strength? It seems reasonable to assume that people will act in
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accordance with the concepts of power they hold when trying to 
influence events, but that other people will put a different inter­
pretation on their behaviour if they do not share these concepts.
For example, if you value democratic behaviour but equate democracy 
with being informal, your actions may be seen as undemocratic by 
others who have a different view of democracy. It is also suggested 
that the way people see the nature of the political system may 
depend on their vantage point, whether from a position of personal 
autonomy they observe the forms of democracy, or whether from a 
position of close involvement in the political processes they find 
themselves able to influence events.
Some further issues concerning the relationship between autonomy and 
power emerge from the study. It is suggested in Chapter 2, section 4, 
that there is a difficulty about relating the need for personal 
autonomy and the need to influence others, and this dilemma was 
reflected in the data over the question of who ought to be consulted 
and who ought to decide about what. The suggestion is that it is 
possible for people to resolve this dilemma in ways which suit their 
interests, perhaps by reference to some superordinate value. This can 
be seen also as an attempt to establish a pecking-order between 
different Groups in the organisation in a way which favours your Group, 
by reference to the purpose of the institution as you define it.
Section 5 of chapter 2 considers the relationship of rules to power 
as discussed in the literature, and the field-work data also reflect 
on this relationship. The data suggest that rules have an impact 
on the political process in that people may be uncertain whether the
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rules exist, or, if they exist whether they apply. However, 
because some people are more powerful than others in relation to an 
issue, it matters who thinks they apply or do not. It is further 
suggested that rules, and their uncertainties, can be used as a 
political resource. Undermining the certainty about rules, so 
that they may or may not be applied, creates one of those ambiguous 




It has been suggested in this chapter that the research data 
reflect in a number of ways on the existing literature of power.
Given the diverse nature of the power literature and its lack of 
grounding in field-work, and of attention to the perceptions of 
organisational actors, it is not to be expected that any tidy 
relationship between the existing theory and this study can be 
made. However, it will be seen that a number of themes emerge 
from the data which are relevant to existing theory, and in this 
section these are drawn together by looking at what the research 
reveals about the opportunities which the organisational setting 
can present, so that actors are enabled to pursue their own 
interests, "the chance to carry through one’s will", as Weber (in 
Walliman et al(l98o)) has called it, and how these are related to 
existing theory.
Criticism of the A-B model of power discussed in Chapter 2, section 2, 
suggested that it was limited by its lack of reference to the context 
of the A-B relationship. This criticism was supported by the present 
study which shows how the context (and the actord interpretation of 
it) provided political opportunities for both A and B. It can be 
suggested that these opportunities are derived both from the structural 
characteristics of the organisation, and the values which underpin 
and are supported by that structure. In Chapter 2, section 3» the 
difference of opinion as to whether structures or individuals can 
be said to have power was discussed. In this study organisational 
participants reported both views, some talking of parts of the
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structure such as the Senate as having power, and others talking 
of individuals having power. Although it could be argued that 
these are simply handy ways of talking about political phenomena, 
rather than carefully thought out terms, nevertheless it is suggested 
that the use of particular conceptual models can affect the ways in 
which people think about their organisational context, a point 
which will be returned to again.
Power was acquired by individuals in this study by what can be called 
structural means, but it was also suggested that structure may be 
more a matter of perceptions than of facts, and there is therefore 
a difficulty about saying as Bacharach and Lawler (198O) do that 
power derives from the group (see Chapter 2, section 3)- It could 
be suggested instead that structure provides opportunities of 
various kinds for individuals to pursue their self-interest, and 
the nature of that opportunity is conditioned by the culture of 
the organisation. In the organisation studied for this research, 
power did not in the main derive from the ^roup, except in the 
most general sense of the support provided to the individual’s 
actions by a consensus of values, which form the basis for the 
organisation’s existence (the idea of the academic community, for 
example). Although some organisational roles conferred considerable 
amounts of power on the role-holders, and provided access to ^roup 
membership, they did not necessarily participate closely in groups, 
or even depend much on the opinion of group members. This seemed 
particularly true of the professorial role, in that it was possible 
for a professor to feel that he hardly knew his professorial colleagues,
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or that he could largely disregard the feelings of his staff.
However, where groups consisted of a patron and protege, it could 
be said that power was derived from such a glroup, and where groups 
were formed for decision-making purposes, group members derive 
power from having the opportunity to influence the decision.
Structural questions such as where role boundaries should be drawn, 
affect the domain of power of the individual, and it has been 
suggested that the representation system integrating the structure 
may also by chance provide greater political opportunities for some 
individuals sind groups than others. The research findings support 
the idea found in the literature (see Chapter 2, section 3) of 
the ways in which structure both facilitates and constrains political 
interaction. However, the relationship of structures and values has 
also been commented on in the literature, (see Chapter 2, section 4) 
and it can be suggested from this research that the values of those 
who have power will prevail, and also that those whose values prevail 
will have power, as discussed in that section. Once a view of what 
the structure should be like has crystallised into formal procedures 
(for example, am Area system rather than a Faculty system) some 
people may find that their voices, and therefore their values, 
will have been structured out of important decision-making arenas. 
This is one of the ways in which values also play a part in providing 
or constraining political opportunity. It is also suggested that 
once values have been established as part of the culture, it may be 
difficult to know whether these operate as criteria for decisions or 
as justifications for them. In other words, they become political
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resources or opportunities for the pursuit of self-interest.
Dependence has been a recurring theme in the literature of power 
(see Chapter 2, section 2), and this study has shown considerable 
variety in the strength, nature and perception of dependence in 
different parts of the organisation. Some people were able to be 
relatively independent of other organisation members, either because 
their role provided considerable autonomy, or because they were able 
to obtain resources from outside the organisation, so that they 
had diffused their dependency - a strategy suggested by Dalton et 
al (1968) (see Chapter 2, section 2). In some cases it was seen 
that by a combination of having the opportunity of choosing between 
multiple roles (technical, group and organisational) and having low 
task dependence on other individuals or Groups, and therefore a high 
level of autonomy, some people had considerable opportunity for pur­
suing their self-interest successfully. It was suggested by this 
research that, in such circumstances, people could gain power with­
out the commitment to the organisation itself which Zalznic (1968) 
in Dalton et al has suggested, but could ignore, devalue or reject 
an organisational role, and perhaps also a Group role, and concentrate 
their energies almost entirely on a technocal role. This, together 
with their access to external resources in effect represented a 
"strategic contingency" route to power, (See Chapter 2, section 3) 
since the bringing in of these external resources (such as large 
research grants) was considered important by the more powerful members 
of the organisation. It is also suggested by this research that when 
people gain power by this means, their domain of power may be extended 
beyond their technical role, if the reward system of the organisation
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confers on them status and hence other roles. This consequence may 
turn out to be seen as being against the interests of other organis­
ation members, if they perceive these additional roles to be 
ineffectively or improperly played. This process by which people can 
use opportunities for gaining power which arise outside the organisation 
as well as within it, also supports the view discussed in the 
literature (see Chapter 2, section 4) that people gain power by 
conforming to, or sharing, the values of the powerful.
The tension which may exist between wanting independence or autonomy 
for oneself, but dependence for others, was discussed in Chapter 2, 
section 4, and was exemplified in this research by the suggestion 
that group A should be able to make decisions independently of 
group B, but that the reverse should not be true. It can be suggested 
from the foregoing discussion that the successful use of opportunities 
to gain power by some people can have the effect of constraining the 
opportunities of others. The research does not, however, reveal 
whether this imbalance in autonomy has any effect on the psychological 
health of either the more or the less autonomous, an issue which 
is discussed in the literature (see Chapter 2, section 4).
It has been suggested that the organisational context, which may 
include elements external to the organisation, provides the individual 
with opportunities for gaining and exercising power. However, it must 
be added that such opportunities depend on the perceptions of 
organisational participants of this context, which may be character­
ised by considerable ambiguity. There may, for example, be ambiguity 
about the existence of structures, or whether rules really apply,
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or about what is valued by the powerful. It has further been suggested 
that this uncertainty may in itself become a political opportunity, 
in that an attempt can be made to establish a definition of reality 
in line with one's own interests, as Dalton (1959) has noted. But 
this process of interpretation and definition is not without its 
constraints, since, as discussed in Chapter 2, section 4, and 
exemplified in this study, it is subject to the influence of group 
norms, a factor which may be brought to light by the perceptions 
and behaviour of newcomers to the organisation who are not yet 
socialised into the group's way of defining reality. These norms 
may also include the classification of some types of power (such 
as authority or coercion in this case) as unusable. It can be said 
therefore that political opportunity may bediminished by constraints 
on perceptions, and on the actions which may legitimately be taken.
One major uncertainty in the context of the individual is the cause- 
and-effe.ct relationship in the behaviour of others, to which Dahl 
(1968) has drawn attention. This creates a problem in interpreting 
the behaviour of others and therefore understanding how to influence 
them. Examples in this study, were the difficulty of determining 
the criteria others applied in making decisions and the problem of 
distinguishing which role was beingjiayed by a committee member.
Doubt about cause and effect may make it difficult to apply the 
right inducements to get B to act as A wishes, and even if B does 
so act, it is not necessarily any proof that it was because of the 
inducement, or for some other reason unknown to A. The outcome of 
influence attempts may depend on the anticpated reactions of others
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outside the A-B relationship. The non-compliance of B may be due 
to B’s interpretation of how C will react if B does what A wants.
For example, people trying to persuade a Decider in this study that 
their application for a research grant merits an A grading may be 
thwarted by the Decider's perception of how a powerful colleague 
would react to a rearrangement of the rankings of applications. This 
perception, by B may be entirely unknown to A, but may prevent B from 
acting as he or she would prefer. The cause of B!s behaviour might be 
said to include a prediction of how C will react, and a personal value 
or adherence to a norm against conflict, or even a perceived political 
opportunity to secure the support of C over another issue. As noted 
in Chapter 2, section 5, taking opportunities to pursue your own 
interests may involve accepting adverse reactions from others, and 
although some people in the present study were prepared to risk this, 
particularly if they were in positions of considerable strength, as 
has been shown, avoidance of conflict was a norm. The research there­
fore supports Bacharach and Lawler's (I980) contention that the 
subjective judgements of A, not only about whether sanctions (negative 
or positive) will be applied, but also whether they will have the 
required effect, are important factors in A's attempt to influence B, 
but suggest also that these factors should be seen as arising from a 
wider network of relationships which form the context of A and B.
It can be added that B's capacity to resist A's demands may include 
a capacity for false compliance, and that the uncertainty of cause 
and effect and difficulty of interpreting the context may be compounded 
by the ways in which people may shift the meaning for themselves of
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organisational events (such as competition for resources) or 
obscure them for others by withholding of information (such as 
information about the criteria for ranking research applications).
These shifts in meaning, whether psychological or tactical, are 
similar to those discussed in the literature in Chapter 2, sections 
2 and 4.
It has been suggested in the literature that information control is 
important to effective political action (see for example Pettigrew 
(1973)) and this view is supported by this research which shows that 
information sharing may be limited both by the structure, which may 
formally or informally restrict who talks to whom, and by people’s 
values about the extent and type of information which should be 
shared. Bacharach and Aiken (1976) suggest that the more powerful 
members of an organisation have a problem in trying to gaim information 
from lower participants without losing control (see Chapter 2, 
section 4) and it could be seen in this present study that there were 
some kinds of information - such as signs of discontent over the change 
in policy - which some Deciders would rather disregard, and some people 
felt that the more powerful did not want to know of their views or 
problems. This would suggest that selective attention to information 
from lower participants, or the less powerful, was the strategy adopted 
by some of the more powerful, and it is difficult to see how, in this 
case, making a distinction between authority and influence would 
resolve the problem as Bacharach and Aiken (1976) .suggest. Allowing 
greater influence in decision-making among lower participants would 
seem more likely to further blurr the identification of who was making 
the decision, and therefore erode the authority of the higher
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eschelons, particularly in a culture where gaining compliance through 
the direct use of authority was generally frowned on.
The possibility of maintaining both the goodwill and the compliance 
of B referred to in Chapter 2, section 5 may be affected by B's 
perception of the structure(for example, can these representatives 
in this part of the structure credibly make these decisions ) and 
hence have implications for the perceived legitimacy of A's power 
when this is based on the structure. It is suggested in the lit­
erature that willing compliance may also result from a congruence 
of values between A and B (see Chapter 2, section 4) and there were 
examples in this study of such congruence, for example, when the 
change to a research orientation coincided with an individual's 
interests in doing research. However, there was no sign of an 
unthinking compliance which seems to be the way in which some 
writers think of authority, (see Chapter 2, section 4 page 74) and 
indeed Deciders in this case tended not to see any of the forms of 
authority discussed in that section as usable ways of getting the 
compliance of B, although their role clearly gave them rights to 
decide. The research shows also that B's compliance may be affected 
by the strength of B's commitment to the enterprise (as discussed 
in Chapter 2, section 4) and the nature of that commitment. It was 
in particular noted that some people had little commitment to the 
organisation as such, i.e. to playing an organisational as well as 
technical role, and might comply or fail to comply for that reason - 
for example, by accepting the judgement of the RFC and not taking 
the trouble to find out why an application had been turned down, or 
by throwing all internal memos into the waste-paper basket on principle
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It can be suggested therefore that being able to make effective 
use of the opportunities presented by the organisational context of 
pursuing one’s self-interest, through gaining the compliance of 
others, can depend on the values and percpeptions of the parties 
concerned, which will affect the interpretation of whether compliance 
has in fact been achieved, how others may be influenced, whether a 
political process is legitimate, whether values are congruent and 
what is the extent and likely effect of an individual's motivation 
and commitment to the organisation. Perceived incongruence of 
values might be used to justify an imbalance of power, so as to 
align the organisation with what is perceived by the more powerful 
to be the "reality" of environmental demands (see Chapter 2, 
section 4).
The sharing of information was also limited in this study by a 
cultural norm through which cnnflict was generally avoided, so 
that the confrontation of contentious information was either avoided 
altogether, or restricted to being dealt with in particular parts 
of the structure.
It is suggested by this research that information is particularly 
important for political opportunity, not only as it affects "the 
ignorance of B", but also in its effect on the individual's percep­
tion of the organisational context within which self-interest is to 
be pursued. Interpreting the context is not a neutral activity, but 
guided also by conceptual models which the perceiver uses, so that, 
for example, one person may interpret consultation by a leader with 
subordinates as a sign of relative powerlessness in the leader, and
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another may interpret it as political astuteness. Whatever the 
interpretation, the research also suggests that political skill 
is also required in order to make the most of the opportunities 
offered. If, for example, acting effectively in the Senate does 
require the skills of advocacy, it is not enough to perceive that.
One also needs to be a good advocate. It has been suggested in 
Chapter 2, section 4, that it is important to ensure that your 
definitions of reality prevail, and it can be suggested that 
particular skills which match the ways in which people can be 
influenced are necessary in order to bring this about. The general 
nature of the behavioural repertoire an individual has, for example 
being predominantly "high profile" or "low key" may affect others' 
perceptions of the power of that individual and therefore his or 
her political effectiveness.
It has been suggested in Chapter 2, section 3, that the timing of 
influence attempts, particularly in situations where the salience 
of particular issues may be changing, is important to effective 
political behaviour, and one could say that this is a necessary 
political skill. As will be shown in the next chapter, the partici­
pation in recurring rather than one-off events, and the structuring 
of time in general, have a bearing on the acquisition of both 
political opportunities and skills. (See Chapter 4, Section 4(a)).
Effective political behaviour, can be seen as depending on the 
interpretation of the organisational context, which includes 
interpretation of the structure, the cultural norma and the behaviour 
of others in the organisation. This interpretation is affected by
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the information you have, and the conceptual models you adopt, and 
the outcome is conditioned by the skills you have in acting on your 
interpretation. Since political behaviour is a process between 
individuals, the outcome for any individual depends also on the 
interactions between people who are all similarly engaged in making 
interpretations and acting on these. This research has shown that 
different people make different interpretations of the same phenomena, 
and that this circumstance may be unknown to organisational participants, 
The research therefore supports the symbolic interactionist view of 
politics, but suggests that negotiation over meanings is facilitated 
by ambiguity, because there is no obvious right answer, but only the 
answer which prevails. The ability to deal with ambiguity is there­
fore a necessary political skill. However, the idea of "negotiated" 
meanings is perhaps a misnomer, because it suggests that differences 
in interpretation are recognised and confronted, but this research 
suggests that this may not be the case.
Organisational ambiguity is a major theme which has emerged from 
this study. It is a theme which does not appear much in the litera­
ture about power (Dalton et al (I968) would be an example) although 
it is found to some extent as a variable in organisational literature, 
for example, as a factor in decision-making (March and Olsen (1976)).
From this present research it can be suggested that ambiguity is 
present in the organisation in two main ways. It appears as 
uncertainty of which the participants are aware and with which they 
may have to contend in taking political action. Uncertainty about 
whether or not sanctions exist would be an example of this.
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However, there is also ambiguity of which organisation members may 
be unaware because they lack information about possible alternative 
interpretations, but differences in interpretation are nevertheless 
a factor in the political processes in the organisation, both in 
their implications for creating conflict and in opportunities which 
have been missed because one view has been taken for granted as the 
only reality.
There is very little discussion in the literature about ambiguity as 
a concept, or of its relation to organisational politics. In Chapter 
4 I shall therefore suggest a way of understanding the concept of 
ambiguity which shows how ambiguity is of political significance, 
both in the way it arises in the organisation and in the political 
opportunity it provides for organisation members. Examples from the 
field data will be used to illustrate the ideas put forward, and to 
maintain the grounding of the theory in the field research. It will 
be seen that some of the major themes of relevance to the study of 
power, and which have been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 will again 
reappear, though in some instances with a different orientation. So, 
for example, the structural aspects of organisational politics 
reappear subsumed under the heading of information processes, thus 
emphasising the impact of structure on the information which the 
individual receives and hence on the individual’s interpretation of 
organisational phenomena. To some extent the theory presented in 
Chapter 4 goes beyond the data of the field research, and represents 




THE POLITICS OF AMBIGUITY
1. Introduction
It was suggested in the previous chapter that ambiguity was a major 
theme which emerged from the field research, and the political 
significance, of this characteristic of the organisation studied will 
be examined in this chapter. However, it is first necessary to 
consider the concept of ambiguity itself. Although ambiguity is 
found as a concept in social science theory, there appears to be 
little analysis of it. March and Olsen (1976) and their contributors 
make use of the concept as a variable in decision-making, and although 
they attempt a definition of it, this is limited to identifying some 
ambiguous phenomena in the organisation, rather than saying what 
ambiguity is.
Discussion of ambiguity in other fields, such as literary criticism 
(Empson 0-930) Kris and Kaplan (1932)) the history of ideas (Toshiro 
(1973)) and the history of art (Gombrich (I963)) throws light on the 
topic, although these ideas are not entirely transferable to the 
field of organisational behaviour. However, these authors are concerned 
with the problem of interpretation of ambiguous phenomena, and as has 
been shown in Chapter 3, interpretation is an important factor in 
political behaviour in an organisation. Moreover, they are concerned 
with ambiguity within a particular context, such as a poem or a 
painting, and therefore have more relevance to organisational 
politics than, for example, the writing on the subject by philosophers 
such as Lacey (1976) or Altham (198O), who seem mainly concerned 
with ambiguities of logic, devoid of context. As has been shown
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in the preceding chapter, political perceptions and interactions 
are best considered within their organisational context.
In this chapter I shall start by attempting to clarify the concept 
of ambiguity, and then take a political perspective in suggesting 
how it arises in the organisation and how it affects people's 
behaviour. The ideas present here will build on the analysis of 
the field data and the theoretical implications of the previous 
chapter, and also, where applicable, on the literature mentioned 
above.
The numbers in brackets which appear in the text in sections 3 and 4 
of this chapter refer to the notes at the end of each sub-section. 
These notes relate the material in this chapter to the research 
findings in Chapter 3 and, in some cases, to the literature review 
in Chapter 2. For page numbers to aid cross-referencing, see the 
contents page at the beginning of this thesis. A summary of the 
issues discussed and the main reflection on existing theory of power 
is given at the end of sections 3 and 4. Section 3 is a general 
conclusion to the Chapter,
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2 . Ambiguity
Ambiguity refers to a particular kind of uncertainty in the meaning 
of a phenomenon. The meaning is uncertain because the phenomenon is 
capable of two or more interpretations, which may or may not be 
mutually exclusive. It is not possible to determine a "correct" 
reading from among these alternatives, although it is possible to 
decide, consciously or unconsciously which reading you will take 
to be the correct one, and to try to persuade others to agree with 
your view.
Ambiguity should not be thought of as "all in the mind", unrelated 
to any reality outside the perceiver. The ambiguous phenomenon has 
itself characteristics which render it capable of alternative 
interpretations, all of which are justifiable. Ambiguity arises 
partly as a perception by the individual and partly as a character­
istic of the organisational phenomena with which the individual is 
dealing.
Abstract ideas such as "organisation", and notions about the composi­
tion and operation of organisations, are inherently ambiguous. The 
organisation is rather like an ink-blot into which people read 
meanings, but unlike an ink-blot it will react to any action the 
individual takes on the basis of such readings. It is therefore 
possible for organisation members to test out the meanings they 
assign to organisational phenomena as a check on the efficacy of 
their interpretations, although such tests are problematic as I 
shall show.
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An ambiguous phenomenon need not be perceived as such by every 
individual who perceives the phenomenon, since the individual may 
be unaware of possible alternative readings which could be assigned 
to it, and perhaps are assigned to it by others. Consequently an 
organisational phenomenon may appear ambiguous to a researcher 
collecting views of it from different people, but not to the 
individual interviewees themselves.
Since so much of what happens in an organisation is language-based, 
it is relevant to consider how a classification of types of 
ambiguity, developed in the field of literary criticism, can be 
useful to a study of ambiguity in organisations. Kris and Kaplan 
(1952) (drawing on the work of Empson (1930)) in writing about 
ambiguity in poetry, distinguish between disjunctive, additive, 
conjunctive, interpretive, projective, decorative and expressive 
ambiguities. Of these, the additive, conjunctive and integrative 
categories seem very similar, and can be subsumed under the title 
"cumulative" ambiguity, in that they all involve the accumulation of 
meanings which do not exclude each other. Disjunctive ambiguities 
are mutually exclusive. In projective ambiguity, the variation in 
meaning depends upon the interpreter. I assume this to be a 
reference to the point of view that the poet’s intention is unknowable 
or irrelevant, and that what matters is what the poem means to the 
reader, the poem therefore being a different poem to different 
readers. Decorative ambiguity exists when meanings have no bearing 
on the immediate context - Kris and Kaplan cite the plays on words 
in Shakespeare as examples of this. Expressive ambiguity involves 
psychic distance between the face value of the words and their meaning.
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Too little psychic distance and a poem becomes mere propaganda 
"pragmatic rather than aesthetic", too much psychic distance and 
the poem is either unintelligible or will be interpreted by the 
reader only at the face-value level.
In applying these classifications of ambiguity to social inter­
actions in an organisation, it can be suggested that cumulative 
ambiguity exists when there is doubt about what is to be included 
in a phenomenon, and can be viewed as a measure of potential or 
perceived complexity. For example, the interpretation of the Senate 
as a "ratifying" committee, could include the idea that it is simply 
a "rubber stamp" for all decisions brought to it from other groups, 
and that it might interfere with the work of a School, and that it 
can be manipulated by particular individuals. Varying degrees of 
power can be implied in the "ratifying" view of the Senate, sind 
this would be an example of cumulative ambiguity about its political 
position.
An example of disjunctive ambiguity is found in the opinions expressed 
about the relative powerfulness of the Senate and the Council, one 
informant seeing the Senate as the more powerful of the two, another 
saying that the Council had the greater power. In this instance 
the phenomenon (relative power) is ambiguous in a disjunctive way, 
since if one view of it is correct, the other is untenable.
If one accepts the phenomenologists’ view that the line to be drawn 
between what is subjective and what (if anything) is objective is 
problematic (Thines (1977); Koch (1964); Spiegleberg (I967)), one
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can say that all organisational ambiguities are to some extent 
projective in that they are in part created by the interpreter. An 
example of a high degree of projective ambiguity might be found where 
a person who consciously adopts political strategies in organisa­
tional interactions - perhaps by manipulating meetings to obtain 
decisions that he or she wants - might wrongly assume similar 
intentions in other people and therefore read into their behaviour 
meanings which make that behaviour ambiguous for the interpreter.
Expressive ambiguities in the organisation can occur when a symbolic 
meaning exists alongside the face-value meaning of a phenomenon.
In this research it was reported that having a car-parking space 
with your name on it meant, not only that a space had been allocated 
for your car, but in one instance also symbolised high status in the 
organisation and the ability to survive changes in power structure.
In this case, the expressive ambiguities are cumulative. Expressive 
ambiguities can also be disjunctive however. It could be said that 
one way of including people in a decision-making process, when they 
do not have the right to be present at formal meetings, is to circulate 
minutes of those meetings to such people. For one of my informants, 
however, being offered the opportunity to see the minutes of Senate 
meetings simply underlined the fact that he was excluded from member­
ship of the Senate, to which he felt he should have belonged as of 
right. What on the face of it was an act of inclusion in decision­
making, symbolised exclusion for the organisation member concerned.
In this research I did not come across ambiguities which I would 
consider to be of the purely "decorative" type, but this may be 
because in social interaction in organisations it would be difficult
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to substantiate the view that any words are "irrelevant" to the 
substantive issues, unless they are serving some symbolic purpose, 
as covered by the "expressive" category. Even when people choose 
to talk in colourful metaphors - for example, by referring to 
groups of people as "white hens and red hens" - there are a number 
of purposes which such language can serve in influencing the 
interpretation of the listener, projecting a self image, creating 
a conversational climate, quite apart from its function in conveying 
meaning relating to the substantive issue. Although it is possible 
that words and images may be used for their intrinsic pleasure as 
well as, or in spite of, any other meaning they are intended to 
convey, I have not found the "decorative" category very useful in 
this analysis of ambiguity, because of the difficulty of establishing 
irrelevance.
March and Olsen (1976) identify four different types of "organisational 
opaqueness" by which they define ambiguity. These are, ambiguities 
of intention, understanding, history and organisation. By ambiguity 
of intention, they mean that the organisation has inconsistent and 
unclear objectives. They also talk of the organisation as having 
"motivation" (p.55) and "intelligence" (p.54), but it would be 
more consistent with the view of the organisation suggested by 
this research to consider "objectives", "motives" and "intelligence" 
as characteristics of individuals, rather than of the abstract 
concept "organisation". Ambiguity in the intentions of individuals 
as a factor in organisational politics will be discussed later in 
this chapter.
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Ambiguity of understanding, in March and Olsen’s scheme, refers to 
ambiguity of cause and effect. Technologies being unclear and 
environments difficult to interpret, it is difficult to see con­
nections between the organisation’s actions and their consequences. 
Again, removing the imputation of personality from the organisation 
and returning it to the individual, and taking a political view, 
issues involved in assessing cause and effect in organisational 
politics will be returned to later. Meanwhile, one can suggest that 
"understanding" is rather too broad a term when ambiguity of causes 
is referred to, since there are other phenomena to be "understood" 
besides cause and effect. Ambiguity of history refers to the
difficulty of specifying what happened, and why, in the past, since
history can be reconstructed or twisted. This category could be 
subsumed under a general category of temporal ambiguity, since it 
is not only the past, but also the future which is ambiguous, and 
the question of ambiguity arising out of the passage of time will 
be turned to later in this chapter. In their classification, March 
and Olsen are not so much defining ambiguity as drawing attention 
to certain organisational phenomena which are particularly relevant 
to decision-making as they see it, and where there is a lack of 
clarity or certainty for decision-makers. My orientation in this 
chapter is to consider ambiguity in the organisation in a broader
sense, and to relate it to organisational politics.
Drawing together the various types of ambiguity which have been 
discussed so far, the following table can be suggested (see Figure 5 ) 
Ambivalence has been included in the classification because this 
concept deals specifically with uncertainty about the value to be
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attached to a phenomenon and can be seen as a useful sub-set of 
ambiguity, in making a distinction between ambiguity of fact and 
ambiguity of value. For example, money can be seen as both a 
beneficial and corrupting resource, but this is different from 
ambiguity of what money actually is.
Figure 5








This classification attempts to capture the perceptual process 
between the individual interpreter and the ambiguous phenomena, with­
out specifying particular organisational phenomena as part of the 
classification. It should therefore be possible for any ambiguous 
phenomenon in the organisation to be classified in the appropriate 
boxes in the table.
Talking about "facts" tends to lead towards the metaphysical 
quagmire of argument about whether anything can be proved to exist. 
However, for the purposes of this chapter, it will be assumed that, 
since there is so great a consensus about the existence of some 
organisational phenomena, and it would be so difficult to find
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non-perceivers of them, such phenomena'can be taken for granted as 
really existing. It is suggested that such a consensus is more 
likely to apply to physical objects than to abstract ideas, and 
this point will be returned to in the next section. Meanwhile, 
although no consensus however complete should be regarded as 
sacrosanct, this chapter only deals with some of the possible examples 
of ambiguity in an organisation, those which were brought to my 
attention in the field study, and these will be used to try to 
throw some light on how organisational ambiguity relates to organis­
ational politics.
There were three general groups of issues, all to do with the exercise 
of power and the power structure which could be identified in the 
present study; each of which had corresponding ambiguities:
(a) Generalised philosophical principles.
(b) The process of exercising power, and
(c) Specific outcomes at a point in time.
The corresponding ambiguities were:
(a) Ambivalence about whether a leader ought to control a group, 
how much control there should be over the individual or whether 
individual autonomy is to be promoted wherever possible. Is control 
of the individual by the leader - i.e. a considerable imbalance in 
the power structure - an indication of effective leadership conducive 
to the maintenance of high standards? Or an oppressive imposition 
of a minority view of phenomena, creating unnecessary conflict?
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Should the democracy or autocracy apply to all issues and circum­
stances, and include all individuals or groups, or should some form 
of mixed culture be attempted? Many of these ambiguities are of 
the cumulative type, reflecting uncertainty about what should be 
included in the concept of democracy.
(b) How in practice is the power structure implemented and power 
exercised? Ambiguities (often of the disjunctive type) could be 
found in the present study, over where decisions were actually being 
made, whether power resided with individuals or with groups such as 
committees, whether one such group was more powerful than another, 
whether particular individuals were powerful, and whether they were 
allied to particular groups or not. There was also ambiguity about 
whether certain rules, and certain negative and positive sanctions 
really applied, and what was the precise nature of a threat, where 
danger to an individual was perceived. There were also ambiguities 
about how to "get on" in the organisation and whether the individual’s 
contribution would be recognised and valued, i.e. did the individual 
really have political resources?
(c) Some examples were found of ambivalence about the outcomes for 
the individual of a current political situation or decision. So,
a particular form of leadership could be seen as a mixed blessing, 
and some doubts existed as to whether particular groups were at a 
political advantage or not. There was also some ambivalence about 
whether the perceived absence of democracy was a good or a bad 
thing.
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It can be added that ambiguity can be found at different levels in 
the organisation. For example, some concepts used pervasively in 
the system may be ambiguous, or ambiguity may be found in the very 
purpose of the organisation itself, making it difficult to answer 
such questions as "what is a university?" in a way which satisfies 
all parties. At other levels, ambiguity may be found in the role 
and activities of decision-making groups, or in the thinking and 
behaviour of particular individuals, or in the interactions between 
individuals. It may be a one-off occurrence, or a habitually present 
phenomenon. The ways in which ambiguity arises in the organisation 
and the ways in which people respond to it will be considered in the 
next sections.
3. The creation of ambiguity
In this section I shall look at ways in which ambiguity in organisa­
tional phenomena is created. I shall consider first the question 
of the difference between the uncertainty of ignorance and uncertainty 
of the ambiguous kind, then deal with the use of abstract concepts 
and the ways in which information processes, and the organisational 
characteristics which mould those processes, help to create ambiguity.
In cnnsidering ambiguity in organisations, it is useful to distinguish 
between situations where alternative perceptions are found because 
the phenomena are inherently ambiguous, and situations where 
alternative perceptions arise because of the ignorsince of one of 
the parties. Organisation members will sometimes impute ignorance 
of the facts to others whose perceptions do not match their own, sind 
it is important to try to distinguish between such imputations which
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are valid, and those which are not. Some examples will illustrate 
the difference, and the difficulty of making this distinction in 
some cases:
(a) Person A may claim that his name is first on the priority 
list for the allocation of Research Funds. Person B may deny that 
this is the case. The discrepancy could easily be resolved by both 
parties consulting the priority list, and one of them would be shown 
to be right.
(b) Person A claims that "the VC has frozen posts in social science... 
but person B says that this is technically incorrect, since the VC 
does not have the authority to freeze posts on his own decision. In 
this case, although person A may be ignorant of the formal rules which 
apply to the freezing of posts, the perception that it is the VC who 
is really doing the freezing may be correct, since it is quite 
possible for a person to have enough influence to overcome the 
restraint of formal rules. There is no simple check which could
be done to determine who is right here, and as I shall illustrate 
further in the following sections, such organisational situations 
should be seen as inherently ambiguous.
In example (a) above, there is a "right" answer, and it can be 
assumed that the original perceptions of A and B were derived from 
clues picked up from sources other than a reference to available 
"facts" (the list itself). However, if A and B are denied access 
to these facts, the ambiguity about A's position would remain, kept 
in being by political forces. As both examples show, organisational 
politics can prevent the resolution of uncertainty in organisational
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phenomena, and three causes of such perceptual uncertainty can 
be suggested: false ambiguity based on removable ignorance;
ambiguity manufactured by political forces; and inherent ambiguity. 
Only the last two will be considered as properly belonging to the 
concept of ambiguity.
In the following sections I shall discuss inherent and manufactured
ambiguity, not as consequences of cognitive incapacity or inefficient
communication channels (March and Olsen (1976) p.l8) but as arising
from the nature of organisational phenomena, from political processes,
and from what might be called the limitations on inter-subjectivity -
the impossibility of knowing for certain what are another's
perceptions, intentions or even in some cases actions, and the
(2)considerable doubt which csin be cast upon one's own.
(a) Abstractions. Many of the phenomena of organisational life are 
abstract in nature, lacking physical reference and therefore 
particularly open to doubt as to their existence and operation. 
Abstract ideas, such as "structure" for example, while having 
considerable consequences in the organisation, have little tangibility, 
As far as formal structure is concerned, the physical separation of 
individuals into different sections of a building, the labelling 
of these groups by different names and constant reference to these 
names in speech and writing, the regular calling together of committee 
members and the writing of minutes about their discussions, all help 
to give credibility to the existence of structure, but nevertheless, 
large areas of this phenomenon elude the process of reification.
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Informal structure is particularly difficult to pin down, and 
this research has shown that the very existence of "groups" within 
an organisation may be in doubt, it being possible for one person 
to perceive the existence of a group where another does not. Where­
as it would be difficult to find anyone in doubt as to whether the 
buildings housing the .organisation exist, it is not so difficult
to find people in doubt about, or denying the existence of, some
(5)parts of a supposed structure.
Abstract ideas are not subject to the same constraints as the physical 
world and this enhances the possibility of their being ambiguous.
In the physical world, for example, if you cut an orange in half you 
clearly no longer have a whole orange. However, with abstractions 
such as structure, it is possible to attempt to maintain the wholeness 
of a phenomenon while at the same time dividing it, so that it becomes 
unclear whether the "orange" is whole or not. So an attempt to 
divide academic decisions from resourcing decisions, though persistant 
in the organisation, may be always susceptible to being reversed, 
and the two kinds of decisions viewed as one. With abstract ideas, 
one person can continue to make distinctions which another denies, 
both with equal justification.
Organisation members give credibility to the existence of organisational 
abstractions by behaving as if they existed. However, by the same 
means, others may undermine this credibility. A role boundary, for 
example, might be maintained or denied or altered in this way.
Similarly, organisation members can suggest, not only the existence
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of phenomena, but also the value to be placed on such phenomena. The 
amount of effort they are prepared to make, or resources they are 
prepared to apply to a phenomenon can suggest whether they regard 
it as important or trivial.
Because of the abstract nature of organisational phenomena, and
because organisations are interactive, in that the behaviour of one
person has consequences for another, and because decisions have to
be made, tensions cain develop over the interpretations of the
phenomena, both as to facts and values. Interpretations can become
a crucial matter when they favour the interests of some individuals
or groups and disadvantage others, and hence they give rise to
political processes in which people seek to redefine or re-evaluate
phenomenon or to maintain the status quo. For example, if "being a
good academic" is defined as being primarily a good teacher,this
definition will favour those who are, and want primarily to be,
good teachers. When the role of the university is reinterpreted
in a way which redefines "good academic" as "good researcher", the
former elite group will lose out to a new group of research-oriented
staff. Political processes develop over the attempt to establish
the new interpretation and counter attempts will be made to maintain 
(4)
the existing one.
Organisations are created by individuals (rather than being "found" 
in the universe) but because they are creations built largely on 
abstractions it should not be assumed that they have no reality.
Their reality may be largely psychological, in that it is compsed 
of the perceptions, intentions and behaviour of people, but it is
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none the less real for that. The problem is that the nature of that
reality is not immutable and not always clear. What are assumed
to be facts about the organisation may be no more than the outcome
(4)
of a consensus to see the organisation that way.
The concept of power is one of the abstractions about which people’s 
perceptions can differ. Of all the possible ramifications of the 
concept, which were outlined in Chapter 2, in the field research 
a relatively limited view of organisational politics was found in 
use. The aspects of power focussed on tended to differ between 
the Deciders and Applicants groups, and it could be suggested that 
the more power you have in terms of authority and control of resources, 
the more you are aware of political behaviour as consisting in 
negotiation and manipulation. (The direct use of authority and coercion 
were not seen as "political" behaviour by most Deciders, who tended 
to regard;those forms of power as taboo or unworkable). The less 
authority and control of resources you have the more you are aware 
of the power structure - the capacity of other individuals and 
groups to exercise authority over you and to control the resources 
you need. In general, people did not see all behaviour, but only 
certain kinds, as "political", and it was seen as largely a matter 
of choice whether you adopted this behaviour or not. One 
interesting variation was that if you have power you can avoid 
getting involved in politics but still get what you want, which I 
took to mean that resources would accrue to you without your having 
to make a special effort to obtain them in competition with others^
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This variety in understanding of the concept of power provides an 
example of the way in which abstractions in the organisation are 
given a particular character. One question which can be asked 
about them is the extent to which they are cumulatively ambiguous, 
or in other words, what degree of complexity or richness is attached 
to the meaning of the abstraction in the organisation. It can be 
suggested that abstractions in an organisation become endowed with 
particular meanings, and that these in turn influence the ways, in 
which organisation members perceive and think about organisational 
phenomena. The absence of concrete referends for such abstractions 
allows for instability in meanings and enables ambiguity to be 
created, but there may be limitations on the creation of the range 
of meanings, as will be discussed further. It may be the case that 
different degrees of ambiguity would be found in different types of 
organisation, and if this is so, the degrees of complexity of 
interpretation required of organisation members will differ from 
one organisation type to another.
The next section will consider the ways in which the information 
process in the organisation affects the interpretations people make 
of ambiguous, and largely abstract, organisational phenomena.
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Notes:
1. This question of ignorance relates to the notion of "the 
ignorance of B" discussed in Chapter 2, section 5, and again in 
Chapter 3i see for example the Conclusion to that chapter.
2. Dahl’s (1968) contention that the cause and effect of political 
behaviour is problematic noted in Chapter 2, section6 , was 
supported by the research findings, see Chapter 3» conclusions.
3 . See Chapter 3» section 2. This question of ambiguity about 
"facts" casts the idea of "the ignorance of B" (see Chapter 2, 
section 3, and Chapter 3, section 4) in a new light, since it 
suggests that the political significance may be not in whether an 
individual knows the "facts", but whether he or she knows who 
interprets phenomena which way, and how powerful that person is.
4. This relates to the discussion of values in Chapter 2, section 4, 
and in Chapter 3, section 4(a) and Conclusions.
5 . For examples of these views, see Chapter 3, section 4(e) and 
Inferences 1 and 1? for that section.
6 . See for example the meanings attached to the concept "useful” 
Chapter 3i section 4(a), Inference 3-
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(b) The information processes.
(i) Introduction. Because of the abstract nature of much that 
happens in an organisation, organisation members are dependent on 
clues provided by interaction with others for their understanding 
of the existence and nature of organisational phenomena. The 
giving and receiving of information provides the basis for this 
understanding, and information may come in the form of written 
statements, the spoken word or observation. Although some relatively 
factual information may be in existence, such as a written statement 
of the terms of reference of a committee, some organisation members 
may not be aware of, or have access to, such facts. Some people 
have more, and more useful, information than others, and some 
people actively seek information while others do not^
Whatever their state of informedness, organisation members will use 
whatever information they happen to have in order to madce assessments, 
whether consciously and deliberately or not, of the phenomena with 
which they find themselves involved. Organisation members can there­
fore come to widely different conclusions about their own or others' 
behaviour because they start from differing amounts and kinds of 
information. Whereas some information, such as that in the form of 
written statements, is potentially easily available provided one is 
aware of and has access to it, other information, such as the 
perceptions of other individuals about organisational situations, 
is more difficult to obtain. So, for example, a person who sees him 
or herself as acting under particular constraints, may be seen by 
others as acting on personal whim. If person X thinks he or she
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is acting under constraints it is necessary to have that information 
regardless of whether the constraints really exist, in order to 
understand X’s behaviour, but it is often the kind of information 
not available to person Y. Indeed, person Y may be unaware of some 
of the constraints oh X which undoubtedly ^  exist - such as a 
reduction in budget by an external authority - as well as being
(2)
unaware of person X's perception of what constraints are operating.
It can be safely said that no-one in the organisation has access to 
all the information, potentially available within it, which would 
be necessary for a complete understanding of organisational 
phenomena.
Given that organisation members act on the basis of what they perceive 
to be their self-interest, one important piece of information they 
need is the relationship of cause to effect in the interactive 
process, a relationship which this research has shown may be in 
considerable doubt. This relationship is crucial to political action, 
which necessitates making some assumptions about what will cause 
another person to act as one wants (or otherwise?^ It has been 
suggested that information about how others perceive a situation 
is not usually fully available, and it can be added that people give 
or withhold information in accordance with what they perceive to be 
their self-interest, that is, they act politically in revealing or 
concealing their own perceptions. Moreover, people are not necessarily 
clear about the springs of their own actions, nor necessarily able to 
verbalise them, or in other ways provide information about them to 
others. Without full information about people's perceptions of
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organisational phenomena it is not possible to be certain about 
the cause and effect of political action, and so there will always 
be some ambiguity about the political processes in organisations, 
and about such questions as how much power individuals have, or 
who influences who.
One factor which was found to affect the willingness of people to
seek out information, was their attitudes to political behaviour
as such. It was suggested by one person that obtaining information
through informal discussion with a Decider might be "unfair", and
by another that he wanted to be at a meeting to hear the arguments,
but not so that he could influence events through having this
information. It would seem that to some people, the deliberate
(4)
acquisition of information for political purposes is'hot cricket".
One feature of an organisation is the potential it provides for the
(5)
sharing of information between individuals. Some organisation 
members at least, will be in a position to exchange information 
with each other about organisational phenomena - such information as 
they possess and are prepared to share. One result of this can be 
the perception by individuals that organisational phenomena are 
ambiguous, as they become aware that others see the same things 
differently. In so far as they are not persuaded to relinquish their 
own view, they remain aware that at least two interpretations of 
the same phenomena can be justified. So, for example, a person may 
feel in two minds about whether a low key approach or an aggressive
(6)approach is more useful for getting one's own way in the organisation. 
However, it should be noted that although ambiguity may exist in the
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organisation, this is not necessarily perceived by the individuals 
involved, and it is suggested that the perception of ambiguity is 
less likely in those organisational settings where the sharing of 
information is less common. The converse, that the sharing of 
information necessarily increases perceived ambiguity, is not 
true because of the development of group norms, as will be discussed 
in a later section.
(ii) Sources of information - words and deeds. Information about 
organisational phenomena comes to individual members through a 
variety of different sources. Most of our information about other 
people's intentions, perceptions and feelings comes to us through 
language, and words are notoriously ambiguous symbols in themselves, 
let alone when used in particular contexts which have a history and 
a future. Ambiguity of language is not just a grammatical consider­
ation, although that has its effect, but also arises from the 
idiomatic use of language by individuals and groups. For example, 
when A wants to get B to do something, the meaning of the words 
"would you mind... " could be either a command or a request, and 
the face-value meaning of the statement maybe undermined by the 
usage between the parties concerned. The actual meaning may be 
unclear to an observer, and the behaviour of the parties subsequently 
may not throw any light on their political relationship, since the 
behaviour of B may not indicate whether he or she felt commanded or 
requested. Nor is it necessarily clear to the parties concerned 
that the statement is ambiguous, since what A sees as a command,
B may see as a request, but neither be aware of this. It could
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be said that in this instance a considerable "psychic distance"
had developed between the face-value statement and its symbolic
significance, i.e. expressive ambiguity, but that the ambiguity
created by the differing interpretations is also disjunctive. Two
more general suggestions can be made, following from this example :
one is that although there may be idiomatic usage of words within
an organisation, it should not be assumed that there is^agreement
about the meaning of those words; the other is that the observable
behaviour of individuals is not a sufficient indicator of the
political relationship between them, since the disjunctive ambiguity
of the political relationship in this instance would not affect the
(7)
observable (compliant) behaviour. Information about political
relationships between people in the organisation may come, not just
in the form of discussion, or through the comprehension of idiomatic
usage of words, but in the observation of whole incidents, trivial
or important,- in which the organisation member may be involved
directly or indirectly, and which provide verbal and non-verbal clues(8)
to the nature of these relationships. A small incident at the 
beginning of a committee meeting provides an example which shows 
how ambiguous such incidents can be.
Some committee members having already assembled, a member on 
coming into the committee room switched on the lights and said:
"Is that alright Chairman or are we economising on light?" to 
which the Chairman made no reply.
Several interpretations could be made of this:
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1. The Chairman heard the question but made no reply because:
a. He was in agreement with the action and thought a reply 
unnecessary.
b. He thought it a trivial question not worth replying to.
c. He did not agree with the action but having been faced with 
a fait accompli was unable or unwilling to attempt to get it 
reversed.
. d. He wanted to snub the committee member by paying no 
attention to him in retaliation for a previous offence.
e. He thought the remark sarcastic and was refusing to be drawn.
2. The Chairman made no reply because he did not hear the question.
3 . The committee member:
a. Did not really mean it to be a question, but asked it out 
of courtesy or habit.
b. Asked the question because he felt he should not take 
unilateral action, but assumed that the absence of a reply 
meant consent.
c. Wished to make a sarcastic comment about the trivial 
economies which were being advocated.
Interpretations 1 and 2 are disjunctive, while 3 is cumulatively 
ambiguous with either 1 or 2, and within these there are both 
cumulative and disjunctive possibilities. Id and J>a. and c are
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examples of expressive ambiguity, and any of the ambiguities listed 
may be projective. It can be suggested that the ambiguities of 
interactions which are more complex than the example given, are 
increased by the relative complexity, and that all such incidents, 
whether trivial or complex, are problematic for organisation members 
as cources of information on which to base their interpretations of 
organisational phenomena, whether or not they recognise them as 
problematic.
The political strategies people adopt in the organisation can have 
the effect for observers of creating ambiguous information about 
the meaning of their behaviour. It is suggested by this research 
that if people adopt more public and vociferous political strategies ■ 
joining committees and adopting a "robust" style of interaction - 
they are more likely to be seen as behaving politically than those 
who adopt more covert approaches. This finding is supported by 
Enderud (19?6). It can be suggested that the "high profile" approach 
provides clearer data to an observer who may be more ready, there­
fore, to attribute meaning to such behaviour than to behaviour which 
is less easy to define. This is not to say that high profile 
behaviour is necessarily unambiguous - it just seems so. The 
strength of the image present by "high profile" behaviour guides 
the observer's interpretation of
(iii) Access to information - Groups and roles. The information 
process in the organisation is a means by which the abstraction 
"structure" becomes a reality for organisation members, and the 
structure in its turn affects the information which individuals
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receive. Being part of a group - whether a formally constituted 
group such as a committee or a department, or an informal coterie - 
has the dual consequence for the individual of both providing and
(5)
limiting access to information.
In complex systems where there are a number of decision-making
and social groups, some individuals may be members of a number of
different groups. However, in the present study, organisation
members had some choice over the extent of their multiple group
membership. It was possible for people to play three broadly
distinct roles: a technical role concerned with their subject
specialism; a role as member of a sub-group such as a department
or social group; and a role concerned with the organisation as a
(10)
whole, such as being a member of Senate. It was possible for an
individual to choose to confine him or herself almost entirely to
a technical role, taking a minimal part in departmental or subject
groups and avoiding social groups and system-wide roles. Some roles
available to organisation members were particularly useful in
providing access to the more powerful groups. Some of these were
roles in the technical hierarchy - being a professor for example -
others were roles as representatives on such committees as the
Board of Studies, for which people could put themselves forward
for election. It was also possible to join a group by playing
the role of protege to a more powerful organisation member within
the same technical specialism, or to become a member of an informal(10)
group through such activities as playing snooker.
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Information may be acquired by a group through its representation
in other groups. In the organisation studied, groups differed in
the extent to which they took steps to ensure their representation
in the various committees which were part of the formal group
structure. The value of this representation to the group as a source
of information could be said to depend on the actual attendance of
the representative, his or her perceptions of the information
available and its usefulness to the group, and the way in which this
(11)was fed back to group members.
Having a number of different sources of information through multiple
group membership increases the chance of receiving alternative
interpretations, that is, the chance of perceiving ambiguity in
organisational phenomena. The ambiguity which may thus be illuminated
for the individual can be politically advantageous. For example,
where people are dependant on a powerful organisation member, as
in the patron-protege relationship, having alternative sources of
information helps to reduce this dependancy and also to provide an
assessment of the political status within the organisation of the
(12)
person on whom they dépend. Membership of different groups also
allows for shifts in perspective of which issues are important and
to whom. An action may seem of political significance and an actor
powerful in one context, but both be relatively . insignificant in
(13) 
another.
Shifts in perspective may also reveal or demolish perceptions of 
consensus over particular issues, so that the same issues can be seen 
to meet general agreement in one group, but to be highly contentious
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in another. For example, in this research, a Decider could perceive,
from an Area-level viewpoint, that there was general agreement over
a change in policy and general satisfaction with the system of
representation in the Area, but at the same time people at School
and Group level in particular parts of the Area perceived major
(14)conflict over these issues. Changes in perspective may also create 
ambivalence about organisational policies, so that what seems "right" 
in the context of one group may seem indefensible in another.
Knowing how other individuals and groups variously assess particular 
issues can be politically useful information. The structuring of 
the organisation can be a help or hinderance to the individual in 
receiving this information. Access to information in a group is not 
just a function of what information accrues to that group, but also 
of the process of information sharing within the group. Information 
may be more openly disseminated in some groups than in others, even 
where such groups have the same formal constitution and are at the 
same hierarchical level in the organisation. For example, in some 
Schools in this study, sensitive issues were more openly discussed 
than in others. This variation is perhaps more likely to occur where 
there is little task interdependence between groups and so little 
need to adopt common practices in the information process. In this study 
it was frequently the case that the outputs of one group were not 
the inputs of another, in other words, there was little task inter­
dependence, particularly between Schools and Areas, so that there was
(13)no great incentive on that basis to adopt common management practices.
It therefore matters which group you belong to, not only because of
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the differences in information potentially available to different 
groups, but also because of differing norms about sharing information. 
The information provided by multiple group membership may be politi­
cally useful, but is also itself subject to political pressures.
It has been suggested by this research that the structuring of the
organisation can have the effect of hindering the exchange of
information between individuals and groups, and that characteristics
of the organisation’s climate can reinforce the barriers to information
exchange. Competition between individuals and groups is one such
characteristic, but it is suggested that competition may not be a
generalised aspect of the culture, but only apply to specific issues.
It can be said that the less generalised competitiveness is, the
less effect it will have in hindering the exchange of information.
A norm of secretiveness in the organisation can also hâve the effect
of inhibiting information exchange, and coupled with a distaste for
confrontation and a respect for status, can prevent open argument
on contentious issues, thus limiting the information on which people
(16)can base their interpretations, and hence their decisions.
Given these ways in which people can be provided with or denied 
access to information, it could be argued that what limits the 
"decision flows" discussed by Cohen and March (19?6) is not just 
rules, but a more subtle mixture of formal and informal organisa­
tional structuring. Information about the roles people are playing 
within different groups in the organisation can also be ambiguous.
The formal system presents certain expectations about the roles that 
group members will play. For example, in the Senate, members are
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expected to discuss academic matters; in the Finance and General 
Purposes Committee, they will discuss resources. However, whatever 
the formal requirements, there is no guarantee that members will 
confine themselves to roles appropriate to the committees they are 
in. It is perhaps too much to expect that someone who is a member of 
one group will switch off all knowledge of the interests of another 
while interacting with that group. One could say that to talk of 
"solutions looking for problems" (Christensen (1976)) is really to 
talk about the way individuals carry interests from one group over 
to another.
Because roles and role boundaries are abstractions based on expecta­
tions and values, they provide conditions for role behaviour to be 
ambiguous. Whether you think a person is acting within their role 
boundary and conforming to the expectations of a particular situation, 
depends on where you think the boundary is or should be drawn, and 
what interpretation you place on the behaviour which comes to your 
notice, whether at first or second hand. An observer knowing that 
an individual is a member of other groups may look for signs of 
inappropriate role behaviour, signs that the interests of other 
groups are being pursued in the present group. The person playing 
roles in a number of different groups may experience role conflict, 
and it is also possible for group members to pursue interests of 
other groups contrary to the expectations of their present role.
The interests of one group may be pursued in the language of another, 
as for example, a person in the Research Fund Committee who is not 
expected to "represent" the interests of a particular Area, might
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argue the case for a particular allocation of Research Fund in
terms of "academic merit" to conceal the fact that Area interests
(17)
are being pursued.
In these ways the playing of roles in different groups, and the 
observation that people belong to groups other than the one with 
which they are at present interacting, help to create ambiguity 
in their behaviour. The information which people receive from these 
interactions becomes ambiguous information, particularly in its 
political reference to who is pursuing what interests. The role 
behaviour of an individual may be made ambiguous also by the possibility 
of pursuing private rather than organisational interests. For example, 
if a person adopts a contentious approach in a decision-making group, 
this may be interpreted as an attempt to dominate the group for the 
sake of doing so - a need for power - or as a way of gaining "air­
time" for the expression of anger which cannot be expressed elsewhere, 
or the pursuit of a particular ideology whose roots are outside the 
organisation. The problems and solutions people carry about with 
them are not necessarily rooted in organisational issues. Such 
interpretations have plausibility since people exist other than as 
occupants of organisational roles, and they throw further doubt on
the question of what a person is "really" up to when interacting
(18)
with others in an organisation.
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Notes
1. For discussion of the political implications of information 
elsewhere in this thesis, see Chapter 3, section 4(b) and Conclusions 
to that Chapter.
2. This also relates to the issue of "the compliance of B" and to 
legitimacy as discussed in Chapter 2, section 2 and section 4, and 
Chapter 3, Conclusions.
3- For reference to the perceived probabilities of the use and
effectiveness of negative and positive sanctions, see Chapter 2,
section 2, and Chapter 3» Conclusions. Also Chapter 2, section 6 
refers.
4. See, for example. Chapter 2, section 3(c) Inference 30.
5. This relates to the political implications of organisation 
structure. See Chapter 2, section 3» and Chapter 3» Section 2(c).
6. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inferences 8 and 17.
7. This has a bearing on the Symbolic interactionist view of 
political behaviour, since it draws attention to the possibility that 
a negotiated consensus of meanings may be more apparent than real.
See also Chapter 3, section 3(b) Inference 4.
8. Observed during data collection for this research.
9- See Chapter 3, section 2(c) Inference 17.
10. See Chapter 3» section 2(c) Inference 4, and section 3(c) Inference 4,
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11. For further discussion of representation, see Chapter 3, 
section 2(b)l, and section 2(d).
12. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inferences 12 and 13.
13. See Chapter 3i section 3(b) Inference 7.
14. See Chapter 3, section 4(e) Inference 13.
13. See Chapter 3, section 4(b) Inference 6.
16. For a discussion of the relevance of values to power in the 
literature see Chapter 2, section 4. For findings in this research 
about competition and conflict as aspects of the culture see 
Chapter 3, section 4(c) and (d).
17. Chapter 3, section 2(b)(ii) provides examples of this ambiguity. 
See also note 11 above.
18. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inference l4.
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(c) Bureaucracy and ambiguity. The setting up of formal procedures
in an organisation can be seen as an attempt to get rid of ambiguity
about how decisions should be arrived at. However, they may fail
in this attempt for at least two reasons. One is that they are
unable to specify fully what roles should be played at each point
in the procedure, so that ambiguity arises over this matter. In the
present study, a formal procedure required that person A would
submit a project to person B who would pass it to committee C.
However, since the role of B was not made explicit, some differences
of view arose as to whether B should act as a filter of projects to
the committee, or a judge of staff competence on the basis of the
(1)project, or an adviser to staff, or simply a post-office. Part of 
the difficulty of specifying the role to be played by B in such a 
procedure, even if it were seen as desirable, is the difficulty of 
getting people to agree to the specification where they have the power 
to veto it. The picture becomes complicated when one adds the 
dimensions of time, structure, and the people involved. Where the 
procedure is an infrequent but recurring event, which links together 
people who are not normally task-related, and where some role players 
may be only involved on one occasion, but others recurringly in the 
same or similar procedures, differences in perceptions about the 
appropriate roles to be played are likely to occur. In this instance 
the variation in membership of the procedural chain over time, and 
the absence of a fully explicit formal procedure, made known to all 
parties, gave rise to ambiguity. The absence of such explicitness 
may be the result of a technical difficulty (i.e. you cannot adequately 
specify the role) or a political one (people will not agree on
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specification), or because the potential for ambiguity has not 
been recognised (one interpretation has been taken for granted as 
self-evident).
The second way in which formal procedures, even if they are made
explicit, can produce ambiguity is through the perceived contrast
which can develop between what is supposed to happen and what
actually does happen. From the decision-makers' point of view
this situation can come about because the culture demands that they
justify their actions according to values they find unattainable
in practice. Although a decision-making group may be working to
formally stated criteria, observers of their decisions may come to
the conclusion that these criteria are not really the ones being (2)
used. The decision-makers may be able to justify their decisions 
according to the stated criteria, but the "informal" criteria may 
also appear to account for their decisions quite plausibly - and 
perhaps even more plausibly from an observer's point of view. 
Ambiguity can therefore be said to arise from the steps people take 
to reconcile conflicts of value, steps which cloud issues for 
observers so that they can no longer be sure how to interpret events. 
To give an example, in this study the formally acknowledged value 
of "academic merit" as a criterion for awarding resources to 
individuals was to some extent in conflict with the informally 
acknowledged value of there being "fair shares" between departments 
and subject groups. The practice of using a formal process which 
favoured the formal value and an informal process which supported the 
informal value created disjunctive ambiguity about which value was 
more important and therefore which criterion was really operating,
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and, by implication about whether the decision was legitimate. It
could seem too much of a, coincidence that "academic
merit" just happened to also produce "fair shares" in the allocation
of resources, and because of the abstract nature of such values,
which creates a difficulty over determining what "merit" is and
(2)what is "fair", either interpretation could be justified.
Ambiguity about the activities of decisirm-makers can have the 
further effect of shifting the meaning of a formal process. The 
face-value meaning of a contest of skill, for example, is that the 
winners will be better than the losers in some specified way. For 
example, in the present study people competed for Research Funds 
on the ostensible basis of the "academic merit" of their applications. 
However, if the procedure by which the winner wins does not appear 
to involve a credible assessment of skill, the meaning of the out­
come may shift from being "better" to being "luckier". In this way a 
contest of skill can become a game of chance. For example, it was 
not felt by some people in this study that the Area Committees or 
the RFC could credibly assess academic merit, and therefore the 
outcome was a matter of luck, "If your face fits..." and so^on.
Some of those involved in the process may have a stronger interest 
in the adoption of one meaning rather than another, but the definition 
adopted is likely to be strongly influenced by perceptions of the 
procedure which culminates in the decisive event, that is, in this 
study, the perception of whether or not the Research Fund decision­
making process was credible.
The shift in the meaning of the event can also help to maintain the
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perception of the procedure as legitimate, since the behaviour of 
decision-makers can be seen as appropriate and justifiable in the 
re-defined circumstances. It could be said that this alteration 
in meaning represents a shift in psychic distance away from the 
face-value meaning, and therefore the creation of expressive 
ambiguity.
The action of an individual involved in a formal procedure may be 
made ambiguous because the person uses the procedure to symbolise 
something other than its face-value activity. The overt meaning 
of applying for a research grant, for example, is that you want to 
do some research and need funds for the purpose. However, a 
particular individual might apply for research funds, not through a 
wish to do any research, but simply to demonstrate an interest in 
research and so gain credit with powerful organisation members. Such 
an individual might well feel displeased if "successful" in obtaining 
funds. By so using a procedure symbolically in pursuit of self- 
interest, the meaning of the procedure becomes open to more than one
(4)interpretation. Christensen (1976) discusses an interesting example 
of this symbolic use of a decision-making process (expressive ambiguity 
in my terms) in which much time and energy was used by a group to 
make decisions which were in the event never implemented, the 
process having been used for the expression of values and the 
establishment of status, rather than for the production of substantive 
outcomes.
The intertwining of informal rules along with bureaucracy in the 
shape of formal rules can have the effect of creating ambiguity about
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the legitimacy of people’s actions. Formal rules can have the 
effect of legitimizing actions because they require those actions, 
for example, the formula used for allocating the Equipment Funds 
can be seen as a set of rules requiring a pattern of allocation of 
resources, and therefore legitimizing that allocation. Alternatively 
formal rules may legitimize actions because they do not forbid such 
actions.
If there are few formal rules governing the individual's actions,
this provides the opportunity for a great deal of scope in behaviour
all of which could be regarded as legitimate. A counterweight to
this freedom however is the effect of informal rules, or norms of
behaviour, which can limit the behaviour which would be regarded as
legitimate. Where there are few formal rules, or where such rules
have been undermined, or where there is ambiguity about norms and
about the possibility of effective sanctions being applied, the
conditions exist for attempts to shift the boundaries of what is
legitimate behaviour and for conflict between people over where
(5)such boundaries should be drawn.
One could suggest that the Vice Chancellor's Advisory Committee in 
this study, which was not legally constituted in the university's 
statutes as the Senate and Boards of Studies were, and which had 
few formal rules of procedure, and in which there was doubt about 
the roles of members - i.e. whether they were supposed to represent 
their Areas - and which was a private meeting, -would encourage 
ambiguity about the legitimacy of actions of VCAC members. The 
process by which ambiguity can support or undermine the legitimacy
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of actions will be returned to in a later section.
Although bureaucracy in the shape of formal rules and procedures
can be seen as aimed at reducing ambiguity, it also has the effect
of limiting freedom of action more than some people like, and such
people may deliberately cause ambiguity in order to loosen the
reins of the formal rules. Formal rules may be undermined so that
it becomes less easy to determine whether they "really" apply in
particular cases, and this can be facilitated by the creation of
precedents so that, either by agreement or default, the rules are
not applied in some instances. This opens the way for finding other
"expectations" and for developing norms which help to create
ambiguity. Asked whether a committee could refuse to accept a
proposal from another committee, one informant in this research,
in replying "I suppose... I don’t know if there is a rule book about
this - things get done more by custom and practice rather than by(6)
the rule book", could be seen as exemplifying the way in which formal 
procedures can lose their status as obligations, and become reversed 
by norms of behaviour so that a disjunctive ambiguity is created.
The committee in question did have formal powers which would allow 
it to refuse a recommendation from another committee, but this 
informant showed how "custom and practice" could work to make such 
powers inoperative. The political acts in question were (a) the 
acts of individuals which created cind reinforced the norms which 
undermined the formal powers, including statements that the informal 
processes are the ones we adopt, and (b) the absence of acts by 
individuals to reinforce the formal rules, since as Lukes (1974) suggests
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(7)non-action can in itself be a type of political behaviour.
The processes undermining formal powers can have the effect of
creating ambiguity about what the power of a decision-making group
actually is, and this ambiguity may be enhanced if the group is not
observed to be enforcing its authority on occasions. There are
some good reasons why the authority of a decision-making group is
not made explicit if there is the possibility that this would mean
confrontation in a public arena. For example, a newly-appointed
leader may prefer not to be faced with such confrontations when
(8)
particularly vulnerable - that is, when the political forces in 
the organisation are not yet well understood by the leader. More­
over, it may be felt that such confrontations sour relationships 
between individuals and this may be contrary to the perceived norms
O)of behaviour in the organisation as a whole.
Lobbying committee members in advance of a meeting is one way of 
avoiding confrontation, so that the committee is never seen to take 
actions which are contrary to important interests of some groups 
represented at it. By this means, the power of a decision-making 
group can become open to various interpretation: (a) the committee
is a "rubber stamp" and therefore has little power, (b) the group 
is powerful simply because it does approve the actions of individuals 
and groups and therefore might approve something against one’s own 
interest, (c) the lobbying which precedes the meetings of the 
committee indicates that, (i) it is powerful because people take so 
much trouble to gain agreement at its meetings and, (ii) it is




It can be suggested that bureaucratic structures in the form of formal 
groups and procedures become organisational phenomena with which the 
individual interacts. They also become political resources, and 
individuals, in pursuing their own interests, either in getting their 
decisions ratified or protecting their authority, or maintaining good 
relations with others, may create ambiguity through undermining 
whatever attempts are made to institute bureaucratic certainty in 
the organisation.
Toshiro (19?4) suggests that epistemological developments, in which 
attempts have been made to restructure human knowledge, can also be 
seen as attempts to get rid of ambiguity and thereby provide or 
preserve an ordered view of the universe. However, "... it may be 
observed that each new way of reasoning generates new ambiguities 
which in turn provoke the search for more comprehensive theories 
of casuality". A similar cycle of events can be seen at the level 
of the organisation, in which the institution of bureaucratic rules 
and procedures are attempts to structure or re-structure information 
and to pin down the cause-and-effect of human behaviour, only to 
provoke political opportunities, for example, in allowing the 
"improvisation" which Dalton (1959) recommends, or the uneven 
effects of bureaucracy which allow some people relatively greater 
freedom of action than others, as Crozier (1964) has noted. (See 
Chapter 2, section 3 on rules).
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Notes
1. See Chapter 3(c). Compare the different methods of "influencing"
staff to apply for research awards and the "allow staff to stick
their necks out" approach, (see Inference l4).
2. For further information about the problem of ambiguous criteria, 
see Chapter 3» section 4(b). See also the role of the VCAC,
Chapter 3» section 2(b) ii. This point also has a bearing on the 
difficulty of distinguishing between "reality" and "facade" -
see Chapter 3, section 3(&), Section 4(f).
3. Chapter 3» section 4(b) for views on criteria. See also 
Chapter 3, section 4(c) for the effects of perceptions of criteria 
on competition.
4. See Chapter 3, sections 3(c) Inference 19, and 4(c) Inference 6.
3" The way in which political opportunity arises over uncertainty
about rules is discussed in Chapter 2, section 3 and see also 
Chapter 3 on criteria (decision rules), note 2 above, and Conclusions 
to Chapter 3-
6. See, for example, comments about the relationship between Senate 
and VCAC, Ciiapter 3, section 2(b) i.
7. This question of non-action relates to the issue of the 
perceptions and values of participants and their willingness^ to act 
politically. See for example, Chapter 3> section 2(b) i. Inference 1. 
Section 2(b) iii. Inferences 2 and 10, Section 2(b) iv. Inference 3* 
See also Chapter 2, section 4.
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8. See Chapter 3» section 3(a) Inferences 2 and 4.
9. For a discussion of norms about interaction in the field study, 
see Chapter 3» section 4, especially (d) and (e).
10. See the discussion of the power of the Senate in Chapter 3, 
section 2(b)i.
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Conclusion. I have suggested that a major feature of organisations 
is their ambiguity and that this ambiguity arises in a number of ways. 
It is in essence the uncertainty inherent in the information an 
individual can receive about organisational phenomena, whether 
this uncertainty is perceived or not. It is created by the use of 
abstract concepts, by the nature of words and actions which are 
sources of information and by the structural characteristics of 
the organisation, such as the formation of groups and playing of 
roles, which provide access to information. Ambiguity creates a 
problem of interpretation for the individual, whether this is 
perceived or not.
It has been suggested in this section that definitions of what exists 
and what is important have political consequences for the individual 
or group, and that changing definitions therefore change the power 
structure of the organisation. Definitions of what power is and 
values about its use affect political behaviour, and therefore have 
consequences for oneself and others. A consensus may develop over 
definitions of phenomena, and may also be subject change.
Two main issues have been identified - the problem of interpretation 
of information gleaned from the words sind actions of others, and the 
way in which the organisation may provide or deny access to 
information about meanings, for example, about the power of 
individuals, and therefore about the existence of ambiguities.
Some relevant factors here are the possibility for individuals to 
play a number of different roles so that it is unclear which they 
are playing; characteristics of the culture (such as competitiveness)
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which help or hinder information sharing; access to groups; and 
the styles of interaction within different groups, which have an 
impact on what information can be acquired within a particular group. 
Information is not just a matter of substantive details, but also 
concerns the perceptions and feelings of others, and the meaning of 
their actions.
Bureaucratic procedures, which can be seen as attempts to suppress 
ambiguity and are part of the individual's context, may have the 
effect of creating further ambiguity, enabling individuals to use 
gaps in rules and to shift meanings of events to suit their own 
interests. Bureaucracy therefore may provide, through creating 
ambiguity, political opportunity, and this may include the support 
or undermining of the legitimacy of actions. Ambiguity makes it 
possible for opportunistic use of rules as Dalton (1939) has 
suggested, and for rules to be used as "myths" (Bailey (1977)) to 
legitimize actions.
The suggestions put forward in this section reflect on the existing 
literature of power reviewed in Chapter 2 in a number of ways. From 
the perspective of the A-B model of power, the existence of ambiguity 
in the organisation is important in that it makes it difficult for 
A and B to interpret each other's perceptions and actions, and 
therefore difficult for A to know how to influence B, and for B to 
know how best to respond. It has also been shown in this section 
that the organisational context influences interpretation, and 
therefore underlines the importance of including the context of 
A and B in any analysis of power based on this model. Although
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theories about power may be logically constructed on the basis of 
particular definitions of authority, control and so on, analysis of 
actual political behaviour depends on the interpretations individual 
actors make in their context. A symbolic interactionist approach 
would therefore seem appropriate to the analysis of power in 
organisations.
The literature of power raises various issues about the relationship 
between values and power (see Chapter 2, section 4) and it can be 
suggested that the creation of ambiguity in the organisation is 
not only one outcome of prevailing values, but also has a part to 
play in the way in which values are learned and come to prevail since 
the prevalence of ideas about what "ought to be" may depend on the 
suppression of ambiguities of interpretation. This process may 
require a consensus about the meanings of particular words (such 
as 'useful' in this case) and supports Winch's (1959) implication 
that the meanings of words have a political significance. However, 
this still leaves the problems of, on the one hand knowing what 
the prevailing values are (for example, is it "academic merit" or 
"fair shares" which prevails?), and on the other of knowing if 
particular individuals have in fact "learned" them, or found them 
congruent with their own values, or are merely behaving as if they 
have, for political reasons. Unless one knows whether or not a 
person feels coerced, it may be impossible to tell whether authority 
(in the non-coercive value-congruent definition) is being used or 
not and this information may be withheld in the pursuit of perceived 
self-interest.
- 360 -
It has been shown that the interpretation of an ambiguous political 
context depends on the obtaining of information, and it can be added 
that values about political behaviour which regard it as tending to 
corrupt, as discussed in Chapter 2, section 4, may have the effect 
of reducing the information an individual obtains by inhibiting the 
collection of politically useful information. By this means, 
alternative or more complex interpretations of phenomena, (an increase 
in perceived ambiguity) may be screened out of the individual's 
awareness. On the other hand, adopting a narrow definition of 
power, may solve the problem of wanting to pursue self-interest, but 
not liking the idea of exercising power. Suggestions in the 
literature about the circumstances under which the exercise of power 
may or may not tend to corrupt, such as whether it is inward-looking 
or outward-looking, or whether it aligns the organisation with 
reality, can be seen to be problematic in the light of the ambiguity 
of organisational phenomena. In the one case the assessment hinges 
on an interpretation of the meaning of an individual’s behaviour, about 
which, as has been shown, there may be considerable doubt even in 
relatively simple situations; and in the other case, it involves 
an interpretation of what ’’reality’’ is, which may in itself be 
politically determined.
In the next section I shall consider the ways in which organisational 
members respond to organisational phenomena which are ambiguous. I 
shall assume that organisation members act in accordance with what 
they see to be their self-interest, whether these interests are 
predominantly pragmatic or psychological. Pragmatic interests are
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relating to specific issues, such as the obtaining of money from
the Equipment Fund, whereas psychological interests are more generally
pervasive in a person's behaviour, such as the need of power.
The need for the individual to impose some structure or pattern 
on ambiguous data, as suggested by cognitive theorists (Steinbruner 
(1974)) would also constitute a psychological interest as would 
a need in the opposite direction. These alternatives will be 
returned to again in the next section.
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4. The response to ambiguity
It has been suggested (Toshiro (1973)) that ih their responses to 
ambiguity over a historical period from the Ancient Greeks to the 
present day, people can be broadly divided into two camps: the
rationalists for whom ambiguity is "an annoyance to the cognitive 
process" and an aberration in human perception and understanding 
which should be removed as soon as possible, and artists (including 
writers and musicians) who positively favour sunbiguity since 
"... saying more than one thing at a time to express the complexity 
of experience has normally been one of their aims". While these 
categories distinguish two broadly opposed ways of responding to 
and acting towards human knowledge, i.e. on the one hand looking 
for an ordered and comprehensive pattern of cause and effect, and 
on the other, attempts to express experience in the process of 
understanding it, they leave out of account the political interaction 
between individuals and groups as they pursue their self-interest, 
including the persuasion of others to adopt their way of perceiving 
the world. In this section therefore, I shall look at ways in which 
people in an organisation respond to ambiguity, either by trying to 
remove or maintain it, and at some consequences of these activities.
I shall assume that people must take action on the phenomena they 
perceive, although I recognise that there may be circumstances in 
which people observe and consider organisational phenomena without 
being called upon to do anything about them.
(a) Ambiguity in decision-making processes. Decision-making processes 
can involve considerable areas of ambiguity, as March and Olsen (1976)
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have suggested and as the present study shows. One particular 
example, in this case, was in the criteria being used in decision­
making. These criteria gave rise to three questions to which there 
were no undisputably correct answers: (a) is a particular criterion
being applied by the decision-makers? (b) does the decision exemplify 
this criterion? and (c) (ambivalently) should this criterion be used? 
For example, are the decision-makers trying to provide fair shares 
between groups? Is their decision fair? Should they be trying to 
be fairi
Such ambiguities have implications for the perceived legitimacy of 
decision-makers' actions, as will be discussed later, but they also 
require some response from participants in the decision-making 
process. Two sets of people had to respond to the ambiguities of 
criteria: the decision-makers themselves and those who were affected
by their decisions. It is suggested that where decisions are made 
on ambiguous criteria, decision-makers can attempt to influence the 
decision by obtaining agreement to a resolution of the ambiguity in 
directions which enhance their own interests. Those affected by the 
decisions, on the other hand, can read such motives and intentions 
into the decision-makers’choices as are instrumental for themselves.
In either case the interpretation may be made to further a pragmatic 
interest or to meet a psychological need.
Ambiguity about decision criteria can be put to good use by partisans 
in support of their own cause. If one criterion will not suit their 
purpose, they may be able to call upon another which will. They 
may use the formally acknowledged, or informal criteria, or
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concentrate on resolving ambiguity of fact or of value in support 
of their interests.
For example, when the youthfulness of the Applicant and the 
academic merit of applications are both available as justifications 
for the ranking of Applicants, they may be seen as mutually exclusive 
to the extent that older, more experienced staff tend to produce 
better applications. This enables a Decider to (a) rank a "worse" 
application higher than a "better" one, on the grounds that the 
Applicant is younger, or (b) rank the application of the older 
Applicant higher than that of the younger, on the grounds that the 
application is better. Choosing (b) may have the advantage of 
avoiding conflict with senior colleagues and therefore be preferred.
In this study, one informant, a Decide^ recognised that there was 
ambiguity about the suitability of his candidates for the Research 
Fund. He was aware that what he was claiming were "good" candidates 
could be considered unsuitable if their seniority was taken into 
account. He would not do anything to draw attention to this ambiguity 
himself, but was aware that someone else could use it competitively 
against him. One can suggest that, if the issue of seniority were 
raised, it would then become a question of whose definition of a 
"good" candidate could be supported by other members of the decision­
making group, and further suggested that whether or not they did 
support it would depend on how such a definition would affect their
own candidates. In other words, the resolution of ambiguity would
(2)be a political matter, guided in this case by pragmatic interests.
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The effectiveness with which people can make use of the political 
potential which ambiguity of criteria provides, depends in part 
on the groups (decision-making arenas) to which they have access. 
People confined to public arenas, for example, may have difficulty 
in calling upon informal criteria to their aid, because in such 
arenas the use of informal criteria might not be regarded as 
legitimate- In the Senate, for example, it would probably be unwise 
to refer to a "fair shares" criterion, rather than an "academic 
merit" criterion.
One important aspect of the political processes in organisations is
(3)the making of predictions about what other people will do.
Participants in the decision-making process may perceive that there is 
ambiguity in the basis for those decisions and therefore find outcomes 
difficult to predict with accuracy. In the present study, the 
outcomes of the decision-making processes were relatively clear - 
people either did, or did not, receive Research Funds or Equipment 
Funds - but the reasons for the decisions about Research Funds were 
not. Where decision-making processes are recurring, rather than one- 
off dramas, participants csin try to find some common denominators 
among a series of such decisions over time, in order to try to 
understand the rationality of those they see as decision-makers, 
and hence predict their future decisions. They may try to extra­
polate from the past a prediction of the future, or indeed, use the 
past as they interpret it as a precedent in support of a future case. 
However, when such attempts fail, and the rationality of decision­
makers cannot be discovered by participants, confusions and
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dissatisfactions may result, with decision-makers being accused of
(4)acting on whim or of changing the rules, as happened in this study.
One might imagine that where a decision is repeatedly made over 
time, any ambiguity about it would be resolved, but this appears 
not to be the case.
Some reasons for the failure of prediction in recurring decision­
making processes can be suggested. One is the existence of temporal 
ambiguity, both retrospective and prospective. V/hat actually 
happened in the past can be interpreted in more than one way, with 
equal justification, and it is not possible to determine a "correct" 
interpretation. You can, of course, ask someone you consider to be 
well-informed, such as a Decider in this case, but the reply is 
likely to be conditioned by the informant’s perceived self-interest, 
particularly with an eye to the next round of the decision-making 
process. Moreover, the kinds of political pressure discussed earlier 
in this section will not necessarily be repeated in the future. For 
example, people who lost out in the last round may well make 
new moves to win next time, or last year’s winners may hold back in
the next round in order to avoid escalating conflicts which might
(3)have an impact on other issues.
A further reason for the failure of predictions may be that an 
inappropriate model of decision-making is being used by the predictor. 
People in this study who tended to ignore ambiguity in the decision­
making process could be said to be adopting the "rational actor" or 
"classical" approach to the process (Allison (1971)» Steinbruner (1974)) 
and consequently find themselves in difficulty in making sense of
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the outcome. For example, one informant who wanted to maintain the
view that the ranking of Research Fund applications was done on
academic merit, could not make sense of the ranking which emerged
from the Area-level committee, in which applications from another
School were placed higher than those from his own School. "I can't
quite see why that is". He tried to suggest that an extra criterion
of "relevance" (having practical applications) had been applied, but
this did not stand up to scrutiny when we looked at the chosen topics.
He would not entertain the idea that the other School's applications
had been chosen because it was "their turn" - that a "fair allocation"
between groups was guiding the decision at this point, rather than
academic merit. It can be suggested that this unwillingness to take
political pressures into account and to adopt a more complex model
of the decision-making process, one which recognised the impact of
ambiguity in the process, made the decision outcome inexplicable to
him. His resolution of this problem was to retain his previous view,
"They must have marked them higher because they thought them of
greater merit", which would be unlikely to help him predict future(6)
outcomes. One can speculate that this way of resolving ambiguity in 
a decision-making process, that is, ignoring it, could be related 
to a preference for seeing himself as involved in a process of 
academic assessment rather than political bargaining, or in other 
words, a preference-ordering among values.
A Decider who applied what could be classified as a "cybernetic" 
model (Steinbruner (1974)) to the process, that is, that small 
adjustments, based on past experience, would be made to the future
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decision-making process to correct anomalies in the system, also
(4)
failed to make an accurate prediction of the outcome of the process.
It can be suggested that this Decider had not taken into account 
the absence of a consensus in the relevant committee to adopt the 
cybernetic model - other people having different views of the process 
in which they were engaged. Failure to take into account the 
ambiguity inherent in a decision-making process, or to recognise 
that this (abstract) process itself can be seen in a variety of ways 
by the different participants, can lead to the making of false 
assumptions about how the decision will be made, and hence to a 
failure in prediction.
Underlying the importance of predictions to political behaviour is 
the importsince of time itself as providing both political constraints 
and opportunities. For example, the time factor can be important in 
the calculation of bargaining risks of the kind just discussed. If 
losses can be recouped fairly quickly the risk is less, but when 
the time-span of redress if bargains are not kept is lengthy - for 
example, nine years or so before an individual is again Head of 
School - there is considerable pressure to play sa^e^ Time also 
has political implications in that it is to some extent structured 
in the organisation. Some types of decisions, such as the 
allocation of Research Funds, recurr at given intervals, and some 
roles are played for given lengths of time. This structuring of 
time attempts to reduce organisational ambiguity and allows individuals 
or groups to time their own actions politically, so as to gain the most 
advantage for themselves. Circulating papers for a meeting very close
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to the meeting date, for example, could he seen as a way of 
inhibiting committee members from forming a lobby, and hence of 
reducing the strength of opposition.
Weiner (1976) has observed that the effect of deadlines (which can
be seen as ambiguity reducing) in a decision-making process is to
limit the participation and energy applied to problems, either the
problem to which the deadline applies or some other problems from
which people have to withdraw in order to meet this deadline. Those
who can apply the most time and energy to meeting the deadline become
more skilled at dealing with the problem, thus making access by
(8)others to the decision-making process more difficult. Weiner's 
study involved a one-off decision-making process, but one could 
suggest that where decisions are recurring over time, the "competence 
multiplier" effect to which he refers, in which involvement in an 
activity leads to competence in dealing with it, and competence leads 
to further involvement, works to the advantage of those whose roles 
require them recurringly to participate in the process, as well as 
those who choose to participate in it. In the present study. 
Applicants were relatively free (though under pressure in some cases) 
to choose participation or not in the Research Fund process, but 
some Deciders were obliged to participate through their roles as 
Head of School or Area Chairman. One can suggest that the structuring 
of time, both in one-off and recurring situations, together with 
differences in freedom of choice to participate, affect learning 
opportunities for the individual, and therefore their perceptions of 
organisational phenomena and their skills in dealing with their 
ambiguities.
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The structuring of time, therefore has political implications both 
in the political opportinuty and the political skills it provides 
or denies.
Ambiguity in a decision-making process can be created because the
behaviour of decision-makers is, or is perceived to be, a facade.
Where an observer resolves the ambiguity of a decision-maker's
behaviour by perceiving it as a facade, behind which are the "real"
actions and intentions, cynicism about the process is likely to
result in a predisposition to see the process as ambiguous on future
occasions. For example, it was reported in this research that faith
in the fair assessment of Research Fund applications had been shsiken by
the perception that the Deciders were biassed in favour of their own
proteges, this perception being based on an interpretation of past
(9)decisions. This distinction between facade and reality may have a 
sound basis if the public statements of decision-makers diverge from 
their private actions over a particular issue. Where decision-makers 
are dealing with ambiguous phenomena, and where there is ambiguity also 
about the roles they are playing in decision-making arenas, the way 
is open for them to adopt interpretations of phenomena and covertly 
play roles while at the same time justifying their decisions and 
behaviour in terms of other interpretations and roles. For example, 
because of the difficulty of pinning down what a "good" research 
project is, within the context of the Research Fund allocations 
in this study, a decision-maker may choose to interpret "good" as 
"proposed by someone I know", and to adopt the role of "keeper of 
the peace" rather than ajudicator. This behaviour is made possible
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by the difficulty of defining how a referee ought to act in deciding
on the ranking of projects, or of determining how their relative
merits are actually being assessed. The overt behaviour of judging
relative merit therefore becomes a facade which, because of the
ambiguity of the phenomena involved, would not be easy to demolish
(10)but might nevertheless be perceived by observers.
Where decision-makers are dealing with ambiguous phenomena, their
decisions become open to challenge by those affected by these
decisions. One way in which decision-makers may seek to avoid this
challenge is to reduce the amount of information they provide about the
decision-making process, perhaps backed up by rules which allow them
to avoid giving reasons for their decisions, thereby making it '
legitimate for them to withhold information. An example of this
would be the practice of not giving reasons for Research Fund
decisions (so as to avoid appeals) backed up by a norm against
contact between referees and Applicants. As long as people accept
these rules, and the ambiguity fbr obser̂ Eors which results from the
absence of information, decision-makers may be able to obtain the
(11)protection they want. However, a consequence of such a response to
the difficulties caused by dealing with ambiguity, apart from its
effect in increasing the ambiguity about the decision-making process,
is that it is difficult for people who are affected by the decisions
(12)to find ways of influencing them. There are various ways of looking 
at the desirability of this outcome. You could argue, as some people 
did in this study, that it is wrong to adapt your behaviour in order 
to obtain resources from those who control them. To do so is to
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behave falsely and to conform to the ideas of the dedsion-makers,
with whom you may not in fact agree. Knowing as little as possible
about the decision-rules is therefore a safeguard against the
temptation to falsify onesei^^ Alternatively, the demands of those
who control resources might be seen as representing a high standard.
Meeting these demands is therefore a measure of excellence, and sin
attempt to influence the decision becomes part of the learning process
by which a higher standard is achieved. Withholding information
about the decision making process therefore diminishes the possibil-
(14)ities for learning, and is a mistaken strategy. A third alternative 
would be to see the lack of information as a strictly political 
disadvantage, reducing the possibility of manipulating the situation 
to one's own ends. A demsind for more information therefore has to 
be made in order to redress the balance of power.
If decision-makers, in dealing with ambiguous phenomena, adopt a 
strategy of withholding information, power tends to accrue to those 
who are in a position to obtain information. One way in which this 
can happen is in the biassing of decisions in favour of those who 
have information and against those who do not. A particular 
example of this in the present study concerned information about 
who was making the decision. If person A knows that X is making the 
decision, and person B does not (sind X knows this), X's decision is 
more likely to favour A than B, particularly in cultures where 
conflict is avoided, since A can cause trouble for X whereas B cannot. 
In general terms, one can say that having the information with which
to challenge a decision and thereby undermine the credibility of the
. . (13)decision-maker’s reading of the situation, is a political advantage.
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In situations where decisions have to be made on the basis of 
phenomena which are ambiguous in a politically sophisticated 
context, as when resources have to be shared out in accordance with 
some value judgement about priorities, and those involved in the 
process can be expected to have sufficient information to challenge 
any decision which is made against their interest, one response is 
to provide a pre-determined formula by which all such allocations 
will be decided. This is in effect to make a decision about the 
interpretations to be placed on the ambiguous phenomena, to decide 
which alternative reading of the priorities will be made, once and 
for all, so that any future decisions will be more or less automatic, 
This procedure was used for allocating the Equipment Fund in the 
present study. The danger is that the formula might especially 
disadvantage a particular individual or group, and thereby instigate 
political activity to change it. In at least one instance in the 
present study, provision was made for some flexibility in the 
allocation, in that a small proportion of the Fund was allocated by 
negotiation rather than by formula, and one could say that by adding 
back a measure of ambiguity it was possible to reduce the likelihood 
of conflict arising over the main allocation, so allowing for some 
compensations to be made to people who might otherwise have felt 
aggrieved. In this instance one could say that preserving a




1. See Chapter 3» section 4(b).
2. See Chapter 3» section 4(b) and Section 2(b) ii and Inference 6
for that section.
3. See Chapter 2, section 6 and Conclusions to Chapter 3»
4. For problems of, and attempts at, prediction of decision 
outcomes, see Chapter 3» section 2(b) ii.
3. The informal adjustments to decision-making to allow for "fair" 
allocation of resources mentioned in Chapter 3» section 2(b) iii 
suggest this process. See also Inference 7 for that sub-section.
6 . This discussion was also referred to in Chapter 3» section 2(b) ii.
7. For discussion of the effects of rotating leadership roles, 
see Chapter 3, section 3(c) and Inference 1.
8 . This discussion of the political implications of the 
structuring of time refers back to the discussion of the timing 
of influence attempts in the Conclusions to Chapter 3 and to 
Chapter 2, section 3-
9. For examples of ambiguity of behaviour in this research, see 
Chapter 3» section 3(c) and see also Inferences 26 and 27 for that 
section.
10. Dilemmas and ambiguities in making judgements about other 
people’s work are discussed in Chapter 3» section 3(c) and 
Inferences 26-29 for that section.
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11. See Chapter 3» section 4(b) and Inference 1 for that section. 
Also Conclusions to that Chapter on the use of information as 
political opportunity.
12. Chapter 3» section 4(b) Inference 3»
13. Because of changing values in the organisation i.e. towards 
research rather than teaching, with a concomitant emphasis on 
"usefulness", and a shortage of resources, some orgsinisation members 
seemed faced with a moral dilemma about their activities or the 
reasons for them. Do people do research for career reasons or
for interest? If I "embellish" my application for Funds does it 
become "false"? See Chapter 3» section 3(c) Inference 30» and 
section 4(a) and Inferences 1 and 3 for that section, and (c) 
Inference 2.
14. See comments about the need for feedback on Research Fund 
decisions - section 4(b).
13. See comments about the role of Deciders in assessing others’ 
work. Chapter 3» section 3(c) and Inference 27 for that section.
16. See Chapter 3» section 4(d).
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(b) Interpretation and specialisation. In this section I shall 
consider the problem of ambiguity as it affects the interpretation 
of behaviour, with particular reference to specialist roles in the 
organisation.
Where there is ambiguity there is always the possibility of 
divergence or congruence between the actor’s intentions and the 
observer’s perceptions of these intentions. The chart below suggests 
the types of relationship which can develop between actor and 







In the relationship of mutual trust the actor intends to present reality 
and. the observer perceives that this is the case (without 
necessarily agreeing with the picture of reality presented). This 
relationship requires the willingness to acknowledge perceived 
organisational sunbiguities. In the "con" relationship, the actor 
intends to mislead the observer by presenting a facade, or false 
picture of reality as he or she perceives it, and is successful in 
that the observer takes this to be a truthful representation.
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The "con" may depend on the suppression of disjunctive ambiguity.
For example, one Head of Group may agree with another that his 
group will contribute to the maintenance costs of a new piece of 
equipment,Mowing that he intends to renege on his agreement once 
the equipment has been purchased. Or, the "con" may depend on 
the suppression of cumulative ambiguity, in that a piece of 
information (external to the actor) which could radically alter 
the observer’s decision is withheld. For example, the Head of 
Group mentioned above could agree to contribute to the maintenance 
costs, but suppress the information that such difficulty will arise 
over trying to apportion these costs fairly, that the agreement will 
be difficult to implement. For the "con" to .work, all such alternative 
interpretations of phenomena (in this case, future events) must 
remain unperceived, or be rejected by, the observer.
In a "game" relationship, the actor intends eind the observer perceives 
(whether or not the actor is aware of it) that a facade is being 
presented, and both parties continue to behave as if it were truthful.
In this relationship it is necessary for both parties to recognise 
the ambiguity (of whatever kind) of the actor’s behaviour, but to 
retain the facade that the ambiguity does not exist.
The relationship takes on the nature of "framing" the actor if he
or she intends to present reality, but the observer perceives(2)
falsehood. In this case a disjunctive ambiguity is created. The 
misperception by the observer need not be due to any ill-intent on 
the observer’s part, since false information may have been provided
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(deliberately or otherwise) by third parties. Actors may in fact 
"frame" themselves by "conning" others or playing "games" on 
occasions, so that their actions are always likely to be viewed 
with suspicion. It can also be suggested that observers who 
themselves adopt "conning" and "game" behaviour are more likely 
to perceive such behaviour in others, thereby creating projective 
ambiguity.
It should perhaps be restated here that it is of the essence of 
ambiguity that it is not possible to be sure which of the alternative 
interpretations of phenomena is the correct one, either because the 
phenomena are inherently ambiguous, or because political forces 
prevent its being resolved. Both these conditions exist in the 
relationships just discussed, and the problem compounded by the 
difficulty people may sometimes have in being clear about their own 
intentions, so that they could not explain them even if they wanted 
to.
One situation in which an organisation member may be vaguely aware 
that a "con" is possible, but be unable to determine whether this is 
the case, is when faced with an interpretation of phenomena provided 
by an "expert". People may feel compelled, through constraints of 
information and skill, to accept at face value interpretations of 
phenomena which they are aware might be interpreted differently, 
but cannot themselves supply alternative readings, and a "game" or 
"frame" relationship may develop. In the present study, for example, 
one Decider was seen as being the only person with a detailed over­
view of the organisation’s financial position, and this could make
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other organisation members feel unable to challenge his inter­
pretation of what the priorities should be, or of how much money was
(3)available in a particular fund.
Even if the observer has some ideas about alternative readings,he 
or she may still not challenge the specialist, and two reasons can 
be suggested for this; (a) the facade helps to further the pragmatic 
interests of the observer, and (b) the observer feels unable or 
unwilling to pay the costs of challenging the interpretation - for 
example, in the disruption of amicable relationships, or the 
deflection of time and energy from other activities, or in being 
faced with more difficult decisions through the greater complexity 
which ambiguity might bring with it. The issue may not be seen as 
important enough to warrant paying these cos^sî
Alternatively, the observer may seek to acquire sufficient knowledge
and skill to challenge the expert, and the expert seek in return to
avoid this challenge. On the one hand there is an attempt to draw
attention to the ambiguity in the phenomena being interpreted, by
showing that alternatives are possible, on the other the attempt
to suppress it. The contest turns on the control of information
about the phenomena, including the range of coherent information
which the observer has about a particular issue (as in having a
broad picture of the organisation's finances, rather than information
only about one School or Area), the ways in which data can be
manipulated (as in the technicalities of financial management) and
what alternative meanings are possible (as in the question of what
(5)can be counted as "capital" expenditure).
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When decision-making about substantive issues in the organisation 
has to rely on specialist information, as is often the case, 
ambiguities about the intentions of specialists as well as about 
the substantive issues, have to be resolved. To take example 
from this study, is the specialist trying to increase his power by- 
taking decisions to which he is not entitled? Or is he just not a 
good communicator and therefore misunderst&^&? The reputation of 
the specialist can be seen as consisting not only of perceived 
technical efficiency over time, but also of a perceived pattern 
of intention over time. Specialists in an organisation may be seen 
as powerful because they are perceived as having the opportunity to 
"con" others with impunity, even if they do not avgil themselves of 
this opportunity. The closer their specialisation is to issues 
considered important to the observers, the more critical is the 
interpretation of their behaviour and the more power they are 
perceived to have.
Specialist status can become valued in the organisation because of 
the power it can confer, and examples were found in the present 
study of attempts by people to claim specialist status for themselves 
and to deny it to others. Examples of this would be the adminis­
trator who said that professors were "simple minded" and therefore 
did not understand the finances of the organisation, and the 
academic who said that the administrators did not understand the
scientific requirements of siting and building a new aquarium,
(6)and should therefore leave the decision to those who did.
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It can be suggested that the acquisition and maintenance of 
specialist status can be accomplished by the manipulation of 
ambiguity, undermining others' interpretations of organisational 
phenomena by increasing their ambiguity, and protecting one's own 
view by suppressing ambiguity-producing alternatives. Crucial to 
this process is the control of information.
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Notes
1. See Chapter 3» section 2(c) and Inference 3(U).
2. See allegations of "trickery" in Chapter 3» section 3(c).
3. See Chapter 3» section 3(h) Inferences 2, 6 and 8. See also
the discussion on the difficulty of interpreting another's behaviour 
in the Conclusions to Chapter 3-
4. This relates to the issue of commitment and motivation discussed 
in Chapter 2, section 2 and Chapter 3» sections 3(d) and 4(f) and 
Conclusions.
3. See Chapter 3» section 3(b).
6. This is related to the question of who should be involved in
decision-making - See Chapter 3» section 4(e) Inference 7 and 8 - 
and the question of autonomy for self vs autonomy for others - see 
Chapter 3, Conclusions, and Chapter 2, section 4.
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(c) Resolution by group norms. Mowday (1978) has suggested that
one line of development from his research would be an investigation
of how characteristics of the overall organisation, such as norms
(and also structure and climate), affect the success of various
methods of influence. This question can be broadened to ask what
part norms play in the political processes of organisations, since
it is suggested by this research that norms can be used by
(1)individuals to further their own interests. In this way, norms 
can be seen as providing political opportunities, as well as 
constraints. It is also suggested that, through the development of 
norms, ambiguity is suppressed, and that this process has political 
causes and consequences, as will be discussed in this section.
Although group members may be unaware of doing so, groups may adopt 
norms of behaviour which resolve ambiguities in organisational 
phenomena by "deciding" on a particular interpretation. Norms can 
be seen in this sense as a "meaning in usage" in a group which governs 
the actions of group members. So, for example, a stranger approaching 
the group may be taken to be an unwelcome intruder, since the group 
has "decided" that what is inherently ambiguous behaviour will be 
taken to "mean" a thread. In this instance one could say that an 
expressive ambiguity has been adopted as a norm, and through its 
impact on relationships between individuals and groups, could have 
political consequences. For example, in the situation just cited, 
conflicts of interest would be more difficult to solve between 
groups predisposed to see each other as threatening strangers.
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Group norms may also work towards the suppression of ambiguity in 
decision-making processes where the desirability of alternative 
outcomes is being assessed. In the present study, it was suggested 
that research projects about improving the railways of Pakistan 
would be preferred to projects investigating colour images in Kafka, 
because the former could be identified as "useful". The word "useful" 
in the organisation seemed to be equated with economic gains, or at 
any rate, some measurable pay-off, but if the cumulative ambiguities 
of the concept of usefulness had been acknowledged - by asking such 
questions as "useful to whom and for what purpose?" - it would have 
been more difficult to apply as a criterion for des criminating between 
projects. The further away from measurement the criterion became, 
the more difficult it would be to assess the relative pay-off of 
different projects;'or indeed to say whether there was any pay-off 
at al^. It can be suggested that where the outcome of an activity 
is ambiguous in that it cannot be clearly defined or its existence 
demonstrated, the activity is likely to be denigrated in favour of 
an outcome which is more measurable and certain. This is because 
ambiguity tends to make the norms of rationality by which people try 
to run organisations more difficult to apply, since it works against 
calculation, measurement and prediction. The suppression of 
ambiguity can therefore help people to make decisions, since it 
reduces the possible interpretations of the phenomena which must be 
dealt with. The interpretations which are acknowledged can then 
become crystallised into the formal organisation process - its 
structures and procedures. In the organisation studied, for example,
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teaching across group boundaries was formally provided for and had 
a certain outcome (the courses could be taught) whereas the exchange 
of ideas across group boundaries, which had no certain outcome had 
no place in the formal system. The formal system may also become 
protected by group norms and by individuals' interests in protecting 
the status quo. In this example, a group's acceptance of the 
equation "useful=measurable" would support a structure designed 
to facilitate measurable or certain outcomes, and individuals 
interested in improving the railways of Pakistan would also have 
an interest in maintaining the supremacy of this equation.
Once norms are established which suppress some interpretations of 
organisational phenomena - i.e. suppress ambiguity - such norms can 
be used in the influence process in the organisation. So a Head of 
School may say "my staff think..." knowing that this will be taken 
as an authoritative statement in support of some case, in spite 
of the inherent difficulty of knowing what other people think.
Where norms are strong, those whose behaviour does not conform may 
find that they have provided ammunition fôr opponents to undermine 
their position. When a norm has been established, an organisation 
member who recognises the ambiguity which the norm papers over has 
three choices: (a) to ignore the ambiguity and conform) to group
norms, or (b) to acknowledge the ambiguity and confront group 
norms, or (c) to put up a facade of conformity while pursuing a 
non-conforming action. Either course of action may facilitate a 
pragmatic or personal interest, but (b) and (c) are unlikely to be 
effective without power. In the present case, examples were Aund 
of people who could flout group norms either because they were
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relatively independent of the group, or because the group was 
dependent on them for a resource which the group had decided to 
norminate as important. So, someone who "didn't need the job" in 
the organisation could avoid carrying out administrative duties 
expected by the group, and another person who brought contracts 
into the organisation to its financial benefit could adopt a
(4)contentious style of behaviour against norms of low-key interaction. 
To follow course (c) also requires power in the sense of having the 
personal skill to carry it out.
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Notes
1. See Chapter 2, section 4 for a discussion of the relationship 
between values and power, and Chapter 3» section 4 for evidence of 
this relationship in the field study,
2. See Chapter 3» section 2(c) on the relationships between groups
in the SCR, also Inference 2(b) in that section.
3. See Chapter 3» section 4(a).
4. See Decider's self-perceptions of power. Chapter 3» section 3(c)
and Inference 9»
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(d) Legitimacy and ambiguity. In this section I shall consider 
one of the effects of organisational ambiguity, which is that it 
poses questions about the legitimacy of the actions of organisation 
members, and provides opportunities for changing the basis of 
legitimacy.
As Schaar (1970) has pointed out, legitimacy is conferred either by
endorsement of the action by an authority above and beyond the actor,
or by reference to the values of group members. Legitimacy, or
the right to take the action one takes, can therefore be seen as
only being granted within the framework of role expectations, and
is only secure if it conforms to the expectations of the more
powerful members of the organisation or the relevant external
(1)individual or group. In the present study, the professoriat could 
be seen as the main determiners within the organisation of what is 
legitimate action, and the University Grants Committee would be an 
example of a. powerful external group who could determine, in respect 
of some issues, what would be legitimate action. Legitimacy can be 
said to be based on the ability to justify one's action to the 
relevant audience - relevant in that it has the capacity to under­
mine one's authority to act. What is considered to be a justifica­
tion depends on the prevailing values of that audience, which find 
expression in the formal or informal rules, (including in some 
instances the laws) which apply in the organisation.
In order to assess whether an action is legitimate, the actor must 
interpret the informal or formal rules, and the audience must
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interpret the actor’s behaviour, and this is where ambiguity
comes into the picture. There may be a doubt about whether the
(2)rules really apply, as discussed in a previous section (3(c))
and about how the action might be interpreted or what role is
being played (see sections 3(b) and 4(b)). Moreover it is
possible for formal and informal rules all to be relevsint to an
issue but to conflict with each other as far as justification is
concerned. For example, if powerful organisation members hold
values which are anti-bureaucratic, an appeal to the rules, even
if they formally exist and can be shown to apply to a particular
case, might be considered a weak argument which would not justify,
and therefore not legitimise, sin action. In making a decision about
how to act, and whether one’s action would be considered legitimate,
one may therefore be faced with ambiguous criteria on which to
decide. It can be suggested that illegitimate action may arise
through a failure to perceive this ambiguity, or a misjudgement of
the relative power of support for alternative interpretations within
a powerful relevant audience. It can also be noted that, through
their role as legitimizers, rules may not so much constrain action
as provide justification for it. You may be able to decide what you
want to do, then ’’find institutional sanction for what you are doing".
It may become a question of being able to persuade people that your
action is legitimate, by persuading them to interpret your action
(4)or the rules in particular ways.
One reason why ambiguity arises about the legitimacy of the actions 
of organisation members is that, just because certain values prevail
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in the organisation it does not mean that the alternatives 
necessarily disappear from the consciousness of organisation members 
(although this might happen). It is therefore possible for a person 
to consider that, although an action is legitimate on the grounds 
that it can be justified by prevailing formal or informal rules 
relevant to the issue, it is not legitimized by the individual's 
own values. What is regarded in the organisation as legitimate is 
a relative, not an absolute attribute, depending on who has the 
most power and whose values therefore prevail, but subject to 
political pressure for changed
It matters, therefore, who thinks a particular action is legitimate
or not. It may be possible for an organisation member to get away
with taking action which some other members consider illegitimate.
For example, the professor who refused to discuss financial matters
with the staff in his School was not seen as behaving legitimately
by the staff - his behaviour did not conform to their expectations
or their values about how he should treat them - but they also felt
(6)powerless to change his behaviour. Whether or not such perceptions
of illegitimacy pose any real threat to the actor, depends on whether
people are able, or willing, to mobilise enough political resources to
compel a change in behaviour, and also on the extent to which the
behaviour is supported by the more powerful people in the organisation.
Norms which resolve ambiguities of interpretation by deciding that
the Heead of School's view is what counts in preference to views of
the staff, would clearly support the behaviour of the professor 
(7)in this case. It can be suggested that the power structure in the
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organisation may support one interpretation of legitimacy - an 
essentially ambiguous phenomenon - in preference to another, but 
where the basis of this legitimacy conflicts with the values of 
some organisation members, the potential for change in this basis 
is present.
However, it would be a mistake to assume that actors are continually 
under pressure to justify their actions in order to maintain their 
legitimacy, in relation to all issues. As Dearlove(l973) found in 
his study of local authority decision-making, and as some of the 
data in the present study su^^est, authority may "rest on a bed of 
apathy and acquiescence", (p.89). One of the effects of apathy can 
be that ambiguity is suppressed, making it easier for actors to 
persuade others that their actions are legitimate. Actors may 
retain considerable freedom of action by avoiding challenge to their 
justifications, and hence to their legitimacy of action, and are 
helped in this by characteristics of the organisation which make the 
exchange of information difficult, such as competitiveness sind other 
barriers to social interaction. It has been suggested that inter­
action between organisation members is a means by which alternative 
interpretations of phenomena, and hence ambiguity are brought to 
light, and it is also a process which promotes the development of 
group pressure and the mobilisation of political resources. Aspects 
of the organisation, and perceptions of individuals of their self- 
interest, which operate against these processes of political 
mobilisation and exchange of information assist actors to remain 
free of challenge.
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One problem which actors may face in maintaining the legitimacy of 
their actions, however, arises through the existence of retrospective 
ambiguity. Because legitimacy is based on informal as well as 
formal rules, and these are subject to change, there is the 
possibility that an action may trigger off a decision about its 
legitimacy after the action has taken place, so that what appeared 
to be legitimate - for exsimple, because there appeared to be no 
formal rule forbidding it - may be determined as illegitimate by 
retrospective decision. One could suggest that one of the functions 
of lobbying powerful organisation members - the relevant powerful 
audience - in advance of an action, is to avoid retrospective 
challenge to legitimacy. However, lobbying (which can be seen as 
an attempt to remove prospective ambiguity), has the political 
disadvantage that it may draw attention to the proposed action and 
thereby invite opposition, which otherwise might have been avoided. 
When people are accused on the one hand of taking decisions to which 
they are not entitled, and on the other of not communicating 
sufficiently with others, this may indicate that they are caught 
in this dilemma of avoiding prospective opposition or retrospective
(9)challenge to legitimacy.
It can be suggested that what is regarded in the organisation as 
legitimate and justifiable depends on whose values prevail, that is, 
who has the most power, whether individuals or groups. But power 
structures can also be changed by a change in the consensus of values, 
andhence, so also can the basis of legitimacy be changed. In the 
present study this process could be seen in relation to the issue
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about whether academics should do research, or whether it was
legitimate for them to give priority to teaching or administration.
The change in role expectations for academic staff was being given
effect by changes in the power structure (such as the appointment
of a new Vice Chancellor and new professors?^ However, there was
still some ambiguity about the academic role. Some people talked
about the "contractual obligations" on staff to do research, but
others denied that such obligations existed, and there were similar
ambiguities about whether research counted in passing probation^
It was the stated intention of the more powerful organisation members
that the university should become more research oriented, and this
shift in values could be seen as undermining the legitimacy of some
people's behaviour, but supporting the behaviour of others. It
became legitimate to spend time and money on research activities as
a priority, and some people who did no research found themselves being
challenged. For example, for one member of staff it was becoming
no longer legitimate to spend more than his allocated time on the
lighting studio for architectural students, although in the past
(12)this had been regarded as justifiable and worthy. Ambiguities about 
role expectations can give rise to conflicts about legitimacy, as 
perceptions and interpretations change over time. It can be 
suggested that since legitimacy is the basis of authority, when 
legitimacy is supported or undermined, so is authority, and that 
this has consequences for the scope of future actions. The following 
diagram illustrates the process by which the basis of legitimacy 
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Notes
1. See Chapter 2, section 4 for a discussion of legitimacy in 
the literature.
2. See Chapter 2, section 5 and Chapter section 4(b) on 
uncertainty about decisions rules and Conclusions to Chapter 3-
3- See Chapter 3, section 3(b) Inferences 2, 6 and 8. See also 
the discussion on the difficulty of interpreting another's behaviour 
in the Conclusions to Chapter 3» See also Chapter 3, section 2(b) ii 
for ambiguity about roles being played.
4. See Chapter 3, section 4(e) Inferences 10, 11 and 12.
5. The various shades of opinion about the relative importance of
teaching and research provide an example of a conflict of values 
which could undermine legitimacy - see Chapter 3, section 4(a).
6. See the discussion of Heads of Schools, Chapter 3, section 3(c).
7" See the discussion of the views of Zed in Chapter 3, section 4(e)
8. For signs of apathy, see Chapter 3» section 2(b) iii. Inference
10, section 2(b) iv, and section 4(e). This also relates to the 
question of motivation, see Chapter 2, section 2 and Chapter 3 
section 3(d), 4(f) and Conclusions.
9. See Chapter 3, section 3(b).
10. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inference 13.
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11. See the discussion of pressures on staff to do research, 
Chapter 3, section 3(c).
12. This relates to the view that "when you start research in
the department, the undergraduates suffer" - Chapter 3, section 4(a)
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(e) Testing reality. If organisational phenomena are not "all in 
the mind" but really exist in the individual's environment, this 
raises the question of how, and to what extent the individual can 
determine what is really "out there" and distinguish it from 
projected ambiguity. It could be suggested that the only way to 
test reality is for organisation members to take action in 
accordance with their perceptions, and then see to what extent the 
consequences confirm or deny their perceptions. Apart from the 
difficulty of specifying what an "action" is, particularly when 
abstract phenomena are involved in it, there are a number of 
problems in the notion of testing reality through action, and some 
of these will be discussed in this section.
Since ambiguous phenomena have to be interpreted, the interpretation 
put on them by the perceiver can be said to reflect his or her 
preferred ways of thinking. There was evidence in this research 
that ways of thinking about the organisation can be influenced by 
people's specialist interests, in that metaphors of equations, 
mechanical devices and chemical processes were used in interpreting 
organisational phenomenal As far as organisational politics is 
concerned, thinking styles can also predispose people to look 
for sequential rather than reciprocal cause and effect, so that 
they expect to be able to say that A influences B and therefore B 
acts, in explanation of organisational events. The "cognitive 
annoyance" which Toshiro (1973) mentions as a response to ambiguity, 
may be due to a poor fit between such metaphors and models and the 
phenomena with which the person is confronted in the organisation.
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The use of particular modes of thought can be seen, not as a 
neutral activity, but as subject to their perceived instrumentality 
for the perceiver, and therefore of political significance.
Gombrich (I963) in writing about the individual's responses to 
ambiguous visual images, has pointed out that once one inter­
pretative decision has been taken - for example, which is "figure" 
and which is "ground" - other interpretations logically follow 
from this to provide an image which can be understood. It is 
suggested by this research that people's interpretations of 
organisational phenomena can also be seen as having a degree of 
consistency, so that a cluster of certain kinds of interpretations, 
leads to a relatively coherent, and therefore understandable picture. 
An example of this can be found in the discussion of the data 
collected from Zed (see Chapter 3 PP 136 ff). Zed can be seen as 
having interpreted the organisation as characterised by single-minded 
purpose and a high degree of order and consensus, that is, a low 
level of ambiguity, with just a few minor aberrations which could 
be disregarded. This view was consistent with a preference for 
centralisation of decision-making. It can further be suggested that 
it suited Zed's interests,whether pragmatic or psychological, to 
see it this way, since it allowed him to justify the exercise of 
covert, behind-the-scenes power, by influencing the few powerful 
people in a centralised system, people to whom his own role in the 
structure gave him access. Seeing the organisation this way not only 
made it understandable to Zed, but also was politically useful. The 
way in which individuals deal with ambiguity may also be seen as a 
defensive strategy. For example, in the relationship where one 
party is considerably dependent on the other, as in the patron- 
protege relationship, where the patron has clearly identifiable
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sources of power, such as the ability to offer a job, secure a
promotion or provide resources, there may be considerable incentive
for the protege to interpret events or situations in ways which show
the patron in a favourable light. Alternative readings may be
suppressed in order to maintain the commitment to the powerful
person. So a staff member may castigate all powerful organisation
members as incompetent managers but ignore the possibility that his
own professor is also one of them. He can therefore avoid seeing
(2)
himself as having chosen dependence on a incompetent person.
These examples suggest that what is taken to be "reality" therefore 
can be seen as subject to the ways of thinking of the individual 
and his or her perceived pragmatic and psychological interests.
These factors can be said to apply, not only when decisions are 
being made about what action should be taken, but also in assessing 
the outcome of that action and whether or not the outcome supports 
or disconfirms the actor's perceptions of reality.
It is also suggested that the time dimension of such interpretations 
must be taken into account, in that recurrences and patterns in 
phenomena are perceived by individuals over time. Looking back, 
the past can be used to support one's present interests, for 
example, by claiming that precedents have been set in the past, or 
by reference to tradition, or to long-term policy decided at 
earlier times. Although organisational history may be in written 
form - memos, minutes and other documents - these can be ambiguously 
worded when looked at in the present some years later, and indeed, 
it may have been the intention at the time of writing, for reasons
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which were important to someone then, that the wording should not 
be too clear. But even if the intention was that the statement 
should be clear, there is no guarantee that it will remain so with 
the passage of time. The oral tradition of the organisation is even 
more vulnerable to changes in interpretation, so that informal 
contracts, for example, may change over time to the detriment of
(3)one of the parties. Ambiguities created by the passage of time 
provide scope for individuals to interpret the past in ways which 
suit their present interests. Newcomers to the organisation are put 
at a disadvantage by this process since they have to rely on 
interpretations made by others, while themselves lacking this 
historical resource.
It has been suggested that, looking back into the past at the
decisions that have been made, people try to see patterns which
would illuminate the rationality of the decision-makers and therefore
make prediction possible, but that such predictions may fail
because of political pressures on decision-makers, including their
(5)
own reinterprétâtions of the past. It can be added that looking 
back into the past can reveal what looks like a pattern of inten­
tions by particular individuals, a long-term political strategy 
for which every move is carefully calculated and which unfolds with 
time to a point where a pattern begins to emerge. However, the 
meaning of this pattern may remain ambiguous in that it may not be 
clear whether such individuals really are following a long-term 
strategy, or simply turning opportunities as they arise to their 
own advantage, such actions appearing to be a deliberate strategy
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because of the actors' preferences for seeing their self-interest 
in particular ways. The resolution of this ambiguity is made more 
difficult because people are not always clear about their own motives 
at the time of action and could not necessarily explain their 
intentions even if they were willing to do so. While time may give 
coherence of intention to the behaviour of B as perceived by A, 
the picture, though coherent, is not necessarily "real".
Looking forward in time, people pursuing their self-interests may try 
to predict the future - how others will act or react to them. Such 
predictions guide present decisions, and in decision-making groups, 
whichever prediction prevails will affect the political position of 
individuals affected by the decision. For example, if the prevailing 
prediction is that the UGC will demand that the teaching of part­
icular subjects be cut back, individuals in those subject areas 
will be politically disadvantaged and will remain so until the 
prediction proves false. In this instance it can be suggested that 
an attempt to determine reality by resolving prospective ambiguity 
has created a shift in the power structure; the search for one 
reality has created another one to the detriment of some individuals 
or groups, even before the outcome of the prediction is known. In 
addition, it can be said that some outcomes are themselves ambiguous 
so that the accuracy of the prediction may be politically, rather 
than factually determined.
The accuracy of interpretations of organisational phenomena, whether 
these arise from individual or group decisions about meanings, may 
come to be tested, perhaps unintentionally, by newcomers to the
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organisation. Organisation members with this threshold status are 
at a disadvantage politically in that they have difficulty in 
distinguishing how others are interpreting organisational phenomena 
(including reactions to their own behaviour) and what uses are being 
made of organisational ambiguities, or might be made by themselves. 
However, they have the advantage of not yet being socialised into 
particular ways of thinking about or interpreting the organisation, 
and consequently may call into question the existence or interpret­
ation of phenomena which have been taken for granted by others, or
even demonstrate that some phenomena - particular constraints for
(6)example - do not really exist.
One reason why people maintain their interpretations of organisational 
phenomena, even where these disregard ambiguity, is that such 
interpretations work - that is, they appear to meet the individual's 
need to make sense of the organisation and from a political point of 
view they lead to favourable results. The extent to which interpreta­
tions of phenomena are influenced by characteristics of the 
organisation, and of the individual, are not normally apparent to 
the organisation member, and since the interpretations work, they 
can be taken as synonymous with reality. It can be suggested that 
people do not deliberately test out the reality of their interpreta­
tions unless they become conscious of a need to do so, and an example 
of this was found in the present study over the perception by some 
organisation members that they had a high degree of autonomy. Where 
people have a sense of having a good deal of freedom of action 
arising from a congruence between what more powerful organisation
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members want them to do and what they themselves want to do, the
limits of their autonomy may be unclear. Since they have never
attempted to diverge from their role requirements, by, for example,
refusing to carry out a task, they do not know whether they could
refuse if they wanted, or what would be the consequence. The
notion of autonomy within the organisation may be ambiguous in
this way, in that although it appears to exist its reality cannot
be tested or its limits determined until some point of conflict is
reached. It could be said that in such circumstances phenomena
are being taken for granted by organisation members, but may have
(7)only a nebulous existence.
Because of the effects of seeing what we want to see, of the availability
of only part of the information and the variable ability to deal with
it, and potential for distortion over time, testing reality by
making predictions of future events and then looking back to see if
they proved correct is not an infallible test. Whatever time tells,
it is not necessarily the truth. Looking forward and backward in
time, certain issues may stand out as landmarks, major opportunities,
threats and challenges which focus the attention and encourage
people to clarify their own and others' intentions and interests,
but perhaps for this very reason much of the landscape slips by in
a blur of half-recognition, but some of that may turn out later
(8)
to have been significant.
Temporal ambiguity also enables others to challenge the legitimacy 
of the individual's actions, since legitimacy may be affected by 
shifts in interpretation or in values. Information can be used to
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undermine or support particular interpretations, and specialisation 
can facilitate this process. A consensus about interpretation may 
develop as a result of normative pressure in groups. Although 
reality may be illuminated by the arrival of newcomers to the 
organisation, the testing of reality is problematic because of the 
operation of temporal ambiguity, the influence of ego defences, 
and the use of particular cognitive models.
In the next section, the main issues covered in this chapter will 
be summarised, showing how both the creation of and response to 
ambiguity is related to political behaviour in organisations.
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Notes
1. For examples see Chapter 3, section 2(b) ii, and Inference 10, 
Section 4(e) the discussion of the views of Zed, and "money in, 
paper out" Section 4(a). See also Chapter 2, section 2(b) i.
Inference 3-
2. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inferences 12 and 13.
3. See Chapter 3, section 2(c) Inference 3(d).
4. See Chapter 3, section 3(a) Inference 4, and 3(c) Inference l6.
3. For the problems of prediction and pressures on Deciders making 
judgement of others' work, see Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inferences 
26-29.
6. See Chapter 3, section 3(c) Inference l6.
7. See Chapter 3» section 4(e) Inference 9.
8. This lends weight to the problem discussed in Chapter 2, section 2, 
which arises if an attempt is made to confine the concept of power
to "significant" events, since ambiguity about significance may be 
retrospective, and hence power also.
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(f) Conclusion. It has been suggested in this section that 
individuals respond to organisational phenomena which are either 
intrinsically or for political reasons ambiguous. Ambiguous 
phenomena present individuals with political opportunities in that 
they leave the way open for interpretations which favour the 
individual’s cause, whether psychological or pragmatic. They 
also, however, provide problems in that the interpretation of 
the intentions and behaviour of others, and prediction of outcomes, 
becomes difficult.
In interactions between individuals, ambiguity provides a range of 
possibilities between truth and falsehood, intended by the actor 
and perceived by the observer. The existence of ambiguity provides 
the opportunity for the actor to dissemble, and this action in turn 
creates more ambiguity. Ambiguity provides problems of interpretation 
for the observer, and the interpretation decided upon may itself be 
projective and therefore create further ambiguity.
People may respond to ambiguity and the difficulties it causes
them, either in interpretation or in terms of other people’s
responses to it, by suppressing information. This may have the
effect of creating further ambiguity, and also may provide political
opportunity in that some people may be able to obtain information
which is withheld from others and which may be politically useful.
Expertise is a special case in which ambiguity is created because
information is not, by definition, readily accessible to others
and they are likely to be aware of this. The response to this by
the non-expert may be political, in that interpretations will be sipported
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or challenged as self-interest dictates. However, challenge may 
be difficult and therefore specialist status may be seen as powerful 
and hence valued. This may set in train attempts to acquire 
specialist status for oneself and deny it to others, by the 
manipulation of ambiguity,through challenging the interpretations 
of others while protecting one's own from scrutiny. It is suggested 
that the structuring of time can be useful to such political 
interactions, and may play a role in the provision of political 
opportunity and the development of political skills. The absence
of challenge to interpretations of phenomena, whether the
interpretations of experts or others, may result from the motivation
of the individual. It may also be the result of cultural pressures
or other barriers to social interaction and information exchange, 
but whatever its cause, non-action as a response to ambiguity, so 
that alternative interpretations remain dormant,provides freedom for 
some individuals to act as they wish, and is therefore to their 
political advantage. For similar reasons and with similar effect, 
individuals may fail to challenge their own models of reality.
There may be a group response to the presence of ambiguity in the 
organisation in that norms develop over interpretations to be placed 
on phenomena. However, this attempt to reduce ambiguity may be 
upset by powerful group members who may be able to flout the norms. 
As abstractions, norms are in any case ambiguous, and one response 
to their existence may be to use them to one's own advantage. Norms 
about legitimacy can have a politicai^useful role in this way, in 
providing post-hoc justifications of, or challenges to, the actions
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of organisational participants. The effect of informal bases of 
legitimacy as counterweights to formal ones may lead to a 
misinterpretation of which basis of judgement will prevail, and 
hence to action with is deemed illegitimate. It is, however, 
possible to disregard the perceptions of legitimacy of the relatively 
powerless, and group norms which support particular interpretations 
of phenomena or particular values about who should have most power 
may facilitate this action. Legitimization is, however, not static, 
but subject to change as people reinterpret their context and as 
political pressures undermine prevailing values.
Testing reality by trying to find the "correct" interpretation of 
organisational phenomena is problematic. Taking action on the basis 
of one interpretation as a test still requires interpretation of the 
outcome. Interpretation of the outcome, or a past event, is not 
a neutral activity but may be politically guided. Predictions of 
the future, which might be part of such a test, may in themselves 
alter a power structure, and therefore prediction too may be 
political in intent. A major difficulty in this respect is that 
interpretations are influenced both by conceptual models, which 
may be inappropriate and not take sufficient account of ambiguity, 
and by self-interest, whether pragmatic or psychological. The 
discussion in this section of the responses people make to ambiguity 
in organisational phenomena reflect on the existing literature about
power as reviewed in Chapter 2 in a number of ways.
As far as the A-B model of power is concerned (see Chapter 2, section 2)
it suggests that the interaction of A and B is the outcome of
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perception, interpretation and decision about meaning by the two 
parties concerned, and that they might respond to the difficulties 
of interpretation caused by ambiguity by making political use of 
it. Ambiguity may therefore be seen as a political opportunity 
to A and B, but also as providing a possible danger in the form of 
challenge to their preferred interpretations. It can be suggested 
that trying to get the other person to interpret phenomena in a way 
in which suits your interest is the important factor as far as 
the political relationship is concerned, and may include not only 
such issues as whether a particular action is legitimate or not, 
or whether coercion is being used, but also whether B has in fact 
complied with the demands of A. The subjective nature of the judge­
ments which A and B make about each others' behaviour, therefore, 
go beyond the assessment of sanctions suggested by Bacharach and 
Lawler (I980) but applies to all aspects of the political interaction, 
However, it is perhaps useful to remember here that ambiguity is 
not entirely subjective, not "all in the mind", but is also a 
characteristic of the phenomena which have to be interpreted. The 
suggestion that people may avoid challenging each other's interpreta­
tions or their own models or reality for reasons to do with their 
commitment to the organisation supports the view put forward in 
Chapter 2, section 2 that motivation is an important factor in 
political interaction.
It has been suggested in Chapter 2, section 3, that the structuring 
of the organisation leads to divergence of values and facilitates 
conflict. It can be added that among the norms which develop in
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different groups may be norms about meanings of events or concepts, 
and the existence of conflict (or the absense of it). Norms may 
develop over the determination of the legitimacy or otherwise of 
people's actions, as discussed in Chapter 2, section 4, but it 
is suggested that both formal and informal bases of legitimacy 
may operate together in a given situation, creating difficulties 
for the organisation member who must respond to this ambiguity 
and may misjudge the relative strength of these bases. This 
also relates to the problem discussed in Chapter 2, section 5 of 
judging whether rules exist and really apply, and where the 
line is drawn between acceptable and unacceptable action. Justify­
ing one's action in these circumstances may be a matter of persuading 
others to accept a particular interpretation of phenomena.
5- Organisational ambiguity and organisation politics 
In this section I shall draw together threads of the argument 
presented elsewhere in this chapter to show how ambiguity and 
political behaviour in the organisation, are related.
It has been suggested that organisational phenomena, being for the 
most part abstractions, are ambiguous, both as to facts and values, 
whether or not this ambiguity is perceived by organisational members. 
Various types of ambiguity to be found in organisations have been 
identified.
Information about organisational phenomena comes to the individual 
largely through the behaviour of others, including the written or
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spoken word, actions and incidents which the individual observes. 
Others behave 'as if phenomena exist, or apply such energy to 
dealing with some phenomena as to suggest their value. Decisions 
have to be made by the individual about how such information is 
to be interpreted, and since this interpretation is likely to 
favour the interests of some people more than others, such decisions 
have political implications. Getting agreement to a particular 
interpretation which favours one's own interest is both a measure 
of power and a means of crystallising a power structure.
Information is filtered through the characteristics of the organisa­
tion. The structure of the organisation may allow information to 
be exclusively held by some individuals, as may the existence in 
the organisation of people with specialist skills and knowledge.
The culture of the organisation, including the degree of competitive­
ness and secrecy in the culture, idiomatic use of language and degree 
of consensus about meanings, and norms of interpretation found in 
particular groups or in the organisation as a whole, will also act 
as a filter through which the individual receives information about 
organisational phenomena. The structure and culture are not passive 
objects but the outcome of interaction between people, and it can 
be suggested that this interaction is political, in that those 
concerned are pursuing their own interests, whether pragmatic or 
psychological, as they perceive them. The structure and culture 
are therefore political creations of organisation members^
The problem of interpreting the behaviour of others in the organisation 
can be increased by the opportunity which abstractions provide for
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individuals to dissemble as to the roles they are playing or
interests they are pursuing. This can be seen as representing an
attempt to guide the interpretation which the observer will make
and so influence his or her response in ways which are helpful to 
(2)
the actor.
Ambiguity in organisational phenomena may be seen as a threat to 
decision-makers (i.e. those who have relatively more power) and 
they may attempt to reduce it by withholding information so that 
challenge to their interpretations can be avoided. This has the 
effect of conferring or increasing power for those who can gain such 
information. Challenges to interpretation can undermine the 
legitimacy of actions of decision-makers, as can changes in the 
values which underpin the norms which legitimize their actions.
Attempts to reduce ambiguity through the use of bureaucratic structures
and procedures may fail, through the technical difficulty of
specifying the behavour of individuals who deal largely with
abstractions, and the political difficulty of controlling what
(4)
response people make to the existence of bureaucracy. It can be 
suggested that people will support or undermine it as it helps or 
hinders their interests, and will use it as a political opportunity.
In this way bureaucracy may simply substitute new ambiguities for 
old ones.
It can be suggested that the action which the individual takes on the 
basis of the interpretation placed on information he or she receives
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about organisational phenomena is a means of testing reality, by
testing the validity of the interpretation. However, it is a
doubtful test and subject to political pressures, both in prediction
and in the interpretation of the past. The information which comes
to the individuals is not only filtered through organisational
characteristics, such as culture and structure, and including the
structuring of time, but also through such characteristics of the
individual as cognitive skills and construct;and psychological needs.
It will be affected by the individual's willingness to seek
information and perception of the political value of doing so,
(5)
and hence also by attitudes towards political behaviour. The action 
(or non-action) can be seen therefore as dependent on the motivation, 
values and context of the individual.
The action which the individual takes becomes peirt of the ambiguous 
organisational phenomena which others in turn must interpret. The 
choice of action will be guided by the perceived self-interest of 
the individual, including conformity to his or her personal values - 
the perceived legitimacy of the action and power to act in that way, 
and the perceived pattern of cause and effect based on past 
experience. The action may involve bringing to light or suppressing 
ambiguity and it can be suggested that ambiguity may be used by 
organisation members as a resource in the political process.
The relationship between organisational phenomena, information, 
interpretation and political action can be shown in diagram form as 
in Figure 8 . It might be argued that "organisational characteristics" 
and "individual characteristics" shown in this diagram are in fact
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part of the ambiguous phenomena of the organisation. Although this 
is true, I think it is necessary also to show them separately 
because they are not just phenomena to be interpreted but also 
have a considerable effect on the interpretation. The model 
suggests how the individual interacts politically with ambiguous 
organisational phenomena, whether or not the phenomena are 
perceived to be ambiguous by the individual, sind whether or not 













1. Evidence of the political importance of structures and 
cultures Concluding the values of individuals and norms of groups) 
will be found in Chapter 3, principally sections 2 and 4, and in 
Chapter 2, section 4.
2. Problems of interpretation are discussed in Chapter 2, 
section 4 (values about political behaviour) and section 6. See 
also Chapter 3, sections 2(d), 3(d) and 4(f).
3. See the discussion on the political uses of information in 
Chapter 3» section 4(f) and the Conclusions to the Chapter. See 
also the discussion of the role of the expert in Chapter 3, 
section 3(d).
4. It could be said that both the Research Fund and the Equipment 
Fund decision-making processes, but particularly the former, were 
bureaucratic attempts to reduce ambiguity which provided organisation 
members with political opportunities.
3" For a variety of views on the importance of interaction with 
others and willingness to seek information, see Chapter 3, section 2(c) 
on the formation of groups.
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CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this research were to investigate and throw some 
light on the political perceptions of organisation members, and on 
the consequences of those perceptions for people's behaviour in 
the organisation. It has been shown in Chapter 2 that the literature 
on power is wide-ranging and contains considerable areas of disagree­
ment, and this research suggests that, like these authors, organisation 
members do not all share the same concepts of power. A tidy match 
between this research and the ecisting literature is not therefore 
to be expected, but the conclusion to Chapter 3 of this thesis suggests 
that a link can be made between the two, by considering what 
political opportunities the research setting offered to participants, 
seen in the light of their own perceptions of that setting. It was 
further suggested that a major theme to emerge from the research was 
the ambiguity of organisational phenomena, which enabled different 
people to see the same phenomena in different ways, or some people 
to perceive phenomena which others deny exist.
Chapter 4 took up this theme of ambiguity, which has been given little 
attention in the literature about power, and which, when it has 
been used elsewhere in the social science literature, has remained 
largely unexplored. The analysis of ambiguity in Chapter 4 suggests 
that different types of ambiguity can be identified; that it arises 
in the organisation in a number of ways; and that it represents 
political opportunity for organisation members, whether or not they 
recognise and make deliberate use of it.
Some ideas which emerge from this study seem to me of particular
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interest. First of all, the very fact that people in an organisation 
can have such differing interpretations of their organisational 
context and attach differing meanings to events. This seems to 
be related to the conceptual models they use in making their 
interpretation, and especially to the criteria they adopt for 
identifying and making judgements about phenomena. These differences 
apply not only to the immediate interaction with others in which they 
attempt to pursue their own interests, but also to the wider 
organisational context they perceive. These differences and the 
processes of interpretation are of importance to political behaviour, 
since it seems reasonable to assume that people's perceptions guide 
the actions they take in trying to influence events.
Interpreting other people's behaviour, identifying what causes or 
might cause a person to act in a particular way, has been shown to 
be problematic, and in the light of this it is curious that people 
decide on their interpretations and act on them with such certainty. 
Perhaps what they are doing is adopting pragmatic rules which, as 
long as they appear to work well enough, enable them to make 
assumptions which need not be questioned. I say "appear to" 
because provided that phenomena are ambiguous, it may be possible 
to interpret outcomes to match one's preferred ways of thinking and 
acting, rather than changing conceptual models; reality is not 
easily tested.
It may also be that,where ambiguities are of particular kinds, for 
instance, cumulative or expressive, differences of perceptions may
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well escape notice and it may be difficult to detect what, if any, 
impact they have on outcomes.
Another interesting point to emerge from this study is the way in 
which meanings of organisational phenomena shift - one can suggest 
for political reasons. An organisational event may ostensibly have 
one character (say a competition for resources) but be interpreted 
in a different way (perhaps a public relations exercise) by some 
people involved in it. In other words, the development and use 
of expressive ambiguities in the organisation, with particular 
reference to their political value, is an interesting theme which 
this research has suggested.
It seems clear from this study that the culture of the organisation 
can considerably influence the amount and kinds of information 
people can have and therefore has an effect on the interpretations 
they make of phenomena. Alternative readings may be screened out 
by this means, either because people with different views are kept 
structurally apart, or because particular readings become the norm. 
The ambiguities of phenomena may not therefore come to conscious 
attention within the organisation. The symbolic interactionist 
idea that meanings are "negotiated" is perhaps therefore a misnomer, 
since it suggests that differences of interpretation are noticed and 
confronted, but this appears not to be always the case. Culture 
therefore has a political impact in that certain interpretations 
are submerged, and I take this to be a means by which the values of 
the powerful are sustained within the organisation. Avoiding 
challenge may be an important political skill in this respect.
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On the other side of this coin, however, is the way in which 
cultural characteristics may become political opportunities.
Formal and informal rules may be used to compliment or counteract 
each other, thus providing an opportunity for challenge or support 
to the legitimacy of actions, and flouting the norms of behaviour 
may be a successful political tactic. It is not just substantive 
information which is important therefore in acting politically, 
but one needs also information about what other people's perceptions 
and values are, what norms prevail, or whether formal or informal 
rules are strongest, in order to understand how other people may 
act, and therefore, how they may be influenced.
Several directions for further enquiry can be suggested from this 
research, most of which derive from the identification and discussion 
of ambiguity as an important element in organisational life, and 
therefore in political behaviour. These suggestions can be briefly 
outlined as follows
1. Ambiguity having been identified as a factor of political 
importance, and some suggestions made about how it can be 
analysed and what part it may play in organisational politics, 
some further exploration specifically directed towards the 
relationship between ambiguity, perception and political 
action seems called for. A study of how the particular cognitive 
models used by participants in a particular context relate to 
their political activities would be one way of tackling this 
question. It would need to include perceptions of cause and 
effect relationships in interactions with others and perceptions
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of the context of such interactions, and to show what role 
ambiguity plays in both perception and action.
2. It would be interesting to know whether different types of 
organisation produce different levels of or types of ambiguity.
Has ambiguity emerged as a key theme here because of special 
characteristics of the organisation chosen for this research?
If it is less in evidence in other kinds of organisation, does 
this mean that ambiguity does not exist there or is just more 
suppressed? If so, how and why has this come about?
3 . If ambiguity can be classified into different types as
I have suggested - cumulative, disjunctive, expressive, projective 
and temporal - one can look for uses of this classification in 
organisational research. One application, for example, might 
be in the analysis of conflict. It might be found that 
different types of ambiguity would be more likely to lead to 
conflict and make conflict more difficult to resolve. Differing 
strategies for dealing with conflicts might be suggested where 
different types of ambiguity were involved. It would seem 
reasonable to assume that disjunctive ambiguities make conflict 
more difficult to resolve.than cumulative ones, where a 
consensus would be a possibility. Where ambiguities are based 
largely on projection, a resolution of conflict might be 
achieved by providing information which disconfirms the projection.
Expressive ambiguities are a particularly interesting case 
looked at in the context of conflict situations. It could be
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suggested that identification of symbolic meanings would be a 
necessary step in preventing or resolving conflict, but how are 
they to be identified? It can be suggested that the role of 
expressive ambiguities, how identified and how reconciled in 
conflict situations, would be worth further investigation.
Conflicts have a time dimension, since protagonists reflect on 
past events and consider future possibilities, and this research 
has suggested that temporal ambiguities are political oppor­
tunities. This raises the question of how differing 
interpretations of past and future may result in conflict, 
and how such interpretations may be used by protagonists in 
support of their causes.
4. There is a need to look at the interface between theory 
about organisational politics and motivation theory. I am not 
primarily thinking here of the identification of a "need for 
power" as an aspect of the individual's motivation, but of the 
way in which motivation theory is applied in management education 
and training. In that context, motivation theory is often 
oriented towards the commitment of the employee to the work 
organisation. One can ask to what extent this is, in effect, 
a question of how a manager can gain the cooperation of 
subordinates, or, in other words, A trying to get B to do 
something. Since motivation theory has been around for a long 
time in management training, it would be interesting to know 
how it is perceived by managers. Is it a guide to the successful 
pursuit of self-interest? A political strategy? The picture
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is somewhat complicated by the fact that "apathy" or lack of 
commitment in others can be politically useful to one's cause, 
as Dearlove (1973) has noted and has been shown in this 
present research. For example, it can be helpful to oligarchs 
if organisation members do not demand a say in decision-making.
The notion of the resistance of B to the influence attempts 
of A would also appear to have some connection with motivation 
theory. In this study it was seen that the attempt to align 
organisational activities with the demands of the environment 
may founder, if the rewards used by the powerful to bring 
about this alignment are not seen as rewards by organisation 
members. This suggests that "strategic contingency" theories 
of power need to take motivation theory into account.
It would appear that at a number of points, theories about 
power and theories about motivation could be linked, and that 
the connections between the two could be profitably researched.
3 . A fifth area of investigation suggested by this research 
relates to what Kris and Kaplan (1932) have called "standards 
of interpretation". This is a question which is of relevance 
to organisation members pursuing their self-interests and to 
organisational researchers alike. Kris and Kaplan were concerned 
with literary criticism - whether one can "read the wrong poem" - 
but the question can also be put to interpretation in the 
organisation. If organisational phenomena are ambiguous as I 
have suggested, is there a limit to the interpretations that may
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be placed on them, or is any interpretation equally valid with 
any other?
Sheila Dawson (1963), recalling how a Bomber Pilot made an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of a passage from Macbeth,
("... the deep damnation of his taking off..." etc) comments 
that had the Pilot been aware that the passage was written by 
Shakespeare his interpretation would have been different.
This suggests that, given crucial information, there may be 
limits to justifiable interpretation, since, in the passage 
in question, whatever else Shakespeare might have meant, it 
could not have been anything to do with aircraft. This raises 
the question of whether in interpretation of organisational 
phenomena there might also be found limits to justifiable 
interpretation. When Phillips (1973) in discussing research 
methodology suggests that, rather than attempting to prove facts, 
we should be attempting to show how particular circumstances 
would entitle you to draw particular conclusions, he is begging 
the question of how you determine such "entitlement". One could 
say that a highly projected ambiguity, for example, is not an 
interpretation to which one is entitled; it is like the Bomber 
Pilot’s reading of Macbeth. But is it possible to develop some 
guidelines for defining the limits on interpretation of 
organisational phenomena? This question would involve finding 
the boundary between the interpretations limited by consensus - 
a normative pressure to see phenomena in a particular light 
which suppresses ambiguity - and interpretations which must be
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ruled out as unjustifiable. In the present study it was 
suggested that there were some instances where one could say that 
a respondent’s views were mistaken, and perhaps a line of 
enquiry might be into the discovery of genuine errors of 
perception, how and why they arise, as a step towards finding 
guidelines for interpretation. The difficulty of identifying 
standards of interpretation should not be underestimated however. 
One has only to consider the ways in which individuals and 
groups may ostensibly discuss one topic while symbolically 
discussing another, that is, the presence of expressive 
ambiguities in the organisation, to appreciate the problem. 
Nevertheless, such a study could have considerable value for 
the development of qualitative research methods, and contribute 
to our understanding of organisational behaviour.
6. This question of justifiable interpretation leads on to 
questions about effective political behaviour. In the present 
study two main views about how to pursue one’s interests ' 
successfully were identified - the oblique or "gently, gently" 
approach, and the "nasty" or high profile behaviour. These 
represent two different interpretations of the cause and effect 
in political behaviour in the organisation studied, and the 
question of which was best remained unresolved. This suggests 
that it might be possible to identify and classify a number 
of such alternative interpretations in an organisational 
setting, including ones which are perceived by participants and 
those which are overlooked or rejected. Some criteria might
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then be developed for determining which interpretation would 
be most conducive to effective political behaviour in a 
particular context, and a comparison between different types 
of context could be made. In the light of the present research, 
analysis of this context would need to include values and 
structures and their ambiguities, and give consideration to 
the ways in which interpretation of the context has consequences 
for the effectiveness of political behaviour. Identification of 
an effective style of political behaviour does not, of course, 
mean that individuals will necessarily adopt it, and the 
relationship between perceptions and actions in political 
behaviour could be further explored.
This research has suggested that when the perceptions of organisational 
participants are made the focus of attention, the importance of 
ambiguity as a characteristic of their context is revealed. An 
attempt has been made to explore this concept of ambiguity and its 
political implications, and further lines of enquiry have been 
identified. It can be concluded that where ambiguity in organisational 
phenomena is found, its political implications deserve consideration, 
and where political behaviour is identified, attention should be 
paid to the role of ambiguity in political opportunity.
- 426 -
REFERENCES
Adler, A. (1938). The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, 
(Ansbacher, H.L. and Ansbacher R.R. eds.) London: Allen 
and Unwin.
Agger, R.E., Goldrich, D., and Swanson, B.E. (1964). The Rulers 
and the Rules: Political Power and Impotence in American
Communities. New York: Wiley.
Allison, G.T. (1971). The Essence of Decision. Boston: Little,
Brown and Co.
Altham, J.E.J. (1971). Ambiguity and Predication. Mind, 80, April, 
233-237.
Ansbacher, H.L. and Ansbacher, R.R. eds (1938). The Individual 
Psychology of Alfred Adler, London: Allen aind Unwin.
Argyris, C. (1972). The Applicability of Organizational Sociology, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 427 -
REFERENCES
Bacharach, S.B. and Aiken, M. (1976). Structural and Process 
Constraints on Influence in Organisations- Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 21 (4), 623-642.
Bacharach, S.B. and Lawler, E.J., (198O). Power and Politics in 
Organizations, San Francisco: Jossley-Bass.
Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1962). Two Faces of Power. American 
Political Science Review, 36, November, 947-932.
Bailey, F.G. (1969)- Stratagems and Spoils, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bailey, F.G. (1977). Morality and Expediency, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Baldridge, J.V. (1971). Power and Conflict in the University,
New York: Wiley.
Bates, F.L. (1970). Comments on "Political Economy: A Framework for
Comparative Analysis", by M.N. Zald. In: Power in Organizations,
(M.N. Zald ed) Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Bell, C. (1978). Inside the Whale. New York: Pergamon Press.
Berger, P.L. and Luckman, R- (1966). The Social Construction of 
Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Bierstedt, R. (1950). An Analysis of Social Power. American Sociological 
Review, 13, 730-738.
Blau, P. (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York:
Wiley.
Blau, P. (1970). Decentralization and Bureaucracies. In: Power in 
Organizations, (M.N. Zald ed.), Nashville: Vanderbilt University 
Press.
Blumer, H. (I969). Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Bogdan, R. and Taylor, S.J. (1975). Introduction to Qualitative 
Research Methods. New York: John Wiley.
Bradshaw, A. (1976). A Critique of Steven Lukes's "Power: A
Radical View". Sociology, 10 (l), January, 121-127
Bucher, R. (1970). Social Process and Power in Medical School. In:




Christensen, S. (1976). Decision Making and Socialization.
In: Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, (J.G. March and
J.R. Olsen eds.) Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Clark,' J.V. (1970). A Healthy Organization. In: The Planning
of Change, (W.G. Bennis, K.D. Benne, and R. Chin eds) London: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Cohen, M.D. and March, J.G. (1976). Decisions, Presidents and
Status. In: Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, (J.G. March
and J.P. Olsen eds) Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Crespigny, A. de (1968). Power and Its Forms. Political Studies 
XVI (2) 192-203.
Crozier, M. (1964). The Bureaucratic Phenomenon. London: Tavistock,
- 429 -
REFERENCES
Dahl, R.A. (1937). The Concept of Power. Behavioural Science
2, July 201-203.
Dahl, R.A. (1968). Power. In: International Encyclopaedia of
the Social Sciences, Volume 12, 403-4l3.
Dalton, M. (1939). Men Who Manage. New York: Wiley.
Dalton, G.W. Bames, L.B., and Zaleznik, A. (I968). The
Distribution of Authority in Formal Organizations. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Dawson, S. (I963). Infinite Types of Ambiguity. British Journal
of Aesthetics. 3, July, 289-293-
Day, J. (1963). Authority. Political Studies, XI (3), 237-271
Dearlove, J. (1973). The Politics of Policy in Local Government, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.




Emerson, R.M. (1962). Power-dependency Relations. American
Sociological Review. 27, February, 31-^1.
Empson, W. (1930)* Seven Types of Ambiguity. London: Chatto and 
Windus.
Enderud, H. (1976). The Perceptions of Power. In: Ambiguity and
Choice in Organizations, (J.G. March and J.P. Olsen eds).
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Etzioni, A. (1961). A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.
Glencoe: The Free Press.
Etzioni, A. (1964). Modern Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- 431 -
REFERENCES
Freire, P. (1973)- The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Harmondsworth: 
Penguine Books.
French, J.R.P. and Raven, B. (1939)- The Bases of Social Power, 
In: Group Dynamics Research and Theory, (L. Cartwight and
A. Zander eds). London: Tavistock.
- 432 -
REFERENCES
Gamson, W.A, (1968). Power and Discontent. Homewood, Illinois:
The Dorsey Press.
Giddens, A. (1968). 'Power' in the Recent Writings of Talcott
Parsons. In: Modern Sociology (P. Worsley ed). Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books.
Glaser, B. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity: Advances in the
Methodology of Grounded Theory. California: Sociology Press.
Glaser, B. and Strauss, (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory.
New York: Aldine Press.
Goldner, F.H. (1970). The Division of Labour: Process and Power.
In: Power in Organizations, (M.N. Zald ed). Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press.
Goldthorp, J.H. (1966). Attributes and Behaviour of Car Assembly 
Workers. British Journal of Sociology, 17 227-243.
Gombrich, E.H. (I963). Meditations on a Hobby Horse. London:
Phaidon Press.




Hall, P.M. (1972). A Symbolic Interactionist Analysis of Politics. 
In: Perspectives in Political Sociology, (A. Effrat ed).
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Hall, R.H. and Bates, F.L. (1970). Comments on "Decentralization 
in Bureaucracies" by P. Blau. In: Power in Organizations
(M.N. Zald ed). Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Hall, R.H. and Wamsley, G.L. (1970). Comments on "Social Process 
and Power in a Medical School" by R. Bucher. In: Power In
Organizations. (M.N. Zald ed.) Nashville: Vanderbilt University 
Press.
Handy, C. (1976). Understanding Organizations. Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books.
Hawley, A.H. (1963). Community Power and Urban Renewal Success, 
American Journal of Sociology, 68, 422-531•
Helm, C. and Morelli, M. (1979). Stanly Milgram and the Obedience 
Experiment. Political Theory, 7 (3) August, 321-345.
Hickson, D.J., Hinings, C.R., Lee, C.A., Schneck, R.E. and
Pennings, J.M., (1971). The Strategic Contingencies Theory 
of Intraorganizational Power. Administrative Science Quarterly,
16 (2), 216-229.
Horwitz, M. (1964), Managing Hostility in the Laboratory and
Refinery. In: Power aind Conflict in Organizations, (R.L. Kahn 
and E. Boulding eds). London: Tavistock.
Hurwitz, J.I., Zander, A.F. and Hymivitch, B. (I968). Some Effects
of Power on the Relations Among Group Members. In: Group Dynamics 
Research and Theory, (D. Cartwright and A. Zander eds). London: 
Tavistock.
Husserl, E. (I965). Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy,
(translated and edited by Q. Lauer), New York: Harper and Row.
- 434 -
REFERENCES
Jehensen, R, (1973). A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of
Formal Organization. In: Phenomenological Sociology, (G. Psathas 
ed.).. New York: Wiley.
Jung, C.G. (1968). Analytical Psychology, Its Theory and Practice.
New York: Random House.
Jung, C.G. (1968). Man and His Symbols. New York: Dell Publishing.
- 435 -
REFERENCES
Kanter, R.M. (1972). Symbolic Interactionism and Politics in
Systemic Perspective. In: Perspectives in Political Sociology 
(A. Effrat ed.) Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
Kaplan, A. (1964). Power in Perspective. In: Power and Conflict 
in Organizations, (R.L. Kahn and E. Boulding eds.) London: 
Tavistock.
Kaplowitz, S.A. (1978). Towards a Systematic Theory of Power 
Attribution. Social Psychology, 4l (2) 131-148
Kelly, G.A. (1963). Theory of Personality. New York: Norton.
Kelman, H.C. (1963). Manipulation of Human Behaviour. Journal of 
Social Issues, XXI, (2), 31-46.
Kenen, P.B. and Kenen, R.H. (1978). Who Thinks Who's In Charge 
Here: Faculty Perceptions of Influence and Power in the
University. Sociology of Education, 31, (2), April, 113-123.
Koch, S. (1964). Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowledge 
as Unitary. In: Behaviourism and Phenomenology (T. Warm ed.) 
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Kotter, J.P. (1978). Power, Success and Organizational Effectiveness. 
Organizational Dynamics. 6, Winter, 26-40.
Kris, E. and Kaplan, A. (1932). Aesthetic Ambiguity. In:




Lacey, A.R. (19?6). Ambiguity. In: A dictionary of Philosophy. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Lasswell, H.D. (1930/1960). Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press.
Lemert, E.M. (1964). Deviance and Social Control. In: Modern
Sociology (p. Worsley ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Lockwood, D. (1936). Some Remarks on 'The Social System'. In:
Modern Sociology, (P. Worsley ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.




Maanen, J. van (1979)- The Fact of Fiction in Organizational 
Ethnography. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, December, 
539-550.
Maddison, D.L., Allen, R.W., Porter, L.W., Renwick, P.W., 
and Mayes, B.T. (1980). Human Relations. 33(2), 79-100
Mangham, I. (1979)• The Politics of Organizational Change. London: 
Associated Business Press.
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1976). Ambiguity and Choice in 
Organizations, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Martin, N. H., and Sims, J.H. (1956). Power Tactics. Harvard 
Business Review, November - December 23-29-
McClintock, D.C., Brannon, D., and Maynard-Moody, 8 . (1979)
Applying the Logic of Sample Surveys to Qualitiative Case Studies. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, December, 612-629
Mechanic, D. (I962). Sources of Power of Lower Participants in 
Complex Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly,
7, December 3^9-364.
Miles, M.B. (1979). Qualitiative Data as an Attractive Nuisance:
The Problem of Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly,
24, December, 390-601.
Miles, R.E. (1963). Human Relations or Human Resources? Harvard 
Business Review, 43, July-August. l48-l63
Miliband, R. (I969). The State in Capitalist Society. London; 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Milner, M. (1930). On Not Being Able to Paint. London: Heinemann.
Mintzberg, H. (1979). An Emerging Strategy of 'Direct* Research. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, Decoanber, 382-389
Mowday, R.T. (1978). The Exercise of Upward Influence in
Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23, March 137-136,
Mulder, M. (196O). The Power Variable in Communication Experiments,
Human Relations, 13, 241-237.




Olsen, M. (1970). Power in Societies. London: The MacMillan Press.
Ouchi, W.G. (1977). Relations Between Structure and Control. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, March, 93-113-
- 439 -
REFERENCES
Peabody, R.L. (1962). Perception of Organizational Authority:
A Comparative Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly,
6, December, 463-482.
Perrow, C. (1970). Departmental Power and Perspectives in
Industrial Firms. In: Power in Organizations, (M.N. Zald ed.) 
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Peters, R.S. (1939). Authority. In; Social Principles and the 
Democratic State, (S.E. Benn and R.S. Peters eds.) London: 
George Allen and Unwin.
Pettigrew, A. (1973)* The Politics of Organizational Decision­
making, London: Tavistock.
Pettigrew, A. (1973). Towards a Political Theory of Organizational
Intervention. Human Relations, 28 (3), 191-208
Pettigrew, A. (1979). On Studying Organizational Cultures.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 24 (4), December, 370-381
Phillips, D. (1973). Abandoning Method. California: Jossey-Bass
- 440 -
REFERENCES
Roy, D. (1955)- Making Out: A Worker's Counter-System of Control
of Work Situation and Relationships, In: Industrial Man,
(T. Bums, ed.), Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- 441 -
REFERENCES , , ;
Salancik, G.R., and Pfeffer, J. (1977). Who Gets Power - and
How They Hold onto It: A Strategic Contingency Model of Power.
Organizational Dynamics, 5, Winter 3“21
Salancik, G.R. (1979). Field Stimulations for Organizational
Behaviour Research. Administrative Science Quarterly, 24,
December, 638-649.
Sanford, R., Nevitt, (1964). Individual Conflict and Organizational 
Interactions. In: Power and Conflict in Organizations, (R.L. Kahn 
and E. Boulding eds)., London: Tavistock.
Schaar, J.H. (1970). Reflections on Authority. New American Review,
8, 44-80.
Schwartz, H., and Jacobs, J. (1979). Qualitative Sociology: A
Method to the Madness. Glencoe: The Free Press.
Smith, P., and Drake, R., (1972). Behavioural Sciences in Industry 
New York: McGraw Hill.
Spiegleberg, H. (I967). The Relevance of Phenomenological Philosophy 
for Psychology. In: Phenomenology and Existentialism, (E. Lee and 
M. Mandelbaum, eds.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Sprout, H., and Sprout, M. (1963). The Ecological Perspective on
Human Affairs with Special Reference to Sutemational Politics. 
Pmceton: Phhceton University Press.
Steinbruner, J.D. (1974). The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Strauss, G. (1962). Tactics of Lateral Relationships. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 7, September, I6I-I86.
- 442 -
REFERENCES
Tannenbaum, A.S. (1973)- Social Psychology of the Work Organization. 
London; Tavistock.
Thines, G. (1977)- Phenomenology and the Science of Behaviour. 
London: George Allen and Unwin.
Toshiro, T. (1973). Ambiguity as Aesthetic Principle. In: Dictionary 
of the History of Ideas, Volume I, New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons.
Tushman, M.L. (1977). A Political Approach to Organizations.
Academy of Management Review, 2 (2), 206-2l6.
- 443-
REFERENCES
Walliman, I., Rosenbaum, H., Tatsis, N., and Zito, G. (198O) 
Misreading Weber: The Concept of 'Macht*. Sociology, l4 (2)
May, 261-275.
Walton, R.E. (1965). Two Strategies of Social Change and Their
Dilemmas. In: The Management of Change and Conflict, (J.M. Thomas 
and W.G. Bennis eds). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
Wann, T.W. ed (1964). Behaviourism and Phenomenology. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Weber, M. (1948). From Max Weber, (translated and edited by
H.H. Gerth. and C. Wright Mills). London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Weiner, S. (1978). Participation, Deadlines and Choice. In: Ambiguity 
and Choice in Organizations (J.G. March and J.P. Olsen eds.)
Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Winch, P. (1959). Authority. In: Social Principles and the Democratic
State, (S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters eds.) London: George Allen and 
Unwin.
Winnicott, D.W. (1974). Playing and Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books.
Winter, D.G. (1973). The Power Motive. New York: The Free Press.
Worsley, P. (1970). Modem Sociology. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books




Zald, M.N. (1970). Political Economy; A Framework for Comparative 
Analysis. In; Power in Organizations, (M.N. Zald ed). Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press.
Zaleznik, A. (1970). Power and Politics in Organizational Life. 
Harvard Business Review, 3, May-June, 47-60.
445
